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
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Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL. XXVI NUMBER 1	CO	NTENTS JANUARY	1999
LACHMAN M. KHUBCHANDANI	talk	Speech as an Ongoing Activity: [Comparing Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein]	1
S. Panneerselvam		Myths as Discourse in The Structural Hermeneutics of Levi-Strauss	19
PRABHU NARAYAN MANDAL		Logical Equivalence, Mutual Entailment and Phenomenalism	29
BIJAN BISWAS	:	Pratyakṣa and its Two Dimensions : Advaita Vedānta Perspective	37
KOLAWOLE A. OWOLABI		Orientations in African Philosophy: A Critical Survey	59
MEENA A. KELKAR		Man-Woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy	71
ABEY KOSHY		The Feminine and The Question of Truth In Nietzsche's Philosophy	- 89
GEETA RAMANA	119.8	A Cognitive Journey Towards Truth	109
AMITABHA DAS GUPTA	:	Descartes and Chomsky: An Interface Between Language and Mind	125
S. V. BOKIL	•	BOOK - REVIEWS	149
A. KANTHMANI	:	(A)((A)) Alberta da	160

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VOL. XXVI NUMBER 2		CONTENTS AP	APRIL 99	
Archana Barua		Some Aspects of Professional Ethics	171	
Benulal Dhar	:	The Phenomenology Of Value - Experience :		
		Some Reflections on Scheler and Hartmann	183	
P. K. Sasidharan		Derridean Overtures Of Wittgenstein Critique	199	
Manjulika Ghosh	ho	Performatives and Truth	207	
Ramakrishna Puligandla		The Message of The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad		
		A Phenomenological Analysis of Mind and		
Milesophy. I I - Kaupe Action Palender Nago		Consciousness	221	
Rajendra Prasad	:	Man's Timeless Dialogue with His God:		
		Another Recording	233	
		Book Reviews	277	
V. K. Bharadwaja		Aparigraha		
S.V. Bokil		Idealism and Rights	279	
Alok Tandon	: 4	An Obituary: Prof. N. K. Devaraja	290	

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VOL. XXVI NUMBER 3	CONTENTS	JULY 99
Amitabh Dasgupta	: Language And The Metaphysics of Interpretation: A Critical Note On Davidson's Agenda on Realism	299
ASHOK VOHRA	: Philosophy - Theory or Therapy ?	325
MARK R. WHEELER	: In Defense of A Derivation of 'Ought' From 'Is'	344
P. Sudarsan	: The Logistics of Argumentation :	355
Ananda Pramanik	: The Failure in The Pursuit of Foundational Justification : An Alternative Response	369
R. P. SINGH	: Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas	
Kumar Mitra	: How Much Deep Are The 'Deep Structures' From The	301
TARITMOY GHOSH	Chomskian Perspective?	395
DISCUSSIONS	: Is Observation Theory - Loaded ?	405
A. Kanthmani S. V. Bokil	: Are Mahāvākyas Identity Vākyas ? : A Note On 'Tattvamasi'	415 425
ANANTANAND RAMBACHAN	: Book Review - I	435
. V. Bokil	: Book Review - II	437

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1/1A,	VOL. XXVI NUMBER 4	CONTENTS OCTO	BER 99
0 021,	R.C. PRADHAN	: What is it to be a Human Soul?	459
mpong	Md. Abdur Razzaque	: William James' Theory of Truth And its Later Development	475
nd CS,	JAGAT PAL	: D. Lewis on Causation	495
versity,	SYED ABDUL SAYEED	: A Perspective on The Analysis of Knowledge	503
hangar	Murzban Jal	: Karl Marx's Theses on Feuerbach: Towards an anti - Hermeneutic study	515
Calicut,	S. M. Bhave	: Descartes : Epitome of Scientific Revolution	529
, 1520	R. S. Kaushal	: The Role of Structural Analogy In Physic Sciences : A Philosophical Perspective	cal 543
gusson Indian f Pune,	SANJAY KUMAR SHUKLA	: Sākṣī It's Nature, Role & Status in Advaid	
n I dile,	BOOK REVIEW	e not received the second second for the second sec	
6.72 S	V. K. Bharadwaja	: Hetu-bindu of Dharmakī ti	589
NAME	P. P. GOKHALE	: A Clarification on Hetu-bindu	595
	M.SATISH KUMAR	: Modernity, Morality and the Mahatma	599
	A. Kanthmani	: Situating the Self & Post - Modernism	605

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SPEECH AS AN ONGOING ACTIVITIY: [COMPARING BHARTRHARI AND WITTGENSTEIN]*

LACHMAN M. KHUBCHANDANI

There has been a keen contest among the philosophers of language between the view that the primary function of language is (1) that of an instrument of communication, and the view that it is (2) that of a vehicle of thought. This has a great bearing on the debates over the theory of meaning for a language and its actual use.

One detects quite many similarities in the expositions of Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein concerning language and its relation to reality. At the same time, there are significant differences in their orientations. Ancient sciences, the śāstras, are generally attributed with a holistic approach to knowledge -- understanding the real world in totality, as illustrated by Bhartrhari's sphota theory. The contemporary science, the vijñāna, probes knowledge in analytic terms as a relational system.

In the reality of everyday life what synergically transpires (or is actually grasped, i.e. an action) from a speech event matters more than what it signifies. The instrinsic stability of the concepts of natural language and their openness, their being not well-defined, and their undergoing changes along with usage just as the reality itself changes, lead us to a new meaning of the term "understanding". It is only in natural language that we can be sure of touching reality. A convergence of perspectives that other groups of people may have a different basis from our own allows the "openness" for all kinds of concepts. \(\frac{1}{2} \)

I

"The Whole is Prior to the Parts"

The Indian school of philosophy has a rich tradition dating back more

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than two thousand years capable of shedding light on the humanistic perspective of communication. Indian thought examined the relation of language to consciousness. All aspects of the world and human experience were thought of as illuminated by language.

The sphota theory of Bhartrhari is based on the logic that "the whole is prior to the parts". It accounts for a continuum of cognition, resulting in an ascending hierarchy of speech levels, whether one is dealing with factual scientific language or a poem or a book: vākya, mahāvākya, akhandamahāvākya. The word is subsumed by the sentence, the sentence is subsumed by discourse, the discourse by the chapter (component), the chapter by the book, and so on, until all speech is identified with Brahman. The terms śabdabrahma carries the connotation of indivisible word, sentence, discourse, text, and the ultimate consciousness. In reality only an indivisible speech act, a text (sentence) as a physical whole, is meaningful.

The concept of sphota, the ultimate in language, has been interpreted by traditional grammarians as "something latent which takes form" just as a flower blooms; its literal meaning "bursting, plosion" signifies the point that verbal and non-verbal signals evoke a situation of reality just as throwing a pebble in a pond causes ripples. Mandana Misra's reasoning based on the analogy of the jeweler's cognition points out that a jeweler by his continuous gaze (i.e. a series of cognitions), perceives the genuineness of the stone but with increasing clarity. Each cognition leaves its samskāra, a common memory trace; the last cognition helped by all previous samskāras, fully perceives the genuineness of the stone. An expert before beginning the examination of the stone had the image of a precious stone ingrained is his subconscious. This image is revealed by sphota in the jeweler's mind at the end of his series of partial, as well as erroneous, perceptions.²

Bhartrhari identifies three speech, levels: At the "outer speech" level of vaikhari vāk 'elaborate speech', the sounds uttered sequentially make up a sentence, a poem, or a book. The "inner speech" level of pasyanti vāk 'transcendental speech' marks an instantaneous perception of the reality the sphota: "a bursting forth of illumination of insight". In this context, all intuitive flashlike understanding of meaning of any sentence (or a discourse) as a whole is described as pratibhā. Between the two there is mādhyama vāk, 'mediatory

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
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speech', the mide level of speech. Here the unitary sphota breaks up into a sequence of thoughts, phrases and words but has not yet reached the separateness of individually uttered sounds. The integral $v\bar{a}k$ is gradually externalized when speaking from undifferentiated to the differentiated; when listening, this is reversed.³

Communication as a spontaneous activity is characterized by effortlessness. The Buddhist doctrine of the *maddham mārga* 'Middle Path' stresses the fact that man functions at his best in the merging of two extremes, i.e. by treading the middle path. Such moderation enables harmony between relaxation and alertness. Spontaneity transcends intellectual evaluation. The Jain theory *syādvāda* is another codification proposing multi-valued logic which stresses, complementarity, potency, potentiality, and possibility.

Greek philosophers have also drawn attention to the holistic interaction involving all the elements of Nature. According to Anaxagoras, the nature of reality is best understood as consisting of *mind* (nous) and matter, each part contains what is in the whole of reality, each thing having a special 'portion' of everything in it. It is akin to the breaking of a single magnet producing two magnets, and not two isolated magnetic poles⁴:



Such a holistic approach to science enables us to work towards a slow merger of physical sciences with social sciences. For modern natural science there is no longer in the beginning the material object, but *form*, mathematical symmetry. Since mathematical structure is in the last analysis an "intellectual construct" -- the image, the "idea", we could say, in the words of Goethe's Faust: "In the beginning was the word, the logos"; in the terms of Bhartrhari, the *Śabdabrahma*.

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II

"What is Customarily Said"

Many different theories of meaning distinguished by various concepts such as sense, knowledge, reference, and truth value are debated to improve and expand our horizons of understanding verbal communication.⁵:

- -- What constitutes successful communication?
- -- What is the relation between words and concepts?
- -- Can the meaning be attributed to the originator, to the code transmitted, or to the recipient?
- -- Is meaning an absolute property of the utterance without reference to the originator or the recipients, or is the speech act to be viewed as a physical whole responding to the complex reality in everyday life? Patañnjali claims: "Meaning is not to be produced by a word, but a word is to be produced by meaning".

Coherence in natural orders is classified on a certain scale. There are different ranges of magnitude within any "measurement constant". One attaches a certain range of meaning to words and sentences of the language. The theory of meaning is intended merely as a systematization of the understanding which a speaker manifested in his/her use of language.

Wittgenstein and other contemporary philosophers have been engaged with the issues concerning meaning, understanding, intention content, and objectivity. Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning and understanding has been summarized in four themes⁶:

- To mean something by a sign is not to be the subejet of an inner state or process.
- 2) To understand a sign is not to interpret it in a particular way.
- 3) Using a sign in accordance with a rule is not founded upon reasons.
- 4) To understand a sign is to have mastery of a tehnique or customs of using it.

According to Wittgenstein, language and all rule - governed institutions "are founded not in our internalization of the same strongly autonomous, explanation-transcendent rules, whose requirements we then succeed, more or

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less, in collectively tracking, but in primitive dispositions of agreement in judgement and action."⁷ The requirement of rules exist only wihtin the framework of institutional activities. The very existence of any rules depends on some rules being applied, and one rule being applied only once would not be enough. This capacity is to be guided by normativity, by cooperative institutional environment within a framework of extensive institutional activity.

Wright (1989) points out to Wittgenstein's mistrust of erecting mythological picture about the content of language as "rule- following", as active in the Platonist philosophy of mathematics and in the Cartesian philosophy on inner experience (i.e. innate faculties of the speaker)8. Wittgenstein posits an alternative account of normativity, to explain how there can be standable middle ground between the hypothetization of "rules-as rails" imagery; "If you use a rule to give a description, you yourself do not know more than you say If you say, 'and so and so'. you yourself do not know more than 'and so and so".9

There is a sufficient gap between the requirements of a rule and a subject's reaction in any particular case. Texts are guided by the notion of "free play" tempered by normativity; this phenomenon abrogates the spurious autonomy of rules. The grasp of such a rule is thus the internalization of an open-ended set of pre-ordained requirements, an informational state accessible, as Wittgenstein had his interlocutor put it, only by a kind of guesswork. 10 In Prigoginian terms all systems, close or open, contain subsystems that are continually "fluctuating": "Free will downstairs operated only within the limits of a menu determined upstairs".11

This ongoing flexibility, in correlating linguistic form with context, regulated according to the expediency of the communicative task, is the concern of pragmatic grammar. "All meanings are sensitive to contexts that, taken together, constitute a galaxy of contexts"; these contexts are labeled as "semantic galaxies". 12 It exhibits the connection between the theory of meaning for a language and the actual use. Language to a speech act can be characterized as an organism that drives to a purpose; it acquires a "practical cash-value" determined by relevant use. 13 Coarse meaning (the 'blueprint') will both determine and be determined by use. Wittgenstein positively insists on use itself as the determinant of meaning. 14 There is no fact of the matter concerning what

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someone means. There could be variable "readings" of the same text.

This phenomenon explains Wittgenstein's preference for "piecemeal" description of "what is customarily said", and his rejection of the *centrality* of the notion of truth to an account of pragmatics. He regards "understanding" as a practical capacity associated with the "multiple application thesis": "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs" (uses, institutions). 15

Often different roles in a setting or different identities or cultural legacies from one generation to another transmit some prominent values of interaction -- a common way to interpret, to share experiences. That common way, that a sort of general frame-work is called the *communication ethos*. ¹⁶ Sharing some same ethos does not mean that the existing differences are to be eliminated; these traits get integrated through a super-consensus; "...the things it aims at, prizes and endorses, and more or less achieves". ¹⁷ One has to account for the play of cross-purpose elements in interpreting reality. In everyday life communications, such elements get adjusted through various "fuzzy" strategies such as elucidating, itemizing, etc. ¹⁸ People in a community do often share concepts and translational meaning, despite differences in their beliefs about the world, and even differences in their explications of the relevant terms. ¹⁹ In the pragmatic and transactive modes of usage, words live and move, a characteristic of an ongoing process.

III

A Synergic Process

Communication at the human level utilizes language as an infinitely subtle and flexible instrument to cope with a variety of relations and a diversity of facts:

"Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are producedEveryday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it." ²⁰

Everyday speech in human interaction, though not-well defined, never loses immediate connection with the reality, whereas the idealized language with

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Speech as an Ongoing Activity

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precisely defined concepts is confined to a construct, a sort of 'formalized' reality. A speech act can potentially have multiple interpretations in the way that in an interaction, oral or written, the "perceived" may differ from the "measured" objective reality. Interpretation is a semiotic exercise, characterized by its "spontaneous" effortless condition (see the Table "Speech as Living Phenomena", in the Appendix).

Communications in everyday life are based on the *synergic* relationship between the twin criteria: (i) *The reciprocity of language skills* among communicators (spread over a speech specturm comprising one or more languages, dialects, styles, etc.) (ii) the mutuality of focus (that is, sharing the relevance of the setting, commonly attributed to the attitudes, moods, or feelings of the participants.)²¹

One characteristic harmoniously blend with the other. Such a relationship accounts for the element of *indeterminacy*, a sort of tentativeness in human encounters characterized by implicitness in everyday communication events, built into the synergic process itself. Time, distance, disparities in outlook or in assumed references require a message to be an operation of "interpretative decipherment". Such indeterminate characteristics account for the quality of communication in face-to-face encounters and in creative writings. Ambiguity becomes a virtue in many human communication settings: He didn't say in so many words what he meant.

According to Husserl, indeterminacy as a progenerative medium "points ahead to possible perceptual multiplicities". ²³ It is a "determined indeterminacy"; I know what this is all about I should not want to say. ²⁴ In this context, Derrida's comments are meaningful: "The meaning of meaning of meaning is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier.... (its force) engages to its own economy so that it always signifies again and differs". ²⁵ Garfinkel also points out that the meaning of every utterance in a conversation bears an etcetera "the open horizon which inhabits the world," a license for permitting some indeterminacy. ²⁶

In this ongoing process, the manoeuvres are always negotiatively shaped choices, working out temporary choices based on the relevance of a context. Dasgupta calls this kind of reasoning "exduction" distinct from deduction and

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induction. One can afford to be "tentative" in keeping track of options, working out contradicting alternatives: doing one derivation from assumption P and Q and another from assumption not-P and not-Q.²⁷

Wittgenstein has been attributed with inventing a startling "Regress-of interpretation" Paradox: "But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.... any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interpretes, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning." 28

Wittgenstein discusses intuitional epistemology, pointing out the contrast between "intuition" and "decision" (Entscheidung); intuition implies and decision repudiates the suggestion that one can say nothing by way of justification for one's particular way of proceeding. Intuition suggests an unarticulated ur-cognition a form of knowledge too basic to admit of any further account. This primal (primitive) faculty can acomplish harmony between the real requirement of a rule and a subejct's impression of them. As Wittgenstein puts it: "If intuition is an inner voice (comparable to Bhartrhari's Pratibhā) -- how do I know how I am to obey it? And how do I know that. It doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide me wrong. This is what we human beings are". 29

In a linguistic interchange, the hearer's presumption that he/she has understood the speaker can never be definitely refuted or confirmed; he can only have evidence that he has done so, which falls short of being conclusive. So regarded, communication rests ultimtely on faith. trusting that one has hit on the very theory of meaning that one's interlocutor has internalized. An individual's explicational ability not only does not suffice to fix the referent of the individual word, it does not exhaust the meaning expressed by a word in the individual's ideolect. 30

In everyday life decisions contain an inevitable element of irrationality. The decision may be a result of deliberation, but at the same time complementary to deliberation; it excludes deliberation and decision.³¹ One will always have to act on an insufficient evidence. The decision always rests on by pushing away all arguments, understood or not, and by cutting off all as a basis for action. Without such a firm stand our own actions would lose all force. In this sense,

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some real or apparent truth forms the basis of life.

The Heisenberg 'Principle of Uncertainty' in physics shows clearly that the concept of probability "potentia" in an event is to be reckoned as a kind of reality. The possibility or "tendency" for an event to take place has a kind of reality. The potentiality may involve or overlap with other potentialities. In view of this, the distinction between a real and an apparent contradiction has disappeared. Capra, explaining the parallelism between modern physics and Eastern mysticism, makes out a compelling case for believing that the trends in the development in the new physics tend to be similar to the basic tenets and insights in ancient Indian and Chinese mystical and philosophical traditions.³²

The potential energy of *relavance* shows man's ingenuity in abstracting or transcribing everyday reality through speech. Projections of different focuses through selection and shift mechanisms convey much more than is grasped at the cognitive plane; they also comouflage many details. A speech event carries a "formal" meaning within sentence(s) signifying subject, predicate, and so on; a "specificational" meaning within a context (conditioned by interactional roles, setting, channel, etc.), and an "effective" meaning within the discourse, emerging from the relavance of interaction. A sentence does not "convey" meaning the way a truck conveys cargo, complete and packaged, It is more like a blue print that allows the bearer to reconstruct the meaning from his knowledge' (Winograd 1974). A

In the light of this, a three-dimensional model of language isolates (1) the cognitive dimension, to draw a broad "blueprint" of verbal activity, (2) the identity dimension, for providing "specific" social details to the blueprint, and (3) the design dimension, to "filter" differential values over the specified details of the blueprint; it intensifies, in a way, the focus that heightens compatability in a speech act.³⁵

Expressive modulations in a creative process, a "language design" so to say, open up many choices to cope with any unprecedented communicative tasks: 'The selective function of meaning depends on "the states of readiness"; as in the game of chess" the movement of a black pawn may mean to the "white"

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players a threat, to the "black" player a relief, and to an ignorant onlooker the displacement of a piece of carved wood'. 36

IV

Complementarity of "Intuition" and "Reason"

In the pursuit of knowledge, modern sciences generally stress isolating a phenomenon under study by controlling its variables: ceteris paribus, "all other things being equal". Each discipline attempts to arrive at a totality, by aggregating or multiplying a single dimension, giving a fragmented picture of the phenomenon, failing to present a total view of life. It reminds us of the parable of the "blind men and the elephant"; the blind men determined the reality from insulated examination of only one or more parts (identifying them as pillars, walls, fans, etc.), but missing the organic whole.³⁷

Many philosophers accept formalized domains with a sharp boundary and with a closure of some sort, and the logic of replicating each mode of accounting on a domain-by-domain-basis.³⁸ Today in interdisciplinary enquiries one notices lot of cross- fertilization on the surface, but these investigations hardly question the "established" domain boundaries.³⁹

Bhartrhari tackles the unity of language, sphota, by relating the "universal" and "particular" characteristics of meaning at two speech levels: (1) the word "reflected" at the paśyanti level, in the intellect of both the speaker and the listener, (2) the word "uttered" at the vaikhari level -- the word in action, the word used i.e., the action accomplished; as stated earlier "what synergically transpies". Wittgenstein's language-game identifies the process of internalization of an open-ended set of pre-ordained requirements in speech, as a "paradox of interpretation", as conditioned by the analytic tradition of linearity. On the other hand, Bhartrhari gives central position to madhyamā vāk; it represents the integral level of speech, discussed earlier.

Verbal discourse in everyday life is an integral activity, a complex interplay between linguistic exchange and related action. It gets modulated on a scale of *intentive* and *instinctive* extremes. Bhartrhari describes this phenomenon by positing two times: 1) Vṛtikāla speech in a sequential time, as in vaikharivāk

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olex on a non ivāk and 2) svakāla; speech in own time - instantaneous time, as in paśyanti vāk. At the intentive end, thought processes are sequential through audio-monitered (i.e. calculated) speech. Verbalization is overt and deliberate. At the instinctive end, communication processes are largely simultaneous with extemporized speech; verbalization is spontaneous and involuntary.

The instinctive use of language is characterized by implicit regulation, depending on identity pressures, suggestion, inference and design. These elements are excessively manifested on the stage or simulated in a literary work. Conversely, the intentive use of language in a formal text is characterized by an explicit value system, maximally detached from the context in order to achieve precise, and overt manifestation. These elements are prominent in formalistic, legal and scientific discourse.

A focus on an external manifestation of word projects discourse on a "rational" plane, and a reflection over the speech act as a whole draws attention towards the unity of a discourse on an "intuitive" plane. Characterizing Wittgenstein's perspective as "rational" and Bhartrhari's as "intuitive" can be justified in the light of the analytic and holistic orientations of their enquiry. For Bhartrhari, "Brahman is the principle of unity which is the starting point as also the goal. And it does not lay down the specific rules, it embodies a method of under-standing any language."⁴⁰

Bhartrhari's two levels of speech highlight the *comple-mentarity* of "intuition" and "reason" in a discourse, a text. The Wittgenstein theory of language use also looks for its justification in the basis of unity; "that is what we human beings are". A discourse in a quest for the conscious, or a poem for the *Sahrdya*, the *Rasika*, or a speech event in everyday life communication setting are primarily understood and acted upon through the faculty of intuition. On the other hand, a text arguing scientific concepts, a narrative of an eyewitness in the court room, or instructions in an utility-oriented setting are deliberated through deductive and inductive reasoning and inference. The degree of prominence of different faculties of interlocutors (or readers) could be *relevant* to the communitative task of discourse. Shah's comments succintly bring out the relevance of both intuition and reason in a discourse: "Intuition without reason lacks power and reason without intuition lacks direction."

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APPENDIX

Speech as living phenomena

Normative entity
a formalized entity, emphasizing uniformity and homogeneity ideally aiming at the targets of being an autonomous and unambiguous tool of communication
interpretation relying heavily on explicit formulasgrammars, dictionaries, etc.; efforts for consistency made through the standardization apparatus
an ideal-oriented representation requiring directed effort; discourse concentrates on "expression", which measures the "event"
characterized by explicitly defined value system - a prescriptive code with sanctions from the language elite in the community

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	Speech process	Normative entity	
6.	regulated by "situation-bound" propriety in which ecosystems, constituting the social reality "here and now", claim a prominent share	conditioned by "tradition-inspired" profiles in which "time- honoured" standard practices (spelled out through the grammatical accounts, lexicons, and style sheets) dominate the scene	
7.	permissive toward inherited variations linked with region, class etc.	less tolerant toward such ascribed deviations; assimilatory pressures in favour of the elitist standard variety	
III.	Total repertoire	2 Karstan optionality store ear	
8.	total verbal repertoire is malleable. responsive to contextual expediencies resulting in uninhibited convergence between speech varieties with the contact pressures of pidginization, hybridization, code-switching, etc.	total verbal repertoire is demarcated for the demands of different normative systems (specified by a "distant" elite) involving stress on maintaining divergent development of a different system, and insistence on exclusiveness or "purity" of tradition	
9.	greater scope for functional fluidity leading to innovations and creativity of expression in negotiating the "event"	Restrictions over the scope of or spontaneity and creativity due to the pressures of exclusive conformity to different systems	
	M. shracito W. David Co. of Collaboration in	a constant, south it aid.	
10.	fuzzy speech boundaries; interlocking variations responding to covert stratificational and situational differences	sharp language boundaries; compartmentalization through overt linguistic differentia	

Source: Khubchandani (1983) (f. note 39)

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NOTES

- * A revised version of the paper presented at the seminar on Word and Sentence: Perspectives of Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein held by Sahitya Akademy and Indian Institute of Advanced Study. Shimla 1994.
- 1. "The concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of scientific language, derived as an idealization from only limited groups of phenomena... hence we must be sceptical about any scepticism with regard to this natural language and its essential concepts" (Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, pp. 171-72.
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Speech as an Ongoing Activity

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MYTHS AS DISCOURSE IN THE STRUCTURAL HERMENEUTICS OF LÉVI-STRAUSS

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S. PANNEERSELVAM

The aim of this paper is to discuss myths as discourse as reflected in the structural hermeneutics of Lévi-Strauss. He is one of the important figures in the structural anthropology and his study of myths has a special significance in the contemporary society. An hermeneutical understanding of his study of myths would suggest that it is used by him as a form of discourse. Unlike many others who used myths as creation theories, by giving a religious interpretation, Lévi-Strauss considers myth as secular. For him, myths do not reveal any religious truths. This paper mainly deals with the structure of myths and how they are helpful in hermeneutical understanding. This paper also tries to throw some light on the tension between structuralism and phenomenological hermeneutics as discussed in the writings of Lévi-Strauss and Ricoeur. The first part of the paper deals with the general characteristics of myth and also with the two important theories of myth. This will serve as background for developing Lévi-Strauss's theory of myth which is discussed in Part two. Here an attempt has been made to explain how in the theory of myth developed by Lévi-Strauss, there is a movement from text to context in order to make myth a discourse. The position of Ricoeur, who is one of the critics of structuralism, is also briefly analyzed to see whether there is real tension between phenomenology of Ricoeur and structuralism of Lévi-Strauss.

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The role of myths in human experience and reality cannot be easily rejected because, to some extent, it shapes human experience and reality. In modern social thought, myth has been playing a prominent role. For example, the creative hermeneutics of Mircea Eliade and the structural hermeneutics of

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 1 January 1999 20

Lévi-Strauss prove how myths have relevance in the social context. Myths transcend time and also first order reference. Myths are always used as a form of symbolism and are also autonomous in character. One of the characteristics of myth is that it goes beyond limit-situation, thus extending invitation to the transcendence. It shakes up, distorts, or in some manner overcome the ordinary way of looking at the world. A myth which is structured or built on ordinary language transcends the ordinary language because of limit-situation. The Wittgensteinian notion that the limits of language means the limits of the world, may not hold good here as myths always go beyond the limit-situation. Another important charcteristic feature of myth is that it is autonomous in character. i.e., it is always self-justified. They are self-justified because we cannot check with the outside world in order to verify them. Though they borrow many words from our ordinary language, this borrowing has altogether a different purpose. The literal or ordinary meaning has no role to play in myths. They always conceal things. This definition of myth takes us to the next characteristic, namely that what a myth conveys cannot be known in non-mythical ways. There is a wide gap between mythical language and non-mythical language. Another important characteristic feature of myth is that there is always a process of "demythologizing" which means all old myths are refurbished, but continue to convey the basic truth they always have conveyed.

Myths are always used to represent the reality. It is used as a form of symbolism. A symbol is a visible thing that stands for or suggests something invisible. They always point beyond themselves. Symbols open up new dimensions of reality for us that would otherwise remain inaccessible. Mircea Eliade, for example says that symbol reveals certain aspect of reality. "Images, symbols and myths are not irresponsible creations of the psyche; they fulfill a function, that of bringing to light the most hidden modalities of being." Thus myth is a basic symbolic form that shapes itself in the human psyche. Myths are, sometimes strongly structured and are logical; sometimes it is purely historical and thus pre-logical in character. It may be a revelation or deception, a real or fictional one, an archetype or stereotype. It may talk about gods, or about men or about ancestors. But what is important is that how these myths are interpreted in the social thought and whether they have any relevance in the social context.

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Myths as Discourse in The Structural Hermeneutics

Two main theories of myth are suggested: the critical theory and the applied theory. In the critical theory, we deal with our basic assumptions about myth. This theory deals with how the myths are to be studied and used. Thus it is a prescriptive study. Mircea Eliade, Lévi-Strauss, Malinowski are some of the thinkers who belong to this group. The creative stories of Eliade, the strongly structured stories of Lévi-Strauss and the pragmatic theory of Malinowski point to answer the question namely, how myths are produced and how they are to be studied in relation to creation etc. They talk about how to reconstruct the original meaning. In the second theory, we apply the term "myth" to use the ideas of myth. In other words, it deals with application. A conceptual foundation is not the subject matter of this study and it mainly deals with application of myth in different fields like arts, literature, politics etc. For example, Alfred Rosenberg and Rudolf Bultmann are representative thinkers of this group. In the critical theory of myth, one can see the attempt made by the supporters to reconstruct the original meaning. For example, Eliade argues that myths have no other function than to explain how something came into being.2 He, while analyzing the structure of myth argues in support of primitive mythologies and says that most of the Greek myths were recounted and hence modified, adjusted and systematized. For him, myths become the exemplary model for all significant human activities. Thus in the critical theory, we see the relation between myth and society, which is explained through a proper conceptual basis.

Lévi-Strauss is one of the important figures in developing the theory of myth by relating it to the society. In his writings we can see the role of functionalism, though he is not in full agreement with it as because it neglects history. Functionalism, like structuralism, is tied to the synchronic point of view; it seeks to explain the practices it comes across in terms of their everyday social function. Each practice is a part whose "value" lies in the place it can be known to occupy within the whole. Thus it is simple structuralism. Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, Rousseau, Marx, Freud, Saussure, Trubetskoy and Jakobson influenced Lévi-Strauss considerably. His interests are diversified. He wrote on various themes like kinship system, the theory of primitive classification and totemism, the most important being the study of the theory of myth.

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According to him, myths are "strongly structured stories". How does it differ from a tale? His answer is as follows:

In the first instance, the tales are constructed on weaker opposition than those found in myths. In the second place- and precisely because the tale is a weakened transposition of the myth-the former is less strictly subjected than the latter to the triple consideration, of logical coherence, religious orthodoxy and collective pressure. The tale offers more possibilities of play, its permutations are comparatively frecer, and they acquire a certain arbitrary character.³

Thus he is different from Eliade who regarded myth as a sacred story and relates it to an event that took place in primordial Time. Eliade says that the cosmogonic myth is true because the existence of the world is there to prove it and similarly the myth of the origin of death is equally true because man's mortality proves it. Thus the actors of myth, according to Eliade, are Supernatural Beings. This is not acceptable to Lévi- Strauss. First of all, he is careful in disassociating myth from rituals. In The Naked Man, he explains how myths are associated with the teleology of mind. Secondly, for him myths do not reveal any religious truths and deploy no supernatural power. Thus myths are secular for Lévi-Strauss. The notion that myths are structured stories is important for him. As a structuralist, he was very keen on defining myths in terms of structure. For him, structure is a primordial fact and with structure we always reach fundamental levels of human existence. This is the reason why he wants to maintain the term "structure" while defining myths. Structuralism stands for the ability to analyze individual myths into constituent units. This "strong structure" involves analysis. The importance of myths can be better understood if they are conceived only as strongly structured stories. In The Naked Man, he explains the relation between myths and society in this way: "Myths teach us a great deal about the societies from which they originate, they help us lay base their inner workings and clarify...beliefs, customs...they make it possible to discover operational modes of the human mind, which have remained so constant over the centuries and are so widespread." An interesting feature of his theory of myth is that he accepts the original intended meaning of the theory of myth and tells us how we reconstruct the meaning through their functions. He maintains that the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction. But what is interesting is that since each would be solution generating another

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contradiction, they fail in their purpose. Lévi-Strauss says that this failure is admitted in the myths and there precisely lies their function. Thus telling of a myth is a way of telling oneself that however far one pursues the dialectic, there is no guarantee that it would lead to absolute knowledge.

For Lévi-Strauss myths like art, have a function of reconciling on the imaginary plane those social contradictions which cannot be resolved on the real plane. In other words, myths for him, are therapeutic by nature because they deal with something which societies might otherwise keep repressed. They always stand in a dialectical relationship to the social and the economic. Lévi-Strauss has really understood the significance of myths as evidence of a society's way of understanding the world around it. Myths have no author and they exist only as they are incarnated in a tradition.8 In this context, Lévi-Straúss asks the important question, namely, how these myths are chosen. He answers that myths which serve as reference or starting point, are arbitrarily chosen and they allow the logical transformation from one to another. He observes : "Mythology confronts the student with a situation which at first sight appears contradictory... There is no logic, no continuity. Any characteristic can be attributed to any subejct; every conceivable relation can be found. With myth, everything becomes possible."9 Roland Barthes's view on this, is important. He uses the term "myth" in a deliberately tendentious way to refer to systematic abuse of the process of signification. For him, there are no limits as to which objects may be so absurd. "Anything can be a myth? I believe it can, for the universe is infinitely suggestive. Every object in the world may pass from an enclosed, mute existence to a spoken state, open to approriation by society, for no law, natural or not, forbids us to speak of things."10 For Barthes, there are two ways in which myth can be shown to act to conceal a system of class domination. One is that in myth what are expressions of definite social forms become represented as natural and inevitable occurrences and in the second, myth eclipses the conditions of its production. Commenting on this, Lévi-Strauss says that there is always an underlyng structure common to all myths everywhere. His analysis of myth goes as follows: Each myth is divided into its constituent elements, otherwise known as mythemes and then are classified in terms of their "functions" within myths. Finally, all the various classes of functions are connected with one another in the overall explanation of the structure of the myth.

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Lévi-Strauss compares his study of myth with that of musical composition and shows the similarities between musical harmony and the imaginary, social or cosmological harmony in myth. Music and myths are "machines for suppressing time", eventhough both, have to unfold in real time, which is at the time of their performance. He says that an orchestral score "suppresses" time by encapsulating it within a sphere that makes possible an indefinite number of actual performances. The temporal dimension of music, as of myth is "reversible" or "non-cumulative" in contrast to the "statistical" or "cumulative" character of historical time. Thus for Lévi-Strauss, music and myth express langue in its most accessible form. His comparison that both music and myths as narratives when actually played or told, operate through the connection of two orders of relation, horizontally and vertically. To him, myth serves as his reference or starting point for his detailed study of myth. Since myths themselves generate other myths, they allow transformation. The messages myths convey may have little apparent coherence. The primitive mind is a bricoleur improvising with odds and ends. Lévi-Strauss describes the primitive man as bricoleur. Myth is produced by the activity of bricolage thinking where the old half-forgotten stories appear in new form as new stories. Hence the literal sense of the statement is not important. Lévi-Strauss asks an important question namely, whether myths have some common structure and answers affirmatively. He says that if we see the original intended meaning of a theory, we are able to construct the meaning. How is it possible? It is possible by consulting the author's other writing. Thus through such comparison and consultation, one can understand, interpret and improve the author's ideas. This is inevitable because one must know that the plain meaning will not be known or can never be known. This means that myth is not a mere study of the text, but text in context, informed by intention. Thus two points are to be taken into account, according to Lévi-Strauss. The context and the authorial intention which shapes the structure of the myth. A close study of this would reveal one thing. For him, there is always a movement from text to context. This means that a text has to be studied only in relation to the context. It has been stressed by Lévi-Strauss that context plays a special role in determining what is said in a theory. The context is important not for explaining the text, but for our understanding of it. In other words, it is not a mere explanation, but an understanding which is possible through the context. The understanding and explanation which are often considered as a paradigmatic distinction held by

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
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and by Dilthey and others, are transcended in Lévi- Strauss. For him, understanding and explanation are not opposed antithetically. Thus context alone helps us to recover the intentions of the author. It may be explained as follows:



It has been argued by many that there are some changes with regard to Lévi-Strauss's earlier and later conceptions of myth. This change has not affected his general and overall conception of myth. There is some consistent element in both the conceptions. For example, his analysis of the principle of binary opposition as the origin of structures is maintained by him in both places. It is used both as a way of identifying the structural components of myth, and at the same time as a mode of confirming the structural analysis. A close study of *Mythologiques* will reveal this. He has explained how each myth serves as a sign rather than a complete order of signification. Myths according to him, cannot be studied in isolation. In other words, each myth is used to provide a clue for explaining the structure of another and the process goes on. Binary opposition is used by him both as a way of identifying the structural components of myth and the same time as a mode of confirming the structural analysis. Thus he talks of "spiral movement" as a method for decoding myths. The following observations in *The Raw and Cooked* are important in this context:

....every myth ultimately has its origin in an individual creation....but in order to move to the level of myth, it is necessary precisely that a creation does not remain individual; and that in the course of this transition it essentially discards those features with which it was contingently marked at the outset, and which can be attributed to the temperament, talent, imagination, and personal experience of the author. 11

The study of the distinction he makes between language and myth shows that his position is somewhat similar to that of the Saussurian distinction between langue and parole. To some extent, Lévi-Strauss has assimilated the distinction between the individual and the social as found in Saussure. He writes:

Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the speakers who create and transmit myths may become aware of their structure and mode of

operation, this cannot occur as a normal thing, but only partially and intermittently. It is same with myths as with language; the individual who conscientiously applied phonological and grammatical laws in his speech, supposing he possessed the knowledge and virtuosity to do so, would nevertheless lose the thread of his ideas almost immediately. 12

He talks about how oppositions are analyzed by mythic thinking into pairs like hot and cold, high and low, east and west, raw and cooked, wet and dry, sun and moon, day and night, near and far and man and woman. The last four of these oppositions, operate in the group of myths. All the myths are organized by the pair of opposites. This notion of binary opposites play an important role for Lévi-Strauss. He is of the view that when any one of the polarities is stressed and other neglected, the problem comes. What Lévi-Strauss is trying to say is that when there is structural equilibrium among men and women, individual and society, then there is no disturbance. In the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, the mytheme, the element of mythological significance is constituted by the binary relation between relations, a resemblance between differences. The differences are those between the contrary opposites that figure in the surface structure of the strong. But it is only the analogies between these pairs that yield the structure. The structured study of myths have an important signification because for him they are helpful in understanding societies. But the structural method cannot be demonstrated by reference to one or two. In all the four volumes of Mythologiques Lévi-Strauss tries to explain how structural method is a difficult method to operate and has also shown the difficulty in demonstrating the structural analysis. In the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, the basic idea is that the institutions such as kinship and social organization like mythical beliefs are structured according to the fundamental organizing principles of languages. Myths are used by him to denote the ways of thinking about order in human life. Lévi-Strauss makes it clear that myths are formed out of ideas, concepts, proverbs, maxims etc., and that a myth is an assembly of odds and ends. Myths do not have a centre or absolute origin or beginning. Thus there need not be any unity among myths. Everything begins with structure, configuration or relationship.

Lévi-Strauss's concept of myth has helped Ricoeur to develop his hermeneutic theory. One of the criticisms of Ricoeur against structuralism is

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based on the concept of myth developed by Lévi-Strauss. It is maintained by the structuralists like Lévi- Strauss that a sign must not be defined in terms of some object for which it stands, but rather in terms of its relation to other signs within the system of which it is a part. But Ricoeur says that myths can never be considered purely as an interlocking self-sufficient system of relationally positioned signs. The reason is that myths talk of something about the world which are objects of a structured investigations. Some like Bleicher claimed that myth functions as a specific kind of discourse. There is hermeneutic element involved in myths and also sense and reference. The "mythemes" isolated by structural method are expressive; they talk of human phenomena such as birth, death, marriage and incest. 13 In one of his replies to Ricoeur, Lévi-Strauss makes it very clear that anthropology including structural anthropology, rests on hermeneutic understanding. But it is also argued that his position comes close to that of the classical hermeneuticians like Schleirmacher or Dilthey than that of Gadamer or Ricoeur. For example, Lévi-Strauss and Schleirmacher held the view that understanding of a historically remote people is facilitated by a shared human nature. Though this is also correct, while retaining the view that explanation and understanding are not antithetical, he is close to Gadarner and Ricoeur. Dilthey considers this distinction a paradigmatic one. It is true that Ricoeur is not in full agreement with Lévi-Strauss. 14 Every language has a unique pattern, the units of which can be identified only in terms of their relationship to other units in the same language, says Lévi-Strauss. The claim here is that the institutions and practices such as kinship, social organization and myths are structured according to the fundamental organizing principles of language. Ricoeur shows the limitations of structuralism but admits the need for structural analysis. The fact that Ricoeur accommodates the structural analysis in his hermeneutics shows that he has not totally rejected structuralsim and allows the elements of it to operate in his phenomenologial hermeneutics.

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LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE, MUTUAL ENTAILMENT AND PHENOMENALISM

PRABHU NARAYAN MANDAL

I

Phenomenalism, as the name suggests, favours the phenomena, the given, the appearances as against the noumena, the beyond or the things-in-themselves. It refuses to accept everything that is trans-empirical or transcendental. Based on a very robust kind of empiricist epistemology, it has waged a war, as it were, to make philosophy free from mysticism, obscurantism and transcedentalism. Accordingly it tries to analyse all existence in terms of the given. A material object, for example, which is regarded by some philosophers as an unobservable locus of qualities is analysed by a phenomenalist in terms of sense-data.

Phenomenalism has two chief forms -- the Factual and the Formal or the Linguistic. According to Factual Phenomenalism a physical object is a logical construction of actual and/or possible sense-data. The first explicit formulation of it appeared in J.S. Mill's An Examination of Sir William Hemilton's Philosophy. Here he defined matter as nothing but a 'permanent possibility of sensation'. A material object for Mill was, therefore, nothing apart from sensation and/or possibilities thereof.

Linguistic phenomenalism, on the other hand, holds that all statements about material objects can be completely analysed into statements about sense-data. In other words, a physical object statement, according to it, is equivalent to, or reducible to, or translatable into a statement or a set of statements about sense-data. Wolfgang Stegmuller has very nicely put the basic principle of Linguistic Phenomenalism in the following words:

"In the formal mode of speech, the phenomenalistic thesis says in effect: every statement about things (and their processes) is reducible to

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 1 January 1999

statements about sense-data. If we limit our formulation to the physical domain, it may be so stated: any statement about physical objects is translatable into statements about sense-data; or statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about sense-data."²

Professor Ayer has expressed the basic formula of the Linguistic Phenomenalism thus:

"... every empirical statement about a physical object, whether it seems to refer to a scientific entity or to an object of the more familiar kind that we normally claim to perceive, is reducible to a statement, or a set of statements, which refer exclusively to sense-data."

It is to be noted here that phenomenalism is realism and not Subjective Idealism. Hence, according to it, physical objects exist even when they are not perceived. But the unperceived physical objects, too, have to be analysed into sensory terms as per phenomenalist thesis. The sense-data into which they are to be analysed must be possible and not actual, and correspondingly, the sense-datum statements into which the statements about unperceived physical objects are to be analysed have to be hypothetical. As R.J. Hirst puts it:

"...if the object is observed, there will be categorical sense-datum propositions to correspond to the actual data obtained, and, in addition, a larger set of hypothetical ones corresponding to the various data obtainable when observing the object; if the object is not being observed the set will consist wholly of hypothetical propositions."

Ayer, too, avers:

"...the inclusion of possible as well as actual sense-data among the elements of the material things must be taken only to imply a recognition that some of these statements about sense-data will have to be hypothetical."

A phenomenalist (a linguistic phenomenalist) will, therefore, translate the statement 'There is a tree existing unperceived behind my house' into 'If I will go behind my house with my eyes open and in order and the light being sufficient, I will have tree-sensations or tree-sense-data'. Even when an object is being perceived by me, some of the sense-datum statements into which the statement about that object is to be reduced have to be hypothetical, because I

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cannot perceive all the sides and all the qualities of the object simultaneously. The linguistic phenomenalists admit the possibility of translating every physical object statement into a set of statements which refer only to sense-data. This programme of the phenomenalists to provide translations for every material object-statement into purely sensory terms is known as the Phenomenalist Programme. Since the Factual Phenomenalists claimed that the material object was the family of sense-data, neither more nor less, the Linguistic Phenomenalists had to admit that the set of sense-datum statements was logically equivalent to material object statement, and that these statements also entailed each other.

But Isaih Berlin, in his famous essay 'Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical statements'6 has argued forcefully that there can be no logical equivalence between the categorical statement about physical object and the hypothetical statement or statements about sense-data. Similarly Professor A.J. Ayer arguing slightly differently in one of his most important works The Problem of Knowledge has clearly stated that there cannot exist between the two sorts of statements just mentioned the relation of mutual entailment either. This proves the very idea of translating categorical physical object statement into hypothetical statements about sense-data wrong in principle. And this surely constitutes one of the potent reasons why phenomenalism has been declared to have failed. It is to be remembered here that Professor Ayer was once a staunch supporter of phenomenalism and his earlier work The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge was "widely read as a defence of phenomenalism." But later in The Problem of Knowledge he disavowed it and announced unequivocally that the phenomenalist programme could not be carried through. My aim in this paper is to examine Berlin's and Ayer's arguments and to see how far their objections can be met. I don't claim that I have answered them successfully, much less that I have met all the difficulties that phenomenalism is beset with. I only consider my present endeavour as no more than a little attempt at restoring a bit the theoretical foundation of phenomenalism which seemed to suffer a serious threat in the criticisms of Berlin and Ayer. I shall proceed now by having a brief look at the arguments of the two philosophers and then venture into a critical evaluation of the same in a bid to find some satisfactory replies thereto.

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Berlin argues that hypothetical and categorical statements are two distinct and logically irreducible types of statements. Categorical statements assert or entail actual existence in a way in which hypothetical ones do not. If someone says that there is a table in the next room or that the clock in the dining room is fast, he is drawing attention to some actually existing state of affairs and is committing himself to an assertion about some actual entity at a given place and time. In the first of these examples he is doing this directly, and, although the second is less direct, even then it does entail the continuing existence of an entity, because it would be absurd to say 'the clock is fast but does not exist'. Hypothetical statements cannot do this kind of job. In other words, categorical existential statements, according to Berlin, tend to 'point' to their 'objects' even though the 'objects' 'pointed' to are not being perceived by any percipient. The hypothetical statements which the phenomenalist advances cannot do this, precisely because their import is logically different. As Prof. Berlin himself remarks:

"Existential propositions expressed categorically - in indicative sentences - tend, as it were, to 'point' towards their 'objects'; and demonstratives which appear in existential propositions, like 'this is', 'there is', 'here we have', etc., often function as substitutes for such acts of pointing to things or persons or processes. The characteristic force of the categorical mode of expression is often exactly this - that it acts in lieu of a gesture, of an 'act of ostension'.... But hypotheticals normally do the opposite of this. Hypotheticals, whatever they describe or mean, whatever they entail or convey or evince, in whatever way they are verified, or fail to be verified, do not as a general rule directly assert that something has been, is being, or will be occurring, or existing, or being characterised in some way. This is precisely the force of the conditional mood."

Since the hypothetical statements of the phenomenalist do not commit one to the assertion of existence, the phenomenalist analysis is surely inadequate, and it is this inadequacy which is responsible for the common-sense feeling that something vital is missing from the phenomenalist analysis. The hypotheticals of the phenomenalist only indicate different ways of verifying the truth of a categorical statement. They cannot constitute the meaning of the statement of which they are supposed to be the equivalent.

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Prof. A.J. Ayer argues that the relation of mutual entailment cannot hold between a material object statement and a set of sense-data ones, because neither the statements implying the existence of physical objects can be logically deduced from finite sets of statements about sense-data nor can statements about sense-data be so deduced from descriptions of physical reality. The reason why statements about physical objects cannot be logically deduced from finite sets of statements about sense-data is that the occurrence of sense-data is not a sufficient condition for the existence of the relevant physical object, and the reason why the occurrence of sense-data is not a sufficient condition for the existence of the relevant physical object is that illusions are possible and they cannot be eliminated completely though they can be minimised considerably. A person senses an applish visual sense-datum and he thinks that he is seeing a real apple. But he might be having a hallucination. The next moment he has an appropriate tactual sensation in the same place, but this sensation, too, might be hallucinatory. There may be a long chain of sensory evidences in favour of the existence of a physical object, but the possibility of the entire chain being hallucinatory cannot be ruled out. This means that the sense-datum statements may all be true, but the physical object statement might still be false. The statements about physical objects cannot be deduced from a finite set of statements about sense-data also because it is impossible to exhaust all possible sense-data, for they are infinite in number.

On the other hand, the reason why statements about sense-data cannot be logically deduced from statements about physical object is that the existence of a physical object is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of sense-data. The existence of a physical object can lead to the occurrence of sense-data only when appropriate perceptual conditions hold. Hence, the statement about the physical object can entail statements about sense-data only when it is combined with the statements specifying all the requisite perceptual conditions. But such conditions which relate to observer, his sense-organs, his nervous system, the doctor examining the observer, etc., etc., are infinite in number, and an infinite, by definition, cannot be exhausted. The specification of conditions under the circumstances, will require an infinite number of hypotheticals and will lead to many infinite regresses. Hence a physical object-statement cannot necessarily be followed by statements about sense-data.

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Thus it is clear that neither the statements about sense-data entail statements about physical objects, nor do the statements about physical objects entail statements about sense-data. Hence, there is no mutual entailment between the two. This lack of mutual entailment, according to Ayer, is fatal to phenomenalism. And this is one of the main reasons why he disavowed it.

III

Let us now see how far and to what extent Berlin's and Ayer's criticisms can be met. Let us take Berlin's criticism first. The whole gamut of Berlin's argument is that the categorical and hypothetical statements cannot be regarded as logically equivalent because they perform two entirely different jobs. And if the two types of statements are not logically equivalent the one (the categorical) cannot be reduced to the other (the hypothetical). The phenomenalists, therefore, by reducing the categorical statements about physical objects to the hypothetical statements about sense-data makes the hypothetical statement do the job which on account of its very nature it cannot do. But we think this is not strictly correct. Even the hypothetical statements about sense-data perform the same job as is performed by the categorical ones about physical objects. Berlin has argued that the categorical statements perform the act of gesturing or pointing to the obejcts concerned. But the truth is that the hypothetical statements, too, perform the very same act of gesturing or pointing. For how otherwise can we point to an object which is not being perceived by us? Suppose there is a mango-tree in the backyard of my house. I am not perceiving it. And I want to convince someone about its existence. Now, the question is: How shall I do it? Am I not obliged to say in this situation that 'If I shall go to the backyard of my house, I shall have mango-tree-sense-experiences'? Obviously the function of the hypothetical statement is nothing but to assert that there does exist a mango-tree in the backyard of my house. In all such cases we have no other option but to use a hypothetical statement in order to assert the existence of unperceived objects. We do use hypothetical statements about sense-data for asserting the existence of the physical objects in the same way as we use hypothetical statements about experimental results and people's overt behaviours for asserting the existence of electrons and unconscious feelings respectively. It is wrong to call such a use a 'misuse' or a 'distortion of function', for without such a use we would not be

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it. in the o use a objects. able to refer to unperceived objects. To use a hypothetical statement about sense-data tantamounts to saying that an unperceived physical object exists. And it is just this that the phenomenalists really intend to emphasize. It appears that Isaiah Berlin in the present controversy is whipping the wrong horse.

As regards Ayer's criticism we have no hesitation in admitting that Ayer's demand of entailment cannot be met in the present context. But this does not demolish the case of phenomenalism. Because of the possibility of illusions and hallucinations, and of the impossibility of enumerating the infinite number of actual and/or possible sense-data, it is surely true that a finite set of sense-datum statements cannot entail a physical object statement. And it is also true that on account of the impracticability of specifying the infinite number of possible perceptual conditions a physical object statement cannot entail any sense-datum statement or any set of such statements. But then the point is that such a lack of entailment hardly affects our realistic beliefs about the existence of physical objects of the world. In our practical life whenever there is any doubt about the actual existence of a physical object we undertake just a few tests and get assured. If somebody says that there is a table in the next room, the hearer either takes his word for what he says or he just goes into the next room and sees the table for himself or also touches it and feels satisfied about the actual existence of the table. It is neither possible nor even necessary on the part of the hearer to keep himself eternally engaged in the task of testing the existence of the table in the next room. Thus it appears that even a few checks and tests are sufficient to guarantee the certainty of empirical statements. There may not be any mutual entailment in the strict sense between the sense-datum statement or statements on the one hand and the physical object statement on the other, but that has never affected our knowledge of the things of the world. For, otherwise our very living in the world would have been altogether impossible.

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PRATYAKȘA AND ITS TWO DIMENSIONS : ADVAITA VEDĀNTA PERSPECTIVE

BIJAN BISWAS

Classical India presents an interesting record of deep human experience, thoughts, beliefs which have been a source of inspiration for countless generations and we are convinced of its lasting value and relevance to modern men. In this paper by using extensive and for the most part unexplored material with scientific rigor and modern methodology, I hope to stimulate and promote interest and research in a field that needs to be placed in its proper perspective. In general my aim is to render intelligible the Advaita position on pratyakṣa pramāṇa with critical cross reference to the respective views in Nyāya School of Indian thought.

One of the most fascinating phases in the philosophical development of Advaita thought is the prolonged and sustained polemics between the Advaita and the Nyāya Scholars. The differences ranged over a vast variety of issues e.g. sources of knowledge, the nature of reality etc. Amongst other problems that assumed greater importance is the nature of perception and its two aspects as it is laid down in Advaita literature and Philosophy. Practically no enquiry has recently been done on the problem, though unbelievably rich formulations and suggestions are there. Perception by Professor B. K. Matilal, is considered to be a significant contribution to modern philosophical concerns, but that too presents the Nyāya view and examines it critically against the Buddhist version over the nature of perception, the criterion of knowledge etc. But, in this article I shall propose for the consideration of my readers problems concerning perception, after Advaita Scholars. My aim here is to understand and share the deeper concern and motivation the Advaita realist had in epistemology of perception. But it is not easy to make a safe transposition of thought from the technical philosophical Sanskrit to its European equivalent. This aspect of the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 1

January 1999

problem is actually a second instalment of my article, the first instalment of it being already available elsewhere.²

Advaita view on pratyakṣa and other sources of knowledge, were systematized, well organized in the most elementary text or *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* by Dharmarājā Adhvarindra (Seventeenth Century) where he provides us with a brilliant exposition of the Advaita view under consideration. The founder and the earliest father of the School does not throw any light for an account of Pratyakṣa. Śamkarāchārya maintains a realist standpoint concerning the empirical world but fails to provide a detailed account of the way through which experience and validation of the knowledge of the outside world are obtained. Ācārya Padmapāda (820 A.D.). his disciple can be said to be the pioneer to attempt a Vedāntic explanation of the process of perception. Padmapāda's superficial attempts were developed further by Prakāśatman (13th Century) and subsequent writers.

One who is well conversant with Nyāya and Advaita epistemology of perception, is aware that while Nyāya makes the sense-object contact, the central point in its definition of Pratyakṣa Advaita deviates from that point. For the Advaita scholars do not consider sense contact as the fundamental characteristic of perception. The cases of perceptual experience without involving sense-contact, e.g. pleasure, pain, other internal perceptions where modes of mind are directly apprehended can be cited in its support. Dharmarājā also subscribes to this view. Hence Advaitins attempt to make a redefinition of pratyakṣa. In Advaita Vedānta, the chief characteristic of pratyakṣa, is the directness of the knowledge acquired through the perceptual process. It can not be denied that perception involves activitiy of the senses, and the contact of sense with objects but there are other attendent features and functions of perception that are not brought out by the narrow characterization of pratyakṣa in Nyāya.

According to Advaita theory, knowledge owes its perceptual character both to object and to its cognition. On uttering the statement, 'I have seen the cloth', one grasps the meaning that 'cloth' is perceived. Again, we say 'I have perceptual cognition relating to the 'Object jar'. Hence perceptuality may mean 'perceptuality of cognition or of object' i.e. perceptibility and percept. It is an empirical fact that perceptuality may be of both the forms - 'Pratyakṣam Jñānam' 'Pratyakṣa ghaṭaḥ'. Since perceptibility of cognition, occurs first. Dharmarājā

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was under compulsion to determine jñānagata Pratyakṣa first.³ It is also interesting to note that Dharmarājā attempts to provide us a more adequate and epistemologically complete account of the perceptual process. Accordingly Dharmarājā, formulates two criteria/conditions or prāyojaka of the two phases of perception, namely Determination of the i) perceptual character of congnition (jñāna pratyakṣatya) and ii) the perceptual character of percept. i.e. (Viṣaya Pratyakṣatva).

I shall address myself to this task of formulating, criteria and expounding both the aspects of perception. But this requires to examine the vital role manas plays in the Advaita theroy of Pratyakşa. In fact, the Psychological aspect of the perceptual process is something unique to the Advaita theory.

Antahkarana (manas) Qua-sense faculty and Mental Mode

Our investigation into the problem will remain incomplete unless one is coversant with the vital role manas plays in connection with the emergence of perception. In the perception of external objects, the sense faculty like vision is the instrument. Similarly in the apprehension of sorrow, happiness etc. the internal sense manas is the instrument, as it is conceived by the Nyāya theorist while all the Advaita scholalrs do not hold one and the same view about the nature and role of manas.

The term manas in Sanskrit is sometimes vendered in English, though wrongly, as mind, as its equivalent. It is thought that there are striking similarities between the two even though there are important differences also. However, the word manas is not used in the same sense by all the schools of Indian Philosophy. For convenience, I shall better retain the Sanskrit term manas than using its foreign equivalent. Here our main concern will be to pursue the nature and function, it does in Advaita tradition.

Manas is an important faculty postulated in Advaitic theory. Manas is not a sense faculty, as it is held by Dharmarājā-adhvarindra, a neo-Vedāntin who points out that, manas is mentioned separately from the other senses in the unpaniṣads. The Sponsors of Vivaraṇa School maintain, manas is not a sense-organ but adherents of Bhāmati System plead for the sense organhood of antaḥkaraṇa or manas. Vācaspati Miśra, the founder of Bhāmati System, argues

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the internal mental states like happiness, sorrow etc. are valid since they are produced by the senseorganhood of manas. According to Padmapāda, (Vivaraņa School) Internal states like happiness, sorrow etc. are generated not through sense, but manifested by witnessing Consciousness, Sākṣibhāṣya. 5

A Sceptic raises an objection, that the Bhāgavat-Gītā says: The sense-organs with manas as the sixth, and, therefore, it is clear that manas is the sixth sense. To this, Dharmarājā points out, The word "sixth" does not convey the sense that manas is the sixth sense; Since there is no contradiction in the manas making up the number six, even though not, itself a sense faculty. There is no guiding rule that the completion of a number connected with the senses must be only by another sense. Śankara's admission for the sense-organhood of manas is evidenced from his own Bhāṣya on Brahma Sūtra. Statements from Upaniṣad can be advanced in support of the thesis. Vācaspati Miśra has postulated the indriyatva character of manas with the traditional code smṛti. We can trace the arguments in support of our claim as manas is stated separately from senses in the Upaniṣad.

We are referring to one such instance of Mund. Upaniṣad 'manah sarva-indriyāni ca' Why is it mentioned separately? Vācaspati Miśra points out, in such case, it is to be understood by means of a logic' the Cattle and the bullocks' (Gobalīvardha) or, "the Brāhman and the Paribrājakas" where the latter though included in the former, are separately mentioned only for the sake of special emphasis. Such is the case, here also. Manas is the recipient of past, present and future where as sense-organ being only the recipient or present, is stated separately from the manas. Dharamarājā states a script, text from the Bhāgavat Gītā, "Manaḥ Ṣaṣṭhāni indriyāṇi" and subscribes to the view that this statement does not ascertain the indriyatva character of manas whereas the Seventh chap, of Bhāgavat Gītā states indriyānām manaścāmī" (Among the senses, I am manas) which explicitly states the sense organhood of manas. Ācārya Śaṅkara and his followers accept the implication without putting the text differently. But Dharmarājā avoids this text and creates a new doctrine. What led him to do this? This springs a pleasant surprise.

Dharmarājā seems to approve the *indriyatva* character of manas? But why is is so? The reason is such internal states as pleasure etc. are born by manas and are cognised directly. These are perceived immediately without the mediation

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of manas qua sense. And further, anumiti i.e. resulting state of inference is not regarded as sense-produced; rather it is generated by manas. Manas is not an independent reality existing outside the subjective whole. Advaita regards manas to be part of a complex, unified inner organ which is known as antahkarana, i.e. 'inner vehicle'. Manas and antahkarana are employed interchangeably. Antahkarana, is characterised by Madhusudan Saraswati as being composed of five subtle elements (tan-mātras), viz. the Subtle essense of earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa with the predominance of the latter over the former. Antahkarana is of light nature and 'having therein at the time the predominance of the Sattva-guna (lightness tendency), being extremely clear like a mirror etc., the antahkarana is capable of flowing out through the sense, and like the solar light, it is capable of speedily contracting and expanding'. The antahkarana, unlike the mind of John Locke, is not a passive recipient of data, it is an active instrument in the process of perception, Dharmarājā points out that the antahkarana 'goes out' through the optical sense i.e. eye, pervades the object of attention and transform itself in the form of the object. The transformation or modification of the antahkarana is technically termed "vrtti" or 'mental state'. The specific transformation or modification (antahkarana vṛtti) is the apprehending mental mode which makes known the object7. But we should not overlook (objective) aim for which antahkarana "goes out" and that is to maintain the directness of the presentation of data to the manas for its immediate apprehension.

So we see the postulation of antahkarana and the properties attributed to it raise a host of empirical problems. Is there such an organ? Has it the properties attributed to it: Does it exist independently of the body? Is it a brain? Innumerable questions, however, can be raised in this way with which we are not at all concerned. The sense given to antahkarana is a functional one, and as such, it can be conveniently accepted to state the perceptual process in Advaita. Thus, we consider it safe and reasonable to accept antahkarana, the inner organ, as the instrument through which the subject acquires perceptual knowledge.

Presupposition of Brahma-Caitanya

One unique feature in Advaita theory (of pratyaksa) is that they had to assume beforehand, some sort of consciousness or intelligence which is the locus of all objects, contents, and details of both the objective and the subjective

components of a knowledge situation in a luminous continuum. This is what Advaitins call "Brahma Caitanya". It is this consciousness that accounts for "the data" that reach the subject, and out of which the perceptual content is configured. and which on the subjective side illumines the perceptual content that results in a cognition. The question, if there is such a consciousness underlying both the objective phenomena and subjective component, is an issue with which we are not concerned here. One is not required to presuppose Brahma-Caitanya now to be anything more than simply light which the object reflects or have the capacity to reflect in normal conditions, and which presumably) persists were the objective phenomena to disappear. In the subjective aspect, Brahma-Caitanya is presupposed to be the flood of light analogous to that employed in a studio to illumine the objects to be photographed. And the antahkarana is similar to the negative or film in the Camera, which modifies as light, penetrates through the lens and registers the shape, colour, and so forth of the object focussed upon. This modification of antahkarana is called mental, mode or Vrtti, that corresponds to the form of the object in attention.

According to Advaita epistemology of perception, all determinate knowledge is a self-abnegation, involving as it does a stratification of the pure-consciousness into three forms: Pramātṛ caitanya or determinate consciousness, Vṛtti-Caitanya or modes of consciousness and Viṣaya caitanya or empirical object. Hence we have in a knowledge situation three major components, each of which is associated with 'light' in some way or another. They are the subject, object and mode of antaḥkaraṇa as the instrument of cognition. We can characterize the pramātṛ caitanya, as subejct-consciousness, viṣaya-caitanya as object consciousness and pramāṇa caitanya as the instrument of knowledge. In jñānagata pratyakṣa, the unity or coincidence of viṣaya caitanya and pramāṇa caitanya, is the criterion. The object, so determined in this type of perception is the defeniundum (lakṣya) of Viṣayagata pratyakṣa or the perception of object qua object. Hence Dharmarājā attempts to determine perceptuality of cognition first, but for which perceptual character of object may not be determined.

Perceptuality of Cognition

According to Advaita Vedānta, antaḥkaraṇa or manas is fiery, transparent and is devoid of any shape of its own. The manas or antaḥkaraṇa (exactly like

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a light) functions as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness which, projecting it on the object, removes the veil of nescience i.e. the object which was so long unknown, has come within the purview of the respective sense-organ. Some sort of relation called conjunction, occurs between the manas that streams out through the respective sense-faculty and the object attended to. The analogy of water in a tank and its going out is given by Dharmarājā. When water is preserved in a tank, it assumes the form of the tank and the same water passing through drain occupies a field and assumes the form of the filed. Hence the antaḥkaraṇa streaming out of the cakṣu assumes the form of the object like pitcher, monastry etc. There occurs an identification of consciousness qualified with antaḥkaraṇa Vṛtti' with the consciousness qualified by the object. So there occurs non-difference (provided, if everything goes well, i.e. the light in the mental state corresponds one to one with the light of the object between the mental state and object related in their epistemic relation.

The pitcher (object) and the mental state (antahkarana vrtti) in the form of pitcher are brought together in one and the same place outside, hence the consciousness limited by the object and the respective mental state, are one and the same, even though the object and the mental state wrought division of consciousness. Consequently this non-difference of the mental state with the object, gives rise to the origin of Vrtti-jñāna or cognition in the form 'This is a Jar. 10 This criterion (Coincidence of both the consciousness limited by mental mode and that by visaya) of the perception of object is bound to vitiate an inference 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke' by the defect of over-coverage, for it appears unduly to the subejet of an inference. But this objection is welcome for Advaitin endorses the view that an inference involves two types of cognition- perceptuality in so far as the subejct 'mountain' is concerned and inferential in the Sādhya or Probandum. The Sādhya or Probandum, say 'fire, is inferred in an inference like 'Parvato Vanhimān dhūmāt' since the condition of perceptibility i.e., coincidence of Vrtti Caitanya and vișaya Caitanya or empirical object is satisfied. In inference, the manas only indulges in thinking of the inferred object but does not go out to meet it. The distinction is practically drawn in modern psychology, only viewed from the point of view of the self's spontaneity i.e., in perception the given element and its interpretation are welded together in a unity, while in inference, they are kept distinct. In perception, the self as invested with the mental mode becomes further

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materialised into the particular function of the sense faculty excited by the stimulus and this might be regarded as a maturation of its karma. In inference, the self just expects to be realised, it descends from the plane to a lower plane, but not to the lowest. Sometimes the tension is so great that it discharges itself in the waking plane. In other words, inference lapses into a percept, as in 'I see my brother'.

How can knowledge of two opposite characters (direct and indirect knowledge) occur in a cognition of the form 'Infering fire on the mountain'? This seems to contradict our experience. A Vedāntin may plead that the Nyāya realists also recognise the occurrence of two opposite characters in one and the same knowledge. We may try to explain the Nyāya position here with the help of an analogy. 'The pitcher is something that causes happiness' 11 The pitcher is in sense contact and hence it is perceptible but what about the 'predicate'? It is not under the purview of sense contact but the Nyāya scholar admit, the apprehension of 'happiness' etc. as a case of alaukika pratyakṣa. As viewed by them, the happiness is cognised by means of Jñānalakṣaṇa Sannikarṣa. Hence the Nyāya scholars recognise both 'laukikatva' and 'alaukikatva' characters in such a cognition and the same logic the Vedāntins demand to apply in a cognition having perceptuality in one part and inferentiality in another.

Dharmarājā points out, in perceiving an object like 'This is pitcher, the antaḥkaraṇa, moves towards the object through the sense orifices and assumes the form of it. Then the coincidence of both consciousness limited by object and that by antaḥkaraṇa, occurs, and the veil of nescience that keeps both the adjuncts seperate, vanishes resulting in the identity of both the types of consciousness limited by Viṣaya and antaḥkaraṇa. But the required criterion of identity between 'consciousness specified by antahkaraṇa' and 'consciousness specified by content' fails to cover the apprehension of happiness etc. in the form 'I am happy'. The reason is very simple. Happiness is an internal state and hence no vṛtti can emerge. The Vedāntins tide over the difficulty by pointing out that happiness etc. are born directly in the antaḥkaraṇa and hence the genesis of vṛtti (of happiness, sorrow etc.) is possible without the participation of senses. If the criteria for the perceptual character of cognition is said to be the identification of the reflected light of the mental state with that of the object, then the said criteria will unduly cover the case of the recollection of happiness as occurring

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in the past. In recollecting happiness in the form 'I was happy' one is required to admit vrtti of happiness etc. occured in the past. Hence the perceptiuality criteria should be amended by adding 'ekakālinatva' with the other character 'ekadeśatva. In fact, Dharmarājā points out that the alleged defect of over-coverage can be averted by characterising the said criteria with a host of adjectives 'ekakālinatva', 'ekadeśātva' and 'vartamānatva' in order to, determine specifically the perceptual cognition. The implication of it is, both the adjectives 'ekakālinatva' and 'ekadeśatva' are to be inserted as criteria of perceptual cognition i.e. happiness and mental mode of it though occurring in the same locus but they belong to different times for an object of memory occurring in the past, happiness is a past event but the mental mode of it is characterised by 'recency' (vartamānkālina). Hence there cannot be coincidence of both the adjuncts occurring in the present and that occurred in the past. Dharmarājā points out the criteria of non-difference as 'occurring in the same locus' be given, then the fallacy of over-coverage, cannot be averted. For it unduly extends to the case of happiness as occurring in the past in the form 'I was happy'. This necessitates the insertion of the adjective 'recency' (vartamānatva)¹².

The other important point for the successful arising of perception is that the object toward which the manas is directed has to be an appropriate object for perception. This character of the object is 'Yogyatā', 'fitness' or 'competency for perception'. This qualification rules out such ideas as dharma, right, conduct, natural laws and a host of other salient features of reality. These are entitles that are not directly presentable to the mind qua objects of perception. The significance of it is that the scope of perception may not be as wide as would be desirable for this is the only method of common sense that makes the object of the search directly presentable to the mind. Hence this gives rise to a perceptual cognition of the object concerned. Further the fire that is inferred at the sight of smoke is a cognition lacking perceptuality. For it is mediately and not immediately given to the mind.

The criteria of perceptuality of cognition extends unduly to the cases like 'he is righteous', 'he is unrighteou's etc. known through language. For there occurs the concurrence of consciousness specified by vrtti and consciousness specified by contents which is present. Hence there is no difference between the mental state and the object contacted in their epistemic relation.

Similarly, the criteria of perceptual cognition applies unduly to inferential cognition in the form 'aham adrastavān bhogavatvāt'. (I am fortunate because I enjoy) The vrtti and its object (dharma, adharma) assume coincidence. This identification of consciousness causes the over-coverage of perception to anumiti. This necessitates the insertion of the word 'yogyatva' so that knowledge derived through language or inferential cognition cannot allegedly be perceptual. But happiness, sorrow like dharma, adharma etc. are the properties of manas and so have no competency for being the object of perception. What should be the determining criteria of competency of being the object of perception? In fact nature of object serves as its evidence i.e. Yogyatva' character of object is ascertained empirically. It is not determined by figment of some one's fond imagination. That some capable of being perceived while others are not, though they are equally attributes of the manas. This is an issue that can be explained only with reference to the inherent nature of things which we must assume on the basis of the actual results. According to Advaitins, dharma, adharma' sukha, dukha etc. are properties of self but only sukha, dukha are capable of being perceived while other two properties do not possess yogyatā of being perceived. It is due to the unique nature of the obejct as the vedāntins preach. The Nyāya position is exactly alike in this respect.

Philosophers of all shade and colour will subscribe to the view that knowledge derived through language e.g., 'That art thou' 'you are happy' etc are not caused by sense and can never be perceptual. But according to advaita epistomological scheme they can acquire perceptuality if characters like 'competency' 'presentativeness' etc. pertaining to object are added. One of the unique characters of Advaita doctrine is that they admit aparokṣānubhūti or immediacy of knowledge derived through language.

In the case of judgement in which the subject is perceived but the predicate is inferred e.g. in the inference of 'a mountain is fiery because it is smoky', having its subject 'mountain' in sense contact may turn out to be perceptual, for vṛtti assumes the form of the object. This change cannot be averted. For we had to admit vṛtti of the subject 'mountain' (occurring in an inference of this form), in sense contact. Hence the mountain (object) and the mental state (vṛtti) in the form of object are brought together in one and the same place outside, so the consciousness associated by them (object and the

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mental state) are one and the same. Since manas does not go out to form a state, in case of fire, there is difference i.e. 'consciousness associated with fire' and the 'consciousness of the mental state' do not coincide. Consequent upon, this identification there is (i) perceptuality in so far as the mountain is concerned but (ii) inferentiality with regard to fire since no mental mode can be produced. The object (fire) is not in sense contact. Thus we have knowledge in the form 'I see the mountain but infer the fire'.

But the present epistemic situation invites the most important question: when do knowledge of different kinds require seperate sources? In other words, the question is this, what is the principle(s) of classification of knowledge into such different kinds as correspond to different source of knowledge? certain answer to this question is always assumed. However, given a knowledge, which kind of knowledge it is, is ascertained in a subsequent and second order act of perception (anuvyavasāya). But what makes this knowledge different from the knowledge of other kinds is to be found, say, among its causal conditions. Thus distinct causes make different kinds of knowledge of this kind and make it different and these distinct generating conditions or causes are the sources of knowledge. Difference of kinds of knowledge is thus causally based on the difference of sources of knowledge.

The philosophical implication of the above argument is that an inference involves pakṣa, sādhya and hetu, Inference of 'sādhya' fire '(probandhum) is possible only when the locus (mountain' characterised by a proban 'smoke' is cognised. An inferential knowledge of the form 'the mountain has fire' must be preceded by a perceptual cognition of smoke, occurring on the mountain. Since perception is the most basic kind of knowledge and an inference depends on it for its genesis. The Nyāya realist adhered to the view that (i) pakṣadharmatājñāna (ii) Vyāpti sṃaraṇa (iii) parāmarśa jñāna separately are the necessary conditions but they together constitute the sufficient conditions, required to be fulfilled for the origin of inference. We express ourselves as 'infering fire on the mountain' (parvate vanhim anuminomi etc. as anuvyāvasāya).

The Nyāya will object to the Advaita argument pleading perceptuality in so far as 'mountain' is concerned and inferentiality in the other part 'fire'. The entire piece of knowledge 'parvato vanhimān' is inferential, as the Nyāya points out

Further, the perceptual criterion as it is formulated will attract the charge of over-coverage. Since perceptuality will cover the case of fragrance like sandalwood. But the predicate 'sandalwood' is 'vartamān' and 'pratyakṣayogya', the mode in the form of 'fragrance' and there is co-locativity of the adjuncts.

According to Vedāntins, the judgement involving both perceptuality (in the subject) and inferentiality (in the object) is not one state but rather a process from the subject thought to the predicate thought. They might argue that this transformation from the subject to the predicate is a necessary thought of the Union of the terms, but then this does not mean their concrete identity-in-difference;

The perception of a thing so far enquired and explained may not amount to the knowledge of an object qua object. That is to say, knowledge is different from the subject and yet connected with it. We can turn our attention now to this aspect of perception, not observed carefully.

The perceptuality of percept

Dharmarājā takes into consideration the second phase of perception that occurs when the consciousness associated with the subject and that with the object coincide. 15 That is to say, the perceptuality in the identification or non-difference of the object from the subject. The significance of it is that the subject through the instrumentality of the vrtti is conveyed of the vrttijñāna. Then subject brings into relation the object corresponding to the contents of vṛtti-jñāna, as his cognition. The non-difference of the subject's reflexive awareness of his cognitive state when takes place, he characterises the obejct to his being conscious of something. The subject thus observes, 'I see a pitcher'. To put the matter in another way. The light of Brahma Chaitanya qualified with the self, further illumines the mental state which is non-different from the object, as portrayed earlier in the first phase. The mental state subsides, and the subject becomes conscious of the object itself. The object is all the more 'given' to the subject in virtue of the double reflection it receives, the first from cidābhāsa that streamed out with the antahkarana and, second, from Brahma Chaitanya that the subject sheds. The cognition is direct and immediate, as sketched in the first phase and if it is true then in the second phase also the resulting perception of

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object seems direct and immediate too. The cognition is self-evident to the subject, it is the instrumentality of the cognitive, the object is brought to the immediate awarness of the subject and a "unity" of the subject and object is effected. In this reflective stage, there is assimilation of the mental contents corresponding to the configuration of the object, its qualities, the relation between the two and with familiar or recognised percepts. The perception of the "entire" object presented, occurs when the assimilative function of antaḥkaraṇa is over. The perception of the object by the subject marks the effective role of the second phase of pratyakṣa pramāṇa.

A problem seems to crop up in this connection : if there is a 'unity' or integration of the subjective and objective components (Visaya Caitanya pramātr - Caitanyābhinna) what causes hindrance to the genesis of the cognition e.g. 'I am the pitcher' 'I am the book'? Dharamarājādhvarindra may take up for consideration such as objection. The difficulty can be tide over. As what is signified in the criteria is not the 'identification' for 'unity' as such, but the non-difference of the 'objective reality' from the subjective reality. The under-lying reality of both components according to Advaitins being non-differnet, all that can be present at this stage would be Brahma-Chaitanya, thus there would simply be no cognitive configuration. Advaita would have to reinstate the constant presence of the cognitive vrtti jñāna as the mode or condition which characterises the difference with reference to the subject and the object. The subjective self is not cognised, in the reflective act at least, immediately as Bramha Caitanya, for its own self-illumination in the form of "I" is also characterised by a mental mode of antahkarana of that form which results in the reflexive ego- sense of 'Ahmakāra'. This mode must be given at the second stage and thus the difference between the subejct and the object is noted by the difference of the 'transformation' i.e. the vrtti to which the two components give rise. But they generate in immediate succession to one another, their awareness is immediate, in their cognitive manifestations; their qualitative difference in resepct of the respective change, the antahkarana assumes and the moment that seperates them, may be missed in an introspective analysis, as Dharmarājādhavarindra most probably did in the Vedānta Paribhāsā. But the uniqueness and most important point that Dharmarājā attempts to do in Vedānta Paribhāsā (which appears to be the nucleus in Advaita epistemology) is that both the subject and the object are brought into a direct relation by means of the

functioning of mode (vṛtti) in the antaḥkaraṇa as its agent. Thus the resulting state, in virtue of a mutual identification of their respective cognitive effects mode and vṛtti, an immediate perception of a thing follows.

In illuminating the object, what notes the 'coming together of the subjective mode and objective' vrtti? For the cognition of the relation between the subjective and an objective, is it inconceivable that another cognition may be required? Admission of the second cognition would mean another cognition is necessary for its apprehension, and yet another for this and so on? Then this leaves open the possibility of an infinite series of cognitions required to manifest one preceeding the other. To obviate this difficulty (i.e. regressus ad infinitum), and if any theory of perception has to meet this challenge, then there has to be admitted one cognition which is self illumined and does not require to be illumined by any-other cognition. The problem cannot be solved unless a basic self evident cognition is accepted. Perhaps for this reason and in finding a solution to the problem, Advaitins base its solution on the introspective evidence of the reflexive 'I' notion, however, 'consciousness' of the self- illumined mode of the subjective reality would remain. And it is by virtue of the mutual conjunction (Sannikarşa) of the subjective mode and the vṛtti jñāna that the cognition becomes illumined. The vrtti in the form of the object impresses itself, as if, it were the mode of the subject itself, and thereby comes to be cognised, as a predicate and not as the pure subject content which is the 'I' notion in the subject's apperception. And the perceptual judgement results in the following form "I see the jar', 'it is big and blue'. But is it pratyakşa Pramā? Advaita would accept it as a case of veridical perception. For given that appropriate instrument of sources (pramāṇa) in this case, the antaḥkaraṇa operating through the senses is present and is not diseased (free from defects) and given that the external environ is free from befogging obstacles, e.g. dimness of light, smoke in the air and so on, and given that the thing is brought before, then it logically follows that the perception is veridical, as a resulting state of pratyaksa, follows.

A sceptic doubts whether the basis for the claim to validity still holds true, if the manas was not assumed to "go out". In other words, would the sense faculty give rise to the same vṛtti in the antaḥkaraṇa as is assumed to occur when the antaḥkaraṇa 'goes out' to hold contact with the object? If the 'out going of antaḥkaraṇa' is denied, then the instrumentality of sense faculty would

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be needed to effect operative relation with the obejct, as it is seen in Nyāya theory. Acceptance of the mediacy of sense faculty would mean raising further objection. The sense data received by the antaḥkaraṇa cannot be considered as immediate, with the consequence that cognitive content loses its 'presentative' nature. Thus the truthfulness of the cognition comes in question.

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The Advaitins face an insurmountable difficulty and may not be able to overcome the crisis. The 'outgoing' of antahkarana may not be possible where we see the distant object e.g. star etc, A star is at a great distance from us and if the manas, reaches the object after a long time, there is no certainty that the star exists in the place by the time the light of manas or antahkarana reaches it. The manas could travel to and back very speedily only if it could go almost at the speed of light (which travels 1,86,000 miles per second) to cover the distance immediately. Advaitins point out that the manas is constituted of the sattva guna, of the subtle essence of the physical elements, and that when it streams out through the vision it streams out as light tejas - which is the essence of the vision, and thus travels as fast as the light does. Further, we can suppose that light comes from the object, though the object might have gone out of existence, the light that started from it when it was there could impinge on the vision and excite the nerves causing the perception. According to Astronomical information, some stars are at a remote distance and their light takes some 'light years' distance to reach us. We may see a star now but there is no certainty that the same star will continue to exist at the same place and time - the star may have moved away or may have even ceased to exist altogether. So how can the Advaitins explain this event? how can we be sure that manas reaches out to star? The difficulty can be averted if we assume that light emanating from the star reaches the antahkarana (apprāpyakāritva character)' Likewise, so far as other cognitive acts e.g. hearing, touching etc. are concerned, it would be wise to maintain that impulses or 'sense- data' issuing from different parts of the thing and from outside reaches the manas. But it would be more reasonable to maintain that the manas ddetermines which object or features thereof, the faculty are to focus upon, and that it chooses only such data as may be required for the genesis of specific cognitive act. Advaitins would point out that this is surely a

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case for the origin of pratyakṣa pramā for the data. We think such a problem pertaining to distant object should not arise at all. Professor P.K. Sundaram and Professor P. Bilimoria have referred to such a difficulty. We believe that the object referred to in this context, should be none other than the empirical object, determined by the subject. Professor Krishnachandra Bhattacharya subscribes to such a view. According to him, the vrtti in relation to which the obejet exists, for the object is only empirical object is a dertermination of pramātr. The vrtti then points two ways, towards the self and towards the object. At each moment, the whole of manas gets transformed into vrtti (this being vivarta, not parināma), by the ripening of some sańskāra or karma seed, under the stress of the cosmic karma organism appearing as stimulus. Professor Bhattacharya points out, 'on the one hand the sanskāra gets materialised into a percept and the percept into a bodily impression; on the other hand, the cosmic stress takes the form of the phenomenal object, giving the sense-stimulus; Thus the pramātṛ Caitanya rests on the visaya Caitanya in the perception of the object as object.

We think the whole subejct-object relationship in consciousness being unintelligible to the Advaitin, where is the propriety of seeking for a satisfactory view of this relation? Turning to the peculiar view of "outgoing phychosis" (vrtti), that reaches to the locality of the object, pervades it and takes on the same form as the object, triangular, quadrangular etc. We are straight-away in the meshes of representationism. Why should a phychosis be like an object? How are we to judge the presence or extent of the likeness? By another phychosis? And does that bear a resemblance to its object and so ad-infinitum? We find ourselves bogged in a morass of logical absurdities since we are interested in the cognitive mechanism

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Dharmarājā-Advarindra, the author of Vedānta Paribhāśā seems to have flourished in the Seventeenth Century and was a reputed scholar of Southern India. The source of our knowledge is the Introduction verses to the paribhāsā and also similar verses by, his son and commentator of the two main branches of the Śamkara school of Advāita Vedānta, founded by Padmapādācārya and Ācārya Vācaspatimiśra, respectively; Dharmarājā belonged to the former. He

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comes very close to the Navya-Nyāya of Gaṅgeśa-upādhyāya, in his discussion, method and phraseology. The three most famous handbooks produced are the Paṅcadaśi of Vidyarānya (Fourteenth century). The Vedānta sāra of Sādanada (Sixteenth century) and Dharmarājā's Vedānta Paribhāśā (seventeenth century). The last of these is a lot more than merely a handbook: in fact, it is most important, possibly the only, developed treatise of the systematic stage in Advaita. It has a style that is neither expository and commentorial, nor polemical and historical. Rather Dharamarājā's style features intercoonceted definitions. Dharmarājā's training was in Navya-Nyāya and he wrote some treatises explicating that school's doctrine. He addresses himself to the smart student who knows some logic of the sort he might have learnt from a Naiyāyika.

I know only one systematic work like Dharamarājā's in Advaita, just as the Bhāśāpariccheda and Siddhānta Muktāvali occupy a similar position in Nyāya.

Why did Dharmarājā's work suddenly terminate the systematic development of Advaita?

The possible answers are:

- a) Dharamarājā was a Naiyāyika as much as an Advaitin. His Vedānta paribhāśā
 may have been a kind of tour de force emanating from a "foreign" source viz.
 Nyāya.
- b) Dharmarājā was so successful that nothing was left to be done. The critics were silenced. Writers returned to the simple exposition of the truth, realising that nothing more needs to be done along systematic lines. As such Dharamarājā's stature among Advaitins ought to be much higher than it in fact is. The fact is that it is Citsukha and Madhsudana who were regularly held up as the paragons of post-Śańkara Advaita scholasticism, not Dharmarājā.
- 1. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of knowledge, B.K.Matilal, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
- Vide my paper: 'Pratyaksa pramā in Advaita Vedānta', 'Vol. XIV, No. 1, January-March, 1987, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Pune. pp. 91-102.
- 3. Kim Jñānagatasya Pratyakṣatvasya Prayojakan Prechasi, Kim vā Viṣayagatasya? Ādye-Pramāṇa, Caitanyasya Viṣayava-cchinna-Caitanya bheda iti brūmaḥ: V. P. edited by P. Śāstri, p. 27.

to have Southern paribhāsā branches cārya and ormer. He

Bhāmati Prasthān The sense organhood of manas is admitted in 4. 'manasastvindriyatve smrteravagate kvacit indriyebhyo bhedeno padānām govaļi vardhanyāyena' or 'Indriyānam vartamānamātra viṣayatevan manasasttu traikālyagocaratvāt bhedenabhidhānam (Bhāmati).

Brahma sūtra, it is said on 5. commentary indriya ni tadvyapadesadanyatra śresthāt' 2.4.17. Sukha, dukha etc. are the unique contents of manas just as colour etc. are the contents of optical sense. Manas is distinctly mentioned as a faculty in Śāmkhya and Vaiśesika philosophy. The Nyāya aphorism "Ghrāņa rasana cakṣstvak śrotrāni indriyāni bhūtebhyaḥ" i.e. the senses, namely, the olfactory, the gustatory the visual, the cuttaneous and the auditory. These originate from material elements. The classical Nyāya Scholars seem to remain silent on this issue but in the Praśastapāda Bhāṣya, manasa is enumerated amongst the senses. Hence according to 'Tantra Yuktinyāya, 'manas is admitted in Nyāya system also. I refer to my book 'Sannikarṣavāda, published from Govi. Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for a detailed account on it.

Vivarana view:

Scholars of Vivarana School are reluctant to admit the sense organhood of manas, According to them, scholars who accept sense organhood of manas, its instrumentality for Brahma Sākṣātkara face an opposition concerning śruti and smṛti like 'Kasyaisa Khalvidṛso' Mohimati - indriya bhūtasya'.

'buddhigrāhyamti indriyam' to attain Brahmasākṣātkāra, manas need not be accepted for it is due to the instrumentality of language and sukhādijñāna is also like witnessing consciousness.

Opposing the instrumentality character of manas so many anumānas can be cited-Mano na indriyam abhautikatvāt.

Mano na indriyam Vāhya vişayesu, svatantratvāt etc.

Numerous śrūti, smṛtis can be advanced which oppose the sense organhood of manas.

- i) indriyebhyah parahyārthā arthebhyaśca; Param manaḥ (Kathopaniṣad).
- ii) atmeindriyamanoyuktam ... etc. (Katho upanişad).
- iii) indriyam manohnnam (Gītā).

In fact, all the acharyas of vivarana school assailed the sense organhood of manas.

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Pratyakșa and its Two Dimensions : Advaita Vedānta Perspective

ti Prasthān ānām govali manasasttu

Vācaspati Miśhra States, 'manas stvindriyatve smṛteravagate Kvacidindriyebhyo bhedenopādānam govalivardhanyāyena athavā indriyānām vartamāmāna mātra 6. Visayatvān manasastu traikālya gocaratvād bhedenābhindhā nam' Bhāmati - II, 4.17

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Antaḥkaraṇa, extensively existing in a body. dominated by Satvaguṇa and hence 7. subtle, of Sub-stitutive nature constituted by avidyā, reflective as mirror, comes out through the sense organs, and with the help of them approaches towards the object to be perceived, pervades the whole object and takes up its form as melten coppers do. It can extend or contract itself as sun rays can do while one opens the door or closes it. Being a sāvayava padārtha, this antaḥkaraṇa can run even as long as Sūryāloka, while still existsing body and also is capable of collecting knowledge about object existing far or near, part of antahkarana existing in body, termed as ahamakar, is known as the subject; part, in between the subject and the object is know as Vṛttijñāna or pramāṇā; part, prevailing over the object and conferring expressibility to it is known as pramiti and, unperceived Brahma Caitanya embodied object is known as prameya. Revelant pure consciousness reflects, consequently over the first three parts helping them to be revealed. Thoguh this revelant consciousness is unitary by nature, is also practised as four fold state of Pramātā, pramāṇa, prameya and pramiti, prameya caitanya, on being known, holds in it the result of knowing, This kind of modification of antahkarana is termed as 'antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti' vide Siddhāntavindu p. 57-58 Sri Madhusudan Saraswati, edited by Abhyankar, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

- 8. Tatra Yathā Tarāgodakam. pariņamate, V.P. P- 30-31.
- 9. Pramāņa Caitanyasya Vişaya-Caitanya bheda iti brūmaḥ, ibid P- 28.
- 10. Ghatadeh tadaakar Vrtteh Ca Vahirekatra dese Samava dhanat aganakatvat. V.P. P-33.
- 11. Sukhakar ayam ghaṭāḥ
- 12. Yadi caikadesasthatva matamupadheya visaya vişesanam deyam V.P. - 52.
- 13. Vide my paper 'Advaitians on Śabdāparokṣatva' in OUR HERITAGE, Bulletin of the P.G. Training & Research Govt., Sanskrit College, Calcutta Vol. XXXVII. Pt. I, 1989.
- .14. Indian Realism: A Rigorous Descriptive Metaphysics; by Professor P. K. Mukukhopadhyay, K.P. Bagchi & Co. Calcutta May, 1984.

BIJAN BISWAS

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- Ghatādeh- Vişayasya-Pratyakṣatvam tu pramatṛ abhinnatvam. Śikhāmani, a commentary on Ved. Paribhāśā P-65.
- Vide my paper "Indian Theory of Prāpyakāritva" in "Our Heritage", 1994,
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- 17. This problem is raised actually by Professor P.K. Sundaram in Advaita Epistemology, Madras, Madras University 1968.
- 18. Studies in Philosophy, edited by G. Bhattacharya, I tried to adopt the different Vedānta Concepts, at least partially as used by K.C. Bhattacharya who had a deep study of ancient *Indian Philosophy*, particularly of Ad. Vedānta, Pages 71-76 of the book are of primary importance.

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KOLAWOLE A. OWOLABI

Philosophy in the general sense of the concept refers to the critical reflection of human beings on the problem of their existence and essence. African Philosophy therefore is the activities of African people in this respect. It connotes the process of critical thinking embarked upon by the African people in the bid to solve certain problems that confront them. We need to mention that the idea of philosophy as an academic enterprise is a recent one in Africa. It is precisely an offshoot of Africa's contact with European culture. But that does not imply that Africans prior to this time never gave attention to philosophical issues, at least in an informal manner. African Philosophy as we have it today is therefore an amalgam of the various ideas and problems of traditional African thought and modern philosophical culture; employing the methodology of the Western philosophical tradition. This paper is an attempt to survey although in a critical manner the various arguments of the dominant orientations in African philosophy. In this regard our effort is historical, in the sense that we feel the urge to begin to document the movement of ideas that culminated into African philosophy as tension on the debate about the existence of African Philosophy is gradually cooling down today.

An African student of philosophy who takes a course in African philosophy for the first time may be shocked by the fact that an extensive amount of literature on African philosophy is devoted to the polemic surrounding the issue of the existence and essence of African philosophy. But the shock ought to abate if he recalls that Western philosophy throughout its history is constantly questioning its own existence and essence. The fact that African philosophy is essentially meta-philosophical confirms its status as genuinely philosophical. Any form of philosophy is and ought to be a meta-philosophical enterprise. The

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 1 January 1999

self-critical aspect of philosophy is the appropriate starting point of the philosophical programme. This self-criticism is always fruitful by generating many fundamental questions. In the same vein, the polemic concerning the essence and the existence of African philosophy generated many issues, the discussion of which forms the content of African philosophy today.

Do we have an African philosophy? This apparently simple question dominated the discourse of African Philosophy for many years. This question is first raised in reaction to Father Tempels book: Bantu Philosophy. The publication of this book brought into the concsiousness of people the fact that there can be a body of literature than can be categorised as African Philosophy simply because of the cultural context that generated it. With this innovative project of Temples, certain nagging questions in relation to African thought begun to surface such as these: What is the philosophical status of African Worldviews? "Do those worldviews demonstrate a systematic coherence and a fundamental unity from which we can deduce a distinctive African mode of thought, even a form of rationality?" Can African Philosophy be produced by mere description of the folk beliefs of the African people? What is the ideal method of extracting African philosophical materials from the body of ideas of traditional African culture? Can the methodology employed for the production of African philosophy?

Precisely, the discussion of Tempels Bantu Philosophy stimulated a vigorous debate on what is and should constitute African Philosophy. Although superficial analysis of the discourse may lead to the conclusion that the issue is simply whether African philosophy exists or not, but a deeper study of the polemics will reveal that the bone of contention is whether and how it is possible for the traditional African thought to be retrieved and presented as African philosophy. In essence, the debate is not essentially about the existence of African philosophy but about the approach for repackaging it for the consumption of the contemporary integrated and interrelated global society. In this respect, there have been four approaches which have been tagged as the four trends in African Philosophy. The four trends are: (1) Ethno-Philosophy; (2) Philosophic Sagacity; (3) Nationalist Ideological; and (4) Professional Philosophy.

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(a) Ethno-Philosophy Trend

The name ethno-philosophy has been given to the orientation in African philosophy that subscribes to the approach employed by Father Tempels in presenting the communal beliefs of the Bantu people as an example of what and how African philosophy should be. Majority of the scholars categorised as members of this orientation are theologians such as J.S. Mbiti and Bolaji Idowu, anthropologists like Mercel Griaule, Alexis Kagame and Robin Horton. It has been said that these scholars are interested in African thought for two major reasons: (i) to debunk the ethnocentric assertion made by first generation of European Africanists; that African people are incapable of rational and rigorous reflection and analysis; (ii) to make the African mentality or cultural matrix comprehensible to the Western mind especially for the purpose of the "civilizing" or colonization.

Ethno-philosophy as an orientation in African philosophy can be identified with the following features:

- (1) An acceptance of the descriptive methodology as the appropriate method of extracting African philosophical materials from the body of folk beliefs of the African people.
- (2) A salient belief in the uniformity of the diverse cultures of the African peoples.
- (3) An acceptance of the need to differentiate between African beliefs on the one hand and western assumptions on the other and the presumption that each is unique and completely distinct and parallel to the other.
- (4) The belief in a very liberal conception of philosophy that manifold ideas can be categorised as philosophical by this orientation..
- (5) A sentimental and romantic attachment to the African past, so much so that criticism of the cultural facts are completely avoided.
- (6) A conception of philosophy as the enterprise of the community rather than that of the individual. An open denial as Odera Oruka puts it of "Plato's maxim that the multitude cannot be philosophic".

Ethno-philosophy has been severely criticised by many people since the establishment of this orientation. So many are the pitfalls of this trend identified

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that one may not discuss it all in this essay. But we shall endeavour to examine the very fundamental ones. The most popular critic of ethno-philosophy, Paulin Hountondji who indeed gave it the name criticised the trend for confusing the two senses of the word "philosophy". According to him the concept refers to a strict academic enterprise and also connotes a loose act of reflection in the ordinary sense. The ethno-philosophers according to Hountondji present the loose and debase form of "philosophy" as African philosophy. In doing this ethno-philosophy seems to be implying that Africans are only capable of practising the weak form of philosophy and not the rigorous one.

Ethno-philosophy has also been criticised for its descriptive approach. The mere documentation of the folk beliefs of the African people, without proper critical analysis of it has been seen as unphilosophical. Even if there is a need for a recording of these beliefs, this can only be philosophical if it is critically and analytically reconstructed.

A mere description of the empirical world cannot satisfy these conditions. The pity is that ethno-philosophers usually fall in love so much with the thought system they seek to expound that they become dogmatic in the veneration of the culture to which the thought system belongs... They do not raise philosophical issues about the system (because for them no problems arise once we 'understand' the system); therefore, they do not attempt to give a philosophical justification of the belief system or of issues that arise in it.⁵

Finally and related to other criticisms against ethno-philosophy is the claim that ethno-philosophy rather than working dogmatically in favour of African culture and people is saliently operating for the imperialists. The ethno-philosophy project has therefore been denounced as an attempt to disarm and demobilise the process of critical reflection in Africa. Mere presentation of folk and uncritical beliefs according to the critics is a ploy to distract the focus of African people away from the more worthwhile enterprise of critical thinking that can contribute to the project of liberation that is expedient for a dependent and subservient group of people that presently occupy the African space.

(b) Philosophic Sagacity

The second trend in the debate concerning the existence of African philosophy is the Philosophic-Sagacity trend. This trend emerged as an attempt to challenge the claim that African philosophy is a myth because the individual thinkers that generate philosophical issues are absent in traditional Africa. Having accused ethno-philosophy as presenting folk ideas as African philosophy, there was the challenge of revealing the individuals capable of systematic and rigorous reflection in Africa, the way individual philosophers abound in the Western society. Philosophic-Sagacity trend is a response to this challenge. The argument of the subscribers to this approach can be summarised thus: (i) There exists in pre-colonial African societies, Sagacious people who possess the capacity to engage in rigorous and systematic thinking about problems that are genuinely philosophical. To prove this, the members of this orientation identified such Sagacious people who still exist within contemporary African society and still operate like their predecessors with genuinely African cultural materials; (ii) All societies possess extra-ordinary people who give attention to philosophical problems. These sages are the minds behind the so called folk beliefs of the society. These individuals are anonymous within African traditional society because the absence of literacy and writing culture will prevent their recognition. Therefore, the task for the contemporary African society, particularly for the trained philosophers is to prevent the remaining living sages from being denied the necessary recognition.

Philosophic-Sagacity trend has been identified with scholars such as Marcel Griaule; the French anthropologist who documented the ideas of the Dogon Sage Ogotomeli⁷; C.S. Momoh, the Nigerian Philosopher, who engaged some Uchi Sages in serious discussion about philosophical issues and problems8; Barry Hallen and Sodipo, the American and Nigerian Philosopher respectively, who analysed the philosophical assertions of some Yoruba medicine men⁹ and Odera Oruka, the Late Kenyan Philosopher who popularised this orientation 10.

The argument of the members of this orientation that there were and are still African individuals whose thoughts are sufficiently rigorous to be described as philosophical has been demonstrated further by personal engagement with some of these sages. Employing the ethno-graphic method, the believers in this approach recorded and analysed the ideas of the sages and attempted a

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systematisfation of them into a logical, consistent and coherent form. In doing this, the members of this philosophic sagacity trend demonstrate (1) That Africans are capable of rigorous reflection; (2) That African folk beliefs are not uncritical, that in fact African thinkers are as critical as their European counterparts; (3) That the African sages are independent in choosing their theme and in approaching them, they are even capable of disagreeing with the communal and conventional positions. The sages in fact "recommend only those aspects of beliefs and wisdoms which satisfy their rational scrutiny". 11

But the approach of the philosophic-sagacity trend has been criticised. Objections to this trend are basically subsumable under three categories. The first series of objections concerns the problem of identifying the real owner of the ideas produced by the engagement of the academic philosopher with the indigenous thinker. As Pater Bodunrin puts it "whose philosophy does the philosopher produce as a result of such research". 12 The second group of objections relates to the influence the professionally trained philosopher will have on the indigenous thinker, given the status of the former as an elite and the other as an illiterate. How are we sure that the trained philosopher will not be prompting or even putting words in the mouth of the sages. The last set of objections is directed at the desire of the believers in the philosophic-sagacity trend to establish the uniqueness of the ideas produced by the African sages in contradistinction to Western ideas. Can such a desire be realised given cross-cultural interactions of the world community today? Do we still have Africans who are truly insulated from Western cultural influence? We believe that such a goal is unattainable and even unwarranted. Manifestations of foreign ideas in indigenous philosophical enterprise is a reality and part of the dynamism of the contemporary age which cannot be ignored in Africa.

(c) Nationalist Ideological Orientation

The third trend in the discourse on the existence of African philosophy is the Nationalist-Ideological trend. The people who have been categorised as members of this orientation are the first generation of statesment and politicians who were in the vanguard of independence movement. Prominent politicians who have been identified with this trend are Kwame Nkurumah, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Amilcar Cabral and others.

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We need to mention that these people did not argue for the existence of In doing an African Philosophy in a direct manner. Indeed, their purpose in philosophy (1) That is secondary. It is not their fundamental objective to partake in the discourse fs are not concerning the existence or otherwise of African philosophy. Rather, they stray European into philosophy because of their belief that the genuine liberation and eir theme development of Africa cannot be realised unless it is based on a well developed with the system of ideas which is authentic and unique to the African societt. The only those members of the Nationalist-ideological trend feel that this authenite and unique system of ideas was the foundation of the pre-colonial African society. But they criticised. also realise that this body of ideas had been disturbed by colonialism and its ries. The

Simply put, Nationalist-Ideological orientation argues that the project of liberation of the African people demand that the traditional African thought system should be revived as the foundation of the new society. Certain basic positions are accepted by virtually all the members of this orientation. Those positions can be summarised thus:

- (1) The belief in an authentic African thought in traditional African society and the assumption that the traditional ideas sustained the pre-colonial African society.
- (2) The sentimental belief that this traditional system of ideas ensured social order and peaceful co-existence in the traditional African society and the yearning for the return of the old order.
- (3) The belief that the traditional African society was egalitarian and communalistic, so much so that there was peace and order.
- (4) The claim that post-colonial African society can only realise full liberation and genuine development if it is based on the traditional African social and political philosophy.

But these arguments of the Nationalist-Ideological trend have been criticised. The first argument against this orientation is that the body of traditional ideas which they seek to employ are completely lost to history. The second argument against the trend is that the beautiful and romantic picture of the African past painted by the African nationalists is a figment of their imagination. According to the critics of the trend, abundant evidence are in place to debunk

nilosophy orised as oliticians oliticians old Sedar the belief that traditional African past was glorious. As Bodunrin puts it: "A way of life which made it possible for our ancestors to be subjugated by a handful of Europeans cannot be described as totally glorious". The last fundamental argument against the position of the nationalists is to the effect that the ideas of the ancient past cannot be adequate to meet the challenges of the contemporary world. How can the ancient ideas be adequate for the demands of the modern society of today?

(d) Professional Philosophy

The last trend in the discourse of African philosophy is the Professional Philosophy trend. The trend has as its members the professionally trained philosophers who have imbibed the Western orientation of practising philosophy. At the centre of this trend are the first generation of academic philosophers in Africa, namely: Kwasi Wiredu of Ghana; Peter Bodunrin of Nigeria; Paulin Hountondji of Benin Republic and Henry Odera Oruka of Kenya.

This category of philosophers has been accused of denying the existence of African Philosophy simply because they disagreed with the presentation of folk beliefs as African Philosophy by the ethno-philosophers. The fundamental contribution of this orientation to the enterprise of African Philosophy is that they purified the discipline by ensuring that the debase form of philosophy is not adopted as African philosophy.

The arguments of the professional philosophers are these:

- (1) African Philosophy like Western Philosophy must be a strict, rigorous and critical discipline. It must not be seen in the popular sense of the idea as the totality of worldview of the African people. The professional philosophers who belong to this trend are mindful of the need to demarcate the philosophical from the non-philosophical.
- (2) They have a universal conception of philosophy. In this sense, they feel that if African philosophy should be different from its Western counterpart, the variation should not be fundamental. African philosophy to some of them, is the work of professionally trained Africans in all areas of philosophy. It is desirable that the works be set in some African context, but it is not necessary that they be so. 14

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- (3) African traditional thought cannot be categorised as a philosophical piece because it lacks the written culture which is a necessity for the formulation of philosophical tradition.
- (4) The only way that Ethno-philosophy can attain the status of philosophy is through the process of critical analysis of its products. Ethno-philosophy can only produce the raw materials which will be further refined using the traditional philosophical tools. "It is not enough simply to collect information about what our ancestors said or thought, we must try to interpret, clarify, analyse and where appropriate after a critical evaluation, assimilate and develop the resulting body of thought". 15
- (5) African philosophy instead of venerating the African culture the way the Ethno-philosophers do, ought to critically engage with the culture. It ought to criticise certain items in our culture that do not favour our development as a society. It can also reconstruct the culture in order to make it respond appropriately to societal challenges.
- (6) African philosophy to them is more of a potentiality than an actuality. Unlike the ethno-philosophers who mamintain that the enterprise is established, the professional philosophers contend that it is still in the making and needs the effort of those properly trained philosophers. "African philosophy as distinct from African traditional worldviews, the philosophy that is being produced by contemporary African philosophers, is still in the making." 16

The polemics surrounding the discourse of African philosophy since the commencement of academic philosophy have been dominated by members of professional philosophy trend and their opponents. The critical attitude of the professional philosophers particularly for the materials of ethno-philosophy has been seriously challenged. In this respect, professional philosophy trend has been accused of elitism, universalism, imperialism and of so many other things.

The major criticism levelled against the members of this orientation is directed at their goal of establishing African philosophy as an aspect of Universal enterprise of philosophy. This Universalism according to critics, does not take into consideration the fact that all philosophies are produced from different cultural contexts. The conception of philosophy as a universal enterprise fails to take into consideration the cultural diversities of the world and the fact that every

culture reflects on those problems that are pressing to them. The cultural original philosophical problems and the cultural dimension of their solutions purposes on the desire of the professional philosophers to integrate Africal philosophy into the so called universal philosophical culture.

Related to the above criticism is the argument that the professional philosophers having been schooled in the Western tradition seek to entrench the Western Orientation in Africa. The intellectual imperialism that the professional philosophers are accused of, is said to be behind their ambition of trying to force all the techniques of Western philosophy on the African enterprise. Since Western paradigms and tools cannot effectively meet the challenges and aspirations of Africa, the professional philosophers have encouraged its adoption in order to further consolidate Africa's dependency on Western culture. To avoid this, it is argued that African philosophy ought to be established as a unique and distincenterprise that will reflect on the problems that are peculiar to Africa. The establishment of an African philosophy, the critics of Professional philosophy maintain, is to forge and consolidate the identity of African people which have been seriously undermined by Western Scholarship.

Our attempt so far, is to revisit the identified four orientations i philosophy. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now say that virtually all th four tendencies benefited the discourse of African philosophy. Ethno-philosoph can be credited with providing the raw materials needed for analysis and als for insisting that our indigenous culture can only be neglected at our own peri The nationalist-Ideological trend should also be commended for raising th fundamental themes of indentity and development. Their discourse has put i focus the imperative of reflecting on the issues of our freedom and development without which any form of reflection will be hair-splitting. The Sagacious trent cannot also be ignored. The transition between the traditional and the modern's encaptured by the African Sages. For the transition to be smooth and fruitful their didactic and philosophical Knowledge should be documented. The importance of the professional philosophers cannot be over emphasised because they are the heirs of this emerging tradition. The tools that they have supplied are indispensable for the African philosophical project. In all, the controvers over the essence and existence of African philosophy, long as it may be, he

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provided us with the appropriate starting point. We can then begin to say that African philosophy has come of age.

NOTES

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MAN-WOMAN RELATIONSHIP IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

MEENA A. KELKAR

One of the important issues in the present day Indian context is to discover the space for a possible theorization in feminism. The articulation of man-woman relationship provdies a nexus of such and other related inquiries. This relationship is expressed by three different models in ancient Indian philosophy. The models are not separately given but they occur in the context of mataphysical theory of the classification of reality. Most of the classifications of reals speak of two types - the living and the non-living. The classification of reality into male-female type is something which is unique in itself. Whether reality can be classified in this way or whether such an attempt presupposes a different kind of perspective are problems that need serious consideration. This paper attempts to evolve the possible perspective for making this type of classification and in the light of this perspective tries to elaborate the three models of man-woman relationship and suggest their implications for feminist theory.

According to the Indian tradition, the knowledge of any object is not only through reason but also through experience. Most of the classical Indian philosophies (darśanas) accept direct sense-perception as a means of knowledge along with others. The so-called exclusive commitment either to reason or to perception does not arise in this context. Everything is an object of both perception and reason. There is no experience that is exclusively rational or exclusively perceptual but every bit of experience is a gestalt of the interplay of both the rational and the perceptual.

The description of reality that comes from the classical Indian philosophy not only refers to the conceptual classification of reality but it also refers to the perception of reality. The direct experience of reality many a time has been expressed in the naive and childlike language of perception. This language is the language of sound, touch, physical form and smell.

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Logically, a distinction can be made between conceptualization and perception. Thus Schopenhauer makes a distinction between concept and what he calls an idea, so as to distinguish philosophy and aesthetics. According to him, the domain of philosophy is the domain of reason, reflection and conceptualizaton. The domain of art, on the other hand, necessarily involves perception, feeling and imagination. Concepts which play an important role in philosophy have a determinate and fixed meaning. The meanings of the concepts do not change so often. But they are barren and unproductive in art. Concepts are to be understood and not to be perceived. Ideas are used in the field of art. They resemble living organisms as they have a generative force, which brings forth that which was not previously put into them. Ideas are not to be understood but they are to be perceived. Yet both philosophy and art are interrelated in that both seek to answer the question "What is life?" by different means, art by percepts and philosophy by concepts.

However, as has been said earlier, the logical distinction between conceptualization and perception does not in any way disfigure the description of reality made by ancient Indian philosophers. The conceptual classification of reality is simultaneously pregnant with imaginative awareness of reality. This imaginative awareness of reality is suggestive and is expressed through various models and images. Such descriptions of reality are the best exemplifications of aesthetic sensibility.²

All Indian philosophical theories are called 'darśan'. The term 'darśan' not only implies knowledge but direct experience of reality. The models and images that speak for the reality are such that they are related to the form of life. They are made from actual lived situations by a process of abstraction. They act as heurists devices for pointing to some form of life. At the same time models also act as exemplars for present day living of men and women who consciously follow and practise them in their own ways. Thus these models hint at the man-women relationship that existed and was lived sometimes. They also act as guides for the man-woman relationships in the future. Indian philosophy consists of three models of man-woman relationship (1) The Brahma-Māyā model. (2) The Purūṣa-prakṛtī model and (3) The Śiva-Śakti model. These models have important implications for feminism. At this point, It is necessary to see as to how models are different from symbols. In a sense, models are also symbols.

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Symbols are used for representing objects. Models not only represent the objects but also have a formal structure by virtue of which they can be used as heuristic devices for analysis and justification of new thoughts or theories. Yet they can be said to have two aspects which the symbols have. Paul Ricoeur narrates two aspects of symbols - the regressive and the progressive.³

The regressive aspect refers to all those suppressed desires and ambitions of which a human being is not conscious. The progressive aspect throws light on new ideals and moral points of view and, in this sense, symbols have a prophetic flavour. The above mentioned models can be considered from these two aspects. From the psycho-analytic point of view, a search can be made for all those personal and racial memory impressions that have imprinted their marks on the unconscious mind. From another point of view, a search can be made for exploring new horizons of ideals and new normative forms of life that emerge from these models. The construction of utopia would become a challenge in this context. But there is one more reason for treating models as means of research. Models, being symbolic, are means of discovery. As psychiatrist Rolo May had pointed out, they progressively reveal a structure in our relation to nature and our own existence. They reveal a new ethical form and by drawing out inner reality they enable a person to experience greater reality in the outside world as well. The Brahma-Māyā, the Purūsa-Prakṛtī, and the Śiva-Śakti mdoels can be considered from this point of view.

Most of the classical western philosophers have classified reality into mind and matter but there is no attempt to make use of the pair of male and female. (the Pythagorean classification includes references to masculinity and feminity but they are treated as qualities and not as substances). The intention behind this exercise is to classify reality. But naming the elements is followed by personifying them. Personification of reals is the unique feature of classical Indian Mataphysics. It is because of this imaginative exercise the elements of the world not only become concepts but also become models. In this way, the domain of philosophy and art merge into one another and do not remain apart as has been suggested by Schopenhauer. Such an exercise provides a wide space for two altogether different theories of modern aesthetics. One of them, namely structuralism, emphasizes the basic structure of the theory and consequently gives more importance to concepts. The other one, Deconstructionism, emphasises the

changing shades of meaning and hence gives more importance to everchanging interpretations. It is interesting to see how both these extreme theories almost converge upon one another. The models used are not models from science. They are not devices to represent some abstract entities but are models from aesthetics. They are not only representations but superimpositions or projections on reality, They presuppose a particular perspective of understanding and interpreting the form of life. The personified elements thus become the vehicles of meaning They capture a segment of reality and open up a new way of living. If unmasked they exhibit layers of meaning. But the meanings are never determinate and stable. Different agents at different times and places interpret them in different ways. According to Derrida, this technique is called "active classification" and it is contrasted with the technique of passive classification which takes the form of conceptual analysis.5 However, conceptual analysis can go hand-in-hand with interpretations, including new ones. The contrast made by Darrida becomes more complex because the models of Brahma-Māyā, Purūṣa-Prakrtī and Śiva-Śakti are not mechanical models but are organic. The Derridan distinction cannot be applied to these organic models. The two techniques -- the active classification and the passive classification cease to remain unrelated and separate. On the other hand, their everchanging, continuous interplay and configuration add one more dimension to the total complex of meaningfulness. The models are founded on a framework that is rooted in real life situations. The 'inner design'itself becomes flexible and everchanging. The models get a new context and a new meaning everytime. Both the processes of making models and of interpreting them are carried out continuously and this exercise becomes a part of our living.

The consideration of the three models from this point of view may highlight neglected areas of Indian philosophy. The models of reality now should not only be considered from the conceptual point of view but they have to be appreciated from the aesthetic point of view. In order that such an appreciation becomes fruitful and philosophically relevant, the models and the foundational form of life have both to be taken note of. In the normal form of life, man-woman relationship is very complex. Sometimes they are taken to be equals. Sometimes a woman is treated as subordinate and sometimes a woman is given greater importance.

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ometimes in greater The 'Śiva-Śakti' model of the Śākta philosophy refers to a form of life where woman's position is stronger and more pronounced. The Śiva-Śakti model of the Śaiva philosophy suggestes that both are equals. The Purūṣa-Prakṛtī model gives more importance to the differences between man and woman. As Māyā is non-different from Brahman, the Brahma-Māyā model does not give any separate status to woman.

The Brahma-Māyā model - The Advaita Vedānta describes reality in terms of Brahman. Brahman refers to the pure existence that has no qualities, no form. It is pure consciousness and it is free. It is the source of creation, growth and destruction of the world.6 Whatever exists in the world is the expression of Brahman. Existence, dynamism and livingness are the properties of Brahman: When human beings attempt to understand Brahman from human point of view, they impose human attributes on the reality that has no such attributes. Brahman which has no qualities, no form, now becomes a personified God. The God (Iśvara) is also a manifestation of Brahman. It is because of ignorance the human being forgets the real nature of oneself as non-different from Brahman and this results in the identification of oneself with one's body. This identification further gives rise to distinctions like you and me, yours and mine and the whole web of human world is fabricated.⁷ This phenomenal world is the world of names and forms. This is called" Prapanca". The human world, along with the notions of truth and falsity, rightness and wrongness, and the everyday form of life that is based on distinction, are products of human creation. The origin of this anthropocentricism lies in the process of superimposition (Adhyāsa). Howerver, just as the whole living and non-living world is the expressin of Brahman, so also God is but one expression of Brahman. It is because of superimposition of human qualities, Brahman appears to be God (İśvara) that has a human form. The power of God is called Avidyā or Māyā. It is because of $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ or ignorance one forgests one's real nature and thinks that one is a physical body. Ignorance or $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ is not created by humans, although human beings are governed by it and are subject to its functioning. The creator of Māyā is God, hence he is called "Māyin". Māyā functions for the playful enjoyment of the God.

 $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ does not have independent existence but it cannot be said to be non-existent, either, since human beings are affected by her. $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ is said to be

indescribable. Māyā functions in two ways. It envelops an object so that it cannobe perceived properly⁸, consequently an object appears different from what it is It obstructs the knowledge of an object. The phenomenal world of names and forms is illusory and not real in the true sense of the term. Sometimes a rope appears to be like a serpent. The cognition that it is a serpent is an illusion and when the illusion vanishes, only the rope remains. The phenomenal world is also illusory like a serpent.

The term "Brahman" transcends all notions of feminity or masculinity. I stands for Existence, Par exelence and various forms of gods and godde ses an nothing but manifestations of Brahman. However, these gods and goddesses have phenomenal existence. Māyā depends for her existence on God. God is the creator of the world that is real in the true sense of the term. On the other hand due to Māyā, the illusion of the phenomenal world occurs. Māyā is lifeless and does not have any purpose of its own existence. It is created for entertaining the God.

The model of Brahma-Māyā is important in many ways. Māyā does not exist in the true sense of the term. She is not substance proper. The very mode of her existence is of a lower order. A woman also belongs to the lower level of existence. She does not have an independent existence in the sense she does not have her own purpose for life. Her whole existence and living is for the sake of man. The Manusmṛtī and other ancient treatises state that it is woman's duty to give sexual satisfaction to the male and procreate. The Manusmṛtī also narrates laziness, fickleness and lying as the natural, inborn qualities of woman. It is said that she is not at all worthy of trust. It is emphasized that she has always to be under the control of her parents, husband and sons. All this implies attributions of wholly dependent and slave-like existence.

Many implications about man-woman relationship follow from the above male point of view. The relation between a man and a woman is never taken to be a relation between two equals. A woman has no identity and she is also not supposed to have her identity. Whatever identity she is supposed to have is conferred on her by males. She is like a slave and a male is like a master. A slave does not have his own wish, similarly a woman cannot act according to her wish but she has to follow the duties that are prescribed by man. The moral code of conduct, which is almost followed religiously, looks upon woman as

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Man-woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy

property. Ancient Indian law speaks of women and children as the property of the male. The clubbing together of women, *Vaisyas* and *śudras* in *Geetā* implicitily presupposes the prejudice that woman has no mind and hence no capacity to think. This prejudice is presented in the *Brahma-Māyā* model.

The Purūsa - Prakṛtī Model - The second model is the Sānkhya model of Purūṣa and Prakṛtī. The Sānkhya philosophy speaks of Puruṣa - Prakṛtīī as two independent substances. Both are pure existents and cannot be perceived directly. Purūṣa is sentient and eternally existent. He is the seer and one who witnesses everything (sākṣi). Having no qualities, he is not subject to the experience of pleasure and pain. Sentience is the mark of Purūṣa. He is neither the doer nor the enjoyer. He is neutral and indifferent towards the experiences of the world. He is above bondage and liberation in the sense that he never falls into bondage or gets liberated. The experience of pleasure and pain are of the body-mind complex (jīva) and never of the Purūṣa. The Purūṣa identifies itself with body-mind amalgum and hence experiences sorrows. The moment he understands that he is wholly and radically different from the subtle body-mind organism, he is liberated. According to Sānkhya philosophy Purūṣas are many and because of their contact with the Prakṛtī they get the forms of subtle body-mind organisms.

The second substance is *Prakṛtī*. *Prakṛtī* is inert and is wholly devoid of consciousness. Yet she has to go through the cycle of birth and death. The distinctive quality of Prakṛtī is that she is active, although she has neither consciousness nor knowledge. ¹⁰

Prakṛtī is made up of three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva produces knowledge of doing many things. Rajas initiates the tendency to act and Tamas stops the tendency to act and promotes lethargy. The three qualities act and interact with one another, sometimes helping one another, and other times dominating one another. They behave and co-exist like man and woman. The state of their equilibrium is called "Primordial Prakṛtī (Mūla-Prakṛtī)". The coming together of these three qualities is not for one's own self because Prakṛtī is lifeless (unconscious). It is activated for the sake of enjoyment and liberation of the Purūṣa. Her activity is as natural as the occurrence of milk in the cow for her calf. The mere existence of sentient, neutral Purūṣa activates Prakṛtī. The coming together of Purūṣa and Prakṛtī is like coming together of a lame

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person and a blind person. 12 The whole world of phenomena is produced of this coming together of *Purūṣa* and *Prakṛtī*.

Prakrti's experiences of pleasure and pain. He becomes unhappy and quests in liberation. Ultimately, he understands that he is radically different from Praket The knowledge of his true identity (being) liberates him. If there is no one see and enjoy, the very functioning of Prakrtī has no meaning. The minute but that comes into contact with different gross bodies acts like an actor. In this we Purūsa has to undergo sufferings of birth, old age and death until the minute body is destroyed. The dancer goes to the back side of the stage as soon as he dance is over. Similarly, once the world has been created, Prakṛtī become indifferent towards the world. Purūṣa is always pure, free and conscious. On Prakṛtī has bondage or liberation. 13

The model of Purūṣa-Prakṛtī refers to two independent substances. unmasked, it exhibits one more form of man-woman relationship. Man at woman have each their own identity. They have their own independent existent and their own distinctive qualities. Their existence, however, is qualitative different. Purūṣa has consciousness but Prakrti is devoid of it. She does not ha an iota of consciousness. The distinctive quality of Purūṣa is knowledge, a the distinctive quality of Prakṛtī is capacity to act. 14 Yet their coming togeth is purposive. They come together in order to compensate for their ov imperfections. Purūṣa does not undertake any activity. He is basically pure a free. But because of his contact with Prakṛtī, he is dragged into the cycle! phenomenal world. He does not act but, being conscious, his mode of existent is of a superior kind. Similarly, a man, by nature, is supposed to be superior A woman, being on par with unconscious inanimate objects, has no intelligend Her mode of existence itself is of a lower level. Yet she has the artistic qualities of an actress like that of charming the people. The concept of Prakṛtī express the view that a woman lures and hypnotizes. Yet the status of Prakrti is high than the status of Māyā in Brahma-Māyā model, for Prakṛtī has an independe existence. She is the cause of the world and the God does not participate in the creation of the world. This model presupposes that the roles of man and wom are basically different. Yet their coming together is governed by pragmatic considerations. The view that both of them co-operate in order to fulfil the

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Man-woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy

missions suggests prudence in practical life. Here the utility consideration becomes more important than the understanding between man and woman. No understanding and cooperation between them is hinted. Apparently the relation between them looks like the relation between two equal beings - but the qualities attributed to woman are such that she is almost like pre-ordained executive who carries out the plan of the board of directors. She has no identity of her own nor has she the power of making decisions. She is also not supposed to know that one must have such an identity. She is a slave-ex-machine.

Such a view implicitly presupposes the modern biological and psychological determinism in terms of which the differences between man and woman are projected to be basically natural and hence unavoidable.

The third model is the Śiva-Śakti model. This model comes from Kaśmiri Śaivism, Śākta philosophy and from the philosophy of Jñāneshwara.

Kaśmiri Śaivism: In this philosophy, Śiva is believed to be all pervading, eternal and pure consciousness. He is beyond perception and conception. The word Śiva is beyond the comprehension of language and thought. The realization of Śiva is never through words or thoughts. There is no ida or symbol that fully represents 'Śiva'. No human intellect can understand it. He is not an object of knowledge and yet can be directly experienced.

Kaśmiri Śaivism believes Śiva to be a personal God Iśvara. Īśvara is full of love. 16 Śaktī is an inseparable part of the loving God. Vendānta does not give an independent status to Māyā. Sānkhya takes Prakṛtī to be lifeless. In keen contrast Śaivism states that Śakti is not inert but living. She is Śiva's energy. She is the knowledge, activity and desire of Śiva. 17 Sometimes she becomes the power of will. Volition is the grace of God and it creates desire for emanicipation. The power to know is a means to know God. Sometimes she becomes the power of activity. It is in and through the power of activity that the whole world continues to survive and grow. 18

Śakti is the cause of both -- bondage and liberation. It is through the medium of Śakti that Śiva becomes one with the whole creation or world. It is through the exercise of Śākti that Śiva becomes the creator, caretaker and destroyer of the selves. The whole universe is created through Śakti. Śiva is not created by Śākti and Śakti is not created by Śiva. In fact, Śiva and Śakti are

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just two names. Both the names refer to the same existence, (reality). $Siva_{is}$ the quiet, silent and neutral state of $Siva_{is}$ and $Siva_{is}$ is the dynamic, active state of $Siva_{is}$. The relation between $Siva_{is}$ and $Siva_{is}$ is like the relation between the Sun and the rays of the Sun. They are one.

The attempt to trace the roots of this model leads us to a form of life where man and women are equals. Yet on the metaphysical level, they do not refer to two separately existing realities. It is only on the level of attributes that they are different. Both of them are expressions of one and the same existence. There are similarities and differences in them. They are similar in respect of being living and conscious. They are different in the sense man is neutral and passive but woman is active and dynamic, she takes interest in everything. Their coming together is something that is natural.

This model places man and woman in a wider context of 'being human' but this context does not produce any new thought. The suggestion that both are human beings does not lead to forming a specific relationship between the two. From the grammatical point of view, man becomes the subejet and woman as his power becomes either a quality or an activity. Thus there is one-sided dependence of woman on man. This dependence is expressed by treating her like an object. Hence Kasmirī Śaivism does nto provide any foundation for equality between man and woman.

Śākta Philosophy: The Śiva-Śākti mdoel is also used by Śākta philosophy. Yet the Śākta model and consequently the model used by Tantrism is very much different from Kaśmirī Śaivism model and also from other varieties of Śaivism. According to Śākta philosophy, the realtiy on which the existence of the world depends is both the formal and efficient cause of the world. The belief that there is feminine element at the root of every creation is central to the Śākta philosophy. This basic reality or energy behind the creation is everpresent. There is neither creation nor destruction of energy, but only transformations. This reality has no beginning and no end. It is eternal, self luminous and dynamic. The Śākta philosophy calls this state as Śiva-Śakti Samarasya. In this original state of unity or oneness, Śiva element is inactive. On the empirical level, even the element that is called is Śiva is also a form of Śakti. One cannot talk of Śiva without Śakti. The world is grounded in the

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Man-woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy

oneness of Śakti and Śiva. Both are independent and yet they are together. There is an implicit harmony between them. There is a feeling of oneness and a sense of belongingness between them. This is the original primordial state of existence. At the next level, the feeling of oneness is replaced by the feeling of one's own distinctness. This creates the feeling of one's own identity against the awareness of the other. Both the elements then start acting and reacting against one another. These two forms of energy are called fire (Agni) and the moon (Soma). Fire produces suffering and death. Soma (the moon) produces happiness and life. The function of fire is to destroy and that of the moon is to create. The whole world is the play of Śiva and Śakti. It is the throbbing of energy or Śākti. Śakti is non-different from Śiva. When she desires to see the functioning of Śiva and Ātmā, the creation of the world takes place.²³

The whole universe is implicitly present in the womb of this great power (Mahāsaktī). The origination, growth and decay of the world is but the play of this power. Siva is sentient and luminous, Sakti is dynamic. The Sākta philosophy states that Śiva-Śakti is both sentience and dynamism (Sat, cit) harmonized together. Śakti is free, she produces livingness which gives rise to the awareness of one's own self. This awareness of oneself is a form of Śiva, but Śiva is also an inseparable part of Śakti. Jīva or individual self is identical with Śiva. When the self forgets its identity and becomes aware of its physical body, it develops ego and becomes proud. It is only by the grace of the teacher that it becomes aware of its real nature. In its unity with Siva, the power of worship (Bhakti) on the part of the self becomes one with the sentience of Siva and a feeling of oneness is created. The self becomes Śiva like but not Śiva himself. The worship of Śiva, (Bhakti) is not converted into Śakti but it becomes like Śakti. In this state, there is no question of either bondage and liberation. What remains is the self-luminous, harmonious and everflowing existence, par excellence. This is the perfect state of the existence of the universe.²⁴

This model of Siva-Sakti would have given a new turn to feminist thoughts. All other philosophies presuppose a male's point of view. Central to $S\bar{a}kta$ -philosophy is the thesis that the world is produced by female element. Siva is also considered as the form of Sakti. Here woman is considered to be the mother of everything. She is neither inert nor like an animal but living and intelligent. She is not the object of enjoyment but like a man she is an enjoyer,

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an agent. She does not act as an obstruction to liberation but she helps in liberating the self. There are many beautiful names of the goddess in the $S\bar{a}kta$ philosophy. $Mok \bar{s}ad\bar{a}$ (the giver of liberation) is one among them. The $S\bar{a}kta$ philosophers believe that realization of self is also the result of the awakening of a power (Sakta) which is called "Kun dalini".

A woman not only gives birth but she also brings up the young ones. In the $M\bar{a}rkandeya$ $Pur\bar{a}na$, the goddess says that she would nourish the whole world with the life-sustaining vegetables, which would grow out of her own body and that after the heavy rains, she would again come on eath, as $S\bar{a}kambhari$. The $S\bar{a}kta$ philosophy glorifies the woman. Motherhood has always been a matter of respect for the Indians. The various forms of Sakti occur in the different forms of goddesses and their worship. The model of Sakti at least gives us a clue to infer that sometimes there must have been matriarchal societies in which woman reigned supreme.

At the practical level, the model implies that man and woman are on par with one another. They have their own distinctive qualities and yet none of them is either superior or inferior. The model is suggestive of a peaceful, harmonious co-existence of man and woman. It explicitly expresses equality that is demanded by the feminists. But, more importantly, the model supplies hints to develop a possible ontology and epistemology of feminism. Freedom, dynamism, power of creation, luminosity, the throbbing of life are some of the qualities that would be necessary for such a theory. This theory would look upon nature not as a resource but as a source of life. If mother's point of view is generalised nothing remians except love and benevolence for the world. However, if feminism would take this stance, there is the danger of creating the female counterpart of male chauvinism, where, instead of man, woman would dominate, matranize and do everything that is done by man in a male-dominated society. On the other hand, the Siva-Sakti model opens a new possibility wherein transcendence of male-chauvinism as well as feminism itself becomes a necessary step. Here transcendence does not mean destruction of masculinity or feminity but awarencess of a limit - a point of perfection beyond which the differences cannot be stretched. Such a transcendence would provide for the creation of a new kind of world, a world in which man and woman are in perfect harmony joy, and

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peace with each other. The Śiva-Śakti model is thus the symbol of the ideal man-woman relationship.

Śiva-Śakti model of Jñāneśwar: In "Anubhavāmṛta", Jñāneśwar talks about the creation of the world as the result of coming together of Siva and Śakti. According to him Śiva and Śakti are independent and equal yet because of love they cannot remain away from one another. Dr. Pradeep Gokhale presentes Jñāneshwara's description of Śiva-Śakti at four different levels.25 On the first level, both the elements are independent. The essential properties of Siva element are existence, capacity to perceive, enjoy and act. The essential properties of Sakti element are capacity 'to be perceived' to become an object of perception. Both come together and a child in the form of the world comes into existence. Siva and Sakti can stay away from one another but because of their attraction and love towards one another they live together and not separately. At the next level, it is impossible for them to live separately because Sakti becomes the quality of Siva. Both are expression of existence, par excellence, both are luminous. They live so happily that their so-called separate existence is also illusory. They are one and the same. At this level Śakti cannot be separated from Siva, just as sweetness cannot be separated from jaggery. This view is similar to Kaśmiri Śaivism model. At the third level, Śiva-Śakti are not separated but they are one. Both are just two names of Siva or, just as well of Sakti. Jñāneśwar states that the difference between man and woman is also the expression of one single Siva-element.

At the fourth level, the whole world is split into two parts *Śiva* and *Śakti*. Both of them refer to separate substances but yet they are not mutually exclusive. They are mingled together. This model seems to have been assumed in the image of "Ardhanārī Nateśwara". In a sense, they are beyond one and many. They are so experienced together that one cannot understand whether it is the experience of *Śiva* or of *Śakti*. Jñāneśwar also believes like Kaśmiri-Śaivism that the whole world is produced out of *Śakti* in the form of knowledge, desire and action. He says that the world is the expression of *Śiva*. Just as the moon and its light, the ocean and its waves cannot be separated, similarly *Śiva* and the world cannot be separated. The world becomes a sportive play of *Śiva* and *Śakti*.

The consideration of these four types of relationship with reference to feminism evokes four different types of man-woman relationship. At the first

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level, man and woman are independent and equal. Both have consciousness and intelligence. Man is capable of action, he is the doer, enjoyer and observer woman, on the other hand, is the object of action, an object of enjoyment. Both of them have their own distinctive natures but their love for one another doe not allow them to remain separate. However, there is a logical possibility that they can live separately. In this context, the love and understanding becomes more important but the relation of the enjoyer and that which is an object of enjoyment does not vanish.

At the second level, woman becomes the power of man. The relation between man and woman becomes a relation between substance and quality. Thus both are not on par with each other. There is no reciprocal relation between the two.

At the third level, man and woman are just two names of Siva, the difference between them is a matter of nominal, linguistic type. In reality they do not have an independent existence. Both are imperfect and unless they come together they cannot overcome their imperfections.

At the fourth level, man and woman turn out to be two different modes of existence. Their personalities and qualities are different yet they are interdependent. This view suggests that, although being equal and independent, they cooperate with one another. Siva-Sakti model in this sense can give rise to equality between man and woman because even after coming together their distinctive qualities are not destroyed. Their identity is preserved. On the psychological level, some qualities are common to both man and woman but some qualties are different and unique. This particular view springs from Siva-Sakti model of this type, The psychological questions about the uniquencess of qualities with reference to man and woman will have a different dimension from this model. Yet this model acts like a metaphor. It does not provide the determinants of heterogeneity or homogeneity, either explicity or implicitly.

The discussion of these above mentioned models at least suggests that the articulation of man-woman relationship has anthropological, philosophical, psychological, social, political and aesthetic aspects. Any question of feminism in the context of Indian tradition demands serious attention to these various aspects.

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Man-woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy

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The consideration of these three models also suggests one thing, that is, even within the male dominated discourse there is a possibility of progressive transcendence in terms of better attitude towards woman. The same discourse contains Brahma-Māyā model that denies any status to woman, the Purūṣa-Prakrtī model that grants independent existence to woman and the Śiva-Śakti model opens up a new form of life wherein woman is respected. Both the glorified and the denigrated versions of the models highlight new areas of research in feminism.

NOTES

- Schopenhauer, "The World as will and Representation" (Payne E.F. 1) (tranas.)
 Dover Publications, 1969, Vol. II, page 235 and page 406.
- 2. These models are not expressions of primitive modes of thinking where language is not very important but they are expressions of a refined sensibility. At times, maturity in thinking leads to the awareness of the limits of language. The classical Indian thinkers however did not think (like Wittgenstein) that one should remain silent where language falls short of expression. On the other hand, for them the limits of language open up new and novel ways of 'sensing' the things. The reality exhibits itself and the expreience of reality is a matter of 'perceiving' and not just thinking.
- 3. Paul Ricoeur, "These authentic symbols are truly regressive progressive, rememberance gives rise to anticipation; archaism gives rise to prophecy" ... Such symbols both disguise and reveal; (page 497 from Frued and Philosophy translated by Denis Savage. Yale Uni. Press, 1970.)
- Rolo May (edited, Introduction), Symbolism in Religion and Literature, George Braziller, New York, 1961. Page 45.
- 5. Derrida, J., Writing and Difference, Bass. A. (trans.), Routledge and Kegan Paul, Page 11, Page 292 as quoted by Stuart Sirn in his essay, 'Structuralism and Post-Structuralism'. pages 426, 427. From Philosophical Aesthetics and Introduction (ed.) Oswald Hanfling Blackwell, 1972.
- 6. Janmādyasya Yatah, Second Verse, Brahmasūrtrabhāṣye Vaidika Śānkar Advaitamatānuvāda, (Marathi), edited and Published by D.V.Jog, 1954, Page 589.

- Adhyāsa-bhāṣya, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Page 170.
- 8. In the Atharva Veda and Aaitereya Brāhmaņa the term Māyā has been used; the sense of magical power.
- 9. The Manusmṛti, Adhyaya 9. Verses 17, 14, 13 and 16. From Shri Sārlı Manusmṛti, edited and translated into Marathi by Pandit Ramchandra Sass Ambadas Joshi, Sri Gurudev Prakasan, Pune 411 002.
- Sānkhya Kārikā, versa 19, edited by Dr. Ramashankar Tripathi (Hindi), Varanas 1970.
- 11. Ibid., verse 57.
- 12. Śańkaracāryā argues that Purūśa is indifferent, passive and cannot activate Prakņi Even a lame person has to act in order to help a blind person. Purūśa is simply incapable of any action. So the analogy of the blind and the lame person break down. See "Brahmasūtrabhāshya" Adhyāya 2, Pāda 2, Sutra 7. From the Marah translation of Śańkarbrahmasūtra. Volume 2.by Vāsudevśāstri Abhyankar an Prof. Cāndorkar. Published by Bhāndarkar Oriental Research Institute, Punt October 1957.
- 13. Sankhyakārika, verse 59 and 62, edited by Rāmasankar Tripathi (Hindi) Varanasi, 1970.
- 14. It is because of the dynamic, active nature of *Prakṛti*. Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyar seems to hold the view that the *Prakṛti Purūśa* model must have been emerge in the matriarchal society.
- 15. Siva-Sakti were worshipped in the pre-Aryan Sindhu Culture as the Phallis Symbols Linga and Yoni.
- 16. Wherever there is God, there is love and where there is love, there is God Tirumantiram, verse 151.
- Sivajñāna Siddhiyār, 1.66 Śaiva-Siddhānta Darśan, (along with the Hind translation) by Dr. Kailāsapati Miśra, Ardhanārishvar Prakāśan, Vāranasi, pagr 57, footnote 2.
- 18. According to Kaśmiri Śaivism in power of activity which Śiva has is the natural play, a throbbing of the Lord Śiva. The Śaiva-Siddhānta on the other hand hold that this activity is motivated by the noble desire to uplift the human beings.
- 19. Spinoza talks of two expressions of substance, 'Natura Naturata' and 'Natura

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Man-woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy

Naturans'. 'Natura Naturata' refers to whatever has been created. It refers to the passive state of Nature. 'Natura Naturans' refers to Nature in its active form creating the whole world. To Spinoza, Nature created (Naturata) is created by Nature naturating, creating (Naturans - the active state). Both are expressions of one single substance or God. Śaivism goes a step further and defines the passive (Śiva) and the active (Śakti) in terms of one another. So there is a reciprocity between them.

- Śiva-Jñāna Siddhiyār, Supakkam, 5, 9. Foot note 1, from Śaiva- Siddhānta darśan, by Kailaspati Misra, Vāranasi, 1982.
- 21. Dr. Deviprasad Chattopadhyaya in his book *Lokāyat* quotes the following verse from the *Mārkandeya Purāṇa*. The verse expresses the statement by the Goddess herself "I shall support (nourish) the whole world with the life-sustaining vegetables, which shall grow out of my own body (*Ātmadehasambhavaihi*) during a period of heavy rain I shall again fame on the earth, then as Śākambhari."
- Gopinath Kaviraj 'Hindi Book' Tantrik Vangamaya me Shaktadristi, Bihar Rashtrabhasha Parishad, Patna, 1963. Page 133.
- 23. Cakreshvara Bhattacarya, Śāktadarshanam (Sanskrit) 1968, page 92.
- 24. Ibid., page 100.
- 25. Pradeep Gokhale, his Marathi book 'Jñānadevānce Anubhavāmrutatil Tattvajñān' Published by Alka Gosavi, 1985, page 15 to 18.

I am grateful to Dr. Ramkrishna Pulligandla Prof. Emeritus, Toledo University, U.S.A. for his valuable suggestions.

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The various comments Nietzsche's made about women gave him an ill reputation as a misogynist. Indeed he made lot of statements which are truly offensive to women. However in their haste to stamp him as a hater of woman the critics mostly fail to see the complexities in some of his expositions that relate the question of woman with the issues of truth, art and nihilism. A few of the recent feminist readings in Nietzsche to a certain extent moderates this bad image by articulating certain ideas which are usefull to the feminist cause. Still these readings could not bring out properly the feminine dimension of his philosophy. 1 Embarking much on Nietzsche's derogatory comments about woman these studies yet consider Nietzsche as a philosopher who shares the parameters of the patriarchal logic of western tradition. Adopting a different perspective Derrida's reading of Nietzsche enlarges the feminine question to the issue of multiplicity of styles in writing. Although the exposition of this paper largely goes in tune with Derrida's reading still it considers his discussion of Nietzsche's style as "the feminine operation" not sufficient enough to highlight the transfigurative potential of the question of woman posed by Nietzsche. This paper on the other hand, attempts to reexamine the prevalent notion that Nietzsche's philosophy is anti-feminine. By reformulating the existing ideas of masculinity and feminity with the aid of the recent psychoanalytic theories on sexual difference an attempt is being made to reconfigure the image of woman that appears in Nietzsche's writings. It is argued that woman as a model for life radically transforms the perenial question of truth that appears in Western philosophical tradition. The study traverses through the dichotomy of truth and untruth that appears in philosophical systems with the aid of Nietzsche's woman image in order to highlight the power and value of untruth in life. Following

> Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 1 January 1999

90 ABEY KOSH)

the path of Nietzsche's critique of truth the paper extends the feminine question into Nietzsche's interrogation of nihilism and ascetic ideal. It's effect is identified as a suggestion for a new way of perceiving the world and the purpose of life

Woman's absence in the Western philosophical tradition is not only the absence of the woman-philosophers but it is the absence of a feminine space itself. In the major philosophical systems of the world the issue of the feminin does not appear even as a point of reference. This silence about woman neve seems to have taken by the critics as an anti-feminine stand. Nietzsche was ven much eloquent about woman, though most of them were deriding. But this ven eloquence perhaps emphasizes a concern for the feminine in his philosophy More than its absence its presence indicates a care for the issue. Nietzsche doe not devote any specific book or part of books exclusively to write about woman His opinions about the issue appears often as casual comments scattered her and there in the form of aphorisms in his works. In them we meet with multiple faces of Nietzsche's woman. In a few of them we see woman as shallow and the most dangerous play thing,³ as mere child bearer,⁴ the enigmatic love object,¹ the reactive, castrating feminist⁶ and as dissimulator (masquerade) who is never interested in truth.7 In few other aphorisms, which are friendly to women, sh is projected as the abode of man's happier self, 8 and more life affirmative and natural than the contemperory degenerated man.9

Nowhere Nietzsche seems to give a standard definition of woman that should dictate as a regulatory code for women's behaviour in society. His opinions are plural in nature and he never intends to set a woman's essence. Instead of denying women outrightly his comments seem to be coming from a person who expects to see woman as the affirmer of life with all its tragic sense. He seems to be displeased to see modern woman often as a bad affirmer of life. For Nietzsche affirmation is the formula for greatness in existence. Affirmation endorses a stand in favour of multiplicity and chance in life and is posited against the will to negation of the worldly life through moral and ontological conceptualisations. Whether one is a male or female what is expected, in Nietzschean standards, is a glorious acceptance of the appearance and becoming of existence. Whereas religion, metaphysics, morality and human science fabricate another order of reality above life in order to tide over the insecurity emerging out of the fear of becoming and plurality. Nietzsche thinks, plurality

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alone admits the beauty of the fleeting moments and accepts the world of apperance as the only true world. Its opposite, truth as essence is considered as a masculine - philosophical attempt to arrest chance and plurality merely to provide secruity and stability in life. This negative 'will' that "impose upon becoming the character of being" 10 is seen as the guiding principle of the recent history of humanity. The values of our religion, morality, politics, and social institutions are interpretations of the world provided by such a nihifistic will. The nihilistic will requires homogenisation in place of multiplicity in order to exist. It requires truth and essence instead of plurality and appearance. The ideas of man and woman as such assumes relavence only with the dawn of a metaphysical age that instituted sexual differnce by introducing the rational 'subject' into the sphere of thinking. Hence the essence of woman is non-existing as there is no place for a man's essence. So Nietzsche's highest question becomes who overcomes man (overman) rather than fixing man's essence or woman's essence. If nihilism is a result of essentialisation, its remedy, overcoming of nihilism requires celebration of multiplicity of life forms.

But does this explanation provide a sufficient justification for Nietzsche's rediculing comments on the 'eternally feminine'? And do we need to forget his eloquence against woman entering in ths public sphere. It is true that Nietzsche spoke against giving freedom for women and their imancipation. Does this underline a position that essentialise woman and marginalise their lot? Imancipation as an ideal itself was objectionable for Nietzsche. In the conventional sense imancipation represents the logical and ontological values of a rationally dominated society of the modern bourgeois state which in the opinion of Nietzsche is the most decadent form of humanity. The integration of women into the socio-symbolic order of the male through 'higher education, slacks and political voting-cattle rights', 11 Nietzsche argued, would result in degeneration of feminine specificity. This is considered as defeminisation and effacing of the feminine specificity. Such a defeminisation by "imitating all the stupidities with which European manliness is sick" 12 was not an acceptable proposition for this analyst of the European nihilism. This suggests that the basic objection of Nietzsche was only against reducing woman to the sick animal man of which he was highly critical. In fact his entire Genealogy of Morals is devoted to analyse the root of sickness that began to envelop the man in the modern age.

becoming a sciences insecurity s, plurality 92 ABEY KOSH)

Nietzsche criticized the attempts of women to achieve enlightenment and becoming scientific as it leads her to unlearn the art of grace and playfullness. He believed that she is rich in such arts which man already has lost and deviated from. In this regard woman is considered as more natural and playful than man According to the Nietzschan position being more natural and animalistic is a sign of health and its opposite, becoming scientific and enlighted is a sign of degeneration.

Shedding the feminine dimension of one for seeking the advantages of the masculine social order, its logicality, its pricision, its idea of justice and its truthfulness amounts to aborting oneself, putting a fullstop to the productive and creative aspects. 'Truth' is considered as the domain of the unproductive type the masculine, the reactive, and the 'speculative philosopher' who, instead of creating, wants merely to explain and arrange things. It is towards this spiritual barrenness, of which humanity is already sick, modern woman is trying to reach Contrary to such abortive adoptations Nietzsche saw being pregnant with child or being pregnant with ideas, both as a sign of maternity and something positive whether it is in male or female. According to Nietzsche pregnancy is a feature of the productive types. "Making music is another way of making children". Its immense potential for interrogating the nihilistic culture is overlooked while Nietzsche's comments were measured with the yardstick of recieved notions of gender equality and were judged to be male chauvinistic.

Nietzsche argues that 'truth' is a fabrication of the 'nihilistic will' manage life and society. He does not count the feminine will as part of such nihilistic denial of life and appearance. Disinterestedness in 'truth' (in the metaphysical sense) is reckoned as the feature of the 'eternal feminine'. While articulating the woman's specificity Nietzsche writes: "she does not want truth. What is truth to woman? From the beginning nothing has been more alien repugnant and hostile to woman than truth - her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty". 15 But instead of degrading woman of these counts Nietzsche considers this as a virtue that need to be honoured. Because man has already unlearned these instincts and in him seperation from animality and innocence became more or less total. Instead of branding this is essentialisation of the feminine nature, acceptance of appearane and beauty must be considered as affirmation of plurality. An essentialised being clings to

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homogenised truths. Whereas affirmation of multiplicity must be seen as going beyond of all essences by presenting oneself as indeterminable and plural.

Elaborating Nietzsche's ideas on femininity in the above manner does not intend to radically convert him in favour of a feminist cause by diluting all the offensive position he took on the woman question. As critics pointed out before, many of Nietzsche's derogatory statements may be symptomatic of his failure in love relationship with Lou Salome. Instead of bailing him out on these counts the objective of the paper is to highlight the feminine specificity and its effect on thought if woman is taken as the model for truth.

Before going into this issue, we need to agree with the critics of Nietzsche, at least on a few of his anti feminist remarks, that his position expresses a male bias on the issue of giving freedom to women in public sphere. His pronouncements may be coming out of various reasons. But those remarks seem to be operating on certain received ideas of femininity, which are partly his own and partly received from the ninteenth century male prejudices about women. Most probably he might have made use of the traditional conceptions of gender differentiation existing in the biolgical as well as philosophical notions to express his personal resentment in the failure of his love affair. Biological idea of gender places woman as physiologically weaker to man. In metaphysics Cartesian cogito was a central notion in the determination of human subjectivity and consciouness and is still prevalent in all rationally dominated discourses. The traditional notions of sexual difference which have founded through biological and metaphysical ideas place woman in opposition to man with seperate social roles to play. Woman is defined as emotional, illogical, flux, chaos, passive and weak, whereas man is defined as active, rational, logical, stable, orderly and possesser of truth. According to this notion the difference of man and woman is eternally determined by their differences in physical and psychic status. While Nietzsche writes that "Man....must concieve of woman as a possession, as property that can be locked, as something predestined for service and achieving her perfection in that"16 (BGE, 238) we need to admit that he stands within the assymetrical logic of the sexual division instituted by the patriarchal social order.

We need to analyse how the metaphysical notions of subjectivity and individuation work in the constitution of sexual difference in traditional manner. Recasting the issue in the light of psychoanalytical theories on sexual difference

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ABEY KOSHY 94

may help us to reformulate the feminine question in Nietzsche and its relation te 'truth'. Psychoanalytic theories of Freud and Lacan now enable us h reconfigure the problems of individuation and subject formation which wen previously remained obscure. Nobody comes to earth as a man or woman and that gender identity and sexual division is a product of the socio-symbolic order is central to their understanding. This provides a powerful critique of the explanations of biologism and the metaphysical concept of the rational subject Subjectivity, according to this notion, is not a pre-given substance. How do human beings create a self identity? a sense of self? According to Freud oedipalisation is the point at which the warring desires and anguished fragmentation of the small human infant becomes organised within the structure of social relations. It signals the transition from the free reign of polymorphous desire to the reality principle-to the constitution of the individual as a human subject. According to Freud biological sex difference remains irrelevent for the child until the onset of the phallic phase.

In psychoanalytic terms castration complex is understood to institute the humanisation of the small infant in its sexual difference. Prior to the castration complex, which is pre-oedipal phase, the little infant is not constituted as an individual subject. The infant's entry into cultural domain and sexual division occurs at the level of the symbolic order. In Lacan symbolic order is the overarching structure of language and received social meanings within human culture. In order to achieve psychical differentiation and to enter life in society, human beings must take up a position as a subject within this order. The shift from the child's imaginary unity with its mother into the socio-symbolic order is made possible by the intervention of linguistic order, which is the law of the father. In Lacan this seperation is experienced as castration, the cutting of the individual from the world of desire and imagination. The power backing this law of the father is symbolised as phallus. The phallus serves to seperate the child away from the world of desire and imaginary unity with the mother and also for entry into socio-symbolic order. An institution of the selfhood of male places the female, in opposition to man. This renders woman as something outside of the truth and social meaning and as the 'other' of man. Lacan's position that the institution of male and female identity is centered around the presense or absence of anatomical feature, however, does not agree with assigning any essential characteristics to these sexes. The selfhood of both man

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Julia Kristeva's psycho analytical expositions give a different interpretation to the meaning of castration. For her the entry of the individual into the symbolic order of the society through castration is a separation from the presumed state of nature, of pleasure fused with nature. ¹⁷ The subjectity of man and woman is not something pregiven but the effect of this seperation from the pre-oedipal unity. Psychoanalytical theories now teach us that they are the product of socio-symbolic order of the patriarchy effected through the suppression of desires.

In the pre-oedipal level where the infant is not yet transformed as an individual "discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are arranged according to the various constraints imposed on this body by family and social structures". 18 The nonexpressive totality formed by these drives and energies is represented by Kristeva as the chora a term borrowed from Plato's Timaeus. The small infant experiences itself as an array of passions and bodily capacities which are multiple and discontinuous. This semiotic dimension of the early phase of the individual is prior to any sexual difference. This pre-self experience of the semiotic chora is non-gender specific and continues to exist in both man and woman even after their separation into oposite sexes in the socio-symbolic order. Kristeva's theoretical activity consists of exploring the semiotic dimension of language in order to evolve its subversive and disruptive potential which in turn help to reach the imaginary dimension of our earlier existence. Subjectivation and gender divisions are ruptured by the boundless play of semiotic drives. By the idea feminine Kristeva essentially means the heterogeniety of the pre-oedipal experience which has nothing to do with 'the woman' in the biological sense. She writes:

"The belief that 'one is a woman' is almost as absurd and obscurantist as the belief that one is a man....Therefore we must use 'we are women' as an advertisement or slogan for our demands. On a deeper level, however, a woman is not something one can 'be'By 'woman' I understand what cannot be represented, what is not said, what remains above nomenclatures and ideologies". 19

Kristeva's idea underlines that the semiotic is a mode of being that exists

96 ABEY KOS

in all human subjects and, consequently, either gender can be feminised in radical fashion. Kristeva's position does not allow us to posit feminine essentialistic terms the way it appears in biological and metaphysical account According to her: "....if the feminine exists, it only exists in the order significance or signifying process, and it is only in relation to meaning a signification, positioned as their excessive or transgressive other that it exists speaks, thinks (itself) and writes (itself) for both sexes." 20

Reading Kristeva's position against assigning an essence to wom together with Lacanian notion that "woman does not exist" enable us to req the question of feminine. The feminine is to be understood as a mode of existen that affirms desires and imaginary multiplicity of life. In psychoanalytical ten it is non-gender specific. As it exists in both man and woman through imaginary transfiguraion any self can be radically feminised. It exphazises to the biological presence of separate genital organs does not give anyone essential status of a man or a woman. The biological woman being situate within the symbolic order may not represent the feminine nature merely becau she is a woman. She is part and parcel of the phallocentric discourse, while reduces multiplicity into homogeniety and desires into logic. Thus she may also hold the very same masculine perspective on the question of truth and value Castration places her in a similar position of alienation and loss of imaging dimensions of the self. The entry into the socio-symbolic order necessitates but man and woman to shed their early imaginary mode of existence. In this backdn femininity can acquire meaning only by way of its difference from masculi phallic position. Lacan's claim that "woman" as some kind of essence does # exist, puts this issue into sharp focus. According to this position 'feminim' becomes an endless series of masks and fabrication which women and men spel their lives seeking out, in the same fashion that the human subjects forever set an imaginary'. Men and women fantasize femininity as a potential site of desir fulfillment, joy, and wholeness.

Psychoanalytic articulation of femininity as the chora of prest experiences that goes beyond gender divisions can in no way be linked to Nietzsche's rediculing comments on the 'eternal feminine' nature. Psychoanalytical understanding of subject formation also works in a different plane from that of Nietzsche's analysis of subject formation. However

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Nietzsche's deconstruction of the moral subjectivity questions its permanency as a rational substance the way it appears in various metaphysical discourses. His analysis in On the Genealogy of Morals brings out the various techniques initiated by the reactive forces to form a morally responsible individual. Nietzsche argues that in pre-historic period it is through the inflicting of punishment and other means of correction by man upon man that humanity is able to mould a self identity. Although such a critique of the subjectivity does not take the institution of sexual difference into account it vehemently criticises the exiling of desires and imaginative dimension of life from the cultural domain. In this sense as a site of desire and imagination femininity can be seen as a powerfull presense behind all of Nietzsche's later criticisms of religious, moral, and metaphysical interpretations of existence. Thus psychoanalytical notion of the feminine and individuation carries the key to the entry into Nietzsche's world of multiplicity of life forms, which in turn enable us to discern Nietzsche's affirmation of nature and desires as a counter position to patriarchal appropriation of reality through metaphysical postulations.

In the observation of Nietzsche resentment, bad conscience and ascetic ideal constitute the essence of modern man. This is not an essensial definition of man but is attributed as a gradual development in history. A sort of degeneration which is said to be the outcome of the triumph of the reactive forces that seized truth and meaning of existence and created the age of nihilism. This is considered as a historical occurrence which the humanity has to surpass and overcome. In this sense man as such does not exist with a universal essense, but is merely a product, a subejet, effected through various discourses of truth, morality and religion. Can man hope for any escape from this depreciation of the value of life? In the opinion of Nietzsche this most sick and degenerated among the animals needs to affirm plurality of life in order to reach a site that stands above man. Nietzsche suggests 'overman' as a figure representing a transfiguration in existence. For a transfiguration of existence one needs to unload the heavy weight of truths and morality deposited on humanity by nihilistic forces that uptill now stands victorious in history.

Thus if Nietzsche depicted woman as untruth, in strict sense it is applicable to man as well; if Nietzsche derided woman for trying to become part of the power structure, governance, social institutions man also comes under his

sharp criticism. For it is the reactive values and concepts of world denial and down upon is trying to institute in his social activities.

Coming to the central issue of the paper, if 'women' who is the figure of untruth is taken as the model for truth its repercussions for philosophy would be far reaching. Since its beginning philosophy has been devoted to fit principles and approached truth as changeless essence. It has been an enquire for 'being' which is the changeless. The changing and the fleeting has place in opposition to truth and often depicted as becoming, chaos, emotion and anon-representable phenomena. Thus philosophy became the privilege and he always been the vocation of man, the possessor of phallus, who alone possess truth and who is the truth. But what would be the effect it truth is identified woman, or equated with woman? Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil starts with raising this question:

"Supposing truth is a woman - what then? Are there not grounds for the suspicion that all philosophers, insofar as they are dogmatists, have been very inexpert about women? that the gruesome seriousness, the clumsy obtrusiveness with which they have usually approached truth sofar have been awkward and very improper for winning a woman's heart? what is certain is that she has not allowed hereself to be won-and today every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged"²¹

Nietzsche's assigning of woman as the model of truth has to be readic comparison with his various comments about women. This woman metaphienable us to recast the way in which the perennial questions of world, truth, if and art so far presented in philosophy.

Nietzsche constantly ridicules the feminist woman who wants to resemble man, the dogmatic philosopher, demanding truth, science, objectivity, and the illusions of male verility. Nietzsche's most of the attacks are directed, in fact towards this castrating type of woman. Nietzsche loved the affirmative women who does not discard her feminine modesty, who is more natural, 'the dyonisian's who resists the masculine attempts to essentialise and reduce her plurality. Woman stands in Nietzsche's writings as the very image of untruth, multiplicity and the other pole of the male's ideal of truth as identity.

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denial in down upon. Instead Nietzsche himself positioned with multiplicity, becoming, untruth, and appearance and accepted them as the highest conditions of existence. I shall quote three passages from his texts to show that he favoured untruth and appearance to correctness and precision. The first one on untruth comes during a discussion on art:

- 1) "If we had not welcomed the arts and invented this cult of the untrue....the realisation that delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge and sensations would be utterly unberable...art as the good will to appearance..."22
- 2) "what in us really wants "truth"?why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?²³
- 3) "the antithesis of a real and apparent world is lacking here : there is only one world, and this is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning -- A world thus constituted is the real world. We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, this "truth", that is in order to live"24

Instead of saying that woman is untruth and man alone has access to truth Nietzsche's position underlines that nobody has truth and that "truth itself is a kind of error"25 instituted by a sort of will to power that wants to master the universe. However asfaras sexual division exists and socio-political domain continues to be based on metaphysical/phallocentric ideals man will be considered as the truth and logic and woman will remain as his shadow, an image formed in his imagination. But Nietzsche's image of woman as multiplicity discomforts this situation. In this backdrop the potential of the 'woman metaphor' in undoing the existing image of truth and overcoming metaphysical discourses is immense.

Going back to the proposition of Beyond Good and Evil, if woman is the model of truth how will a philosopher approach this reality, the woman? Woman being the model of multiplicity may not be possessed in any of the familiar discourses of metaphysics. But the dogmatic philosopher thinks that she was won over by him and that her essence has been discovered. In fact she has no essence and the "truth" about woman is a fabrication, a fetish of the philosopher. We can conceive of the dogmatic philosopher an inexpert lover who does not know the proper way to approach a woman and win her love. Nietzsche

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100 ABEY KOSH

writes that so far she has not allowed herself to be won, implying that the actual nature of the world and life, and of woman has till today eluded the grasp of metaphysical philosophy. The dogmatic philosopher in his haste to possess to woman adopts immodest means. He goes too close to see her, even to the extension of stripping without knowing that she has not any truth within her. He fails to keep a little distance from her reality. Nietzsche perhaps places woman is comparison with the veil of the māyā of the world: "The magic and the most powerfull effect of woman is, in philosophical language, action at a distance". Woman's beauty is seductive only from a distance. We need only to listent from a "distance" inorder to be enchanted by her melodious song. On the other hand if one goes closer to discover her 'truth in itself' or 'beauty in itself' it may not be available.

Nietzsche here links 'woman's action at a distance' to a specific way & percieving the world. The dogmatic attempt to find the truth of the world by measuring it with logical categories give only a distored picture of the world Its theoretical grasp instead of leaving the world as it is, imposes 'the characte of being upon its becoming'. In order to perceive the appearance of the work as mere appearence one requires distance from the world as we reqire distance from woman. Distance is the very condition for the aesthetic perception of the world. However, if we go too close to the reality and attempt to disclose to essence behind the apparent things as the way a dogmatic philosopher does was will be cast out of the magical spell of things with all their dreamy enchantment One needs to let oneself to be carried away by the plurality and chance of the world in order to be succumbed by her magical spell. The joy of plurality come to us as an aesthetic moment which is radically distinct from the logical/metaphysical grasp of the world. The aesthetic moment is to be set essentially a moment of the transfiguration of the ontologically fixed image the world.

Correlating woman with the reality of the world signify that the world has plurality of principles. Perhaps they are not principles and could be ment innumerable possibilities. The multiplicity and flux in nature gives a seductive charm to life on earth. How one would represent in logical discourses the fleeting beauties of nature that could only be appreciated? Those rare individual moments such as "love, spring, a beautiful melody, the mountains, the moon, the sea"

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appro situat which only speak to our heart. The attempt to locate their 'truth in itself' in all probability will be defeated. So what we can suggest the truth seeker is not to go too closer to such wonders of earth. In order to enjoy one requires to keep a little distance to such phenomena. The attempt to find their truth is a shabby proposition and most likely to end in mere babling. The categories and concepts of metaphysics employed for measuring highest reality becomes ineffective at this point. Woman evades the attempt to grasp her in the language of dogmatic philosophy. But the philosopher never desist from his attempt to get hold of the truth. Perhaps an artist may be able to depict the woman- truth in a different mode of expression. Here the representative reason is subordinated to 'perspectivism'. Instinct of possessiveness here gives way for affirmation and acceptance of the world as it appears to the senses. This way of interconnecting the woman question with 'truth' gives a different image to Nietzsche's idea of the feminine. In the renewed sense woman in Nietzsche's texts no longer appears as an object to be hated and exiled. Woman as the image of life affirmation and as a figure of plurality becomes the most acceptable being against the degenerated man of the nihilistic age. This is very well articulated when Nietzsche presents

"the world is overfull of beautiful things but nevertheless poor, very poor when it comes to beautiful moments and unveiling of these things. But perhaps this is the most powerful magic of life: it is covered by a veil intervoven with gold, a veil of beautiful possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity and seduction. Yes, life is a woman."²⁸

the world as covered with a veil of beautiful appearance:

This parallel between woman and truth and between woman and life suggests a new image of thought different from the metaphysical way of percieving the world. In identifying the question of truth with woman the question of art is posed and the end of metaphysics is heralded. 'Truth' no longer is the obejct of the philosophical enquiry.

Affirmation of life and world requires a different approach distinct from representation and appropriation. A love and care for the world would be a more appropriate appraoach. Woman who is the model of life and desire would be situated in the centre of such a transfigured perspective of the world. A philosopher's relationship to life can be compared to that of an unskilled seducers

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102 ABEY KOSH

relationship to a woman. Both these men are not knowing that a woman has be loved and affirmed in order to win her love. Possessing and mastering a not the proper means to win her. This gives a clue to the contemporory scientificann's approach to the world itself. Instead of affirming the beautiful possibilities of life with all its multiplicity he wants to master and possess it. The anthropocentric greed to dominate nature is indeed the culmination of the metaphysical way of approaching reality and world. In Nietzschean terms the result of the victory of the reactive forces has been at work for some time in history to sieze truth and values in its favour.

Nietzsche's supreme concern was how to overcome nihilism that he enveloped the history of man in the modern age. This is essentially linked to the issue of changing the element of values. The reactive values have to be defeated and active values have to be played out. If negative forces in histon interpreted their values into things and made life reactive this has to be reversed and made active. This reversal would be possible only through affirmation of multiplicity as the supreme task of life.

In this regard the 'woman' question acquires a new significance in Nietzsche's writings. She is posited as a counter figure to 'man' the philosophe. Woman in Nietzsche's texts appears as the very image of the power of like affirmation. If 'man' could be taken as a figure of truth and homogenisation (in Lacanian sense) woman as a figure of multiplicity disrupts the image of truth as identity and essence. In both senses, woman as a metaphor for truth as well as the concrete woman with flesh and blood, is the figure of life affirmation capable of confronting the nihilistic negation of life instituted by the reactive forces.

If Nietzsche is offensive to woman it is those reactive women who want to adopt the position of phallocentric men and their values he offends. The large corpus of Nietzsche's anti-feminism is in fact directed against the castrating woman who adorns objectivity and truth as the true form of life. However Nietzsche accepts the affirmative woman 'who is more natural than man'. Because woman as a life affirmative force carries the potential for confronting the reactive forces who reduced the meaning of existence to the value of nil.

Life affirmation comes as a desire for enhanced life. This entails accepting

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multiplicity including pleasurable and painfull in existence as a necessary precondition for healthy life. This is a counter position to the moral interpretation of life that suggests to avoid painfull and error from existence. In the moral interpretaion of existence what are considered painful and error are always those fleeting things which stand outside the realm of truth. The christian interpretation of life often posits sensuous things of life in the realm of sin. Major religious discourses and metaphysical systems of the world always make us cautious about the dangers of sensuous life in deviation from the paths of reason and truth. It is precisely in this regard woman, the image of sense and life, is associated with sin. In their idea this seductress who plays at the worldly and material desires has to be approached cautiously and be given a different social sphere from that of the masculine truthfulness. In a single stroke dogmatic thinking dissociates itself from everything associated with desire such as sense, woman, and beautiful possibilities of the apparent world. Nietzsche's critique of nihilism as "the positing of higher values above life and the consequent depreciation of earthly life" in effect is an attack on such masculine appropriation of the meaning of existence. His embracing of multiplicity and its parallel with the feminine question need to be highlighted in order to discern the specificity of Nietzsche's philosophy in the history of Western metaphysical thought.

If we can discern a sexual difference within philosophical tradition among various philosophies then Nietzsche's writing represents 'the feminine' in the history of thought. This representation of the feminine is not entrirely of the woman as such or of woman's sexuality. Going back to the psychoanalytic idea of the feminine as a site of desire and multiplicity enables us to recast sexual difference in a new way. From a mere man-woman relationship its manifestation can be discerned even in our ways of looking at the world and life. Taking up multiplicity and facing desire and love of world as a challenge in life alters the traditional notion of reaching truth as the objective of thinking. Exalting the beauty of earth by representing the world of change and plurality as the proper task of Nietzsche's philosophizing comes from the need for a feminine site of existence. In order to eternally affirm the world and say 'yes and amen' at life 'woman' who is the figure of life and desire needs to be affirmed:

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104 ABEY KOSHY

"Oh how should I not lust for eternity and for the wedding ring of rings - the Ring of Recurrence! Never yet I find the woman by whom I wanted children unless it be this woman whom I love: for I love you eternity" 129

It is this lust for life and world that is missing in the logically dominated traditional philosophy. Parodying Heidegger we could rightly say that the history of metaphysical thought has been the history of concealing the feminine dimension of life. In traditional philosophy truth as the law of life has been pursued in a language of precision that represented only the male perspective of life. Woman being the site of desire and multiplicity could remain only in the margins of the grand philosophical systems. Nietzsche's unsystematic though inagurates a new form of writing through the practice of plurality in styles. heterogeneity and deisre for life are its hallmarks. This disrupts the epistemological standard of truth as single and univocal. This stylistic plurality through a language of desire subverts the 'phallogocentric' language of the metaphysical philosophy. Nietzsche would represent the acitivty of life as the power of falsehood. Like a woman it dupes, dissimulates, and seduces Philosophical activity, in his opinion, should redouble and elelvate this power of the falsehood. According to Nietzsche only an artistic will could compete with the ascetic ideal of the dogmatic philosophy that debased the value of worldly life to nothingness.30 The language of plurality turns the will to untrub and desire to a highest affirmative power. In connection with this, Delueze in his interpreation of Nietzsche comments that: "Then truth perhaps take a new sense. Truth is appearance". 31 This desire for appearance and love of nature does not exclude the woman, who is the figure of life affirmation, from the domain of thought.

In many ways Nietzsche's philosophy endorses a stand in favour of a feminine dimension of existence. The plurality of styles practiced in the aphoristic forms deviates from the phallocentric notion of 'truth' as the supreme law of life. The grand philosophic systems can be viewed as mere male attempts to symbolise a chaotic world of the imaginary in order to tide over the fear of castration. Contrary to it Nietzsche's celebration of multiplicity and chaos brings a stand in favour of the feminine which is the model of life affirmation. If we can agree with Kristeva that 'feminine exists only in signifying processes' Nietzsche's practice of plurality of styles can be viewed as a search for the

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feminine. His writings unleash a semiotic experience of the pre-Oedipal mode of life that is closer to poetry and music. According to Kristeva semiotic is the space of flux and heterogeneity. Poetic language contains a semiotic pressure that dislodges reader's ideological assumptions. Which in turn disrupts the symbolic through releasing the semiotic forces.

Femininity as a search for a potential site for fulfillment of desire and imaginary experience is said to be at work behind every artistic form of expression. The woman who was cast away from the philosophical discourse returns to play at an artist's philosophy. As Nietzsche considers himself to be an artist and his philosophy to be dance and play one can visualise his stylistic plurality as the operation of the feminine. Such a writing enables one to surpass the constraints of a subjectivity that ties one to the masculine socio-symbolic order. The aspiration of one to become woman as a motivating force of literary expression is a Deluzeian idea as well, which comes from the need for becoming and transformation:

"Writing is inseparable from becoming: in writing one becomes-woman, becomes-animal or vegetable, becomes- molecule...."32.

In Deluezian sense this transformation to womanhood or animalhood is required because "man" inhabits only the dark side of the world. Man, who is the 'transcendental ego' (Cartesian Cogito) deployed by the mataphysical tradition has become a desease of the earth. Deleuze writes that the reason to write comes from the need to overcome the shame of being man. If the morally responsible rational subject of the metaphysical tradition represents the absence of desire and love of earth, the woman who as the figure of life affirmation carries the potential for the retrieval of all elements of desire which have been exiled from the domain of life.

This desire to become woman may be seen as the root of Nietzsche's stand against all sorts of asceticism such as christianity, modern science and metaphysical thinking. Christianity that advocates extirpation of the senses represents the strongest case for world denial. The modern scientific spirit and democratic institutions as long as founded on abstract generalised truths are, for him, nothing but christianity in disguise.

Nietzsche's attack on the great philosophers of the world for having

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106 ABEY KOSHY

remained unmarried and for depreciating the value of the senses in favour of their love for the beyond in effect, is a stand against the hatred of the senses they preached in their systems.³³ This negation of the sense should be identified, as the negation of the feminine principle. Nietzsche's affirmative philosophy, on the other hand, would consider will to truth as a symptom of nihilism and a sign of impotency for willing the beauties of this world. Such a negative will which is the hallmark of the dogmatic philosophy represents the casting away of the woman from the domain of life. Contrary to it the unpercievable presence of woman would be a specificity of every affirmative philosophy that stands against asceticism of all kinds.

NOTES

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- Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, sec. 239, pp. 167-69
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- 9. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 239, p. 169.
- 10. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kanufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York, Vintage, 1968, sec. 617, p. 330.
- 11. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Ibid
- 12. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Ibid
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- 14. Will to Power, sec. 800, p. 421.
- 15. Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 232, p. 163.
- 16. Ibid, sec. 238, p, 167.
- Julia Kristeva, 'Women's Time' trans. Alice Jardine and Harry Blake, in Toril Moi (ed.) Kristeva Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p. 198.
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- 20. Cited in Toril Moi (ed.), The Kristeva Reader, p. 11.
- 21. Beyond Good and Evil, p. 1
- 22. Gay Science, sec. 107, p. 163.
- 23. Reyond Good and Evil, p. 9.
- 24. Will to power, sec. 853, p. 451
- 25. Ibid, sec. 493, p. 272.
- 26. Gay Science, sec. 60,p. 124.
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- 28. Gay Science, Sec. 339. pp. 271-72
- 29. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 244-45.

108 ABEY KOSHV

30. On the Genealogy of Morals, III, sec. 25, in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, pp. 153-54.

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- 33. On the Genealogy of Morals III, sec. 7.

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A COGNITIVE JOURNEY TOWARDS TRUTH*

GEETA RAMANA

The appeal to sense experience is commonly the quickest and most immediate source of our knowledge about the external world. It seems quite obvious then, that we do know a lot of things and yet philosophical tradition has sought justification for knowledge claims based on experience. The Greeks, for instance, called absolute certain knowledge 'episteme' and contrasted this with 'doxa' or mere opinion. Traditional epistemologies therefore defined genuine knowledge as justified true belief or opinion. The Knower must be able to justify his/her beliefs, give reasons for them or even establish or prove them. The search for the most reliable sources that validate knowledge claims consequently became a perfectly legitimate enquiry.

The empiricist's search for the ultimate and most dependable source of knowledge claims gave rise to the formulation of basic- statements or observation-statements, which must necessarily underlie all propositions about the empirical world. Russell for instance defines a 'basic-statement' or a proposition as follows: it is a proposition which arises on occasion of perception, which is the evidence for its truth and it has a form such that no two propositions having this form can be mutually inconsistent if derived from different percepts.1 Russell and some of the positivists like Schlick and Ayer would accept the thesis that the truth of basic propositions depend upon 'its relation to some occurrence of fact or experience'. Further, basic propositions arising from pure immediate experience is never the source of error. Error is always due to an 'active' misinterpretation or wrong inference made by the Subject in making the statement. Sense-data experienced are never doubted; though, one can misperceive and misinterpret one's sense-data. Knowledge claims based on ideas, impressions, sense-data or atomic experiences which are immediately or directly known and consist of 'unadulterated elements of information' are all varieties of what Popper calls the 'Bucket' theory of mind where all experience consists

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110 GEETA RAMANA

of information received through the senses.² At first, the 'bucket' is empty. When the senses begin to operate, information flows into the mind and experiences get ordered giving rise to beliefs. This picture has two immediate consequences; one is that, the longer your 'bucket' has been around the more experiences you will have had and the more beliefs you will have formed Secondly, if some of the holes in the 'bucket' are blocked, then whole areas of experience and belief thereof will be unavailable³. To most empiricists all belief as a matter of psychological fact arise out of experience. The philosophical question however, is, which of these is to be called knowledge. It sense-experience is the only authoritative source of knowledge, then we do not get very far.

Learning from experience requires knowing a language. Language enable us to see with other people's eyes and know by other people's understanding. Helen Keller's two most important holes in her 'bucket' stopped and one would suppose she was condemned to a life of ignorance. (She became blind and deal shortly after birth). Yet, she says in her autobiography she had no sense of herself as a human being before she knew language. Classical Empiricists then like Locke and Hume continued to talk of ideas, impressions, beliefs and their justifications. Instead of saying, all we can think of are our own ideas, we now say, all we talk about are our own words. Pouring psychologistic wine into linguistic bottles may not have really improved its flavour. but it does make the important transition from the world of subjective experience to the world of public language.

Though for all practical purposes, our observational experiences do provide the starting point for our knowledge claims about the external world, it has been difficult to provide 'certainty' for most generalisations that form part of scientific knowledge. Hume's problem of Induction, for instance, had repercussions on the entire area of scientific knowledge which seemed no longer able to make knowledge claims with much validity. If Hume's analysis on the problem of Induction is accepted, one cannot draw any valid inference from observation to theory and our scientific beliefs are no longer reasonable. On the one hand the principle of empiricism requires theories to depend on the results of observation and experiment and on the other hand, these can never be validated or justified. Probability is all that science can offer. It is possible however, to

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accept the principle of empiricism without the principle of induction which seeks positive justifying reasons⁶.

Karl Popper replaces the problem of justification with the problem of explanation in the form of critical reasons⁷. Justification taken in the sense of being able to give a final verdict in favour of one's conclusion with the help of some observation-statements or some incorrigible experiences, generates infinite regress apart from the practical problems in the attempt to trace back all knowledge to its ultimate source in observation. Critical reasons on the other hand, are never ultimate but remain forever conjectural hypotheses which one can continue to examine infinitely. They help explain by rational arguments why in the light of one's goals, a particular theory is chosen over another. Neither observation nor reason nor any inspiration is to carry any authority. All human knowledge is mixed with error, prejudices, dreams and hopes and truth therefore must remain beyond human authority. Instead of asking, what are the best sources of knowledge, we need to modestly ask, "how can we hope to detect and eliminate error."8 The logic of criticism only requires one to avoid and eliminate error as far as possible. This can be achieved by criticising the theories or guesses of others, as well as one's own, if possible, and thus make it least resistant to falsification. Instead of seeking justifications then, we need to accept the conjectural character of scientific statements.

Knowledge does not begin then with well-marked areas or boundaries of subject matters. They begin with problems and end with problems. It is only in and through a problem that one becomes conscious of holding a theory. There are no given starting points in the form of pure observations or experiences and therefore the growth of scientific knowledge is logically independent of anyone's subjective experiences and beliefs. Scientific knowledge is not the result of what one believes. A theory, for instance, may be true even though nobody believes it or has any reason to think it is true. On the other hand, a theory may be false even though we have very good reasons for accepting it (*The geocentric view*, once held, is a good example). It is knowledge in the objective sense then, that characterises scientific knowledge which consists of 'conjectural theories, open problems, problem-situations and arguments'9. Scientific knowledge in this sense can be studied, absorbed, applied as well as accepted or rejected critically or dogmatically. The aim of all rational criticism does remain a search for a 'true'

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theory. Popper was deeply influenced by Einstein's work and he showed how Einstein apparently did not believe that Special Relativity was true. At best is could be an approximation (since it was valid only for non-accelerated motion) "He searched for truth and thought he had critical reasons, indicating he had no found it". Objective truth therefore, is to Popper a regulative idea in that it is a standard which we may always fall short.

Popper thus attempts to resolve the tension between the empiric prejudice to base all knowledge claims on experience and the logical requirement that knowledge be understood in terms of truth. He makes a very imports distinction between the psychology of knowledge and its justification in ten of some subjective experience, and, the logic of knowledge (and not belief which critical perference generates, namely, objective knowledge. It is knowledge without a knowing subject - without a knower¹¹. It is true, however, that the is knowledge in the subjective sense, which consist of dispositions at expectations and a whole world of subjective experiences. But there is als knowledge in the 'objective sense which consists of linguistically formulated expectations submitted to critical discussion' 12. Popper gives an evolutionary analogue to the growth of objective knowledge where its growth is determined by how problems are faced and solved; how, from these new possibilities, not problems emerge. The approach to objective knowledge begins with analysis the products of human activity; with effects, rather than causes. It is thus of of the mistaken subjectivist approaches to knowledge to imagine that a 'bool without a reader is nothing'. A book remains a book-a world 3 product, even it is never read, or is a useless one or is misunderstood and misinterpreted What makes knowledge objective is because of what happens to knowledge information. In order to belong to the world of objective knowledge a book ned only be capable of being grasped. Popper thus adds to the common sens distinction of the world of physical events (known as world 1) and mental stall (known as world 2), a third world of language (world 3), in so far as it describe the physical or the mental world, which also includes our grasping of theorig or events. World 3 products include all that is represented in books and journals stories and myths, scientific and poetic thoughts and works of art as well¹⁴.

Popper builds on Karl Buhler's theory of the lower and higher function of language 15. The lower function of language is more natural, expressive and

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function sive and communicative (which is also shared by the animal world). The higher function of language is the descriptive or information giving fearture, which is our basis for what is called the argumentative or the critical function. Description normally involves expression and communication which one could also interpret to include what Davidson calls, 'propositional attitudes' which are non-individuative in that, 'though they are psychological, do not bestow individual propositional content on the attitude 16, that is, there is an unavoidable self-expression involved in description which may not necessarily be as relevant as the description itself. To Popper, 'expression' and 'communication' are more psychological and therefore connote subjectivist perspectives which do not help in contribting to the 'objectivity' of knowledge. It is through the interaction between the descriptive and the critical function that one is able to allow for any objective knowledge to develop. There is then an autonomous growth of knowledge (scientific knowledge) which emerges out of this descriptive and critical nature of language. The idea of objective truth emerges out of the descriptive function of language, wherein one evaluates a story or theroy in terms of facts as they actually happen or occur. The truth content functions from a regulative context which takes one closer to the true story 17. Verisimilitude is again further critically or rationally evaluated from the point of truth of truth-finding. However, the criteria in scientific theories is not necessarily in terms of how 'true'they are or how closely they approximate to how things are, but more in terms of 'relevance' and 'completeness' of the explanation. For, there is always a presupposition that the story told or a theory put forward, is to solve 'problem' 18. Putting forward explanations and testing them assume that we hope to find true theories. It is this regulative idea that makes rational criticism possible. However, these categories have meaning only within the critical function of language and therefore belong to the World 3 arguments. Truth, validity, logical relations and theories about nature, are all world 3 concepts 19.

Since all experimental observation is an interpretation of facts in the light of some theory or other, there is no such thing as 'pure observation' observation without component.'All knowledge any theoretical theory-impregnated'²⁰. That observation is theory-laden is also seen in the famous duck- rabbit figures. Research in empirical psychology brings out a lot more examples in the form of visual patterns seen in drawings, paintings and photographs. When we formulate observation statements they can transcend 114

GEETA RAMANA

experiences which prompt them and consequently there is a distinction that philosophers make between 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. Seeing that something the case requires concepts and it is language that enables us to formulate observation-statements. 'Here is a glass of water' is a simple description and yet theoretical because the words, 'glass' and 'water' denote physical bodis which exhibit law-like behaviour. In a sense, glasses of water and electrons and at par and our decision to take the one rather than the other is simply a matter of choice. Since all observations presuppose the existence of some system of expectations, one lives in what is called a 'horizon of expectations²¹' which becomes the frame of reference conferring significance to our experience, action and observations. This analysis refutes the thesis that observations are the basi or foundation of all knowledge claims. Science begins and ends with 'problem' always presupposing a 'horizon of expectations' or even, as it were, yesterday horizon of expectations. Observation acts as a 'witness' in the course of critical testing, where it does not stand at the beginning, but at the end of investigation confirming predictions, crowning success. As Morritz Schlick also pointed out observations play the part of absolutely certain knowledge when science make 'contact with the real, not at the base, but at the apex.... what matters in science not what it rests on, but what it leads to²². Observation-statements supply us with genuine knowledge of reality wherein one grasps the meaning at the same time one grasps its truth²³. In all other cases of synthetic statements, determining the meaning is distinguished from determining the truth. Schlick too attempts to save Positivism from foundationalist problems, by allowing for the corrigibility of basic propositions, since they function as nothing less than hypotheses. 24 l is only at the moment of observation itself, that these propositions have the role of preserving perfect certainty and with this process Observation-statements do not constitute a basis for science but are starting points for the conjecture of general propositions and can be at any moment corrected by new observations.

Popper's position differs in that there are no 'pure observations' which are ever ultimate or the basis of any objective claims to knowledge. However, scientific knowledge does lead to some contact with the real for which the role of observation is subordinate to the 'testability' of a theory²⁵. The statements of science or the system language as Carnap puts it must be universal and intersubjective. Unified science, to Carnap and Neurath was nothing but the

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ends. g points attempt to construct a non-contradictory system of protocol or basic statements. Neurath, unlike Carnap, rejects any attempt to take any conclusively established pure observation-statement as the starting point of the sciences. It is meaningless to talk of a private language, to quote Neurath, 'we are like sailors who rebuild their ship on the open sea; never able to dismantle it on dry rock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials²⁶.

The demand that all scientific statements must be justified only by (observation) statements leads to dogmatism and infinite regress. The other alternative termed as psychologism entails that statements must be justified also by perceptual experiences. The trilemma²⁷ cannot be solved by opting for either of the above. As Popper sums it all up, 'Experiences can motivate a decision and hence an acceptance and rejection of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them - no more than thumping on the table'28. If every statement is corrigible, then one can as well go on infinitely. But this would render science impossible and therefore scientists have to make a decision or agree to accept an observation statement when it has passed a certain number of tests. To this extent observation-statements are conventions. Unlike the positivists, one cannot verify or justify our empirical knowledge claims. One can only rationally criticise them and tentatively adopt those which seem best to withstand our criticism and which have the greater explantory power. The aim is to avoid dogmatic protection of theories or immunising a theory against refutation. Falsifiability or Refutability is a test to ascertain the empirical character of scientific theories and reject thereby transcendent metaphysical theories which are non-testable and irrefutable. Thus, the more testable and criticisable a theory is, the more progress we make. For Popper, the role of basic statements then, belong to a class of statements that are used in testing theories and constitute what is called as a 'potential falsifier' for a theory²⁹. We find that experience is no longer the touchstone of all knowledge claims. Subjective experience is not the basis of the growth of knowledge. Knowledge, if it has to be objective in the sense of being true independently of individual perceptions and experiences, can never by definition, be ultimate, final or absolute. It is not only because of the transient and private nature of ones experiences that they cannot be the basis of objective knowledge. It is also because there must be progress not just change, in one's knowledge claims. This entails a certain amount of distance from subjective experience which is at once also bridged by

language. Language then is not merely a tool of communication but determine significantly the play of meaning and truth.

Popper's world of objective knowledge has significant interactions with the psychological world, particularly in the understanding and in turn contribute to the growth of objective knowledge which arises from the interaction of the descriptive and critical functions in language. The worlds of physical even mental states and language restrict objectivity to only the third world of language in its critical function.

Let us look into a similar attempt in providing for objective knowled without foundationalist problems. Donald Davidson's epistemology require knowing Subjects to confirm knowledge about world 1, world 2, and world! if we include and assume that what goes on in people's mind, in so far as the express linguistically the 'same' reality, gives rise to a different kind irreducible knowledge. Davidson posits three varieties of knowledge³⁰ and attempt to compare these with the schema of Popper's objective knowledge. The first two worlds of physical events and mental states have their counterpartit the following two varieties of knowledge. Knowledge about the world around us (that is, knowledge in the objective sense), and about ones thoughts and feelings (that is, knowledge in the subjective sense), is something that we are most often immediately aware of and do not require proof. Both Popper at Davidson therefore begin by assuming the two worlds of physical and mental events quite unproblematically. The third variety of knowledge is knowledge about what goes in people's minds, which of course is indirect and consequently asymmetrical to the direct knowledge one has of the contents of ones mind.

Inability to unify these three varieties of knowledge would result i scepticism and therefore Davidson attempts a holistic analysis of the conceptul connections between our knowledge of our own minds, of others and of the external world³¹. Each of these varieties of knowledge is concerned with aspects of the 'same' reality and each irreducible to any one or both. Popper's world is an autonomous area of knowledge including all products of the human mind whether of science or of art. Although he calls world 3 a metaphor³² - a wol of ordering our world, it is more than a metaphor. There is a 'real' interaction' between the Subject, which anyway takes in a lot by way of books and other objective sources, and, physical events or world 1. For instance, goals and plant

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operate on world 1 through the Subject and belong to world 3. Not only does operate on the Subject act upon world 3, but world 3 acts back on the Subject 33. (An artist, may, for instance learn from his work constantly, even whilst creating). Everyone participates and contributes towards world 3, which begins with a language, and, gets something out of it. And sometimes we get more back than we have put in. Einstein once said, 'My pencil is cleverer than I am'. By writing and calculating on paper he could often get results beyond what he had anticipated³⁴. This is the world then, which is an important source of truth and objective knowledge. Popper, like Davidson, is more interested in truth and truth-conditions rather than words and their peculiar meanings and unique reference. Davidson's problem now is to account for knowledge of the external world, the contents of ones own mind and that of others without resorting to observation or evidence. Although belief is a condition of knowledge there is an additional demand that one must be able to discriminate between true belief and false belief, between reality and appearance 35. In short, beliefs also involve the capacity to grasp objective truth. Beliefs about the external world and the problem of other minds, both require the logical independence of the truth conditions of what is believed and the truth of those beliefs. No amount of knowledge of the content of ones mind can insure the truth of a belief about the external world. The logical independence of the mental works equally on the other direction. No amount of knowledge of the external world entails the truth about the workings of a mind³⁶.

All knowledge of the world does come through the agency of the senses and this is of epistemological significance. What gives content to ones belief and meaning to ones words, however, requires a theory which makes truth primary (rather than evidence) where meaning is directly connected to the conditions that make sentences intersubjectively true or false.³⁷ Truth conditions are developed through a correlation of ones own response with those of others vis-a-vis the same objects and events, 'All evidence for or against a theory of truth (whether of interpretation or translation) comes in the form of facts about what events or situations in the world cause or would cause speakers to assent to or dissent from each sentence in the speakers repertoire.'³⁸ Unless therefore the triangle of two observers reacting to common features of the world is completed, one cannot give content to thought and belief. Thus the knowledge of another observer is essential to all thought and knowledge. Knowledge of other minds and of the external world are mutually dependent. Knowledge of

118 GEETA RAMAN

our minds and that of others are also mutually dependent. Beliefs about the work are publicly confirmable. Since thought depends on communication, interperson communication becomes the source of truth-claims.

Davidson invokes two key Principles of Coherence and Corresponders (together known as the Principle of Charity), if correct interpretation is to a possible specified. The Principle of Correspondence prompts the interpreter to take specified to the responding to the same features of the world that the interpreter would respond to, under similar circumstances. The Principle of Coherence prompts the interpreter to discover a degree of logical consistency in the though and actions of the other speaker. Together they endow the speaker with belief about the world which contain some amount of truth. The nature of communitaries that a large number of our simplest beliefs are true at that they are also known to others speaker.

Another consequence of such a position is that the totality of evidence provides no unique reference for a theory of truth because all possible eviden cannot limit acceptable theories to any one. Therefore with respect to the ment world, what is required, is for the interpreter to consider how best to consider the other person as intelligible. This knowledge differs from knowledge I have of my own mind in being inferential and depending on observed correlation between say speech and other actions of the person concerned. Self-knowleds remains direct and subjective; yet, what gives it content is not subjective experience. The thoughts we form and entertain are located conceptually in it world we inhabit and know we inhabit with other. Although another Subject relation to the same world is a necessary condition to objective knowledge, the does not give rise to any priority to the subjective world of experience. In fact in Davidson's position at least, the objective world and the intersubjective world are both equally essential and form the context to anything 'subjective'. Whi in fact provides for the foundation of the concept of truth and reality is the necessary degree of communatly essential to the understanding of another individual's experiences. This is of course a matter of degree and reasonable approximation. What is however significant is that the clarity and effectiveness of our concepts grows with growth of understanding that of others. There are no limits therefore to how far dialogue can take us and no limits to our own progress thereby.

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Neither Popper nor Davidson hold truth to be a one to one correspondence with facts and both would accept a basic Tarskian notion of truth as property of sentences. Davidson howerver, goes further and adds that it is a property not only of sentences but also of utterances of speech acts⁴¹. Truth therefore is a relation between a sentence, a person and a time. Thus to Davidson neither language nor thinking has conceptual priority. The two are linked in that each requires the other, to be understood. Experiences and beliefs only provide for applications of truth-conditions not their justification. The logic of truth is analysed to be independent of any experience of it. As an attribute of propositions, truth is a public, not a private affair All knowledge then begins with experience but its truth lies elsewhere, constrained by the limits of language and conditions of progress.

Though truth of sentences remain related to linguistic demands, one is still able to, as Davidson says, 're-establish unmediated touch with familiar objects and events.' 42. Truth relative to conceptual schemes which most often is the cause of disagreement, does not allow for dialogue further obstructing objective knowledge. Davidson's method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, but to allow for meaningful disagreement which must depend on some foundations in agreement. The agreement here would mean the minimum requirement for communication to be possible. For this, a maximum of self-consistency is to be attributed whereby we assume that most beliefs are held because it is thought to be true. The aim of interpretation is to be able to understand other people and we can choose the one that maximises truthfulness. And we choose the one that maximises truthfulness, by eliminating the ones that do not 'fit'. This again requires not merely the appropriate interaction but a 'critical' interaction. That is, interaction aimed towards some 'true' picture. Although Popper has written extensively on the 'myth of the framework', he too would agree that 'certain preconditions for a discussion such as a wish to get nearer to the truth and a willingness to share problems or understand the aim and problems of others' 43 are necessary. What is dangerous is to assert that a certain intellectual/theoretical framework must be shared amongst participants to ensure a fruitful discussion. Agreement can be smooth and pleasant but boring. Disagreement can be difficult and unpleasant but extremely fruitful. Popper would thus agree with Davidson that the gulf between different cultures is usually bridged and success depends largely on good-will. Davidson would

120 GEETA RAMAN

add the principle of charitable interpretation which also entails ascription beliefs and desires, rationalising behaviour.

world shared by all and attempts to make rational the sense of difference perspectives with the help of the principle of Charity of Interpretation. 'If we can produce' says Davidson, 'a theory that reconciles Charity and the format conditions for a theory, we have done all that could be done to ensure communication. Nothing more is possible, nothing more is needed.' What is however needed is to be more demanding in truth-finding. To Popper, objective knowledge arises out of what can be done to the content of our thoughts through the 'critical' and 'argumentative' functions of language. What is done does not taint, but allows for critical comment. The products of human activity are neither imprisoned nor coloured by their source but available for active interaction. This goes beyond Davidson's 'interpersonal communication' where an additional requirement of 'criticisability' characterises all interaction which is aimed towards progress. Objective knowledge in terms of truth-seeking and as a function of language must arise therefore from interaction and criticisability.

As Christopher Hookway⁴⁵ comments, 'Interpretation rests upon a number of standards which are normative. We are constrained to 'look for true beliefs to look for rationally coherent bodies of belief, to avoid ascribing inexplicable ignorance' and 'make an effort to look for reasonable desire and ... conherent patterns of attitudes and preferences...'. In a way, we need to rely only on ou selves as the measuring instruments to explain how far the beliefs and capacition of others differ from our own and whethr intelligible patterns of language and action can be successfully attributed. The 'holistic constraint' upon interpretation which are normative in character can bring out a reasonably true picture by allowing the entire episode to be part of 'critical reasoning'. This might by difficult for some, but as Popper says, rational discussion must not be practised to while away our time. It cannot exist without real problems and without the search for objective truth. Somehow, truth is relative to our active ciritical dialogue and our discovery of conjectures and their refutations, rather than any insurmountable theoretical framework. 46 Dialogue can bring out the most favourable interpretation which can be subject to further criticism or alternation interpretations till the most consistent one stands, until further challenged. There

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ternate There is an attempt to revive the Greek Critical Tradition where the fallibility of human knowledge is best represented in Xenophanes and whom Popper quotes quite extensively⁴⁷ - {...But as for certain truth, no man has known it, Nor will he know it; neither of the gods, Nor yet of all things of which I speak. And even if by chance he were to utter, The final truth, he would himself not know it: For all is but a woven web of guesses'}. This is the premise on which Popper's thesis of Critical Rationalism also rests.

To conclude, a combination of the Principle of Charity in Understanding and 'Criticisability' in attempts at truth-finding, can make up not only for the loss of subjective experience as the basis of objective knowledge claims, but also competing interpretations. Davidsonian and Popperian attempts to make experience significant to an objective epistemology without making it the final arbiter, does control and moderate the instinctive human desire to seek complete solutions and final answers. Just as we do not have a pretheoretical notion of reference in the Davidsonian frame-work we may not need to have a pre-normative notion of interpretation. It is in and through dialogue and critical discussion that the 'holistic constraints' emerge, regulating the direction towards the most consistent and reasonable interpretation of not only others but ourselves too. Although Truth may be an elusive destination the jouney must still be worth it.

NOTES

- * This paper is a revised version of a paper read at the National Seminar on "Knowledge, Truth and Experts", titled, 'The loss of experience passing from Knowledge to Truth', on 26th February 1998, at the Depter Philosophy, Bombay University, Vidyanagari, Mumbai.
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124 GEETA RAMA

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DESCARTES AND CHOMSKY : AN INTERFACE BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND MIND *

AMITABHA DAS GUPTA

Indebtedness to Descartes

One of the most distinctive features of modern linguistics, namely, Transformational Generative Grammar (henceforth TGG) is that it owes its theoretical origin to the rationalist philosophers of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. This is a claim made by Noam Chomsky, the founder of modern linguistics. His book 'Cartesian Linguistics' is not only the work addressed to this theme but it is also the expression - the cover term that describes his own enterprize. His linguistics is a revival of the conception of linguistics unheld by the Cartesian philosophers. In Chomsky's own admission, the major components of his system such as, the creative aspect of language use, the deep versus surface structure of language, universality and nativism can all be shown to have its origin in the rich tradition of Cartesian thought. This shows his deep intellectual involvement with the Cartesian tradition.

Among the Cartesian philosophers, the influence of René Descartes on Chomsky's thought is perhaps the most significant. In most of his major philosophical writings we find Chomsky expressing his indebtedness to Descartes. This indebtedness to Descartes arises mainly due to the two particular views that Descartes upheld. These two views are: first, language is the medium of expressing one's thought and second, the thesis that there are innate ideas. In Chomsky's explanation, both the theses have far reaching significance for the study of language. The first accounts for the creativity of language which Chomsky characterized as Descartes problem² in linguistics. As we will see, Chomsky takes this to be a central question in linguistics. The second is an epistemological thesis which Chomsky used to explain the nature of linguistic knowledge as possessed by a native speaker.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 1 January 1999 126

These two theses are not unrelated. They are related because the presuppose a philosophy of mind without which both these theses will have a existence. This again is a distinctive feature of modern linguistics—in mentalistic turn. As Chomsky argues, language has an intimate relationship with mind. Descartes rules out any mechanical explanation of mind and language Grammar being mentalistic in origin cannot be subejeted to mechanic explanation. We need extra mechanical principles to explain it, particularly the linguistic behaviour of man. This is how mind or the thinking substance—Recogitan, as Descartes calls it, becomes crucially important for Chomsky in the study of language. It may not be untrue to say that Descartes' philosophy of mind constitutes the fundamental presupposition to Chomsky's system of transformational generative grammar.

This paper seeks to argue the Cartesian background of Chomskyl linguistics. To do this, its basic task is to show, in a general term, in who sense transformational generative grammar may be described as Cartesia linguistics. This is a general thesis which involves a specific thesis where or concern will be to show why and how Descartes is important in this respect. The specific thesis is the part of the general thesis and thus I will not discuss it separately.

An important clarification may be sought here. The theme addressed above has been questioned both in philosophy and in linguistics. The objection raised are of two types. The first is historical in nature, whereas the other is purely conceptual. The historical objection challenges characterization of his linguistics as Cartesian. It has been pointed out the Chomsky's claim that his theory is Cartesian is not well founded. His position on many of the vital aspects of Cartesian thought is found to be different. This difference with Cartesian tradition led to the view that there is no historical continuity between Chomsky's theory and the Cartesian thought. The second a conceptual objection which challenges Chomsky's mentalistic theory language. The particular view that has been the main target of attack in the recent time is Chomsky's thesis on innate linguistic universals. It may be the said that the conceptual objection has an important bearing on Chomsky's version of Cartesian linguistics.

In the context of this paper, the historical objection is more relevant that

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the conceptual objection since the objective of this paper will be to show primarily the Cartesian origin of Chomsky's theory. This will be done mainly with reference to Descartes. It is thus quite natural to respond to the historical objection in order to show the continuity existing between the two traditions and the two thinkers. In my attempt, I have tried to counter this objection without going into much details. But I have not gone into the conceptual objection because I am afraid that will not be relevant to the present paper. With this clarification, I shall now go into the main body of my paper. In the first section of the paper, I shall try to show why Chomsky felt the necessity of going back to Cartesian linguistics. In the second section, I shall be concerned with the problem of TGG, namely, the creative use of language which Chomsky described it as Descartes's problem. In the third or the final section of the paper, I shall be concerned with Chomsky's theory of linguistic competence -- a theory which has been construed along with the line of Descartes's theory of innate ideas.

I

Back to Cartesian linguistics

The study of language must be necessarily accompanied by a second order question: What is a proper theory of language? This is a question which gives direction to the study of language otherwise the entire study will be chaotic. Depending on the answer, the content of the study will be accordingly determined. In fact, what linguistics should be -- its nature and goal are shaped by this question. The same question is crucial in understanding and reconstructing the history of the discipline.

Chomsky who has placed this question at the centre of his inquiry thus defines the goal of a linguistic theory in the following words:

The central fact to which any linguistic theory must address itself is this: a mature speaker can produce a new sentence of his language on the appropriate occasion, and the other speakers can understand it immediately, though it is equally new to them.³

This passage states a fact of language: a native speaker has an ability to produce and to understand a new sentence of his language. If this is taken as a fact, the

128

goal of a linguistic theory will be to give an account of this fact. To give a account of this fact implies giving an explanation of the linguistic competence which underlies this ability. In this picture the very objective of linguistics is thus changed. The aim of linguistics is now conceived as the elucidation of man's linguistic competence rather than organizing of linguistic data.

Considering this goal as set by Chomsky, our next question is: What do this elucidation of linguistic competence consist in? Chomsky has given technical answer to this. In fact, his own answer to this is the construction TGG, 'Competence' refers to a system of rules that constitutes the grammard a speaker's language. The grammar allows the possibility of generating the infinite set of well-formed sentences to each of which it offers one or more structural descriptions. The grammar in this sense functions as a device and Chomsky calls such a device a generative grammar. A generative grammar thus distinguishes itself from a descriptive conception of the grammar whose main task is to give a taxonomy of elements that appear in the structural description of language. According to Chomsky, the grammar represents the phonetic, the semantic and the syntactic structures of language. The grammar as a whole is responsible for pairing sound with meaning. This means that phonetically interpreted signals are paired by their semantic interpretations. Further, this pairing is done through a medium which according to Chomsky is the system of abstract structures generated by the syntactic component. In view of this Chomsky conceives the task of the syntactic component to be two fold. First for each sentence, the syntactic component must provide both a semantically interpretable deep structure and a phonetically interpretable surface structure Second, since these two are different possibilities, the task of the syntactic component is to show the mutual relation between them.

It is no wonder that this formulation of a linguistic theory brings a radical change in our approach to the study of language. The idea of constructing a generative grammar of language was never conceived in the Bloomfieldean tradition which was existing prior to Chomsky. It was not interested in the substantive issues of language. Rather it was mostly concerned with how to collect and organise data about various languages. Accordingly, the idea of a linguistic theory was identified with a set of procedures to be developed in order to process and describe the data. This data oriented approach finds its support

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Descartes and Chomsky: An Interface Between Language and Mind

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from the empiricist/positivist methodology of science.

Chomsky finds serious flaws in this approach to language. His major difficulty is that as a methodology it has a very limited significance. It cannot provide a basis for a proper theory of grammar nor can it adequately explain the fact of language acquistion. The fallacy of the empiricist theory of learning will be evident from a simple fact that the knowledge a speaker has about his language cannot be acquired entirely from what he has learned. The reason is that there are crucial aspects of language about which he knows without being taught. Such difficulties lead Chomsky to think of a different paradigm in linguistics. It is not the compilation of data but rather the capacities of human mind responsible for the speaker's knowledge of his language should be the main concern of linguistics. Acceptance of innate ideas thus comes naturally as a part of Chomsky's linguistic enterprise. It speaks for his mentalism which according to him constitutes the scientific study of language. One of the important methodological insights of Chomsky is that mentalism in linguistics must be accepted on a scientific ground. Unless we accept mentalism we cannot adequately explain language acquisition i.e., how does a child learn his language? Chomsky's charge is that much of linguistic theory has been the victim of an ill-conceived notion of science propagated by dogmatic empiricism. As a result, linguistics or, more specifically, grammar has been confirmed into certain superficial aspects of language. Chomsky, therefore, urges that a grammar in order to be scientific must go beyond its descriptive task i.e., organizing linguistic data. To be scientific means to be explanatory and for a grammar to be explanatory means explicating speaker's knowledge of language i.e., linguistic competence. This, indeed, is going back to Cartesian linguistics - a tradition which was largely forgotten in the interest of the so called scientific study of language.

Chomsky identifies the four Cartesian theses which form the common core of the two traditions of linguistics. Among these four the three are substantive theses whereas the fourth one is methodological. The three substantive theses are

First: The creative use of lanugage.

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The distinction between the surface structure and the Second

structure of language.

The acquisition and the use of language as based on the Third

innate capacities of the human mind.

In addition to the above three, the methodological thesis says:

Explanation is more important than mere description of Four

language.

The above three theses together constitute Chomsky's notion of linguis competence. However, the third thesis also works as a presupposition in without it the creative use of language which is unique ability of man cam be explained. The creative use of language is, according to Chomsky, the cent fact to which a linguistic theory must address and it thus presupposes rationalist philosophy of mind. This shows that the central question in linguist is inseparably related to a certain conception of mind. Chomsky submits to both the objective and the presupposition of his linguistics have been essential derived from the Cartesian tradition of thought and particularly from Descare Going back to Cartesian linguistics, for Chomsky, is thus a necessity -1 inevitable move that will make linguistics a truly explanatory science. With remark, I shall now go into the second section to substantiate my argument if the creative use of language which forms the goal of Chomsky's linguistic that has its origin in Descartes.

II

Descartes's Problem: The Chomskian Formulation

'Descartes's problem' symbolizes a general problem whose main control is how to explain the normal creative use of language. But what does this creative use of language mean? In what sense does it mean creative? Chomsky has give an answer to this. The creative use of language does not imply any special of The normal use of language is itself creative. The reason is that it allows nove and freedom. This means that the normal use of language is necessary accompanied by some unique characteristics. These characteristics are: Freedy from control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations and the capacitations are control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations are control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations are control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations are control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations are control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations are control by external stimuli, appropriateness to situations and the capacitations are capacitations.

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to evoke appropriate thought in the listener.⁴ All these characteristics are possible only when we assume that the speaker has the ability to form new sentences which are characterised by these unique features. Thus, the features which characterise the creative use of language is speaker's ability to form new sentences. In view of its importance, Chomsky accordingly sets the goal of a linguistic theory which says that the task of a linguistic theory to give an account of this ability which is possessed by all human beings. This is, in short, what constitutes Descartes's problem in linguistics.⁵ Our next task to find out: first, how does Descartes approach this problem? and second, what implication does he draw from the fact of creative use of language?

There are two sources from which Descartes draws his support while he approaches the creativity problem.⁶ The first is his view that language is an expression of thought and the second is that language is not amenable to any mechanistic explanation. Regarding the first, the main emphasis of Descartes's argument is on thought. If language is taken to be an expression of thought the characteristics which are peculiar to thought must be also shared by language. The general nature of the argument assumes the following structure. Since language is the expression of thought and since thought is essentially creative, from these two it may be thus concluded that there is a creative aspect of language use. Our next question is: what does this creativity of thought mean? and, how is it reflected in language? The creativity of thought implies the two following features. First, thought is unbounded because there is no limit on what can be thought. If thought is unbounded so is also language, since through the use of language an infinite number of different things can be said. Second, thought is autonomous because it is neither the function of the environment not of internal physical states. The same notion of autonomy also holds true with respect to the use of language. Given these characteristics the creative aspect of language use may be said to have the property of being "both unbounded in scope and stimulus-free". This establishes how creativity in thought is reflected in creative use of language. The latter is possible because of the former since it is accepted that language is the expression of thought. This is the first part of Descartes's argument justifying the claim that the normal use of language is essentially creative in nature.

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language use. As I have said, there is the second source from which Descarseeks to justify this unique fact of language. The main force of the argumerests on showing that language or more appropriately linguistic behaviour man is not amenable to mechanical explanation. This implies that our use language cannot be predetermined. If this is so, man is free in his use of language An important consequence of this argument is that language has a mentalish basis and it further shows that in order to give a proper account of language is necessary to accept mind-body distinction. Let me now go into a few detay of the argument.

In the history of ideas, Descartes is well known for his work on a mechanical theory of the universe. The objective of his theory is that everythin which falls under our experience can be explained in mechanical terms of body interacting with each other through the means of direct contact. Chomsky call it 'contact mechanics.' By this mechanics, Descartes tried to explain thin which are as diverse as, to quote Chomsky, the motion of heavenly bodies, to behaviour of animals and the behaviour and perception of human.

True that Descartes developed a mechanical conception of the univers But at the same time he accepts that there are areas of experience which came be accounted for by this conception of mechanics. In his finding, the most strike amongst all of them is the creative aspect of language use. It falls under different domain and, therefore, the explanation of it has to be given in other than mechanical terms. It is a domain which is beyond the reach of contain mechanics. Descartes's claim that the creative aspect of language use demands non mechanical explanation is a specific issue coming under a wider them showing that language essentially has a mentalistic basis. Descartes thus used strategy which combines both the objectives, namely, creativity and mentalist It assumes the following pattern of reasoning.

Descartes argues that mind has properties which are different from the of bodies that constitute the physical world. Since the bodies constitute the physical world there are external methods available through which we can know them. But the same is not true of mind. I can know that I have a mind only through introspection. However, introspection will not help me to determine whether another creature also has a mind. This is essentially the problem concerned with how to prove the existence of other mind. The Cartesian solution

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of the problem of other mind was offered in the form of a thought experiment. The supposed experiment is designed in such a way that it can determine whether the organism exhibits distinctive feature of human behaviour. Through this way one will be able to determine whether someone has a mind like him because the distinctiveness expressed in human behaviour is the result of the thinking mind. Descartes and the other Cartesian thinkers find that the creative aspect of language use is the most striking example of this distinctive feature of human behaviour. To establish the point that the creative use of language is the result of certain mental activities the Cartesians proposed a test. It is a test where a parrot is so conditioned that it can speak under a given stimulus. But the result will show, as they argue, that whatever parrot will say will be strictly determined by the conditions which were already set before. The same determinism, of course, will not hold in the context of an organism having a mind like our own. We can make this assertion because an organism having a mind has the freedom to express its thought by using the language appropriate to it. The creative use of language is thus intrinsically related to mind. In fact, without the latter the former will not be possible. It will not be unreasonable here to make an inference that the organism which exhibits the creative aspect of language use must have a mind like ours. This is a key to the difference between a human being and a machine. The entire organisation of a machine is arranged in a way that it is compelled to act in a particular fashion under a fixed environmental condition. Whereas a human being even if he is situated under the same cirucumstances will behave according to the way he wants to behave. The notion of choice is crucially important while we talk about human behaviour. Chomsky 10 makes a distinction between 'compelled to act' and 'inclined to act' in order to bring out the difference between a human being and a machine. The difference between the two is vital to the description of human behaviour, particularly, if it claims to be an accurate description.

The above account makes it clear that the creative aspect of language use must be seen within the context of the mind-body distinction that Descartes makes. Without this distinction we cannot give a proper account of the essential features of human behaviour since they cannot be described in mechanical terms. Further, without this distinction we cannot understand the sources of these unique features of human behaviour. If the creative aspect of language use cannot be explained in mechanical and deterministic terms the only way to do so will be

to appeal to something that goes beyond the scope of mechanics. This is he postulation of mind becomes necessary for the true characterization of humalinguistic behaviour. As Chomsky argues, Descartes's proposal for the men may be construed as a scientific approach to language and thus accepting he proposal does not lead to the acceptance of the Cartesian metaphysics.

Chomsky used the Cartesian resources to develop his own system. grammar to explain the creative aspect of language use. Chomsky takes the di from Descartes and starts from the premise that language is free form stime control. The fact that language is free from stimulus control leads Chomsky argue for his second thesis that generation of new sentences cannot be predictable on the basis of external stimuli. These two constitute Chomsky's poverty stimulus argument on the basis of which he arrives at the same conclusion that of Descartes which says that language is the expression of new though This is the philosophical basis that Descartes provides while giving his account for the creative aspect oflanguage use. At the background of philosophical/Cartesian argument, Chomsky's constructive task in linguistics to study the mechanism that is responsible for the generation of new at grammatically correct sentences. In this respect there are two important idea involved. First is Chomsky's idea of generative principles and second is his it of deep structure in language. For both these ideas, Chomsky has been influence by the Cartesian thinkers especially by Humboldt and the Port Roji grammarians.

As we have noticed, the task that Chomsky has set before him is to study the mechanism that is responsible for the generation of grammatically comes sentences. But what does this mechanism mean? What does it consists of ? And finally, how is it related to the generation of infinite number of sentences. Chomsky finds that the nature of this mechanism may be conceived as that a formal structure consisting of a set of rules called generative principle responsible for the generation of infinite number of sentences. Chomsky with the help of recursive function theory offers a technical exposition to the operative associated with this mechanism. As we can see, this way the creative aspect a language use assumes a rigorous and systematic explanation in the hands of Chomsky. Creativity is intrinsic to language and it is possible solely due to the nature of grammatical rules.

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Chomsky points out that this idea of creativity conceived as the result of the operation of grammatical rules was originally proposed by Humboldt. The general thrust of Humboldt's theory of language 11 is that language is an active process (energeia) and it is not something which is complete (ergon). This realization led Humboldt to argue that language use is a creative act and it therefore cannot be interpreted as the mechanical reception of an inert product. In this connection he proposed the notion of a language universal or what he called form der Sprache (form of language). As Humboldt claims, this notion is basic to man's linguistic ability since by virtue of it human beings are able to articulate their thoughts in diverse ways. This obviously refers to the notion of a generative grammar. Humboldt's notion of 'form of language', as Chomsky argues, can be interpreted as implying a notion of a generative grammar. There is evidence in Humboldt's writing which supports this interpretation. Humboldt makes it explicit that language is a generative process being governed by a finite system of rules and because of this it is infinite both in terms of its scope and product. These generative rules or principles constitute his 'form of language'. They are the underlying system of rules which are commonly possessed both by the speaker and the hearer. The claim that there is a generative identity among human beings, ascertained on the basis of the fact that there is uniformity of human nature.

There is a second important idea involved in Chomsky's notion of mechanism that is responsible for the generation of sentences. This is the idea of deep and surface structure of language 12 which is important for understanding the actual processes involved in the production of sentences. This thesis is also closely connected to the idea of creativity of language. Of course, it does not address to the problem of creativity directly. But the ultimate import of this thesis has a definite bearing. Without assuming the particular conceptual organisation (i.e., deep and surface structure) that grammar represents no satisfactory account can be given regarding the production of sentences. This is a claim made by Chomsky and the same claim, as he argues, was made by the Post-Royal grammarians long back.

To the Cartesian thinkers, the distinction between the deep and the surface structure of language comes because they view language as having two aspects — sound and meaning. Let me explain this view by following Chomsky's

commentary on this. The view that language has two aspects -- sound meaning, is same as to say that it has an inner and an outer aspect. Given perspective a sentence can be studied from a point of view which is either in or outer. In concrete terms, it can be thus studied either "from the point of h of how it expresses thought or from the point of its physical shape." The correspond to semantic and phonetic interpretations of the sentence. These systems of interpretations may be respectively characterized as the deep struct and the surface structure of a sentence. But what does this deep structure the surface structure mean?, what is their nature?, and, what role do they pla The deep structure is an "underlying abstract structure that determines semantic interpretation." The surface structure, on the other hand, is manifestation of the observable organization of language that determines phonetic interpretation. Through the phonetic interpretation the physical form the actual utterance is related to its intended form. However, one must note to these two structures may not be necessarily identical. As Chomsky points or "the deep structure may not have point by point correlation to phone realization." The actual arrangement of a sentence as found in its surface structure may not reveal the underlying organization of the sentence at the deep structure In view of this disparity the immediate task of a grammar is to relate deep! surface structure. Without doing this we will not be able to understand how sentence is actually produced from the deep structure that "conveys the thought expressed by the senence. With a view to explain this, Chomsky developed system of transformational rules that do the job of converting sentences for the deep structure to the surface structure. In actual term, converting implies' rearrange, replace, or delete items of the sentence" in the deep structure with purpose to arrive at the surface structure. The observable form of the sentent in the surface structure is the result of all these hidden linguistic activities performed by the speaker in his mind with the help of transformational rules. will be unfair to say that the Cartesians were unaware of this aspect of gramma However, the disstinctive contribution of Chomsky in this connection is that it formulized speakers' knowledge of language and elucidated the nature grammatical rules, namely, generative principles and rules of transformation constitute the grammar which is mentally represented by the speakers.

The above discussion on creativity which incorporates the discussion of generative principles and deep structure strongly suggest that language cannot

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be thought of without its relation to mind. The study of language or linguistics cannot therefore, ignore the mentalistic origin of language. Knowledge of language, as possessed by the speakers, is not acquired through external means. It is, on the other hand, the part of the innate structure of their mind. Descartes's theory of innate ideas thus has a special relevance in Chomskian linguistics. In fact, as mentioned earlier, rationalist theory of mind serves as the background theory to Chomsky's system of linguistics. The issues that we have discussed will not have any foot hold unless we accept this particular design of mind that Descartes conceived. Considering this we now come to the final section where the main thrust of our argument will be to show that Chomsky developed his theory of language by assuming Descartes's theory of mind at the background.

III

Descartes's Theory of Mind: A Presupposition of Chomskian Linguistics

The claim that Descartes's theory of mind is a presupposition to Chomskian linguistics must be seen in relation to Chomsky's theory of language acquisition. It provides the basis for such a claim. As pointed out earlier, for Chomsky, the question: How does a child learn his language? has an enormous significance in linguistics. In fact, it changes the entire direction of the inquiry since while answering it, Chomsky moves away from the empiricist theory to the rationalist theory of language. In this connection, he finds that Descartes' theory of innate ideas is of great help. The following discussion will elucidate this by showing how the theory of innate ideas radically changes our conception of language learning and thereby provides a new foundation to linguistics.

Chomsky's question: How does a child learn language?, assumes a context in which it has been raised. The context is the failure of empiricist conception of language learning. A child cannot acquire his knowledge of language entirely from what is given — the data. The data is often found to be inadequate and scattered and yet what is learned exhibits uniform pattern — an order. This uniformity – the knowledge of language which is achieved as the result of learning is not determined solely "by the data itself." How does this uniformity achieved in spite of the degenerating nature of the data? Chomsky's answer is that the only viable option left here is to accept that mind is equipped

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with the knowledge of certain principles and ideas which are innate in nature. They are characterized as linguistic universals both by Cartesians and Chomsky. They are the preconditions of language acquisition and, as preconditions, they are not taught. Finally, our knowledge of these universals is unconscious.

As we can see, innateness thesis in the context of language has a methodological justification. Chomsky posed it as an explanatory hypothesis. Unless we postulate that a child has an unconscious knowledge of the rules of grammar, we will not be able to explain how a child on the basis of inadequage data could come to know the highly complex grammatical rules of his language. A learning theory based on the simple mechanism of association and reinforcement cannot explain such a startling fact like the creative aspect of language use. The child's acquisition of language and the subsequent use of a including that of recursive rules can be explained only by postulating that there is an innate knowledge of language with which the child is born.

The innateness thesis has a wider implication. Using the Cartesia argument Chomsky claims that the innateness thesis unites the three theories namely, the theory of learning, the theory of perception and the theory of comprehension. The unity of the three lies over the mechanism that they follow. All these theories essentially assume the same source according to which—'s store of latent principles is brought to the interpretation of the data of sense.'

It has been mentioned that the principles and categories of language which are innate to the mind constitute the universal grammar - a description used both by the Cartesians and Chomsky. The notion of universal grammar is one of the foremost contributions of Chomsky. In this connection, Chomsky finds that this idea too has its origin in the Cartesian thought which attempts to discover, to put it in Chomsky's language, "the universal conditions that prescribe the form of any human language." This search for the universal conditions constitute the subject matter of grammaire generale of the Cartesians. As Chomsky points out, one of the fundamental claims of Cartesian linguistics is that there are features which are common to the syntax of all languages. These features are so intrinsically connected to mind that they reflect "the fundamental properties of the mind." In Chomsky's reading, this feature of language turned the attention of the grammarians to the stand point of Grammaire Generale rather than Grammaire Particuliere. There are language universals which fix the "limits to

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the variety of human language." But fixing of these limits will be possible only by discovering the conditions -- the universal conditions that "prescribe the form of any human language". Grammaire Generale thus becomes the basis of Chomsky's universal grammar. The Universal grammar forms the core which gives rise to the grammar of particular languages. But can there be any language which does not have these universal categories? Chomsky and the Cartesians will rule out this possibility. They approach this problem from the point of view of language learning which clearly shows that learning of a language is possible due to the application of certain linguistic universals by the mind. The argument used in this context has a following structure. If the universal grammar is viewed as a fundamental property of the human mind then language learning including the use of it involves mental operation since the latter will not be possible with out the former. The instrinsic connection between the two as established by the mind shows that there cannot be any language which does not reflect these universal categories. To use Chomsky's words:

....such universal conditions are not learned, rather, they provide the organizing principles that make language learning possible, that must exist if data is to lead to knowledge.

The other side of universality is the notion of necessity — a thesis which is well known in the Cartesian tradition. For Descartes, that which is universal is also necessary. While talking about the universal features of language we have already pointed out their necessary character. As our discussion shows, the universal principles and categories are necessary in two ways. First, the innate knowledge of the universal principles are the pre-conditions for language learning. Without them a child cannot learn his/her language. Secondly, universal grammatical conditions are necessary because without them there cannot be any particular language. The present discussion shows that there is an inseparable connection existing between language and mind. Descartes's theory of mind conceived as a thinking substance thus becomes a presupposition to Chomskian linguistics.

I have said in my introductory remarks that objections can be raised against Chomsky's use of the innateness hypothesis to explain the intricacies of language. This is a conceptual objection which challenges the view that the knowledge of language as possessed by man is innate. But there is a historical

objection which says that Chomsky's claim that he is using the same innatence hypothesis of Descartes's is not true. His theory is not in continuity with Descartes and thus the historical claim made by him is unfounded. In this respect David Cooper's work¹⁵ is well known which raises a serious historical objection to Chomsky's claim.

To put it briefly, Cooper is concerned with the three constitutive notion of Chomsky's linguistics, namely, innateness, universality and necessity. Sim these three notions also characterize the very nature of Cartesian though Chomsky's claim is that his theory of language is on the same ground whichis Cartesian in nature. But this claim will be valid if Chomsky's use of these notion are same as that of the Cartesians'. In Cooper's finding Chomsky's use of the notions is substantially different from the Cartesians. As he analyzes, the ten 'innateness', for Chomsky, is meant to be a kind of disposition, whereas for the rationalists and particularly, for Descartes, the term means that human being know certain truths and ideas prior to experience. Regarding the universality innate knowledge, Copper's point is that both Chomsky and the rationalist understood it in two different ways. For the rationalists the term is meant to be the knowledge of universals -- the non- particular truths. This is totally different from Chomsky who, on the other hand, takes universality of human knowledge as that which is universally and generally possessed. A similar kind of different is found when we come to the notion of necessity. For the rationalists, the notion implies that which is non-contingent, whereas for Chomsky the same notions meant as presupposition -- a pre-requisite for language learning. In view of the differences, Cooper concludes that Chomsky's notion of innateness is not if accord with the Cartesian notion of innateness. It is a new sense in which the notion is used and thus a distinction should be made between, what Cooper calls "Innateness -- Old and New."

The question before us is to find out whether the objections levelled against Chomsky are valid and is he proposing a new concept of innateness. The answer is obviously: No. Cooper has failed to see that Chomsky is using the same traditional notion but is expressing it in a language which is suitable to his enterprize. As a result, many of the notions have been reformulated. But it will be wrong to think that this reformulation has changed their essential content which subsequently leads to the formulation of a new concept of

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innateness. The content of these notions were not changed. What was changed was their outward expressions. Let me come back to the three notions that Cooper examined in order to explain his contention.

I wonder in what sense Chomsky's notion of innateness can be called a dispositional concept, so that it may be regarded as conceptually far away from that of Descartes. For Cooper, the term 'disposition' has a behaviouristic meaning and accordingly it is thought that dispositions and capacities have no mental reality. Cooper's failure is that he did not see that 'disposition' has a meaning which is other than behaviouristic. This is exactly the case with the older rationalists who interpret disposition in a non-behaviouristic way. This requires elaboration from Descartes's discussion on innateness as found in the various places of his work. In this respect one cannot rule out Descartes' interpretation of this term as disposition. In his analysis, innate ideas exist within us in the form of capacities or powers. These capacities exist in the mind potentially and they are brought to consciousness only in a situation that is appropriate to it. Innateness, for Descartes, is thus meant to be a potentiality or a kind of disposition. This establishes the first point that Descartes has a notion of disposition while he formulates his theory of innate ideas. But the most crucial aspect of his notion of disposition is that Descartes interprets innate ideas in the sense of real power. This may be characterized as the realist interpretation of disposition which distinguishes Descartes's position from the behaviourists. In this interpretation there are three things to be noted. First, the universal truths and ideas which are characterized as dispositional in nature and conceived as psychologically real though they may not be psychologically actual. Second, the notion of potentiality or disposition is construed by Descartes as a real power and has a dynamic nature of its own. It thus plays the role of an active power where potentiality or disposition is understood in terms of its growth. Here the principle is: the thing which exists potentially will ultimately grow into an actual thing. To cite the example, the tree which exists in the seed potentially will in turn grow into a fullfledged tree - the actual tree. Third, the universal ideas or truths which exist as potentialities are though unconscious can be brought to consciousness. In this connection, one of the principal argumetns of Descartes is that a cognitive act which is necessarily a conscious act is the outcome of certain innate ideas. To sum up, innate ideas exist as potentialities and thus it is formulated by Descartes within the broader theory of disposition where the

term 'disposition' acquires a non-behaviouristic interpretation.

Let me now come back to Chomsky and ask that in what sen Chomsky's position is different from Descartes particularly with respect to b dispositional construal of innate ideas. -- the point that Cooper raised differentiate Chomsky's position from that of Descartes. The present discussive shows that there is no substantial difference between the two since both of the formulate their respective theories in a similar manner. It may be pointed to that Cooper's objection against Chomsky is no objection because the issue who he is attacking is not an issue. In the beginning I have made a remark to Cooper has failed to see that Chomsky's use of the term 'disposition' has non-behaviourstic meaning. This is evident from Chomsky's acceptance Descartes's interpretation of disposition as real power existing in mind. Further like Descartes, Chomsky also accepts the active role of power, where power meant as growth. In his later writings Chomsky makes this idea explicit while discussing language learning. To explain, the process of language learning. Chomsky maintains, involves a few distinct cognitive states. Thus, for example knowing English is a cognitive state which starts from the initial state and finally reaches at the steady state. Note that the initial state which exists as print to experience starts interacting with experience during this process of succession The initial state is common to all members of human species and, by definition it is innate. It consists of rules and principles which are specific to language faculty. These rules and principles together form what is characterized a universal grammar. To use the Cartesian terminology, the initial state (# universal grammar), which exists in the form of potentiality in the speakers mind moves towards the steady state which is the attained state (i.e., the actual state) where the speaker attains the grammar of his language. As is evident Chomsky is using the same Cartesian methodology to explain the role of innst ideas in language.

While talking about the non-behaviouristic understanding of disposition it is important to note that the notion which occupies the central place it Chomksy's theory of innate ideas is linguistic competence. He made it absolute clear that this notion cannot be understood in any behaviouristic term, such a system of habits or dispositions to verbal behaviour. On the other hand, it defines the notion of competence as a system of knowledge -- "a mental structure"

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consisting of a system of rules and principles that generate and relate mental representation of various type". I think this is sufficient to establish that Chomsky's notion of innateness cannot be taken as dispositional in the same sense in which the behaviourists understand by this term. His use of the term is no way a departure from Descartes.

The second objection of Cooper concerns with the notion of universality - a notion over which Cooper finds that there is a difference between Descartes and Chomsky. For Descartes there are truths which are universal in the sense of being non- particular and thus universality of innate knowledge implies knowledge of those universal truths. Whereas, Chomsky, according to Cooper, approaches the problem, namely, universality of innate knowledge from the other side. That is, for Chomsky, universality of knowledge implies knowledge that is universally possessed. To put the same idea in a different way: knowledge is universal because it is universally possessed. This makes it evident that the notion of innate ideas conceived as universal knowledge differs in the context of the two thinkers. In fact, it is further pointed out, that since Chomsky's universals are not universals in the traditional rationalist sense they are not innate by the rationalist criterion. One of the important marks of the rationalist concept of universal is that, to put it in Cooper's words, "no one could fail to recognise them (universally known truths) as true". According to Cooper, Chomsky, on the other hand, used the term 'universal' in a "different and unusual way". As he pointed out, from Chomsky's talk about grammatical and phonetic universals one expects that these universals will be present in each and every language. This will be perfectly in line with the Cartesian stand on universals. However, Chomsky's claim, on the other hand, is found to be contrary to this Cartesian assumption since he maintains that these universals, to quote Cooper, "need not be found in each and every language". In view of this the problem that may be posed here is: either we should give up that there are innate ideas since there are no universals in the rationalist sense of the term or we should accept that Chomsky is offering a new definition of innateness based on his new theory of universal.

Cooper has wrongly conceived the problem. The problem arises because of Cooper's failure to see that Chomsky is not offering a new conception of universal. In fact, his notion of universal is no way essentially different from

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the rationalists' notion of universal. However, the difference that we find any due to the context in which they are applied. This is particularly true in 6 context of Chomsky whose main concern is with languages. The difference among particular language is a fact and, therefore, keeping this is mind one the most challenging problems before Chomsky is how to explain the present of universals in spite of the differences found among languages. In this respec the argument used by Chomsky is well known. As he argues, the principles to categories of universal grammar exist in all human beings as the part of the common genetic endowment. From this common possession it follows that he knowledge of it must be universally possessed by all human beings. However though these truths are universal they may not all have application with respectively. to different languages. Unless this is accepted, we cannot account for h differences among languages. In his recent writings, Chomsky takes a special care to explain the most important fact of language acquisition, namely in does one arrive from universal grammar to a particular language to which he exposed? In fact, the uniqueness of his theory is that it seeks to relate the two namely, the universal grammar, on the one hand, and the linguistic different on the other. As I have pointed out earlier, learning of a language is a proxi which passes through different mental/cognitive stages of a child. It starts for the initial stage - the universal grammar and finally reaches at a stage which called the attained stage where the child acquires his/her own language . is language of the community. The very structure of universal grammar is sufthat it allows certain open positions which account for the differences.

Finally is the notion of necessity. Cooper's argument is that along wi universality, necessity is also one of the defining features of innate ideas. Fi the rationalists, 'necessity' is a logical notion and thus necessary truths conceived as those which are true in all contexts of application. In Cooper assessemnt, Chomsky's notion of necessity radically differs from the rationals concept since, for Chomsky, 'necessity' is an empirical concept used by him! the sense of a prerequisite or a requirement to be fulfilled. True, Chomsky not used the notion in a strictly formal sense but that does not make his position radically different from the rationalists. On the same consideration the rational too can have the notion of something being empirically necessary. The strange evidence to this is that, even for the rationalists, innate ideas are used in sense of empirical requirement because without them, as they argue, there without them.

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a deep relations not be any cognition. This is a general methodological standpoint that follows from rationalism and I wonder in what sense it is different from that of Chomsky's position.

I think I have given answer to the historical objection. The historical continuity between Descartes and Chomsky should not be seen entirely through the texts. Rather the focus should be on interpretation and it is only through such effort that we can see their closeness. Chomsky's deviation from Descartes is not a substantial deviation. This deviation should be seen in relation to the primary concern of his inquiry. Since Linguistics is the context of inquiry, Chomsky's attempt is to contextualize Descartes's theory of innate ideas in such a way that it can be shown to be significant for the study of language without distorting the linguistic realities. This deviation may be thus understood more of a methodological nature than as a deviation in terms of its content.

This paper is not concerned with the conceptual objections against Chomsky's use of the theory of innate ideas to language. This is a different field which perhaps does not come under the scope of this paper. However, as a passing reference it may be mentioned that Chomsky's work in linguistics made it evident that a learning theory based on the simple mechanism of association and reinforcement cannot explain such a central fact as creative aspect of language use. After Chomsky's work on the formal properties of grammar, it has been particularly evident that the acquisition of computationally complex rules of universal grammar can be explained only by accepting the presence of an innate language-learning device. This gives rise to a new trend in philosophy, in psychology and in linguistics where the necessity of going beyond the empiricist and the behaviourist foundations of language have been felt. Mentalism in linguistics thus comes as a natural consequence.

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The main assumption of this paper is that Descartes and Chomsky express a deep seated unity. The unity expressed is a thematic unity showing the relationship between language and mind. What we see as observable linguistic

behaviour has its source in mind. Similarly 'mind' cannot be a simple conto In order to explain the complexities of language mind has to be rich enough terms of its content. This speaks for the powers of mind which are large responsible for the rich structure that language exhibits. I think this is one the fundamental insights that Descartes offered to modern linguistics. Through this paper, I have tried to argue that Descartes's theory of mind, call it a Cartes conception of mind, works as a presupposition to Chomskian linguistics. Ma of the principal thrusts of Chomskian linguistics will be unintelligible with accepting this theory of mind at the background. Chomsky could give a line direction to linguistics because he saw that language and mind forms a unin His rehabilitation of the notion of innate ideas is thus celebrated as a 10 dimension not only to the study of language but, more importantly, to the study of man in general. Through the revival of innate ideas, Chomsky restored to freedom of man -- a cognitive freedom that defines the very essence of hum nature. There are two insights involved here. First is the idea of infinite possibilities and second is the idea of self-fulfillment. Revival of the notion ideas led to the view of a man being endowed with infinite possibilities. It idea suggested here is that man has the ability to make free use of his endowen Here lies his capacity to fulfill himself. Freedom thus implies individual possibility of self-fulfillment. But the idea of self-fulfillment will have I significance unless we accept that there are innate capacities. The reason is these are the capacities to be fulfilled in order to achieve self-fulfillment. In the connection, one cannot overlook the presuppositions implicit in this suggestion The presupposition is the denial of the empiricist conception of mind where miss is thought of as nothing more than the aggregate of random perceptions. Further to this idea of freedom as self-fulfillment there is also the idea rule-governedness. This follows from Chomsky's definition of innate ideas. ** is well known, the concept of an innate idea is defined by Chomsky as a generative device which conceives the idea of infinite possibilities as expression of freedom within the bounds of finite rules. Freedom is not anarchic concept nor does it lead to lawlessness. The Chomskian linguistic ensures this freedom. This is a consequence which follows from Chomsky reconstruction of the Cartesian theory of mind and language.

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NOTES

- * This paper was originally written for a symposium on René Descartes organised by The Asiatic Society, Calcutta in December, 1996.
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Barlingay, Dr. S. S.: A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN ETHICS - (My Impressions of Indian Moral Problems and Concepts), Delhi, 1998, Penman Publishers, pp. viii + 183, Price Rs. 320/-

This book has been postumously published very recently in 1998 but all those who were present at the World Philosophers' Meet held in MIT, Poona during the last week of November 1996 will reminisce that radiant occasion when the book was publicly released in the very presence of the Late Dr. S.S. Barlingay, the author of the book. They will also recall the very elegant speech made by Prof. John R.P. Mayer de Berncastle of Brock University, St, Catharines Ont. Canada, reviewing the book in superlatives and arousing thereby very high expectations about the contents and their treatment. The matter printed on the cover page 2 of the book articulates these expectations and makes rather tall order of claims about the book. Surely those lines have not come from the pen of Dr. Barlingay. The author of the book introduces the subject-matter with no overtones for what he has achieved, nor does he withhold his apologies to readers for not having been able to incorporate all his findings on extensively vast literature which he claims to have studied very carefully. He claims that it is an incomplete presentation based on the literature ranging from Vedic times down to Panini's astādhyāyi, Patanjali's mahābhāsya, Bhartrhari's vākyapadīya, some portions of Mahābhārata, Bhagvdgīta, Anugīta, Smṛti literature, and moral tales comprising pancatantra and hitopadesa etc. He states clearly that the study could not lend him a genuine satisfaction that he was aspiring for. It's not sheer modesty that makes him say so. He draws our attention to the fact that in order to attempt a fullfledged study of Indian Ethics, one will have to work on four other segments of ancient Indian literature: 1. Whole of mahābhārata omitting Bhagvadgīta and Anugīta, 2. Bhagvadgīta, Anugīta and Smrti literature, 3. Bauddha literature, and 4. Jaina literature. May it be noted that Dr. Barlingay is not limiting the scope of such study to merely darsanika works but referring

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to literature in general. As per his own averment, this study is to be regarded as preliminary to a very ambitious project and all that he has done is to enter his observations and reflections on them. The phrase 'introduction' in the is thus justified inasmuch as the author intends his readers not to expect a ven neat and systematic presentation of Indian ethical doctrines and theories as such One of the reasons that he adduces for the imprecision that characterises h work is that although he had himself clearly realised the 'ethical message contained in the literature mostly available in the form of stories, it is not possible to formulate it in moral and ethical principles clearly and distinctly. These store were written to authenticate some or the other accepted and established code conduct, an 'ācārasamhitā'. We do not know how those ācārasamhitās we themselves formulated, nor do we have any historical evidence showing ho they came into existence at all. Moreover the stories contain, says the author several statements that are mutually inconsistent. Even Bhagvadgītā and Sm literature contain many assertions that contradict one another. Naturally, one faced with the problem of easing out these contradictions before one attempts 'structuring in' of any moral view or theory. The author deserves sympathis not merely for exasperation he feels at the stupendity of the project but also in the forbearance with which he would like to encompass within it a very was expanse of ancient Indian literature full of diversity, variety and richness d cultures. The author is attempting a task which is seemingly impossible nevertheless, worth attempting.

The whole book has been divided into ten small chapters. There are that appendice. The first chapter is introductory, leading upto the second chapter which depicts the entire philosophical background that is essential for appreciating the approach of Indian thinkers to the moral problems posed by the social milieu in which they lived. Rise of the moral concepts is covered in the third chapter. The fourth deals with social reality and moral order. In the fiftic chapter the author takes a close look at the grammar of moral concepts and indicates the possibility of metaethical level of discussion in Indian ethics. The Sixth chapter brings out the theme of 'virtue and value' and the seventh of develops the crucial topic of Karma and Karmabandha. The difficulties faced organizing the Indian moral thought into a system or systems are highlighted the eighth, thereby suggesting why the prospects of presenting Indian moral thought are rather dim. The ninth chapter deals with preconditions of moraling thought are rather dim. The ninth chapter deals with preconditions of moraling the limitation

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as conceived by Indian philosophers. The final chapter contains conclusions based on earlier discussions. The first appendix lists important quotes and passages which, it may be presumed, will be useful for research scholars in the field. The second appendix presents Dr. Barlingay's own reflections on the nature of freedom in the context of individual and seciety. Though small, it broaches an all-important issue in the sphere of public and private morality. Third appendix acquaints us with the Buddhist concepts of Duhkha, Tṛṣṇā and Vaira. This review, without making any reference to the three appendice, will focus its attention on the main body of the argument in the book.

At the very outset of his presentation, Dr. Barlingay expatiates on his view of philosophy as a cultural discipline. Though difficult to specify what exactly is the significance of this charaterization, it may not be after all impossible to get at what Dr. Barlingay is implying thereby. Philosophy is construed in modern times as intellectual exercise in argumentation on basic issues and concepts used in various spheres of human knowledge, or as mere conceptual analysis, or again as linguistic analysis in the direction of clarification and dissolution of philosophical problems. But more than that, according to Dr. Barlingay, philosophy is a product of an anthropocentric world constructed in abstract plane on the basis of cosmocentric world. Such a product cannot remain completely immune form the influences of the culture in which the thinkers live and breathe. Philosophical reflection then mirrors the form of life and cultural patterns of any society in which it takes place. It's only through such an approach to philosophy that one can understand the tissue of moral thought that developed in Indian society. In the texture of any human culture, a few philosophical beliefs always get ingrained and human beings carry on their routine life and even special deals on the basis of such beliefs. Their decisions and actions just flow from them as a matter of deontic necessity. So far as our land is concerned, we have various kinds of societies and the diversity sometimes exists even in diametrical opposition. In the history of unknown times, this process of consolidation of philosophical beliefs has taken place in India for over a very very long time. One does not know how to account for the legitimacy of such concepts as Rta, Satya, Rna and Karma in Indian philosophy. Same is the case with Buddhistic notions of Vaira, Tṛṣṇā and Duhkha. All these become lively in significance only when related to the cultural forms lived by the societies of those times. Dr. Barlingay presents from this angle an analysis of Purva

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Mīmāmsā, Sāmkhya and Uttar Mīmāmsā which is plausible and revealing. points out to the entire gamut of thinking in Pūrva Mīmāmsā on Karma emanating from the culture of 'sacrificial fire'. There should be then no scrub whatsoever over the predominance which Karma takes, procreating the entire Karmakānda in accordance with vidhīs. Fire became the symbol of various celestial deities to whom the offerings are made in the form of 'arghya' and 'āhuti'. The whole life then became a matter of rites and rituals. Mantras were composed for being uttered with great accuracy in pronounciation and purity persons and their surroundings. No mantra was thought to be efficatious unless it was uttered systematically and accurately. Dr. Barlingay discusses at length the Sārnkhya and Uttarmīmāñsā systems and shows how the different interpretations with regard to those systems are ultimately rooted in the cultural differences within the different forms of Indian society. He even goes to the extent of suggesting his hypothesis that Sāmkhya, Uttar Mīmāmsā and Bauddh darsanas may be regarded as revolts against the Karmakanda culture of Puru Mīmānsākas.One can notice linkages between the philosophical shifts from Karmakānda to Jñānakānda in Indian philosophy and the cultural transformation that have taken place in the Hindu society. The relationship is essentially of cultural type. It is the view of Dr. Barlingay that all darsanas in India believ in the reality of cosmic universe, of knowing self as a constituent of it though distinguishable form the rest and the capacity of the knowing self to attain knowledge of the universe. In an endeavour to come to terms with the cosmit universe, the Indian society has thrown up diverse cultural forms of life of which the respective philosophies are integral part. This cultural transformation is a on-going process and has continued till this date.

In the same vein Dr. Barlingay addresses the body-soul problem in the context of human beings and throws a good deal of light on the systems of Indian philosophy. His discussion is thought- provoking and has immense potentialities for further reflections. Relying on Samkara's oft-quoted remark. Satyānrte mithunikṛtya.....naisargiko ayam lokavyavahārah', he defends reasonably well the contention that all our moral problems belong to the world in which we live and that they have nothing to do with any other-worldly domain. They are the problems of 'here and now' which we have to face. They are universal in the sense that they can erupt anywhere in the human world. However in the West, these problems have received due attention of the thinkers in

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culminate into sophisticated philosophical theories and reflections, while in India, no systematic effort seems to have gone into exploring and formulating moral theories. Though Dr. Barlingay expresses great regret over this situation in India, he seems to entertain a few scruples about it. He thinks that in the ravages of times, much of the philosophical writings which dealt with our moral problems and reflections over them may not have come down to us. He supports this contention by citing that famous stanza from Brhadaranyaka, viz., Tamaso mā jyotir gamaya, mṛtyormā amṛtam gamaya, asato mā sadgamaya. He unravels the great and the deep significance of the morals that must have led poets of ancient past to compose such a fine and philosophically pregnant verse. Thus the glory of our past, so far as ethics and moral philosophy is concerned, has remained and will for ever remain, lost to us. Since the records are lost, we cannot even remotely say about their contents. Lots of changes have taken place since then. These changes have taken place not through free and frank disussions (i.e. democratically) but through the hegemonies of certain powerful groups in the society. Only a few people who weilded power politically or sociologically used to frame injunctions and decide for the entire society as to what its members should do or should not do. This is how 'ācārasamhitās' were framed and hence they had a mandatary character. The prescriptions used to be binding on every member of the society and any departure would be met with severe punishment. It is through such samhitās that we meet with the rise of the moral concepts of satya, rta, anrta & rna. Dr. Barlingay's discussion of these concepts as arising from the ācārasmhitās is illuminating. It shows how as the human thought in India moved from cosmic structure of the universe to the anthropocentric structure of the human society, the moral concepts get more and more enriched by moral import and significance. He draws our special attention to the Indian concept of rna as carrying equally rich moral import as the concept of 'ought' in the West, if not more. Similarly he maintains that the advocacy of the four puruṣārthas: Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa has by way of implication a very sound and rich moral reasoning, which unfortunately has not come down to us or was never systematically presented by our thinkers. All the moral concepts are, as it were indiscreetly, embedded in the ācārasamhitās framed from time to time. So long as they lie embedded in the presecriptive form, it is obvious that they will not lend themselves to moral reasoning which mainly focusses on criteria or reasons for their acceptability or rejection. Dr. Barlingay seriously 154 S. V. BOX

complains that while Western thinkers necessarily make distinction betwee 'desired' and 'desirable', the Indian thinkers do not ever make such a distinction and consequently fail to produce moral reasoning or theory as such. I see to this is debatable, but if it is true, that will throw some light on the moral debation which we find ourselves presently in all walks of life. According to him to concept of 'puruṣārtha' is bhavya, which memans 'having potentiality of cominto existence in future'. He indulges in a few basic scruples about the moral teachings of the Bhagvadgītā and emphatically suggests that the paradox of the immoral man and the moral society, which was true of those ancient times, true of today perhaps even more fiercely.

In the chapter on 'Social reality and Moral order', he first expounds notion of Dharma which is central to Indian Moral Philosophy, then referri the three-tire distinction between morality, normative ethics and metaethics finally comments upon the notion of freedom as it was handleld by the India thinkers. Basic philosophical issues, he maintains, emerged here in India at result of man's confrontation with the universe. The concept of 'Dhami covered within its scope all such issues - material, metaphysical and moral. Barlingay takes the expression 'Dharma' in this context as standing for b ultimate goal of human existence. Dharma means 'abhyudaya' and 'nishreya' The real meaning of 'Niśreyas' is to become completely identical with b ultimate reality which may be either Nirguna Brahma or material Prakṛti or wir we call 'Nature'. If we take this seriously enough, then the objective of morals can be nothing else but 'abhyudaya' i.e. prosperity in this world inhabited us. We must aim at prosperity in this world, no matter in which direction dimension we work. Barlingay feels strongly that our ancient forefathers is this insight. Mantras available in the literature of those times and which are sufficiently quite often even today - the mantras like 'Sahanāvavatu' and 'sarve api sukhis santu' etc. - are indicative of the predominance of such insight then. Prosper is a human concept basically. He unfolds its intimate relationship with all four purusārthas and presents an analysis of that concept which speaks for exceptional analytic mind the author had. His reflections on 'soul', 'rebit (punarjanma)' and 'karma' and reactions given to the views in their respect expressed by Pūrvamīmānsakas, Uttarmīmānumsakas and Bauddhas noteworthy and original. He points out that if we take into account quintessential teachings of Advaita Vedānta then there is absolutely no place of

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cālurvarnya and varnāshramdharma as structural canons of human society. The concept of 'karma' (as passing from past life to present life and from this life to future) results from ignorance. But because our ancient thinkers did not consider all this carefully, the concept of 'abhyudaya' in the sense of prosperity during this life on this planet did not take root in our society. Instead, otherworldly objective described as 'pāralaukika niśreyas' (something to be achieved not in this world but beyond it) dominated thinking of the people at large. Keeping performance of rites and rituals at the centre, the notions of soul, its immortality, karma, karmabandh, pre-birth, re-birth, swarga and narak, etc. together with God as moral governor - all this brought into existence the 'caturvarnya' structure in the society and allowed it to culminate into a steel-framework that made free movement of thought and ideas impossible. Dr. Barlingay complains that the teachings of Gītā on the notion of Karma have not been fully appreciated in our society. This complaint is genuine but one fails to see why 'abhyudaya' - the this worldly prosperity - could not serve as a summum bonum of human life in India if the moral world, according to author's basic contention, is anthropocentric and not cosmocentric. If the story of Indian ethics is different from the story of the West, one must develop a perspective which can account for such difference. Dr. Barlingay's perspective is certainly laudable because it opens up the possibilities of new and revealing investigations. He opines that G.E.Moore certainly gives a linguistic turn to moral issues in the form of meta-ethical inquiries, but never goes to the roots as to how the moral issues emerge in human life. It is his contention that in Indian ethics, all the discussion that has taken place in respect of the concepts of rta, rna, bhavya and dharma is in the context of issues arising in moral sphere of man and it has bearing on human prosperity (abhyudaya) which is linked up with preyas and sreyas. But this discussion got off the right track due to bewitchment caused by the false but immensely enticing notion of other-worldly niśreyas. A human being, no matter where he belongs, is going to return to the dust from which he sprang. Nothing of his own as such is going to last after him. Most of the moral problems arise because we do not take into account the true nature of our destiny. Attachment that originates in man's egoistic sentiment and selfishness strengthens its grip of him. He comes to develop strong attachment for such things in his life as do not really belong to him. Till the end he fondles this attachment so vehemently that the thought of separation from things he possesses 156 S. V. BO

becomes painful. Death is going to put a full-stop to that attachment. Moke nirvāṇa are not distinct from this. It's an absolute return to the absolute return t

The chapter ends with reflections on the concept of freedom - al concept of the moral sphere. Freedom to act is considered by Indian philosophic as fundamental and sui generis. But freedom is also the goal and as such ave in itself. The whole human existence is bound up with manifestation of free Indian philosophers, especially Advaitins, consider freedom on two levels: on individual level and second, on the level of universe in which the indivimoves. In one sense man is free on both the levels. On the first level, individis architect of his own future and thus is responsible for every act he perfor He is free to choose however. He has freedom to decide what action or ach he will perform. While choosing and exercising freedom, individual comes realise that after all his own existence is a part and parcel of the total univer-The feel that I am different from that totality is an illusion. Freedom consists getting over that illusion and in relieving oneself from the egoistic complete limits one's own life to oneself. Moksa really means such freedom. Thought physical body gives one a personal identity, with its destruction is lost consciousness, self-consciousness and the entire mental make-up. Dr. Barling is expressing a very profound truth when he says "Freedom in the sense of Mile then is complete annihilation of man's individuality. It is not freedom, if freedom from being bound to a particular organization called man". (p.70)

The fifth chapter of the book under review deals with the Grammal moral concepts. It is of a technical nature and will require acquaintance with grammar of Sanskrit literature. One might therefore think that this chaptal addressed to grammarians and linguists. But it is not so. Though the main the is not clearly formulated, one can sense the philosopher's concern with the molanguage that prompts Dr. Barlingay to bring to light the meta-endic considerations that lie hidden underneath the grammatical formulations commands, injunctions, and moral laws, etc. If the attempt in the direction indicated by the author succeeds in showing that the discussions held by Indicated by the area of moral philosophy had reached the heights of meta-endicated level - a matter of further research, then the possibility of there being a fine moral normative theories receiving attention of the Indian thinkers cannot be incompared to the series of the

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excluded. Dr. Barlingay's discussion of the concept of 'vidhi' from this approach is certainly enlightening but incoclusive.

The sixth chapter deals with 'Virtues and Values' in the context of Indian Ethics. He focusses his attention on the discussion regarding these in the traditional systems of Indian philosophy, Buddhism and Jainism. He informs us that in most of the philosophical literary tales such as Hitopadesh and Panchatantra, Mahābhārata, Ramāyana, various stories in Purānas, in Yogasūtras and Yogavāśīṣṭha not only are virtues mentioned but they receive high prominence and weightage.

Virtues have been classified mainly under two heads. Munīs, Sanyāsins and Bhikhkhus are expected to cultivate one set of virtues very rigourously with all the detachment for worldly pleasures. Ordinary people have to cultivate a different set of virtues that are less rigourous and are not necessarily opposed to worldly pleasure and happiness. Virtue needs to be distinguished from Vratavaikalyas. In the onward march of tradition, these distinctions have not been always meticulously observed. Virtues have also been bound up with pursuit of puruṣārthas. From all this it would follow that like ancient Greek Philosophers, Indian philosophers laid emphasis on promoting strength & sturdiness of human character by pursuing the path of virtues which is strenuous and straitly. All systems of philosophy in India look upon moral discipline as a necessary conditon, implying thereby that philosophy is a way of life and not merely an intellectual exercise. Ethics of virtues was formulated as a code of conduct in which injunctions are issued asking people to do certain things or to refrain from doing certain things. Dr. Barlingay presents several classifications of virtues given in different systems, such as Nyāyā, Yoga, Bauddha and Jaina and unravels very deep and profound significance of the concept of virtue as conceived by Indian philosophers, together with his own insightful observations. If the ideal of moksa or nirvāna is the same as the nisreyas in the sense in which he takes that expression (which every human and non-human living being is destined to end with), then we should be able to make out a reasonable case for the pursuit of virtuous life as against the path of vice for attaining prosperity (i.e. abhyudaya) in any human society. Unless we are able to show that there is some kind of a priori necessity that would make happiness follow inveterately from evey act of virtue, the task of a moral philosopher is not going to be an easy one. If in the

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history of Indian thought and culture we find the notion of prosperity, by individual and social, being not given due prominence, it would be an index, the absense of sound and just level of moral philosophy.

In the Seventh chapter, Dr. Barlingay comes to the crux of the issue, he discusses the notions of Karma and Karmabandh. Both these notions have been viewed in the wrong light by the ancient thinkers in India, according him. Indian Ethics lays stress on the doctrine of Karma, Cāturvarnya composito of society and the Aśramadharma. He does not speak anything about the ethin of asramadharma, presumably because there is none behind it. However he dim our particular attention towards Karmasiddhānta as a stronghold base Cāturvarnya structure of the Society. The theory of Karma was pressed in service as a pivotal ground in defence of that social structure. Divine sancia was also espoused. We must however note that the Caturvarnya structure h itself cannot be said to be a direct logical consequence of Karmasiddhānta li were so, the Bauddhas and the Jainas would not have subscribed h Karmasiddhānta and supported it strongly. It is more comprehensive and m confined to merely āstika darśanas. Dr. Barlingay draws our particular attention to its original formulation by the Pūrva Mīmānsā and thinks that that formulation is philosophically inoccuous and that it would not have done much harm to the Indian society were it to continue in its old original pristine form. In the course of history, however, the doctrine underwent radical modification so as to bring? within its fold such beliefs as cannot be easily justified. This is not the only worry that he expresses. When we consider all the beliefs covered up by this doctrine as a whole, it leads to plain logical contradiction. Dr. Barlingay the sees that the doctrine loses all its rationality. His comments on the notion of Karmabandha are original as they trace the trouble with that notion as lying separating those aspects of human action which can be only distinguished by # in our thought.

In the eighth chapter, Dr. Barlingay pinpoints the difficulties in presenting Indian moral thought in the form of moral theories as such. Linguistic difficulties would be obvious but his main complaint appears to be that the whole thought is characterised by relativity of groups, cultures, and diversity of metaphysical beliefs. In brief, Indian society was never one society to place before itself one common good to be pursued by its members. This would explain why there

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wasn't concerted effort on the part of the Indian society as such to realize the objective of prosperity for all in the land. Moralities seem to have developed placing at the centre only self-anchored reasons and not the society- anchored reasons. The chapter ends with a note on 'Social and Moral' in which Dr. Barlingay casts his cursory glance over the relationship between society, law and morality. The issues he raises are certainly important and are quite relevant to modern times. One does not have means to know whether those issues were of much concern to ancient thinkers. In the last but one chapter, Dr. Barlingay reflects over the expression 'moral' to trace distinguishing marks, if any, that would render a certain action moral. He brings out the significance of 'chodanā' according to Pūrvamīmānsakas in this context but it is doubtful if he succeeds in overcoming all the difficulties in this context. The last chapter is a sort of summing up of the views expressed in the book.

The subject matter of this book viz., Indian Ethics, is of a complex nature. Its span is also vast. Dr. Barlingay's study is only an introduction to an ocean of moral phenomena on the continent of India. It seems that most of the moral phenomena found expression in Indian society at customary level of morality and never rose to reflective level. The social realities that have come down to us reveal lack of fairness and justice to feeble sections of the society - the untouchables, the poor and the downtrodden, the ignorant and the illitrates. The treatment meted out to our women-folk does not speak of any high level awareness of moral principles. If at all, it is an indication of the prevalence of what Hegel calls 'master-slave' relationship in its ignoble form. It is to be hoped that Dr. Barlingay's work provokes us into undertaking further deeper studies of our traditions in moral spheres and exposes us to their merits and demerits to refine and reform the moral texture of our society.

S. V. BOKIL

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A. KANTHMAN

II

Dretske, Fred: NATURALISING THE MIND, (A Bradford Book Jean Nicod Series), Cambridge, MA, 1995, The MIT Press, pp. 232.

This book* is an extremely important contribution to the ongoing deba during the last two or three decades of our philosophically rich and pregnant by fast vanishing Century, whose story is a story of passage from non-naturalis to naturalism. While Wittgenstein offered therapeutic naturalised semantics promote philosophical naturalism, Quine advocated naturalised epistemology promote naturalised skepticism. In the philosophy of mind, however, to qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of mind had defied traditional and modern forms of naturalism. It was therefore an important question: How can the perplexing and baffling problems of phenomen experience be accounted for? To answer this question Dretske offers in this box a provocative discourse to argue that in order to understand human mind, recours to comprehend merely biological machinery that enables the mind to do its in is not enough. It's necessary to understand what the mind's job is and how can be performed by a physical system, the nervous apparatus. The understanding is developed by Dretske within the framework of naturalism by claiming that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real world properties that experience represents world having. He presents to us a completely naturalistic account of phenomena consciousness, a theory which may be named as 'Representational Naturalism

The notion of representation is central to cognitive science. It is paradigmatic to current philosophy of science (R. Cummins, 1989). With cognitive science, there are opposite camps, the representationists, who hold the internal representations exhibit a 'read-write-copy' linguistic structure, as we as the anti-representationists. According to critics like Andy Clark (1994)

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^{*} The original inspiration to write this review comes from Professor S. V. Bold contribution to the Seminar on 'Critical Theory and Post-Modernism' (1991) held at the RIAS, Uni. of Madras. Bokil's thesis was: on matter what post modernism means, naturalism comes to stay. He encouraged me to write modest summary.

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anti-representationists are not as sceptical of the notion of representation, as they appear to be. They need a notion of deep representation, and they avow to identify mental representations with the 'cut-and-paste' neural architecture. They work with vector coding in a high dimensional space. Such representations are at the micro-level and may not after all require language. They are language-less. There arises, therefore, a dispute as to whether sentential or non-sentential paradigm is better suited for cognitive science. No decision to favour one or other is imminent because both use symbol manipulation and then confuse the implicit and explicit levels of representations, but in the reverse directions. Besides there are revisionary representationists, who favour a variation of radical, dynamic, and non-computational models. In between there are representationists who couple representations with segments of environment. All these notions probably lie in a continuum.

There is no one viable theory that holds sway. The whole story began with Jerry Fodor's 'strong' representational theory of mind that found representations of thought in mentalese (language of thought). Among the 'dizzying range of options' (Stephen Stich, 1992), one finds weak syntactic theory, causal co-variation theories (Dretske, 1988; Fodor 1987; and Fodor 1990), teleological (Millikan, 1984; Papineau, 1987), narrow theories (Devitt, 1990) and wide theories (Burge, 1979). The mainstay of the projects is to naturalise intentional categories, such as belief, desire etc. The crucial issue here is to know whether representation is a naturalistic phenomenon and it can be said to have a physicalistic or reductionistic character.

Stephen Stich cautions us by telling us that there is no one single project but a family of projects, much of which are located as interdisciplinary in its core. From this, he was led to theorise that there is a plurality of theories. From a common sense of folk psychological point of view, a distinction can be drawn between mental representations that are of the form I believe p (monadic structure) and I believe that p (dyadic structure). The monadic structure view entails a modularity assumption about the mind, according to which, it occurs within a module in an encapsulated form, thus warranting a hard-and-fast distinction between perception and cognition (inferential). This is shown to be a way of overcoming the substituitivity argument. The dyadic view, on the other hand, cannot see perception and cognition (conceptual) as integral forms of a

162 A. KANTHMA

cognitive organism. An offshoot of the monadic view holds that I believe just analogous to I say/express p (where p is put within a scare quote) where questions the rationale of philosophical theories, which aim to give necessary and sufficient conditions for

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For them, mental state M has content p = p, and propose to offer a syntax theory of mind (Stich, 1983). Fodor, on the other hand, deems it convenients explore only sufficient conditions throughout his writings. The answer to above question comes in the way by holding that mental representation in naturalistic phenomenon. Robert Cummins (1989), for example, identifies su a project with a computational theory of cognition. Like Fodor, Cummins is seek sufficient conditions. The difference between Fodor and Cummins, in the regard, is significant in that while Fodor proves it in support of ceteris panh laws, Cummins wants to pose the question whether the idea of men representation plays the same role both in computational psychology. For answers 'Yes', and Cummins answers 'No'. Cummins opens the way in computational states that are realised only indirectly rather than directly Following the lead of Cummins, Terence Horgan was led in the direction what I call an anti-Fodorian (he calls it as non-Fodorian, however) thesis: lating sufficient conditions as tractably sufficient conditions or surveyable, or as ! prefers to put it, psycho- tectonically (a term used by Colin McGinn) realisable he was led to formulate an argument against type-type identity of mental st computational states, finally arriving at a conclusion which states that it is a possible to specify tractably sufficient conditions. Horgan justifies the above h advancing a distinction between direct and indirect realisable conditions. latter denies any strict identity between computational states and wells realisation states. They are not computationally tractable because they non-unique, and baroque (what functionalists call as multiply realisable, which provides an argument against type-type psycho-physical identification). corresponding argument is called type-type identity of mental and computation states.

There are at least three crucial premises that led toward the about

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standpoints. They are: there cannot be any one-to-one translation between different computational relations with two individuals or even within one and the same person. And hence there may be different computational relations between what is psycho-tectonically realised in human and what is psychotectonically realised in Martian Mentalese. It is therefore chauvinistic to hold that mental states can be individuated on account of their identity with syntactic or computational or realisation states. Hence, meaning can only be given in terms of broad content. I take this to be a significant improvement on Fodor, who overcomes the Twin-Earth problem by holding that translations are determinate. In contrast, Horgan uses a major premise of indeterminacy of translaton, which looks like an apparent contradiction at the surface level. It appeals to me as a significant move for studying the very idea of representation (a naturalism without tractably specifible sufficient conditions) which accommodates misrepresentation as well, which requires a similar fundamental premise saying that both experience and thought are representational in different ways (Dretske, staple-cheese becomes the in Dretske's refreshingly information-theoretic approach, which bears a certain contrast with Fodor's own. If what I say is correct, then there is a broad agreement between Horgan's and Dretske's approaches.

So, the orthodox variety recommends a classical computational theory. The un-orthodox deal with cognitive or neural architecture. The former is sometimes identified with a linguistic paradigm, and the latter with a non-linguistic one, and it is supported by a connectionist paradigm. A connectionist paradigm uses parallel data processing for a design of the mental architecture. Stich expresses the scepticism as follows: there is no unique correct framework for theories in cognitive science (253).

Computational system is either individualistic or anti- individualistic (Putnam, Burge). Cummins has reason to take the latter side on account of the above distinction between direct and indirect realisation since beliefs and desires cannot be individuated independent of the environment, our common-sence psychology is said to be antiindividualistic, whereas scientific psychology cannot have that option: it should explain how beliefs are individuated. Externalism provides an option, but it acts more like a safety valve. It is so for the simple reason that naturalism demands coupling of cognitive organism with its

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environment. Eliminativists who try to eliminate the folk elements have at three options. First, they may argue that, following the above taxonomy individualism, and anti-individualism, the ontologies of computational theorem are different or incompatible with ontology of folk theory. However, compatibilist position dominates the scene (Sterelny, 1990). Secondly, they put up a case by holding that there are some features of scientific psychology up that science approximates to the truth than folk: we have only the mad some thing called pan-eliminativism. Probably, Churchland endorses this: what indeterminate in one theory is determinate in a future theory.

In all these, theorists use a modicum of philosophy of language supporting philosophical conclusions. They use description theory, pure refere theory, and causal-historical theory. Descriptive theories argue that we q eliminate by description, pure referential theories seek a strong indentity of mental, making a case against belief psychology, causal-historicists advocate externalist approach. The discriptivist theory is trivially true, whereas is causal-historical theorist is trivially false, and we are left with one option of pr reference. The trouble about these theories is that there is no one unique than and hence pluralism is the result. Consequently, even so, a weaker theory identifies folk and science in a weaker sense (its strong sense in with eliminativism can never become true) suffers a casualty. Pluralism in b referential or descriptive theories is replaced by pluralism about externalism There is a guarantee at least one or other versions may be true. The significant of the critique of the earlier-mentioned pluralism is that all such naturalis projects suffer from a single defect that is germane to crossreferent inter-theoretic relationship (Stich). One may read this as providing scope for argument against type-type identity of mental and computational states (Horga The same point can be said about the relation between linguistic version translates into mentalese and the non-linguistic which fixes it in the cognitive architecture. Are they independent projects in the ultimate run? The answer not so much clear.

Bald naturalism (R. Bernsterin's term) is completely out of question, thence is is chauvinistic. Non-reductive materialism has a promise, but no definition answer has emerged as yet. Versions of this are available from Davidson on water the complete production of the complete production of the complete production on the complete production of

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(Simon Evnine, 1991) up to Horgan who considers it as the third important paradigm, other than eliminativism and physicalism. In Horgan, it occurs in a very developed form which brings together tractably specifiable, and not tractably specifiable at the implementational level. From Horgan's point of view, if Cummin's account has anything to say on this matter, it is that representation theories fail because they can not take into consideration misrepresentation. Thus, misrepresentation becomes a fundamental issue. So it transpires that we need a more generic notion than representation. In fact, Cummins suggests such a more fundamental notion of s-representation, which is non- unique, but even then he could not succeed, by taking mental representation as a special case. Where actually this fails is that it takes seriously tractably specifiable condition for srepresentation. Terence Horgan (1992) changes this into tractable non-specifiable conditions. Horgan argues that even if, they are tractable, they have no prospects of being physical and he was led towards a non-reductive physicalism. Spliced with all revisionary potency of supervenience (mental states are supervenient on physical states), the prospects look brighter. As if to rectify the very notion, Dretske calls attention to the generic status of misrepresentation. For Dretske, the very notion of representation must be rich enough to include misrepresentation as well. How to read the significance of this rich enough notion, which is claimed to be poised enough to meet even a sceptic about representation? Here lies the importance of Dretske's contribution towards the naturalising the mind, as I read it, which combines many of the positive features mentioned above.

The book under review is the latest in the series and it forms the 1994Jean Nicod Lecture, in memory of the famous French logician Nicod, and Fred Dretske is the successor to to this position. Dretske overcomes the unneccessary distinction between perception and cognition made by Fodor by replacing it with facts about representation and representational facts. The latter are mental facts or physically localisable facts in the brain. But facts about thoughts. Whereas Fodor holds that all mental representations are cognitively penetrable, dretskedenies exactly this: some are, therefore, are not. In fact, they offer contrary solutions to the problem of misrepresentation (Kanthamani, 1998). He arrives at a hybrid notion of representation (26) that allows a generic status to misrepresentation. Granted that all mental facts are representational facts, all representational facts are informational states, one has to contend with facts about

A. KANTHMAN

representation which are external. So, we have to add the premise that the representational theory is an externalist theory of the mind. Coming as they are from external sources, it becomes incumbent to annexe them to the representational facts. Dretske is obliged to tell us about introspection or self-knowledge, qualia, consciousness, and supervenience. Can we say that there is something that holds all of them together with some methodological bind? Dretske's answer is that we can. Introspective knowledge is a displaced perception (44); absent qualia has no relation, and hence they do not contextualize, but they are experienced as such.

When S represents F of K, it implies a representational fact. That is for some F, S represents the F of K. But it also implies something that is not a representational fact (possibly misrepresents), and what is not a representational fact is that which does not stand in relation C to S, and so they are hybrid of representational facts and facts about representation (26). External observers are often better positioned to observe a system's internal representation than is the system itself (48). This much is taken to be obvious. The first person authority can thus be jeopardized (54), and Dretske defends such a position against criticisms (Chapter 5), taking it more like a safety valve than an option. The Representational Thesis is assumed to be an externalist theory of mind (124).

For absent qualia, one needs to distinguish between epistemic use (Cl Jackson) and its phenomenal use. The epistemic use tells us that a dog that looks like a poodle to S, is what S believes to perceive, in the absence of countervailing circumstances. The sense is not strictly called epistemic, but epistemic in the 'doxastic' sense (67), and hence its corresponding phenomenal sense will include an additional 'discriminatory' clause, which says that it looks different to S from other objects of a similar type (68). This is just to prevent the people who are colour blind from saying of an object of another colour that it looks like a red object. This clause is deliberately left vague just to allow context-sensitivity and circumstantial relativity (68). Thus we can identify qualia with phenomenal qualities, that is, the way things appear to be, but with a representation clause (s). The representational device is not the same as it would have been if it had been in the vertical state. To some extent this agrees with the view that qualia is not functionally definable (Ned Block and Fodor, 1972; Sydney Shoemaker, 1991), yet it does not mean that they are physically definable. They are physically

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definable as long as there is a description in physical terms, of the conditions which systems have information-carrying function. What is captured by the naturalistic theory of indicator functions is sufficient enough for a naturalistic theory of representation or misrepresentation. For they become apparent in the way two representational devices are related to the external objects. In one, there is an indicator function C and in the other it is not.

Dretske's representational theory of consciousness builds on the critique what he calls Higher Order theories. The major shortcoming of Higher Order theories is that they differentiate between lower and higher orders of the mind (we are reminded of the modularity view advanced by Fodor in this connection). On Dretske's understanding a distinction such as the above is only a form of reductio because it assumes the relation and then proceed to prove that to be differentiable. They either fall a prey to epiphenomenalism, (117), or they cannot explain consciousness. Dretske's view seriously considers experience and thought as forms of representation that are located horizontally rather than vertically and hence he is opposed to both the Higher Order theories of experience (Armstrong 1968, 1980) or Higher Order theories of thought, (Rosenthal 1986, 1990, 1991, 1993), the main casualty here is the definition of consciousness as 'consciousness of, and Dretske changes this into 'conscious with' to his own advantage. Supposing we say, we see s is just equivalent to saying that we are conscious of seeing s, which gives us (i) we are aware of the object we see (conscious of); and (ii) we are conscious of this awareness (conscious of conscious of seeing s). This is 'peculiar' (100).

'They are states (Dretske has a point against Rosenthal's distinction between creature consciousness and state consciousness) that make us conscious, not states that we make conscious by being conscious of them' (100).

Consequently, all experiences do not make us conscious of some object hallucinations do not); but they are also veridical in a sense; so it follows that We are 'tethered' to an object all the time. Sometimes we have no contextual relation; so it is possible that our intentional representation says (or means) that We see pink rats but there is no outside object (pink rats).

Dretske defends an externalism that stems from the writings of Tyler

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A. KANTHMAN

Burge. On Burge's view, he does not deny internalist positions. The question whether he reconciles internalist and externalist positions does not arise in the context as Dretske is against any such reconciliation (such a reconciliation is attempted by Akeel Bilgrami, 1992). Consequent upon the above considerations Dretske's externalism bears a division into externalism about experience and externalism about thought. His defence is, therefore, against thinkers who agree, with an externalist theory of thought but cannot reconcile themselves with an externalist theory of experience. Consistency demands that 'if an externalist theory of thought can be true, an externalist theory of experience can also be true'(127). This is a modal argument about externalism. The relation is not one in which implication between the antecedent and consequent holds. But, if a conceptual externalist (externalist about thought or belief) can accept, then he is also obliged to accept the point about phenomenal externalism (externalist about experience). Since phenomenal experience must be grounded completely externally, it is true one may not be aware of one's own qualia. Does it mean one should Quinise qualia in Quine's way so as to extract a theory of other ascriptions from the above? (Kanthamani, 1998). Self knowledge does not come from the privileged information one has but from extrinsic factors. That one does not look inward to get it (149). So, from this, Drestke was led to an argument about replacement for absent qualia, and supports it with a point about evolution without committing himself to ceteris paribus clause on the one hand and supervenience on the other. The causal pattern of law is not to be given in the ceteris paribus clause, but

Natural Selection → [Warm days → Chemical Activity → Colour Change]

For the case at hand, natural selection causes one thing which causes yel another.

Though this is not a solution to the nature of ceteris paribus laws, not about supervenience, it is presented as one of the most plausible forms of naturalism. Thus, there is a counter to the earlier entailments which advocate a combination of supervenience and tractably sufficient as the hallmark (e.g., Baker), which advocates an entailment that combines supervenience with not tractably specifiable conditions (please note that it does not deny that they are

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Book - Reviews

computed, or tractably specified). It combines tractably specifiable with not tractably specifiable, and brings back to our memory the Kripkean constellation, if not a Kripkean paradigm.

A. KANTHMANI

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The Indian Council of Philosophical Research has been planning to publish a Subject and Author Index of all the Philosophy Journals in the English language which have been published in India during the last several decades. The work has been entrusted to the eminent librarian, Dr. S. C. Biswas, who has been trying to collect the relevant copies of the Journals from various individuals and libraries all over India. However, inspite of his best efforts, the following copies of the Journals have still to be located so that the work, which is an important reference tool, could be completed.

We appeal to all individuals/institutions to find if they possess these missing issues in their own collection and in case they have, content pages of volumes/issues, they may please get the same photocopied and send them along with the bill of expenses to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Rajendra Bhawan, Fourth Floor, 210 Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg, New Delhi 110002. Their help in this regard will be specifically acknowledged and a copy of the comprehensive Subject and Author Index, when published, will be sent to them as an expression of the Council's gratitude.

ICPR - CUMULATIVE INDEX OF PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNALS PROJECT
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Vol. 7 (4) to issues upto 1991

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Anviksika

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Indian Philosophy and Culture

Vol. 21(1976) - 1991

Indian Philosophcal Congress

1960. 1962-1964. 1969-1973, 1975-77, 1980-1983, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1991.

Journal of the Philosophical Association.

(Incorporated Indian Journal of Philosophy) Vol. XI. no. 40(Dec. 1968).

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OBITUARY

N.K. DEVARAJA

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(PUNE)

Patna)

We deeply mourn the sad demise of Professor N.K.Devaraja which occurred on the 11th of January 1999. He was 81. With his passing away the philosophic community in India and abroad has lost one of the perceptive, original and creative minds of the 20th century. Born in 1917, he was, during the formative years of his academic career both as a student and as a teacher, witness of the intellectual revolutions and the sociopolitical turmoils that took place both here and abroad. All these transformations awakened the philosopher in him to the task of reinterpreting the rich and the diverse currents in ancient Indian thought. He had to his credit several philosophical works, each one of them being a valuable contribution to some or the other dimension of human life. His works are multidimensional and reveal significant philosophical insights. Basically he was a humanist but, as a scholar, critical of all forms of humanism developed and advocated by ancient and modern thinkers. He had written several papers and was a Hindi literature.

He had received both D.Phil. and D.Litt. degrees with high honours and had around 40 years' teaching experience. He was Sayaji Rao Gaewad Professor of Indian Civilization and Culture and Head of the Department of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University from 1960 to 1967. He was an Advisory Editor of Philosophy: East and West, General President of Akhil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad (1964), General President of Indian Philosophical Congress (1972). He had also received the honour of being Sectional President of All India Oriental Conference in 1968. He was a member of the Institute of Religion and Social Change, Honolulu. He was recipient of several Fellowships and Visiting professorships. The Indian Council of Philosophical Research bestowed on him the most covetable honour by organizing 'Meet the Philosopher: N.K. Devaraja' a national seminar, at University of Pune in 1994. His association with

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IPO was very old.

In Prof. Devaraja we have lost one of the great senior well-wishers the Indian Philosophical Quarterly and a man who earnestly believed that human life has a purpose and meaning. His belief was his action which all ways reflected his philosophical moorings. May his memories continue inspire us for ever.

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SOME ASPECTS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

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In this paper I shall try to do the following: to draw attention to the facts of moral pluralism or to ethical frontiers which exist parallel to the universal moral facts of our life. At times we become accustomed to these contradictions. Occasionally contradictions are sought to be resolved by moralists who are also moral philosophers. My second contention is to compare and contrast some varieties of ethical pluralisms in order to understand the nature of professional ethics in a socio-historical context. The peculiarities of a profession and its distinctive features will be dealt with in order to show its dependence on a peculiar situation which gives meaning and significance to a profession. I shall also draw attention to the fact that a change in the situation may immensely modify the nature of a profession. It may also modify the codes of conduct of a particular profession. I shall also make an attempt at understanding the relationship that might exist between professional ethics and general morality taking note of the fact that professional ethics, though nourished by a distinctive professional group, does not establish isolated moral frontiers.

Accepting the fact of moral pluralism, professional ethics justifies its distinctive ethical nature and its various codes of conduct. It does not establish complete ethical relativism. A meaningful dialogue between professional ethics and public morality will safeguard the healthy co-existence of the two. The professions are nourished by the society, the society in its turn is benefitted by the help rendered by the professionals.

Ethics discusses universal moral rules which can be applied everywhere, they relate to mankind in general, the way Kant describes it, 'good' is unconditionally good, it is universalizable. These rules of universal moral application derive solely from the intrinsic human nature. The variety in moral

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 2 April 1999 172 ARCHANA BARU

codes draw our attention to the facts of moral pluralism. There are certain ellical duties which are not universally applicable, these depend on particular qualities exhibited by particular groups. Aristotle observed this: "The morals of a man he said, are not those of a woman, and the morals of the adult are not those of a child; those of the slave are not those of the master, and so on The observation is on the mark and it has now-a-days a far greater field of application than Aristotle could have imagined. In reality, the greater part of our duties have this character."

The duties of the citizen are not the same in an aristocracy as in democracy. Within the family everyone does not have same duties. Similarly duties of a judge are different from the duties of a lawyer, that of a teacher is different from a journalist's, a soldier's duty differs from a hangman's. At times there is a conflict of two types of ethical codes, our duty to treat all human beings equally and a solider's duty to treat his enemy as non-human. This was the type of conflict which in the Indian context made the protector of Dharma Yuddhisthira raise doubts about the true nature of righteousness. His conscience made him a citizen of the world, his particular station in life forced him to play his role as a Ksatriya. There was a real tension between these two dharmas which was difficult for Yuddhisthira to resolve.

Similar to the duties related to the particular stations of our life, that are the codes of conduct which are restricted to the field of professional ethics. We use the term profession loosely sometimes identifying it with an occupation. The Dictionary of Ethics² helps one to trace the history of the term profession. Though we often use the terms profession and occupation synonymously, in answer to the question "What is your profession", one usually refers to one's occupation, all occupations are not professions. The Latin term profession originally meant the making of a public declaration. In medieval Latin, it came to mean the taking of religious vows. The English word profession comes directly from Latin and until 16th Century it meant only the public declaration of religious vows. After that it came to mean an occupation in which learned knowledge is applied to the affairs of others, especially medicine, law, divinity and university teaching. It was the procedure of the medieval universities that the students could be prepared for one of these four disciplines. The oaths affirmed general loyally to the doctrines of the church and to the disciplines of the university.

Some Aspects

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members of these occupations thus came to have special ethical obligations, they members of the carried of the control of the carried of the carrie

This conception of a profession now-a-days downplays its religious aspect. It is an understanding between society and those in profession, a bargain specially which both sides benefit. The society grants the following benefits to the members of these occupations: the right to a considerable measure of control over their own activities. This includes those in the profession to define for themselves that standards of performance should be obeyed in it. They may also be granted the right to restrict entry into the occupations by imposing licensing requirements. The Society grants these privileges to the members of the occupation that are highly technical and require extensive knowledge. Outsiders will be unable to make reliable judgements about how those in such occupations ought to conduct themselves; therefore, the setting of standards and the enforcement of discipline may best be left to the specialists within.

In return for granting these privileges society receives from the members of such occupations higher quality service. The profession imposes the following ethical requirements upon itself: responsibilities towards clients (or patients), responsibility towards the profession and responsibility towards the society. Usually the interests of the client will be accorded high priority, the professional's technical skills will be viewed as the client's to command for any reasonable purpose. Responsibility towards the profession aims at enhancing the excellences of the profession and maintaining its standing in the eyes of the public. The responsbility to society, though not negligible, is usually accorded a distinctly low priority. Both society and those in the profession will benefit from such a bargain. The ethical status of professionals will thereby become different from those of non-professionals, whose conduct is not governed by bargains of this type. Though this contrast between the ethics of the professionals and those of non-professionals make more sense within a society that has an individualistic ideology such as the free enterprise system which prevails in the tonomic life of the United States, it is worthwhile to reconsider the professional states that some occupations enjoy in some other societies as well, except in Communist Countries where all workers, whether physicians or coal miners, always should be striving above all to promote the well being of the society³.

Like occupational ethics, professional ethics is restricted to a particular

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occupation. It is the specific duty of a fireman, or of a hangman to play the roles meaningfully. It is however the specific duty of a lawyer or of a doctor work for the benefit of his clients. A professional relationship characterize professional ethics. A professional is promise bound to render his service in particular manner. William F. May⁴ has used J. L. Austin's terminology to describe the specific relationship that exists between a professional and his client Austin drew the distinction between different kinds of utterences: description and performative. Ordinary declarative sentences report a given item of the world performative declarations do not merely describe the world, but alter the world of the person. Promises are such performative utterences. The promise introduces an ingredient into the world of the hearer that would not be there apart from the world for two people.

The professional relationship, though less comprehensive and intimate than marriage, is similarly promissory. Taking a client implies a promise to help a distressed person within the limits of one's professional resources. To the degree the promise alters the world of the patient/client. Correspondingly, to go back on a professional promise is world altering. That is why the conditions under which a professional can withdrew from a case must be carefully limited

The professionals do not display a distinctive set of virtues beyond the reach of others, but the above considerations give a specific connotation to virtues in a professional setting. If we take virtue of truth telling, in medicine it depends more on the truth's impact on the patient's welfare. The debate may concentrate on two different principles, the patient's welfare vs. the patient's right to know. The blunt truth may destroy the patient but the patient has a right to know. The pro-truth tellers would argue that the patient should be informed of the risks that a particular surgery entails. Opponents of truth telling counter that it is easier to tell of not to tell the truth. What is significant in professional ethics is the way the professional delivers the truth, the particular impact it would have on the patient's health and well being. As the lawyer, by his promise to stand by the client through crisis, alters the world of his troubled client; so does the doctor. What characterizes the distinctiveness of professional ethics is something similar to focussing on trust between persons as a fundamental issue in ethics.

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Some Aspects of Professional Ethics

As there are as many forms of morals as there are different callings, the scientist's duty is to develop his critical sense, to have an open-mind, the priest or the soldier on the other hand have a different duty. It is also the doctor's or the solution of the lawyer on occasion to lie. The moral particularisms which we find in according to different duties based on sex, race, occupation, ec. reach its climex in professional ethics. One peculiarity of professional ethics is this: "The distinctive feature of this kind of morals and what differentiates it from other branches of ethics, is the sort of unconcern with which the public consciousness regards it. There are no moral rules whose infringement, in general atleast, is looked on with so much indulgence by public opinion. The transgressions which have only to do with the practice of the profession, come in merely for a rather vague censure outside the strictly professional field".5 It is not so in other areas. Moral discriminations on the basis of sex, race, roles etc. are often subjects of rigorous criticism, as change in the situation at times alters the nature of these codes of conduct. In deciding something as right and wrong what matters most is the fact that morality consists of rules of conduct that have sanction. Theft is punished because it is prohibited. Something which is not prohibited, is not wrong. In a society where polyandry is a practice, marrying two or more men at the same time would not make one unchaste: Draupadi remained chaste with such considerations. Today we find roles of man and women tend to vary. What was not sanctioned in a conservative society would be sanctioned in a modern society.

What is peculiar about professional ethics is general public's indifference to its vital issues. One possible explanation is this: "They can not be of deep concern to the common consciousness precisely because they are not common to all members of the society and because, to put it in another way, they are rather outside the common consciousness. It is exactly because they govern functions not performed by everyone, that not everyone is able to have a sense of what these functions are, of what they ought to be, or of what special relations should exist between the individuals concerned with applying them. All this escapes public opinion in a greater or lesser degree or is at least partly outside its immediate sphere of action. This is why public sentiment is only mildly shocked by transgression of this kind. This sentiment is stirred only by transgressions so grave that they are likely to have wide general repercussions."6

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ARCHANA BARUA 176

Since the society as a whole is not concerned in professional ethics, it is within the professionals that these morals have evolved. These professions and the codes of conduct for each enjoy a sort of moral autonomy. As the professionals are outside the common reach, every occupation cannot be profession, it is the privilege of a select few which is decided by the following considerations: "The spirit and method of the craft, banished from industry, finds a more permanent home in the profession. Here still prevails the long apprenticeship, the distinctive training, the small scale unit of employment and the intrinsic -- as distinct from the economic interest alike in the process and the product of the work."7

It is necessary that restriction on what a professional ought to do cannot come from the general public. If we concentrate on medical ethics, it is very crucial that doctors should have a code to conduct because medical training gives doctor the power of life and death over other people. Untrained men and women cannot easily tell when the expertise is being misused but the doctors can. As such professional self regulation is a need, not a privilege. Codes are also needed because at times the professions are given permission to act in ways that are forbidden to others. Special codes are useful for the further reason that some people have duties to do things which in others would count as acts of supererogation. For example, doctors and par medics have a duty of rescue (unfortunately the duty has been seriously undermined, expecially in the USA, by legal arrangements which encourage accident victims to sue their helpers and rescurers).

Codes are needed because it is sometimes necessary that professionals be given permission to act in ways that are forbidden to others. Doctors are allowed to cut people open and to see people undressed; lawyers often have to be given permission to handle their client's money.

These special sanctions made in professional ethics to otherwise prohibited actions, demand an explanation. Recognising the peculiarity of the professional relationship, a professional lawyer or a professional doctor is allowed to safeguard the interest of his client primarily. There should also be ways to safeguard the interest of the public and to maintain the high standard of the profession. How far a lawyer or a doctor can go to protect the interest of his clients or patients? Do the standards of professional ethics keep changing as Some As

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Why is there a need for professional ethics? Why is this need not felt in the world of business? "There is no general brotherhood of businessmen from which the offender against these sentiments, who does not at the same time overtly offend against the law of the land, is extruded as unworthy of an honourable calling. There is no effective criticism which sets up a broader slandard of judgement than mere success."8 The professions on the other hand assume an obligation and an oath of service. "A profession", says the ethical code of the American Medical Association, 'has for its prime object the service it can render to humanity; reward or financial gain should be a subordinate consideration'. and again it proclaims that the principles laid down for the guidance of the profession "are primarily for the good of the public". Similar statements are contained in the codes of the other distinctively organized professions. 'The profession', says the proposed code of the Canadian legal profession, 'is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money getting occupation.'9 These imply that while the profession is of necessity a means of livelihood, the devoted sense which it inspires is motivated by other interests.

Medicine provides the oldest example of a professional code. Some parts of the oath of Hippocrates (460-377 BC) discourage competitive attitudes - which are damaging to doctors and patients alike. There is an obligation to transfer medical knowledge to suitable candidates, to refrain from harming etc. The context of Hippocratic oath was on a different background. Hippocrates and his members were followers of Pythagorean school of philosophy which opposed suicide, abortion and the slaughter of animals in sacrifices etc. It believed that pharmacological products should be used, if at all, only when simpler, more natural cures fail, and they do not practice surgery.

This is completely a different story about the professional spirit of a dedicated doctor. At our time, a professional, a doctor, a lawyer, a journalist or anyone is someone whose driving spirit is to secure financial gain. Plato observed this fall in the professional spirit: "The ethical problem of the profession, then, is to reconcile the two arts, or more generally, to fulfill as completely as possible the primacy of service for which it stands while securing the legitimate economic

ARCHANA BARUA

interests of its members."10

In spite of many changes in the nature of the profession, doctors are expected to retain some of the Hippocratic spirit of dedication and healing righteousness and service. The present controversy about codes of conduct of lawyers, doctors, journalists, etc. would seem to indicate that the professionals have abandoned their high standards of disinterested motives in favour of mercenary concern over fees. However, the root causes for this degradation in professional morals are of a much deeper nature. The professionals as well as the non-professionals are the worst victims of consumerism. The socio-historical contexts of the professions have changed radically, the intimate and the personal relationship that once existed between doctor-patient, lawyer-client, the professional's dedication to service etc. have lost much of its simplicity, Medical profession too has attained some new dimensions as the perspectives evaluating it keep changing. Medicine was valued for its practical as well as its theoretical aspects. Among Greeks, and for Pythagoras, human body was a prison for the soul. Gradually medicines came to be viewed as primarily a science of the body, the Indian stress on the five Sheaths of the soul gave equal recognition to the annamaya-kosh or the body which is nourished by food. The Lokayatas gave sole importance to the human body. The early Samhitās, Ayurveda, Carak, Susruta, etc. concentrated more on the science of the body. Hippocrates rejected the theological aspect of medicine but recognised the science of medicine with a value dimension. Thus medicine came to be developed as a science of the body, with a moral dimension which was not required in other branches of science.

The practical and the moral dimensions of medicine can never be ruled out. In making a clinical judgment the practioner has to take consent of the patients about a legitimate mode of operations etc. Among all the professions, medicine, with its clearly defined moral dimension, is undergoing tremendous change in recent period. Many factors have indirectly influenced the medical profession to give less significance on its value dimension and to concentrate more on its value-free, scientific nature. As a medical practioner observes: "The underlying problems go far deeper, however, to a group of factors that have been disturbing the economic and ethical patterns of the profession for some years."

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It is my opinion that chief among these factors is the great "splintering of medical knowledge" into specifications, which has made some type of group practice inevitable and thus altered the nature of doctor-patient relationship. A second factor is the spread of the insurance principle to medicine, which has intruded a third party between the doctor and his patient and has imposed uniform fee scales in a notoriously non-uniform field. A third factor is the radical realment of serious disease, which appears when first applied, to verge dangerously upon human experimentation.

The resulting disturbance to the ethical relationships within the profession of physician to patient and of physician to physician - has brought about attempts to revise the written code of medical ethics established by the American Medical Association and to enforce the code more effectively"11

No profession can survive in isolation. We have observed how in this medical profession a change in the situation has affected the doctor-patient relationship immensely, though it cannot take away completely the moral dimension from a profession: medicine profession can not be reduced to a money-making business solely. What gives the professional code its peculiar significance is that it prescribes some duties to those outside their profession as well. "The group code has narrowed the sense of responsibility by refusing to admit the application of its principles beyond the group. Thereby it has weakened its own logic and its sanction, most notably in the case of national groups which have refused to apply or even to relate their internal codes to the international world. The attempt of professional groups to co-ordinate their responsibilities, relating at once the individuals to the group and the group itself to the wider community marks thus an important advance." 12

We must admit that it is in relation of the profession as a whole to the communities that professional ethics is least effectively developed. The problem of professional ethics, viewed as the task of co-ordinating responsibilities, of finding a common centre for the various circles of interest, is full of difficulty. In legal ethics too, the moral issue is how far the lawyer may go in promoting the client's cause. Most attorneys today aim at winning decisions at any cost. Yet over half of today's attorneys are trained in the law without learning to understand the society for which law is created". 13 In the developed countries steps have been taken to restore the professional excellence. "But a measure of

improvement is on the way. The great universities now require a liberal arts bag for law degree. They teach law as an institution of society, as a philosophy, a science and a craft. When enough of their students have been graduated by will be practiced with a sense of responsibility for the ethics of modern life. A any rate there is a chance that lawyers will accept the obligation to make has serve soceity. It is Similar steps have been taken in other professions to bridge the gap between professional ethics and general welfare. "Improvements in anesthesia and pre and post operative care have reduced the risks of operation so much that an unscrupulous surgeon no longer fears to perform unnecessary ones." The medical profession has taken steps to safeguard the public against the unscrupulous physician. For example, hospitals throughout the country have set up tissue audit committees to examine carefully all tissues removed a operation. If such tissue is found to be normal, the surgeon is called to account the continue to remove more normal tissues than is justified, his operating privileges are suspended.

The American Medical Association has aimed to protect the public against unethical medical practices by instigating the establishment of grievance committees in the constituent and component medical society. By January 1933 all of the 48 State associations, the District of Colombia and Howaii had provided committees for hearing and acting on complaints from the public. 16 "This professional spirit of pro-life (not pro-death) emphasis, a concern for public health etc. are still the basic concerns of the medical profession. This spirit is manifested in the IMA' (The Indian Medical Association) following election manifesto published in a newspaper: "We are supporting them not because they are doctors but because as doctors, they are expected to be more responsible."

country is denied safe drinking water and falls victim to water-borne disease like cholera, typhoid, polio and diarrhoe' Dr. Aggarwal said.

'The Government spends huge sums on guns or personal securities, can't it ensure one basic amenity such as safe drinking water to its people"? It asked. . . 17'

Journalistic ethics too is characterized by a concern for public good. The primary duty of a journalist is to report truth rather than falsehood. Yet

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newspapers advocate yellow journalism and sensational news items to attract "The questions that frame the discourse for analysis of specific cases consumer. The reporting fair and belonged a visit the reporting fair and belonged visit the reporting fair and belonged visit the reporting fair and belonged visit the reporting fair and belonged visit to the reporting visit to the reporting visit t most committee? Was the reporting fair and balanced? How was the information gathered? What was the motive of the source of information? What were the consequences of the coverage? Wrestling with these questions afford a critic the opportunity of probing the ethical standards and responsibilities of journalism." 18 However, a responsible press, though a worthy objective, is largely dependent on how individual journalists and news institutions define "responsible". Like in other professions, outside regulation is unthinkable. "Limited, practical mechanisms for fostering and encouraging responsibility and reflection within the media are the only sensible avenues available."19

Every profession has its own problem of conduct. The medical man has to safeguard the interest of his patient, with due consideration for the health of the whole community. So with the legal profession, so with the architect, the university professor to uphold the necessity of academic freedom against odd currents, so with the journalists, in his difficult situation as the servant of a propagandist press. Professional ethics needs to safeguard public interest as well. The profession's growth is part of the movement by which the fulfillment of function is substituted as a social force for the tradition of birth or race.

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUE - EXPERIENCE : SOME REFLECTIONS ON SCHELER AND HARTMANN

BENULAL DHAR

The present paper proposes to address itself to the question as to how we "experience" values. Some continental philosophers, particularly the phenomenologists, draw our attention to the fact that we do possess a cognitive phase in our emotional life which enables us to apprehend values. This congnitive-emotional phase is quite independent of our psychophysical organisation as well as our rational faculty. In what, follows, an attempt will be made to lay bare the logic of the phenomena of this congnitive emotion vis-a-vis values on the basis of the writings of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. In this connection, we shall discuss (i) the historical perspective on the topic, (ii) the status of values, (iii) the nature of cognitive-emotional acts or feeling-acts as distinguished from feeling-States. And finally, we shall present a phenomenological analysis of value-experience in a systematic manner.

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The dichotomy between reason and sensibility, rationalism and emotionalism has been playing a dominating role in most of the western philosophies from ancient times down to the present era. According to this dichotmy, reason or rationalism is regarded as something lawful, orderly, logical and as something superior to the sensibility or emotionalism which is considered to be unlawful, disorderly and something having no cognitive capability. Kant's philosophy serves as an eminent example where

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April 1999

BENULAL DHAR 184

the abovementioned dualism is found to be distinctly prevalent. In his the abovementations of two faculties, namely, "sensibility" by means of which the representations of objects are given to w and "understanding" by which we think or judge. Here "understanding has got a superior position in the sense that it does not draw its laws 'a priori" from Nature but rather prescribe them to it. Hence "understanding makes Nature". The similar trend is quite visible in his ethics. Here he seeks to eradicate the "sensible" as he attempts to build up his theory of ethics on a non-emperical, non-sensible and a priori plane which he calls "pure ethics" or "metaphysics of morals". So according to him, it is Reason (and not human emotions) in its practical (moral) use or function that guides our choices i.e., what ought to be done or ought not to be done Thus Kant denies any significant role of emotions in morality.

Traditionally, in this way, emotional content of the mind, such as intuition, feeling, love or hate etc. are regarded as disorderly and dependent on the psycho-physical organisation of the person and therefore it or cupies a negligible position than our rational faculty. But there are at least some continental philosophers who set their face strongly against the view that everything in the human mind that is non-rational is dependent on man's subjective constitution and therefore cannot be our guide in our practical life. They show, on the contrary, that ethics can very well be based on emotions. That there is lawfulness, orderliness and cognitive capability of emotional life which is irreducible to the lawfulness, orderliness of reason or rationality has been paid due attention by these philosophers.

To begin with, we find that it is Blaise Pascal who with great emphasis on the matter says, "the heart has its reasons, which reason does not know". 1 Or elsewhere he says, "we know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart..."2 so, according to Pascal, our emotional life as a whole is not chaotic or disorderly but possesses the capability of knowing truth corresponding to that of our rational faculty. Later on, we see, Franz Brentano, who is regarded as the forerunner of phenomenological movement, recognises the role of emotion in moral knowledge. all mental phenomena including emotional ones, unlike physical phe

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by the reaotional life pability of ater on, we menological For him, nomena, are characterised by the fact that they are intentional in character. Among these intentional acts at least some such acts which are called acts of loving or acts of hating are capable of evoking a feeling favourably or disfavourably towards things or acts in their value-aspects. For Brentano, to say that an action is good or a thing is beautiful is to say simply that it is 'correctly" loved. Here the direct object of love is not the value itself but the goods or actions in which a value arises through the acts of loving.

This conception of Brentano is said to have given birth to both Husserl's and Scheler's view in this regard. For Husserl, "the heart and the will must have their analogous but specific forms of rationality." And "the valuable properties of things, according to Husserl, are disclosed by emotions or feelings." Scheler expresses solidarity with Husserl in this regard and bolsters his personal insight by appealing to the analogous views of Pascal. He has elaborated a theory of feeling in his major ethical work, namely, Formalism in Ethics and Non - formal Ethics of Values. He clearly distinguishes the kind of feeling which enables us to have the apprehension of values from mere psychological states of mind - the latter being non-congnitive in nature. Similarly, Hartmann being avowedly a Platonic thinker incorporates this view in his value - Platonism as is found in his Ethics. He clearly states that values are beheld in the acts of feeling. In the following, we shall dwell on in details on the views of both Scheler and Hartmann.

II

Before we go on to elaborate theory of emotion upheld by Scheler and Hartmann, it may be worthwhile to understand what type of things the values are. We may begin by pointing out that values are not furnitures of the world. They neither reside nor are found in the world. They arise neither with our desires nor with our interest in them. This means that values are not the product of subjectivism and psychologism. They are also different from their carriers. Turning to the positive characterisation of values, we see that both Scheler and Hartmann differ from each other.

BENULAL DHAR

Scheler, to begin with, distinguishes values from goods by saying that the former are "value-things" and the latter are "thing-value". He draws an analogy that values share with Colours. For him, values "exist" the way a pure colour of spectrum exists. Further, values, according to Scheler, are "genuinely objective objects" quite in the same way for Husserl⁹ colour species is an object given through an intuitive act. Fur. thermore, for Scheler, "value-qualities.... are ideal objects as are qualities of colours and sounds."10 Moreover, values are subsistent or autonomous being as is clear from his statement: "Rather all norms, imperatives, demands, etc. have their foundation in an autonomous being, the being of values". 11 It is to be noted that Scheler is said to have not been decisive enough as to the nature of values. 12 His views changed during his philosophical career. But he denies in clear terms any heavenly realm for values like that of platonic ideas in his major ethical work Formalism, He states, "In fact, I reject in principle and at the threshold of philosophy a heavenly realm of ideas and values that is independent not only with regard to man and human consciousness, but also with regard to the essence and execution of living spirit in general". 13

Hartmann, on the contrary, avowedly maintains a status for values like that of platonic ideas. He clearly states, "in their mode of Being, values are platonic ideas". ¹⁴ This implies firstly that Hartmann gives values, unlike that of the objects of spatio-temporal world, the status of ideal being quite in the same way that Plato conceives Ideas as Ideal Being. The ideality of values, for Hartmann, consists in their self-existent character which he defines thus:

"What in the mode of being is not relative to a subject, whatever confronts a thinking subject as independent and immovable, whatever sets in before him a self-subsistent negativity and energy of its own which the subject can grasp or miss but cannot get rid of, that has for him the character of self-existence". 15

This means that values are independent of everything, such as, of the subject who passes the judgement, of the judgement itself, of person's actual conduct, of valuable things. "This timeless independence from the

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world, according to Kraenzel, is the meaning of Hartmann's term "ideal being". 16 Secondly, that a notion of "ground" is attached to values like being" that of Plato's ideas in the sense that "they (values) are that "through which" everything which participates in them is exactly as it is - namely, valuable". 17 Thirdly, that values are a priori like Plato's ideas. As Hartmann put it, "indeed, it must be an a priori condition". 18

Despite the differences between non-Platonic and Platonic views of Scheler and Hartmann, both of them agree that values are subject to no change or mutation and primarily apprehended through a non-conceptual means, that is, through "emotional sensing" or feeling-acts.

III

Let us now proceed following Scheler and Hartmann to elaborate the nature of the phenomena of the sort of emotion which enables us to 'see" values from feeling-states. Let us first take up Scheler. According whim, emotional acts or what we have called feeling-acts are "feeling of something". 19 This means that feeling-acts are intentional in character and that their intentionality is directed towards some "objects" which Scheler calls "genuinely objective objects", 20 that is, values. So there is a kind of intentional relatedness between feeling-acts and their objects. This kind of relatedness is not mediated by anything else like that of feeling-states which are purely psychological states of mind. In case of feeling-states, there may or may not have objects. If there is any object, the feeling-states are "related" with the former by way of objectifying acts, such as, of sensation, perception, thinking or representation. For example, a psychological state of my mind, say, sadness occurs in me caused by my failure in the examination. Here there is "originally" no connection between sadness of my mind and my failure in the examination. I "relate" my psychological state of sadness with my failure in the examination hrough objectifying acts of "thinking". But in case of intentional relatedness, as we have pointed out, there is no such mediation and therefore the latter is called by Scheler "original" relatedness. The intentionalily of feeling-acts are of themselves related to their objects. So Scheler

BENULAL DHA

says, "we do not feel 'about something'; we immediately feel something i.e. a specific value-quality". Further, feeling-acts, unlike feeling-states are signifying acts in the sense that they mean some object. That is, they are capable of providing us with the knowledge of some objects, that is values. In the words of Funk,

feeling here reveals objects to me; it's neither a question of their being associated, either mechanically or through some mental act, with what I perceive nor of objects being brought in 'from without' the experience, for feeling goes directly to *its* objects, viz., values.²²

In other words, Scheler calls them "goal-determined movement". 23 That is to say, it is a movement of emotional intentionality to bring some meaning into the focus of consciousness, to grasp a thing or an action in its value-aspect. This intentional feeling presents to us some mundane object or action with some spiritual meaning, that is, values. As Scheler says.

This act plays the *disclosing* role in our value-comprehension and that it is only this act which does so. This act, as it were, a movement in whose execution ever *new* and *higher* values flash out, i.e. values that were wholly unknown to the being concerned.²⁴

Furthermore, feeling-acts and its objects i.e. values belong to the one and the same realm, that is, to the immanent realm of moral consciousness. The feeling-acts, therefore, are related through intentionality to the objects of similar nature. The object does not lie outside the realm of consisting consciousness as in the case of feeling-states where the particular psychological state is aroused by outside cause. The process of value experience is immanent to the emotional consciousness and involves to transcendent object. Therefore, Scheler says "feeling 'originally' intentions to the own kind of objects, namely, values."

Now for Hartmann. The above analysis of emotional acts is quite acceptable to Hartmann as the latter has quoted the following from the writings of Scheler: "Even the emotional aspects of the mind - feeling preference, love, hate, volition - possess an aprioristic character which it

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does not borrow from thought, and which ethics has to accept quite independently of logic. There is an inborn aprioristic ordre du or logique du pendently of logic. There is an inborn aprioristic ordre du or logique du pendently of logic. There is an inborn aprioristic ordre du or logique du coeur, as Blaise Pascal happily expressed it". 26 This "aprioristic character" is what Hartmann differently put as "primal feeling of values" or "primary consciousness of value". 27 This means for him "a primal, immediate capacity to appreciate the valuable". 28 It is a kind of immediate apprehension of values. It is a matter of approval or disapproval of some objects, i.e., values. Hence Hartmann further paraphrases Scheler,

Comprehension of ethical reality - whether it consists of goods, human relations or demands for a personal decision - is always, even for the naivest consciousness, transfused with valuations, with preferences in accordance with feeling, with strong tensions for and against. All acts which are related to this fulness of life and which grasp reality are at the same time acts which grasp values and which select according to values. But as such they are never purely cognitive acts; they are acts of feeling - not intellectual but emotional.²⁹

It is for Hartmann as for Scheler these emotional acts are congitive having directedness towards their objects. As Hartmann says,

The grasping of them, how it may be in other particulars, to just as much an act which goes out to something beyond itself as every other cognitive act....³⁰

Thus Hartmann being avowedly a value-Platonist combines well with it the phenomenological analysis of emotional acts which enables us to apprehend values.

In this way both Scheler and Hartmann have shown adequately that we do possess an ordered and lawful phase in our emotional life which is quite competent to get access to the world of values without having to lesort to reason.

IV

In order to proceed to further analysis of value-experience, two points

190 BENULAL DHA

are required to be noted. First that phenomenological value-theorists like Husserl, Scheler and Hartmann want to defend ethics as pure discipline a against moral psychologism and empiricism. And they are in favour of providing the ground for justification of a priori validity of values. Moral psychologism is a doctrine which regards values and norms as the product of subjectivism and seeks to make them relative to individual or group. And thereby the values and norms cannot be claimed to have universal validity. As John Drummond says,

To ground ethics in psychology (or similarly, in biology) would reduce moral laws to those empirical laws governing the activities of evaluating and acting rather than the universal and ideal laws governing the relations among the contents, i.e., the meanings, intentionally inherent in evaluative acts. To ground ethics in psychology would thereby undercut the possibility of any unconditional demand, of any adequate notion of obligation. Evaluative terms such as 'good' and 'bad' would refer exclusively to historically and culturally conditioned usages generally applicable only in particular times and cultures. They would have a mere factual validity...."31

In order to avoid these consequences of ethics, the phenomenological value ethicists plead for ethical absolutism. According to them, the theoretical part of ethics must be *a priori* science and prescribe universal norms and commandments. So they are for grounding ethics on a level with universal validity. For them, values are absolute and subject to no change of mutation, on the one hand and the primary knowledge of them is not grounded on psychic subjectivity but rather on pure emotional subjectivity on the other.

Second that perceptual cognition of goods, that is, the object which is valuable is the pre-requisite of primary experience of value. That which is valuable must at first appear to us as a bare thing given to sense and understanding. The physical presence of a valuable object arouse in our mind the sort of emotion which enables us to grasp the value. For example, my table clock, following which I order my day's works, that is, how much time I shall spend in study, how much to doing physical exercise

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etc. To appreciate the valuableness of the clock, I must first have the knowledge that there is such a thing before me called "clock". The point which we like to make here is that primary consciousness of value is grounded on the perceptual knowledge of the valuable things. In other words, "the experience of the object having value necessarily presuposes the cognitive apprehension of the object and necessarily involves a moment of feeling which builds itself upon the cognitive experience of the object". 32

For the value-theorists in the phenomenological tradition, if this be construed in somewhat flexible terms, values are given, as we have pointed out, through emotion. Here the term "emotion", as we have already explained, is not to be taken to mean "blind" drive but rather to mean cognitive feeling-acts. It is purely an "emotional contact" with the object, that is, values. This is, "in itself something unaccommodating, incapable of being disconcerted, a unique entity, a'law unto itself, a distinctive orientation of values". This distinctive orientation of values is an immediate capacity, to apprehend the values. No mediation such as through concepts, symbols, signs etc. are required in order to become aware of them. One is able to approach directly the "things" (i.e. values) themselves without any kind of previous assumption - be it naturalistic or metaphysical. He enters into an immediate relationship with the value-phenomena themselves. As in the language of Hartmann,

Every moral preference is intuitive, is *immediately* there and is contained in the grasping of a given circumstances (....). It does not first wait for a judgement of the understanding.³⁵

Similarly for Scheler, value are given immmediately i.e. not in any way mediated by symbols, signs, or instructions of any kind". This distinctive stress on presuppositionless, direct and immediate understanding of any phenomena is the hallmark of phenomenological approach to knowledge.

According to the phenomenological value-ethicists, the function of "pure" acts are not to be kept restricted to the domain of intellect but must be extended to the domain of emotion which has its own kind of objects i.e. values to be cognised. Because the emotional acts are in no way less

192 BENULAL DHAR

"pure" than those of "pure thoughts" as they are totally independent of the psycho-physical structure of the human being like those of "pure thought". The pure acts which belong to our emotional sphere are totally different from feeling-states and they are not blind but cognitive in nature. Both Scheler and Hartmann emphatically demand the apriority of the emotional and severing of false unity that till now has existed between the apriori and the rational.

The phenomenological tradition going back to the writings of Husserl succeeds in evolving and developing a methodology which is mainly oriented towards non-rational mode of cognition. Phenomenological value theorists, in particular, have occasion to study and send out a message loud and clear that it is only emotion and not reason which is vastly superior to grasp the value-phenomena. The rational means of cognition is neither immediate nor direct. For reason cannot function unmediated by concepts, symbols, signs etc. It is always seeking justification in terms of arguments based on deductive and inductive modes. Phenomenological approach, on the contrary, is characterised by a mode of understanding which is both direct and emotional-intuitive and it needs no justification from outside.

It must be noted by way of clarification that the emotional-intuitive acts are not contradictory to rational acts. The claim of phenomenological thinkers is that both rational and emotional mode of cognition are different from each other having their respective autonomous area of themselves. The logic of reason is blind to what we are given through the logic of heart. As Spader points out, "feeling gives us an autonomous intentional access to the values (and their hiararchy) that are the bases of moral decision". The emotional access to the domain of values is not vague which requires clarification by the reason as the order and laws contained in this experience are exact and evident as those of logic and mathematics. Feeling-acts, therefore, are in no way aided by reason.

As the apprehension of values is an apprehension through emotion one cannot shrink away from its object in order not to have the eognition of it. A valuing subject is not free to have or not to have the apprehension

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of values. Here he is purely receptive in matters of having the consciousness of value. The subject cannot avoid or escape the appeal of value made upon his "feeling". In the words of Hartmann,

"In this 'beholding' of them the subject is purely receptive; he surrenders himself to them. He sees himself determined by the objects, the self-existent value. But he himself, on his side determines nothing". 38

The kind of feeling involved in the apprehension of values as we have pointed out, are intentional in character. In phenomenological terms, intentional feeling-acts are "noesis" and its intentional correlate is "noema". When I perceive a valuable object, my feeling-acts intentionally correlate a value which comes to the fore of consciousness through noetic act of feeling. Indeed, there is a sense of subjectivity which is said to be the "universe of possible sense". "Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being". This implies that it is through feeling-acts, the emotional subjectivity, constitutes the meaning or value of goods.

The constitution of sense or value of a thing is a process of *elucidation* of a valuable thing in its value-aspect and *not* an activity of creating values. It is through constitution of sense or value, in our view, the world of multiple things and beings appear to us as valuable. Thus

the constitution of the objective world according to phenomenological epistemology repeats itself in the constitution of values in the phenomenological axiology.⁴¹

In concluding the above discussion as to how we "experience" values, we may summarise the main points as follows: working within the phenomenological framework, both Scheler and Hartmann discover a centre of ethical acts in the full-blooded existential person. These ethical acts are cognitive-emotional acts having directedness towards its objects, that is, values. The feeling-acts reveal the actions or goods in their value-aspect and thereby they become cognitive acts corresponding to the cogni-

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tive acts of thought. Thus by the discovery of the emotional a priori and the correlative realm of values which address themselves to men, Scheler and Hartmann establish the foundation of non-formal value-ethics against Kantian formal ethics.

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- lt may be noted here that feeling-acts, we have seen, are instrument of having primary knowledge of values. But they (feeling-acts) cannot further be known by some other acts. One can be aware of values, through

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feeling but cannot be aware of feeling-act itself while engaged in having the knowledge of values. As Scheler says in this context: "in the ette, tion of feeling, we are not objectively conscious of feeling itself". Schile M., Formalism, p.259.

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- 27 Ibid., p.88.

Hartmann defines primary consciousness of values thus: "The primary consciousness of values is a feeling of value, the primal recognition of commandment, is a feeling of that which unconditionally ought to be, by expression of which is the commandment", Ibid., p. 177.

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I am grateful to my teacher Dr. Ranjan K. Ghosh, UGC Research Scientist, Delhi University, for the insightful discussion I have had with him during my doctoral research.

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DERRIDEAN OVERTURES OF WITTGENSTEIN CRITIQUE

P. K. SASIDHARAN

On Derrida's understanding, a critique of logocentricism is a critique against what he calls the metaphysics of presence. This provides the main bulwark against which much of Derrida's writings are directed. This also presents us with the initial mode of deconstruction which Derrida has originally sponsored within philosophy. The point that philosophy is the primary target of Derrida's critique brings his deconstrictive project very close to Wittgenstein whose critique of language has dealt a direct blow to the foundationalist conception of philosophy. Granted this, the task of the present paper is to see how Derrida's critique of logocentricism has certain bearings on Wittgenstein's critique of language.

The attempt to bring Derrida's deconstruction in relation to Wittgenstein's critique entails an attempt to show how Derrida's project endroses an antifoundationist perspective. This could be shown by bringing the interpretations of Richard Rorty and Henry Staten which suggest certain levels of agreement between the two philosophers of different traditions and focuses.

Rorty's interpretation of Derrida, from a Wittgensteinean perspective of pragmatism, attempts to bring out the Davidsonian negative element in Derrida i.e., the denial that there is language. Whereas Staten's is an attempt to make use of Rortian reading of Derrida so as to make a positive attempt to bring Derrida in conformity with Wittgenstein. Staten tries to show that Wittgenstein's treatment of language is similar to

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April 1999

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Derrida's concept "the play of signifiers."2

Rortian reading of Derrida's deconstruction, as the strategy of lextual analysis, suggests that for Derrida, philosophy is "a kind of writing." The antirepresentationalist perspective, from which Rorty approaches Derrida, enables him to locate the functioning of philosophy at the same time, a negative as well as a positive or more literally, a deconstructive as well as a constructive, strains of thought in Derrida's thinking.

Rorty's understands that the fundamental thrust of Derrida's deconstructive strategy is "to debunk Kantian philosophy generally." When Derrida says that ""there is nothing outside of the text," he is taking the side of the tradition of dialectical (or negative tradition) of philosophy which began with Hegel's *Phenomenology* by rejecting the general metaphysical tradition of Philosophy exemplified by Kant. Kant was holding the view of Platonic realism, according to which truth is the result of and vertical relationship between representation and what is represented." Derrida also warns us against taking his "grammatology" as new research programme which aims to do something constructive and progressive, even when he speaks of the systematic transformation of general semiology in his *Of Grammatology*. So Rorty is of the view that Derrida himself concieved his work as fundamentally a *negative* one.⁴

Rorty, while endorsing this negative thrust of Derrida, points out that there is a positive side, which he calls as the bad side, of Derrida's work. The bad side lies in its tilt towards a constructive programme of a kind of philosophy of language where Derrida falls back upon the same grid which he wanted to overcome. Rorty finds there is an ambivalence in Derrida's project with regard to the possibility of a "philosophy of language." This bad side within Derrida's deconstruction works against its negative intent.

With his deconstructionism what Derrida suggests is that philosophy is just another "kind of writing." It does not have a privileged status over other non-philosophical writings with regard to the access to truth of reality. It is to show that philosophy is not a special kind of discourse of

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philosoed status truth or ourse of knowledge Derrida attempts to deconstruct what he calls the concept of episteme and logocentric metaphysics, from which all the western Methods of analysis, explanation, reading, or interpretation are evolved. The critique of the Western metaphysics which Derrida calls as the project of the deconstruction of the great totality," is a matter of getting rid the notion that language is an attempt to present something nonlinguistic. With this, Rorty finds, Derrida is taking the Wittgensteinean doctrine which Sellars calls "psychological nominanlism." This doctrine says that "all awareness is a linguistic affair to the extreme.

The bad side of Derrida treats language as something that all encompassing and unconditioned, and explains it through the concept of "trace" which is posited as something unknown reality. While Rorty wants to treat the transcendentalist notion of trace as the bad side of Derrida's work, there are interpretors like Norris who look Derrida's work as the positive programme. And Norris endorses it by sanying that this is where Derrida, in his textual analysis, shows deconstruction works on the assumptions of logocentricism. Therefore, Norris criticises Rorty's negative reading of Derrida by saying that for Derrida "philosophy is not just a kind of writing."

However, Rorty has further reiterated the negative stance of Derrida's work by invoking the transformation taken place in Derrida's work, i.e., by invoking the transformation taken place in Derrida's manner of doing philosophy, which also endorses Derrida's antifoundationalist stand. There also Rorty finds Derrida's similarity with Wittgenstein. To him, Derrida's moving away from the academic or "standard rules of philosophy manner" of his early work is more similar to the manner of the later Wittgenstein. 8

Henry Staten's Wittgenstein and Derrida is one another attempt to bring Derrida's deconstruction in relation to Wittgenstein's critique of language. Staten's objective of bringing Derrida's project into relation with Wittgenstein's critique is to suggest an Anglo-American context within which deconstruction makes philosophical sense. And Staten further says that his attempt is, to some degree, parallel with that of Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. While Staten shares Rorty's

P. K. SASIDHARAN

antirepresentationalist, antifoundationalist stance to bring deconstruction in the Anglo-American context, Rorty also refers to Staten's work which presents Derrida as French Wittgenstein. Rorty even points to Staten's remark that the deconstructive critique of language could even be phrased as a denial that there is language so as to find justification for his negative interpretation of Derrida from Wittgensteinean pragmatic perspective. 10

As an attempt to read the philosophical bearings of deconstruction Staten reads Derrida as an ally of Wittgenstein. So he finds that Wittgenstein's treatment of language is similar to the kind of functioning of language that is involved in deconstructive practice. Thus according to Staten, Wittgenstein's deconstruction consists in his critique of language which suggests for a denial that there is language. And it is such a view of language that Derrida developed as his concept of "the play of signifiers."

As Staten sees, Wittgenstein's counter thrust is typified in his methodlogy of later philosophy. It is a method which inevitably turns against itself. On the one hand, Wittgenstein tries to loosen up crystalized patterns of philosophical language in order to force real thought. And to subject to the most radical perplexities, for which there would have ready-made answers, but have to forge new language sequences. On the other hand, Wittgenstein finds that the philosophical patterns which fore stall the necessity for real thought as the sources of endless perplexity and urest. Wittgenstein's method desists such patterns because they do not correspond to the true complexity of the facts. 11

Thus the movement of deconstruction in Wittgenstein is that the movement of his language which renews the restless perplexity arises from the inadequate forms of language. It is this deconstructive impulse in Wittgenstein that Staten wants to highlight. That the method of Wittgenstein is one which necessarily passes to new paths. And it is this movement towards new paths which has been characterized by Derrida as "disseminations" (One of the textual strategies).

Wittgenstein's linguistic method is both textual and critical and more precisely, it is a method of destabilization. As Staten puts it, Wittgenstein's

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and more genstein's method is critical. It is a way of attacking another style of language, the traditional style of philosophy.

The style of the traditional philosophy is characterized by the pursuit of "essence" of the world. Staten counterposes Wittgenstein's early account of essentialism as found in the *Tractatus* with his later style of non-essentialism, which he characterises as accidence of language. And he interprets that it is a mehtod in which he characterises as accidence of language. And he interprets that it is a method in which there is certain confrontation between language and philosophy. Thus, in the later Wittgenstein, we can see that the critique of philosophy is given in the form of critique of language. In the later philosophy, we can see how the "ordinary language" can be used in philosophy unlike in the case of the critique of formal language which typified the earlier philosophy of Wittgenstein. This proves that the critique of language is a unifying thesis, though its focuses are different, within Wittgenstein.

The deconstructive movement in Wittgenstein develops against the primal scene of philosophy of the *Tractutus* where naming appears as an "occult process." According to the *Investigations*, naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object" (PI - 38). Contrarily, now the investigation is directed at what is already in plain sight. That is, the spatial and temporal phenomenon of "ordinary language." They are called "as Penelope and Circe" signifying respectively the home to which language has to be returned, and as the seduction of the play of surfaces Wittgenstein's introduction of the German word 'Verwendung' (use), which according to Staten, signifies a per-verting or turning language from its normal use

Along with the emphasis on "use", Wittgenstein rejects the "holiday" or "idleness" of language, because for him, philosophical problems arise when language goes on a holiday. Language can get perverted to the extent that one can say that it is the atrophy (atropos) of language. This is what gets explained in Wittgenstein's use of "seeing as" aspect of language. In the part II of the Investigations, Wittgenstein says, "There are here hugely many interrelated phenomena and possible concepts." Ac-

cordingly an arbitrary cipher will reveal various "aspects." It will look to a childish script, a letter in a foreign alphabet, or a calligraphic flourish, a cording to the fiction one sounds it with.

Rule-following is the another deconstructive motif in wittgenstein. As Staten finds, though Wittgenstein has not developed the ramifications of the idea of rule-following, it is an important fact about the emergence of some thing new. When something is really new it will look bizarre to the old point of view. We cannot know at the time of emergence of an individual variation whether it is an incipient possible form of life or revision of some branch of an existent form of life. So far given as a possibility only, which will have to be filled out now, further consequences filled in and so on. If we say, "perhaps parallel lines can meet," we have only a crazy-sounding. Suggestion that everything depends upon how it is worked out. 13

Wittgenstein's point here is that among the two intelligent human beings who receive the same training, one grasps rule in natural way and the another in a deviant way. Wittgenstein is interpreted to explain that deviant responds naturally in a way that differs from his own. He sees things differently. However, Staten, against Specht and Tugendhat who think that language or meaning is reducible to a set of rules, reports by saying that the concept of rule does not explain anything in the *Investigations*. This is what conveyed in the passage follows:

And is there not also the case where We play and - make up the rules One where we alter them - as we go along (PI. 83).

For Wittgenstein therefore, rules provide no explanation. This provide that Wittgenstein's method is not one method but involves different kinds of methods. And none of this is the method followed in the *Investigations*. It is a clear pointer to the deconstructive motif, in the later Wittgenstein.

Besides the attempt to relate Wittgenstein's critique of language lo Derrida's deconstructive critique of textuality, Staten has also taken the methodological character of Wittgenestein's practice as a form of what Derrida calls deconstruction. In this respect, Staten's reading of Wittgenstein

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differs fundamentally from that of Rorty's, for he pays a special attention to the problem of the materiality of signifier, in which Rorty and other philosophers in general do not take much interest. Staten's aim is to disentangle the deconstructive style of discourse as it has been developed within the discipline of philosophy. This is particularly traced in the case of the tradition of analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein is unique among Derrida's predecessors in having achieved, in the period of beginning with the Blue Book, a consistently deconstructive standpoint.

In the case of both Wittgenstein and Derrida deconstruction is generatead by an intense, sustained confrontation with philosophy, and the language arising out of this confrontation remains marked by its relation to the language of philosophy. He takes deconstructive standpoint as rather like a lateral displacement, or method of writing philosophy.

Thus there seems to have a great complimentarity between taking deconstruction itself as part of the analytical tradition and taking deconstruction itself as having its early origination in Wittgenstein, By suggesting that foundational notion of philosophy as an impossible enterprise, Wittgenstein has pronounced the end of philosophy with utmost rigour than any of his predecessors. As an answer to the question what should be done with philosophy afterwards, Wittgenstein has anticipated deconstruction by telling us that philosophers were those who were supposed to be engaged with the primary task of dissolving philosophical problems. This should be taken as the way in which Wittgenstein wants to understand his therapeutic treatment of philosophical problems as the form of philosophy understood as critique of language.

NOTES

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PERFORMATIVES AND TRUTH

MANJULIKA GHOSH

As we know, Austin makes no secret of his aversion to the descriptivist account of knowledge. 'To suppose that "know" is a descriplive phrase, is only one example of the descriptive fallacy, so common in philosophy', remarks he. So his desire to get rid of the descriptivist account of knowledge and for that purpose, to find a suitable alternative to it, which he thinks would be available in his reconstruction of the notion of knowledge in terms of that of performatives, is understandable. But his stance against descriptivism is not a stance against descriptivism as such; it seems to be confined to his theory of knowledge. For, Austin shows special interest in the problem of truth and the theory that results from it tends to present a very different picture. Asking himself, when it is that a statement is said to be true, Austin answers, " A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by demonstrative conventions (the one to which it refers) is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by descriptive conventions." And speaking of 'is true' as this particular correlation, he remarks, 'If it is admitted (if) that the rather boring yet satisfactory relation between words and world... does genuinly occur why should the phrase "is true" not be our way of describing it'?2 Except for its sophistication, Austin's account of truth is substantially a version of the particular brand of descriptivist theory which in the philosophy of truth is called correspondence theory. Thus, as far as, the problem of understanding truth is concerned Austin, having shun the anti-pathy to descriptivism which he originally showed in connection with the interpretation of knowledge becomes, on the contrary, reconciled to it.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.2

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ing: Demida c Philosophy, ad Way, UniWhat is more, his refined version of the correspondence theory may well be supposed to be a new contribution towards enriching the descriptivist tradition in the philosophy of truth. As regards truth, Austin is thus quite happy with a descriptivist hypothesis. So, it has been only natural that the idea of performatives does not figure in his thoughts about truth. That the concept of performatives, a discovery of his own, can be of any use in a theory of truth does not have any occasion to occur to him. The concept comes in for the first time ³ for exploitation by Strawson in his characteristic theory of truth. This theory, aften called a performatory theory, is an attempt to understand how the phrase 'is true' is used in language, in the light of a characteristic set of performatory utterances. What is historically more important about this Strawsonean account of truth is that eventually it is made to play an antithetic role in relation to Austin's correspondence theory of truth. Reacting to this theory Strawson says, "The correspondence requires, not purification, but elimination".⁵

Strawson's performatory account of truth may well be looked upon as constituted of a number of different contentions. One such contention - no doubt a basic contention - is the non-descriptivist position to the effects that the word 'true' in a sentence of the form 'P is true' does not describe or designate a quality or relation or anything of the kind. This as is known to us, happens to be the central thesis of the particular theory of truth which is associated with the names of F.P.Ramsey and A.J.Ayer and is often called Redundancy or Logical Superfluity theory of truth.

According to Ramsey, the word 'true' in a 'truth-sentence' does not denote anything. So that, we do not have any separate problem about truth; to add the prediacte 'true' to a proposition is to add nothing to it. In Ramsey's own language:

...... it is true that Caeser was murdered means no more than that Caeser was murdered.

The same position is more explicity formulated by A. J. Ayer when he says:

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cally superfluous. When, e.g., one says that the proposition' "Queen Anne is dead" is true', all that one is saying is that Queen Anne is dead..., to say that a proposition is true is just to assert it.⁷

Strawson admits that 'is true' in 'P is true' does not designate anything. So far he is in agreement with Ramsey and Ayer. But he dissociates himself from the latter when they proceed to treat 'is tue' as 'logically superfluous' or as a bare mark of assertion. For Strawson, 'is true' is not logically superfluous "True" and "not true" he says, 'have jobs of their own to do...'8 Let us follow the analysis through which this position is worked out by Strawson.

A sentence-pattern may indeed be used to assert *P*. But this assertiveness is not the whole truth or the only truth about it. For, according to Strawson, there are circumstances in which it may be used to do many things besides making an assertion. To illustrate the point consider any of the following:

- (a) Nehru is the first Prime Minister of India.
- (b) It is ten 'o'clock.
- (c) Truth survives in the long run.

A certain sentence-pattern has been used in each of these cases to make an assertion. But the making of the assertion is certainly not the only thing it can be used to do. Depending on its use in appropriate contexts it can be said to do more things, i.e., perform jobs other than merely that of asserting. Thus (a) may figure in a quiz contest to answer the question 'who is the first Prime Minister of India'?, (b) may be taken in the sense of, say, telling or reminding somebody that he should begin his work. In the same way, (c) may be used to function as a means of encouraging someone who has lost his faith in truth. There indeed are many more such jobs other than making assertion which a sentence may be used to perform, e.g., warning, inspiring, reassuring, reprimanding and so on. Now, in many such cases, i.e., cases which provide appropriate contexts for a sentence to do a job over and above that of asserting, one may make the assertion without using the sentence-pattern. Certain 'abbreviatory devices'

are there for making the assertion. The matter is stated by Strawson himself thus:

In many of the cases in which we are doing something besides merely stating X is Y, we have available, for use in suitable contexts, certain abbreviatory devices which enable us to state that X is Y without using the sentence - pattern 'X is Y'. Thus, if someone asks us 'Is X Y', we may state (in the way of reply) that X is Y by saying 'yes'9.

Now, the word 'true', according to Strawson, is one such 'abbreviatory device'. To be more precise, it is said to work as a substitute for each of a number of such devices. But what exactly are the devices? In answering this question Strawson has recourse to what is identified by Austin as performatory utterances. That is to say, the devices are performatory expressions like 'I corroborate', 'I agree', 'I grant', 'I confirm', 'I accept', and such like. One uses the word 'true', according to Strawson, as a substitute for any of these expressions which, again, is used as a device for making an assertion, say, P, in the context of the same assertion being actually made or envisaged to be made by somebody. From this it follows that 'true', like the expressions it is a substitute for, performs in language a performatory role in addition to that of asserting; and in this, according to Strawson, lies its logical significance; it is not as supposed by Ramsey and Ayer. logically superfluous.

Thus, according to Strawson, the expression 'true' or 'is true' is basically performtory. This performatory feature, while it explains its logical relevance, also explains another important thing, namely, why it is that Strawson accepts the Ramsey-Ayer position that 'true' does not designate anything. The non-designating feature of the word 'true' follows. straighway from its performatory feature. For, one of the distinctive features of an expression called performatory is that it is non-descriptive; it does not report or describe anything whatever in the world, a situation, a state of affair of anything of the kind.

But in maintaining that the word 'true' in a sentence of the form 'P is true' performs basically a performatory role and does not describe anything.

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Strawson faces one difficulty of which he is fully aware. The difficulty arises Strawson lace. The difficulty arises from the obvious resemblance of the sentence 'P is true' to a sentence of from the bottom is yellow'. The word 'yellow' in the sentence describes the subject 'flower' and is a grammatical predicate in it. If so, why should the subject in a position to say that 'true' in 'P is true' is a grammatical preditale functioning as a description of 'P'? That 'true' in 'P is true' is a predictal fact which G tale is an obvious grammatical fact which Strawson does not deny. But he denies that 'true' can be understood as the name of a property describing 'P' in the way 'yellow' as the name of a property describes flower. The function of 'true' is not to describe 'P'. To suppose that it is so, is to be beguiled by is grammatical positiom. According to Strawson, 'true' is neither a device for making an assertion about 'P' nor is it a device for making an assertion other than 'P'; its entire function is to assert 'P' itself in a certain particular way, which is the performatory way. What specifically this performatory way would be would, of course, depend on the nature of the context in which 'P' is asserted. Thus, on occartsions, it may assume the 'agreeing' way, on occasions the 'endorsing' way or the 'accepting' way, and so on.

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To provide an exhaustive account of Strawson's view of truth is not germane to our present interest. However, the outline we have given above of Strawson's account of the use of the phrase 'is true' seems adequate though to highlight the points considered salient and relevent by us. The points are as follows:

- (a) In saying 'P is true' one does not make a statement about 'P'

 or a statement over and above 'P'.
- (b) 'Is true' in sentences of the form 'P is true' does not designate any thing in the way 'yellow' in the sentence 'The flower is yellow' does
- (c) The use of the word 'true' needs a context in which a statement is actually made or is envisaged.

212 MANJULIKA GHO

(d) To say that the statement so made or envisaged is true, is make the statement itself in a performatory way, that is to say in agreeing, endorsing, confirming, and similar other ways

The points are not all of them, as far as we can understand, such as equally and directly related to our interest. Nor do we think that they all equally fundamental.

Thus take (a). It may, in a way, be said to be subordinate to (d), to is, the performatory point. For, if it is granted that in saying P is true we are asserting P itself in a certain characteristic way, then it inevited follows that P is true is neither a separate statement about P nor a separate statement over and above P.

In the same way, (b) also is, in a sense subordinate to (d). For, if be correct to say that the purport of 'is true' in 'P is true' is non-descriptive, more specifically performative, then the question of its designating anything does not arise at all.

The basic and the most important thing from our point of view is thus the point (d). The point (c) is built in (d) in such a way that our need not treat it separately. Dealing with (d), in a way will cover (t). Thus for us, consideration of Strawson's view about the use of the phrase 'is ture' boils down to the consideration of (d). Which means, our test now is going to be basically an examination of how far, if at all, the function of 'is true' in 'is-true' - sentences can be construed after the model of those performed by such performatives as 'I agree', 'I accept', 'I concept' I corroborate', 'I endorse' and such like.

Before we get into this task in right earnest it would, however, to worthwhile to clear up certain general points and therewith certain misging arising out of them. This, we hope, will offer some protection.

Strawson's analysis of 'true' against being unduly exposed to certain misconceptions.

(a) One thing calls for some emphasis. It is this. Strawson is corcerned to explain the use of the word 'true': he has no intention to provide any metaphysical account of truth. This explanation, again, is not intended

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to answer when we use the word 'true', but to answer how we use the word 'true', 10 This, it may be noted is made quite explicit by Strawson himself.

But in mentioning just this we have not fully delimited the scope of Strawson's interest.

The word 'true' is used in a variety of linguistic contexts. Thus it may occur, for instance, in an interrogative sentence like 'Is it true that your friend has lost his job'?; as has been mentioned by Peter Geach 11, it may also occur in a conditional sentence, e.g., 'if the statement "The earth is flat" is true, astronomy is bunkum'. The word 'true' may figure also in similar other sentences. But Strawson's explanation is not designed to cover the vast and varied range of all possible uses of the word 'true'. What it is confined to is the use of 'true' in the context of the particular variety of sentences, namely, those indicative 'is true' - sentences which contain statements as their grammatical subjects. The statement in the sentence, it should be noted, may be explicitly stated, e.g., 'The statement hat sugar is sweet is true'. It may also be left inexplicit, as, for example, in sentences like 'That's true', 'Your statement is true', ' What he said yesterday is true', and so on. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that by taking into consideration 'is true' - sentences of the latter variety, i.e., sentences in which the statement is kept inexplicit, Strawson's analysis enjoys one advantage over that of Ramsey and Ayer. According to Ramsey and Ayer, as we know, 'is true'-sentences of the form 'P is true' does nothing more than asserting 'P'. On this view, explanation of 'is true'- sentences with inexplicit statements as their grammatical subjects runs into difficulty. For, obviously, a statement which is enexplicit cannot be asserted. But if 'is true' in 'P is true' is conceived, as Strawson does, as a device for thdorsing or giving assent to 'P', then there is no such difficulty: there is no absurdity in endorsing or agreeing to an inexplicit statement.

Anyway, let us come back to the point that Strawson's analysis of lruth is not comprehensive in the sense of covering all the uses of 'true' or is true'. Nor does it make a claim to be so. And this, it may be mentioned, is a ground for some, for instance, Warnock 12, to suppose that what Strawson says about truth does not amount to a theory of truth. The sup-

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position would, no doubt, hold good, if it is granted that whatever is to be capable of throwing. as a theory of truth must be such as to be capable of throwing 'some some light on contexts in general in which "true" or "truth" might occur, or which questions of truth or falsehood might arise'13. But is it mandaton for us to understand a theory of truth in this sense? That is to say, is necessary for a theory of truth to be comprehensive to the extent of color ing all, or even nearly all uses of the word 'true'? In that case, one would wonder whether anybody at any time has constructed a theory of true None of the theories of truth known to us would appear to fulfil this p. quirement. "We are surely over the days" very rightly said by Wheale, "when we expect one simple theory to solve all the problems over a huge field"14. The stipulation of being comprehensive not being unduly insisted on, Strawson's view of truth may well count as a theory of truth. For, in trying to throw light on the use of 'true' as a predicate in indicative sentences, Strawson is trying to throw light on use of 'true' which is undenably fundamental. The fact that his preoccupation with 'true' is purposefully selective does not come in the way of his view being called a theory.

(b) Strawson certainly maintains that in saying 'P is true' one is not making any statement about 'P' or any statement over and above 'P' this much is fairly clear: there is hardly any ambiguity on this point. The position may be correct or incorrect. We need not commit anything on this point. But one thing seems pretty clear to us. It is that even if turns out to be incorrect, it would not affect, in any adverse way, the analysis of 'is true' in 'is true' - sentences in terms of such non dissenting performatives as 'I agree', 'I accept', etc, etc. Yet, it is to be noticed that while dealing with Strawson's view of truth, Warnock has chosen this position as a special target of his criticism. But what, exactly, may be supposed to follow, if it is granted that Warnock's criticism is justified. Perhaps only that the position is incorrect, not that Strawson's performatory analysis is untenable. Warnock's criticism, if it has any value, has a value of its own, and not on account of any possible bearing of it on the performatory analysis of 'true'.

Let us take up a connected point which, perhaps, is more important

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ore important.

Even though he denies that 'P is true' is a statement about 'P' or that it is a stateament over and above 'P', Strawson does not deny that 'P is true' is a statement, namely, that 'P', though in a characteristic way, i.e., the way called performatory. Apparently, having this statemental character of 'P is true' in mind, Warnock shows some degree of reservation against calling the Strawsonean account of the expression 'is true' in the sentence 'P is true' by the name performatory. He says, '... Strawson has been taken by some to be propounding what I have heard called "the performative theory of truth" but I think it is clear that what he says neither deserves, nor surely claims 15 any such title'16. And in all this, Warnock, it appears, has been led by the idea that an utterance which is a statement cannot count as a performalive. But this, we suppose, is a mistake not too uncommon in philosophy of language. For an utterance to become a statement does not exclude the possibility of its possessing a performatory character. Being a statement and being a performative are not incompatible concepts. They may well go together without any prejudice to the distinction between performatives and constatives. That is another story which need not detain us here. As a matter of fact, to suppose that the statemental character of an utterance is incompatible with its performatoriness is to commit what is called by Arthur Danto the 'fallacy of the Single Function', 18. Austin says, 'To say that you are a cuckold, may be to insult you, but it is also, and at the same time to make a statement which is true or false'19. It makes no difference if this remark is read with some alternation as "To say that you are a cuckold may be to make a statement which is true or false, but it may also, and at the same time be to insult you'20.

(c) Warnock does not deny that to say "That's true' may be to express agreement with what someone has said.... it is quite obvious', he says, 'that that's so, that this is at least one of the ways in which "is true' is used'21. But explanation of this particular use of 'is true', Warnock lends to feel, does not matter much. What is required of a theory of truth is that it must contain an answer to what the word 'true' means. But sliawson's view is accused by Warnock of having failed on this particular swered, because saying how the word is used is not saying what the word

MANJULIKA GHOSH

means. To quote Warnock:

If someone were to say, corretly, that the phrase 'is a fool' is often used to criticise, belittle, denigrate, or insult the person of whom it is predicated, it is plain that the would not have ofered an answer to the question what the phrase 'is a fool' means; and similarly, it would seem that one who says, correctly, [as Strawson does] that 'is true' is often used to indicate the speaker's agreement has offered no answer to ... what the words 'is true' mean²².

We are not quite able to understand how all this may be said to have a bearing on Strawson's view of truth. True, Strawson does not say anything which is characterised by him as the meaning of 'true' or 'is true'. Nor does he appear, from what he has said, to aspire to do so. His avowed objective has been to explicate how the word 'true' is used in 'is true' - sentences. Whether or not such an attempt can be construed as an explication of the meaning of the word 'true' is to depend on how exactly is the relation between the use of a word and the meaning of it is conceived, in other words, whether or not the meaning of a word is to be defined in terms of its use. But Strawson is non-committal on this point. And that does not in any way undermine the merit of his view of truth, if it really has any: an account of the use of a word - and for that matter, the use of 'true' - does not have to depend for its worthwhileness on an account of its meaning. Explanation of the use of a word is an autonomous philosophical activity having a value of its own.

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It is time that we address ourselves to what we have earlier called our basic task. How far, if at all, is an use of 'is true' understandable as a performative of the non-dissenting type, e.g., "I agree', "I accept', 'I confirm', 'I endorse', etc. Alternately, to what extent, if at all, can we assimilate the varied uses of the phrase 'is true' to the particular species of performatives? One obvious and common way to decide the issue is to conduct an exploration to see whether or not in every case the function of the phrase 'is true' can adequately be discharged by one or more performatives in questions.

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(a) The argument we take up first is of Warnock's. It consists in citing instances in which it is perfectly sensical to say 'I agree', 'I endorse', and the like though, not 'true', or 'That's true'. Thus, e.g., I can agree with a decision, with a policy, with an appraisal, with a taste or an opinion. '... if I agree with his decision or his assessment', Warnock says,'I may, of course, say, "Yes, I agree' ... but in neither case, surely, could I naturally or could I properly say "That's true" '23

Warnock is certainly right in saying that in the context of decision, policy, resolution, taste, appraisal and such like, we are entitled to say "I agree', 'I endorse', etc., and that in these contexts it is improper to use the locution 'That's true'. No one would dispute this. Decisions, resolutions, etc., do not have any truth-value at all, so that there is indeed no point in talking of interchangeability between truth and agreement in their case.

But in what way may it affect the position that 'is true' in the context of a sentence is replaceable by agreement-expressing locutions which precisely is what is maintained by Strawson? A statement differs basically from decisions, resolutions and appraisals etc., in that unlike the latter it is either true or false: in fact, it has to be so. Which means decision, resolutions, etc., provide no reliable model for finding what may be said to hold good in the case of statements. Taken in the sense of an objection to Strawson's view, what Warnock says, seems to lose sight of the view itself.

Warnock's objection has been to the effect that in certain instances agreement-expressing locutions cannot be substituted by 'is true' locutions. We shall now consider certain converse instances, i.e., instances, in which, 'is true' locutions, it is alleged, cannot be substituted by agreement-ex-

pressing locutions.

(b) It is not denied that there are occasions when in saying 'That's true' what one does is to express his non-dissent in the context of a statement. Yet, it is felt by some that, it would be unfair to reduce them to such agreeing or endorsing expressions as 'I agree', 'I accept', 'I endorse', 'Ditto', 'Yes', etc. Thus, take for instance, G. Ezorsky, who in his article, 'Truth in context'²⁴ maintains that the expression 'That's true' has a power or authority which places it above expressions like 'I agree'. This power or authority derives from his idea that saying 'P is true' we take into consideration the evidence or proof in favour of 'P' which we do not do when we say 'I agree that P'. To put the matter in Ezarsky's own words:

To teach someone the use of 'true' is not the same lesson as teaching the use of 'Yes', 'Ditto', 'I accept' ... etc. One would expect words like 'evidence', 'test', 'proof', 'verified' to be the major figures in the first lesson, but they might not show up at all in the second²⁵.

From this alleged peculiarity of 'is true' - sentences, vis-a-vis sentences in which we express our agreement, arises a difference between the two types of sentences at the linguistic level. For example, there is nothing outrageous in saying 'I agree that P, though I do not have any evidence or proof for P', contrarily, we are debarred from saying 'P is true, though there is no evidence or proof for it'. Another connected difference which appears to surface itself when we address 'why' - question to someone who says 'I agree that P' and to one who says 'P is true'. That is to say, when we ask 'Why do you agree that P'? and 'Why do you say that 'P' is true'? In the former case, the answer may well consist in the stating of such extralogical factors, as for example, 'Because it would please X' and such like. But in the latter case, such answers will not do. What is required is a statement of the logical ground for saying that is true.

Ezarsky's argument to draw a line between 'That's true' and 'I agree' does not have any finality for us. It is far from conclusive. For, the criterion he uses to mark off the two sentences from each other is not absolute. It may be true that such sentences as 'I agree that P, though I do not have evidence or proof for P' are normally admitted in our dis-

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But it is equally true that saying such sentences as 'I agree that course. But it is equally true that saying such sentences as 'I agree that and I have evidence or proof for P', is not quite uncommon. One may indeed expect words like 'evidence', 'test', 'proof', 'verified' to figure in our indeed expect words like 'I agree'. But our learning the use of the expressions like 'I agree', etc. will not be vitiated if these words occur in the process. 'That's true' and'I agree' are not thus completely separated from each other, even if we admit what Ezaesky has said. There may indeed be occasions when they meet, in other words, do the same job.

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MANJULIKA GHOS

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- 14. Wheately John, 'Austin on Truth', Symposium on Austin, K.T. Fann (ed), 150 Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 238.
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THE MESSAGE OF THE MĀṇŪKYA UPANIṢAD A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS

RAMAKRISHNA PULIGANDLA

We are all aware that the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is the briefest but most important of all the Upaniṣads, in that it contains the gist, the heart, and the essence of the entire Upaniṣad teaching. It is also my considered judgement that, although a number of commentaries, ancient, modern, and contemporary, exist on this Upaniṣad, a thorough phenomenological investigation of some fundamental issues is lacking. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to undertake such an investigation and shed light on mind, consciousness, and the turīya.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, no Western philosopher or psychologist had ever examined the state of deep sleep; if anything, the state of deep sleep had been ignored as unimportant and insignificant. To be sure, some Western psychologists, such as Freud and Jung, did concern themselves with the interpretation of dreams, but not with the state of dream itself; their inquiries into dreams are driven by psychological and therapeutic interests and considerations, whereas the inquiry of the Mandukya Upanisad into the three possible modes of our being is guided by ontological concerns.

In the waking state, we are aware of external objects; that is, we have thermal perceptions. In the dream state, we are aware of internal objects; that is, we have internal perceptions. In the deep-sleep state, we are aware

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.2

April 1999

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of neither external objects nor internal objects; that is, we have neither to be made have ternal nor internal perceptions. The point to be made here, then is the objects, whether external or internal, are perceived only when the minds functioning. In other words, perception of objects is due to the working the mind. This means that the state of deep sleep, where there is no perception of objects, external or internal, mind is not functioning. In a worth mind is quiescent. During the state of deep sleep, one does not know the one is in deep sleep. However, when one awakes and is asked whether he slept well, he answers affirmatively by saying, "Yes, I have had a result and blissful sleep." The question now is: how does one know that one had deep sleep on waking up, if one does not know that one is in deep sleep during the state of deep sleep? It simply does not make sense to answer, saying that one remembers that one had a deep sleep; for remembering in plies knowing at an earlier time, but one does not know during deep sleep that one is in deep sleep. Let it be emphasized here that a person's claim! have had deep sleep can be objectively determined through neurophysiological investigation, just as his claim to have had a dream. If all knowing is through the activity of the mind through mental operations including remembering -- and the mind is quiescent during deep sleep, the one's claim to have had deep sleep becomes mysterious and inexplicable.

The only way to rationally answer this question is to grant that there is a knowing that does not involve any mental activity--mental operations and the knower is consciousness itself; and there are many passages in the Upaniṣad where "consciousness" is used synonymously with "knower and "knowledge." Let us here clarify the two senses in which consciousness is to be understood as knowledge: 1. consciousness is the ultimate necessary condition for any knowing, and 2. consciousness itself is knowledge. All knowing through the mind involves an object, the known; accordingly, knowing through mind necessarily involves the tripartite distinction of the knower, the known, and the activity of knowing; that is this distinction is never absent and cannot be collapsed in any knowledge through the mind. The upshot of these observations is that the Mandally Upaniṣad recognizes and calls our attention to a knowing and hence knowledge which does not involve the mind--any mental operations. Here, the

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tripartite distinction mentioned above is wholly absent. In a word, in this kind of knowing consciousness itself is the knower, and whatever is known and the act of knowing cannot exist separately from consciousness. Thus, according to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, one knows, through consciousness itself, on awaking that one has had a deep sleep. It is true that on waking up mental activity resumes. Once one knows, no matter how, mind will simply report. I am fully aware that many philosophers will dismiss as absurd the whole idea of knowing anything at all without mental operations. But let me give a clear example of knowing without involving any mental operations. Thus ask someone, say John, "are you conscious now?" John immediately reply by saying, "Yes, of course I am conscious. What do you mean by asking such an absurd question?" Let me clarify the situation here. Yes, there certainly are mental operations enabling John to hear the question, just as there certainly are to enable him to answer the question. But this is not the point; rather, the point is, what mental operations are involved in John's arriving at the answer? I submit that there are none. But if someone thinks that there are mental operations by performing which John arrived at his answer, I would like to see the list. Let me emphasize that this is not a matter to be decided by arbitrary decisions and fiat of definitions, but by phenomenological investigation. I suggest that the reader inquire into this matter and determine for himself how he would arrive at his answer if he were asked this question; and if he does perform some mental operations, he should give me a list of them. Let me assure him that there are absolutely no mental operations in arriving at the answer, "Yes, I am of course conscious." The reason for there being no mental operations in arriving at the answer to the above question is that here knowing and being are one and the same and the tripartile distinction is wholly absent. One immediately knows that one is conscious, not through some mental operations, such as inference. The point of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad can now be stated as follows: during the state of deep sleep, the mind is quiescent, that is there are no mental operations and hence there can be no knowing through the Nevertheless, there is consciousness and it is through consciousness itself that the deep-sleep state is known; and on waking, mental activity ily resumes and the mind simply reports what is known, no matter how it is

known.

Someone might now object by saying that one's claim that one has had deep sleep is based on inference. The objection runs as follows: on waking up, one feels relaxed, and one attributes the state of relaxation to having had deep sleep. This objection, however, cannot stand scrutiny. A state of relaxation can be had through means other than deep sleep. The person was awake before deep sleep and is awake after deep sleep and when he says he has had a deep sleep he means that he was not aware of any objects in between; and this claim he could not have made if he did not in some sense know he has had a deep sleep. He could just as well have said that someone injected into him a substance which induces relaxation. Someone might now object by saying that the person just got un from sleep and no wonder he says he has had deep sleep. But this objection begs the question, for the person did not say he has had sleep but a deep sleep. There is no difficulty with a person's saying on getting up that he has had a sleep, but it is quite a different matter when he says he has had a deep sleep. How did he know he has had a deep sleep? Appeals to feeling relaxed are of no avail, for as pointed above a state of relaxation can be had through means other than deep sleep. The inescapable conclusion, according to the Mandukya Upanisad, is that in some sense there is knowledge of being aware of no objects at all. It might be mentioned in passing that the EEG's of different persons in the waking state are similar, those of dreaming are similar, and those of deep sleep are similar. The import of this remark is that we do not have to take on faith a person's report that he dreamt or has had deep sleep; rather, such reports are open to objective confirmation or disconfirmation.

Another important phenomenological observation here is that when we ask someone whether he slept well, he does not begin his reply by saying, "now, well, let me see..." Rather, he immediately says that he had trouble sleeping, had to turn and toss in the bed for long, had bad dreams, or has a deep sleep. This observation confirms the claim that one knows without any inference that one has had a deep sleep.

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then there could be no continuity between going to sleep and waking up, and consequently the person could not draw any inferences. This is to say that the possibility for drawing inferences presupposes continuity of being; and, according to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, it is consciousness that provides the continuity. And given that the mind is quiescent during deep sleep, it is through consciousness itself (which persists even in deep sleep) that one knows directly, immediately (without having to draw any inferences) that one has had deep sleep. In short, the knower here is none other than consciousness itself.

The important question that now arises is: what happened to the mind during the deep-sleep state? The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad answers this question as follows: To say that the mind is quiescent during deep sleep is not to say that the mind simply vanished away and became non-existent; rather, it is to say that the mind is no longer manifest as an individual entity, but became one with consciousness. It is percisely for this reason that there are no perceptions--objects--at all during deep sleep. In other words, during deep sleep mind merges with consciousness, losing everything characteristic of it as an individual entity. However, on waking up, the mind reemerges from consciousness, manifesting itself as an individual entity with all its specific characteristics such as thoughts, feelings, memories, etc. The point here, then, is that the knowledge that one has had deep sleep is present in consciousness and it is recovered by the mind as soon as one wakes up. If the knowledge were not present, the mind could not recover it. It is clear from these observations that the mind is none other than consciousness with objects-intentionalities. Whatever is known through the mind, is always an intentionality, an object. In the state of deep sleep, there is no mental activity and consequently there are no intentionalities. The knowledge that One has had a deep sleep is therefore non-intentional knowledge, the knower here being non-intentional, objectless consciousness itself. It is clear, then, that according to the Māṇdūkya Upaniṣad, there is non-intentional, objectless consciousness, which is also a knower. All non-intentional knowing, such as one's knowing that one is conscious, is knowing by non-intentional consciousness, not knowing by mind, which is intentional consciousness.

From the above considerations, it is clear that the Māṇḍūkya Upanişad draws a phenomenological distinction between mind and consciousness Mind is phenomenologocally distinguished from consciousness as inlentional knower--that is, whatever is known through the mind is always, unexceptionably, an object, an intentionally. And whatever is known non. intentionally is not an object, and it is known through non-intentional objectless consciousness. However, mind is not ontologically different from consciousness; in facat, it cannot be different from consciousness, for consciousness--Atman-- is the ultimate, non-dual reality; that is, nothing other than the non-dual reality can exist. Whatever exists is a manifestation (appearances) of consciousness, and mind is but one of the manifestations of the ultimate non-dual reality. Manifestations can disappear and reappear but consciousness--ultimate reality--whose manifestations are all appearances, itself never disappears. It is this consciousness that persists through all the three modes of our being, namely, waking, dreaming, and deep sleep. It is also the non-intentional knower and makes possible intentional knowing through mind.

At this juncture, I wish to make some pertinent observations on the treatment of the topic of consciousness in the Western tradition. In this tradition, the terms "mind," "self," "I," and "consciousness" are used synonymously. Thus consider Descartes. He asks, "what then is it that I am?" and answers by saying, "A thinking thing... and if I entirely cease to think, thereupon I shall altogether cease to exist" (Meditation II). It is clear from this quote that Descartes does not phenomenologically distinguish mind and consciousness. I can easily imagine an Upanișadic rishi asking Descartes, "your teaching is interesting; however, I wish to ask as to how you know you cease to exist if you cease to think." The rishi will then offer deep sleep as an example of a state in which one certainly exists, although there is no thinking. This is the basis on which the Māṇdūkya Upanisad phenomenologically distinguishes mind and consciousness. In deep sleep, there is just consciousness and absolutely no thinking; whereas in the waking and dream states there is consciousness with thinking, which is none other than mind; these correspond to non-intentional knowing and The Messa,

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intentional knowing, respectively. Thus from the ontological standpoint, the Western use of "mind" and "consciousness" synonymously is not wrong; Western use on the contrary, it is in full accord with the teaching of the Māṇḍūkya Upanisad. But failing to phenomenologically distinguish mind and consciousness has led the Western tradition into denying non-intentional consciousness-objectless consciousness. In sharp contrast, the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, having phenomenologically distinguished mind and consciousness, consistently and correctly affirms non-intentional consciousness--Ātman. It is not surprising, then, that the Upanisadic tradition also developed various phenomenological techniques--Yogic disciplines--in order to realize non-inlentional consciousness as the ultimate nondual reality. An observation concerning Western phenomenology: Husserl and all his followers regard consciousness as intentional; but from our discussion of the state of deep sleep, it should be clear by now that it is mind and not consciousness that is intentional. It is mind that pays attention to objects and therefore is intentional. Consciousness makes possible paying attention and having intentionalities -- objects.

I come now to a discussion of turīya. "turīya" literally means the fourth. It is worth noting that the Mandukya Upanisad does not refer to wive as a state, but merely as the fourth, beyond the state of deep sleep. The reason for this is that "state" connotes duality, in particular the disinction between the knower and the known turīya, according to the Māṇḍūkya Upanisad, is the highest mode of being, beyond all dualities. But, unfortunately, commentaries on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad do not offer any phenomenological clarification of turīya; instead, they merely describe the wiya in vague terms and phrases, such as "realization of Brahman,' "realization of Atman," "realization of the ultimate non-dual reality," etc. I propose offer here a phenomenological interpretation of turiya. From the phenomenological point of view, turīya is just like the state of deep sleep, except for one important difference: the difference is that whereas during deep sleep one does not know one is in deep sleep, in turiya one does know that one is in deep sleep. I shall now proceed to discuss the most signifieant implications of this interpretation.

In turiya, just as in deep sleep, there are no perceptions-objects; one knows that one is in deep sleep; that is, one is aware that there are the the there are the ther objects at all. This means that one is aware of one's being even when the are no objects at all. This is the mode of highest wakefulness. Why is the mode of highest wakefulness? Because "I am" persists even when the are no objects. This in turn means that there is a reality about each of the -the same reality, non-dual consciousness--whose existence is not comp gent upon any objects. Such reality is indeed the necessary being-ther. ality that exists without depending for its existence upon anything other than itself. A word of caution here: In the phrase "I am" above, "I" is not tok understood as the ego, which is an object. The phrase is to be correct understood as just consciousness (awareness)--Atman, Brahman, the ultime non-dual reality. Even if the entire world--all manifestations--disappears there is a reality that never disappears and reappears. That reality is at our Atman (objectless consciousness) and Brahman (Sat, Existence); realization of this reality is the highest philosophical and religious goal the sages erhort us to attain. He who attains this realization is the most wakeful on and the realization is the discovery that one is immortal. Immortality is m something we need to acquire but rather the attainment of turīya is the div covery that we have always been immortal. In short, it is an epistemological discovery, not acquiring something we did not have before. Having dis covered that in one's true being one is immortal, not subjet to birth and death, one is forever free of pain and suffering and lives in peace and joy It is to be emphasized here that in the teaching of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣd there is no transcendental hocus, pocus such as God, the Devil, Judgement heaven, hell, etc. The Upanisad is concerned with discovering, through thorough going phenomenological inquiry, one's true being as non-intertional consciousness. And since consciousness persists through all of our modes of being, there is a sense in which we are always in turiya.

Before bringing this paper to a close, I wish to make some pertined observations in regard to Berkeley. Remember Berleley's question? Dos the world continue to exist when I am not perceiving it? Berkeley had bring in God to bring in God to assure him that the world continues to exist because for always perceives it. The rishis will have nothing to do with God, and the

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To phenomen to discove knowing through c waking th such as re tentional l knowing phenomen clear pher from Atma cal claim on-dual : continues intentiona would have answered Berkeley's question as follows: The world does not disappear when you are not perceiving it; it continues to exist and does not vanish away, because it is Brahman, Sat; and Sat can never become not vanish away. It merges into and becomes one with your true being, Aman, the non-dual reality (Brahman and Atman are non-different).

But, interestingly enough, Berkeley did not ask whether he continues to exist when the entire world disappears. He would most probably have said that he too disappears when the whole world disappears. Such is not the case with the Upanisadic rishis. They will tell Berkeley that his inquiry is defective, for he does not undertake a systematic phenomenological investigation and analysis of the waking, dreaming, and deep-sleep states; had he done such an inquiry, Berkeley would have discovered that he does not disappear and become non-existent even when the entire world disappears. The state of deep sleep is thus an opportunity, provided us all by Nature, referred to as "Shakti," to enable us to answer the question as to what happens to the world and to oneself, when

To conclude, 1. The Māndūkya Upanisad is unique in its phenomenological investigation of our possible modes of being, in order 10 discover the reality that persists through all of them. 2. There is a knowing independently of any mental activity (mental operations); it is brough consciousness itself that one knows directly and immediately on waking that one has had a deep sleep, not through any mental activities such as remembering and inferring. 3. This kind of knowing is non-intantional knowing, for it is not knowing any objects (phenomena) but rather lowing one's own mode of being. 4. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Menomenologically distinguishes mind and consciousness and shows on clear phenomenological grounds that ontologically mind is non-different Alman, the non-intentional consciousness; the reason for this ontologiclaim is that the non-intentional consciousness is indeed the ultimate on-dual reality; it is ultimate because even when all objects disappear it onlinues to be; objects appear, disappear, and reappear, whereas the nondentional consciousness never disappears; it is non-dual in two senses:

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a). it is impartite and b). nothing other than it can exist; whatever exists this reality. It is for this reason that Atman, the non-intentional conscious ness, is also non-different from Brahman (Sat, Existence). 5. During deep sleep mind loses its individuality by merging-becoming one-with the no. intentional and therefore non-dual consciousness. Whatever consciousness knows in the state of deep sleep is simply reported by the mind on waking up, without having to perform any operations. That is, once something in known, no matter how, the mind also knows. 6. It is clear from this analysis that mind is none other than intentional consciousness, and whatever known by the nonintentional consciousness is directly and immediate accessible to the mind. 7. By failing to phenomenologically distinguish mind and consciousness, the Western tradition denies non-intentional conscious ness; in keen contrast, through its analysis of the state of deep sleep, its Māndūkya Upanisad affirms non-intentional consciousness. 8. Turīya is im like deep sleep, except for one most significant difference; the difference that whereas during deep sleep one does not know that one is in deel sleep. in turiya one does know during deep sleep that one is in deep sleep; thus turīya is the mode of highest wakefulness; it is the mode of highest wakefulness, because one is fully aware of one's being even when the entire world has disappeared. 9. The attainment of turiya is the realization of one's two beign as the ultimate non-dual reality (non-dual consciousness) which never disappears. 10. The realization of turīya is thus the discovery that one has always been immortal (attaining immortality is not acquiring something on did not have before, but rather discovering that one has always been in mortal). 11. Thus the attainment of turīya and therewith immortality is a epistemological event; consequently, turīya is not a postmortem state to be looked forward to after death; instead, it is knowledge that is to be realized here and now, while fully embodied. 12. In the Upanisad tradition, the all tainment of turīya is the highest philosophical and religious goal; for this reason, the Upanisdic sages exhort us to earnestly strive after it. 13. Each person has to achieve turiya by himself or herself, and not expect others of achieve it for himself or herself, and not expect others. achieve it for him or her (just as everyone has to take his or her own bath) 14. The realization of turīya leads one to fearlessness, wisdom, freedom, peace and iou 15. The and joy. 15. The teaching of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is grounded in thor

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ough and sound phenomenological inquiry, and is wholly free of any and all theological baggage and claptrap.

NOTES

- 1. Swami tr., Brahma-Sutra Bhāsya of Śankārācarya, Third Ed., Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta, 1977.
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A note of jīva: We have stated that Atman, the ultimate non-dual reality, is not to be confused with the jīva, which is through and through phenomenal. What, then, is the status of the jiva? The jīva is an appearance of Ātman, just as the world is an appearance of Brahman. Let us clarify this point by an analogy: Imagine an actor who plays different roles in different theatrical performances; thus, one day he appears on the stage as Napolean, another day as Alexander, still another day as Julius Caeser, and so on. But no matter how many times one sees the performances, one does not know the actor himself, for one only sees the appearances of the actor and not the actor as he is in himself (apart from his appearances). The jīva is like the Napolean, the Alexander, and the Caesar one sees on the stage. But it is clear that the these appearances have no being independently of the actor; that is, from the ontological standpoint, the appearances have no existence apart from that of the actor. In a similar manner, the jīva (empirical ego), has no being apart from Atman; and it would be a profound error to think otherwise; for nothing other than Atman the ultimate non-dual reality, can be: Atman (Brahman) is that without a second.

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MAN'S TIMELESS DIALOGUE WITH HIS GOD: ANOTHER RECORDING

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- Man: Charana Vandana, 1 my Prahbu. 2I pray, let my words reach your ears.
- God: You need not worry for that. No word escapes them, even an unuttered one does not.
- Man: Yes, my Lord, that is a necessary truth. It won't be a word if it escapes them. As is the case with everything else, word too originates from you.
- God: But you have not given up your old, inveterate, habit of addressing me as 'my Prabhu', 'my Lord'. Why don't you drop 'my' and address me as the god I am? I am not simply your, or any particular being's god.
 - It is so kind of you to have reminded me of my lapse, of my foolhardiness, you know, since you know everything, how strongly, how fondly, I wish I could address him, the god as such, which you say you are. If I succeed in doing that, in having with him a dialogue even for the tiniest fragment of a moment, I would consider myself to have been blessed with my liberation, with the fulfilment of my life's mission. But whenever I have tried to do that, and I have been trying almost since my genesis and perhaps would never stop doing it, I have never received from him a clearly audible response, nay, even an unambiguous whisper, of which I may unhesitatingly say that it is from him, and not from you, the god of

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April 1999

Man's Tim

my conception. Even if some time something seemed to be a response from him, it was never one about which I did not feel like changing my opinion when, after some lapse of time, I reflected on it, self-consciously and self-critically, in cooler moments.

On the other hand, whenever I addressed you, the response was instantaneous. That is why even at the time I have the feeling that he is responding to me, I cannot completely get rid of the suspicion that I may be misidentifying a response from you as one from him. All this has led me to take seriously the possibility that there is no 'he', but only 'you'; no god out there, but only the god as I think or wish him to be, i.e. the god who is the product of my creative appetition, whom I have posited or created to satisfy some needs of mine, apparently not satisfiable otherwise. Therefore, I addressed this time my salutation straightway to you to my god; I did not first address him and turned to you after getting no reply from him. As expected, I have immediately been favoured by you with a response.

God: But are you going to be really satisfied with a response from one whom you consider to be a creation of yours?

Man: Not at all an easy question to answer. I would certainly not be satisfied with you if I were conscious of your being a product of my appetitive imagination. But normally I am not, because I do not consciously create, or posit, you. The awareness of the possibility of your having been created by me is generally the result of a thinking process which, in effect, is an exercise in reconstruction. To put it in rather crude terms, it runs on some such lines: I find my world, the world I have, willy-nilly, to live in, an extremely difficult place. The demands of living in it make me very badly wish for an agency which can help me in making my living comfortable, or in some unusually distressful circumstances, at least tolerable. I fail to locate such an agency in any individual or object existing, or likely to come into existence in the immediate, of even distant, future. I virtually cry for help. And, the exigencies

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of my existential situation, my own desires and aspirations, which are really very pressing and gripping, quite stealthily, or rather surreptitiously, lead me to (mis)take my own cry for a knock on the doors of my consciousness by the very being I wished were there, the being which alone could be said to have the agency capable of helping me out. My resultant thinking, which has obviously become appetitively directed, then, smoothly flows in some such way:

I cannot do without such a being, the world connot be so cursed that there is none such, there should be, it is very likely there is, there must be, there really is, one.

When I reach the last step, I have a sigh of relief. I have now the feeling that I am absolutely safe. This sense of safety I read as coming from the very being I was in search of. I may then think that the sense of insecurity I felt earlier was simulated and not real:

It is this being which made me feel insecure so that I may sincerely cry for it. Its making me cry is its way of telling me that it is there to take care of me, its way of entering into my consciousness. As a reward for the crying I am blessed with the soothing experience of being absolutely safe under its care. Naturally, I should feel thankful to it for the tortuous experience of insecurity I had, because it is this experience which has opened my ears and enabled me to hear the precious knock.

I then spontaneously exclaim 'How merciful, how great, it really is! 'My god is nothing but this being.

It is in this way that I first begin, of course unknowingly, or indeliberately, with you, with the god thrown up by my own appetitive imagination, and then convert it, again unknowingly or indeliberately, into god out there, the god you say I should address. And, in creating the former, i.e. in creating you, my image of god, I also create, or re-create, an image of myself as a being

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Man:

wholly dependent on god, as obligated to it for being whall and what I can be, as always begging it and hoping to get from what I beg for.

God: You seem to be incurably obsessed with the idea of the false duel ity of your god and god, of the non-existent difference between 'me' and 'him'.

Sorry, Bhagavan,³ I could not communicate to you what I wanted to. For me there never exists any duality between you and him because at no time I address my prayer to both. Rather, I cannot think of you and him, at the same time, as two beings, nor I ever need to. Almost always I think I am addressing him. This is so because I have not brought you into being by a deliberate, intentional, conscious, process of thinking. A being emerging out of an effort-dependent mentation would not have even the seeming competence to do all that the god I need is expected to. Since the process of projecting you is not conscious, there is no question of recollecting that such a thing was ever done, and therefore no question of forgetting it either. I can meaningfully speak of recalling, or forgetting, something only if I had, sometime in the past, an experience of it, i.e. only if I had consciously done it, or encountered it.

What happens is that when I fail to receive a response from him, the god whom I take to be an objective being, or rather to be the being of all beings, I start introspecting and feeling like explaining or accounting my erstwhile dependence on him in the manner I have roughly sketched. It is thus a kind of reconstruction, a belated self-analysis, or rather a retrospective analysis, of my transaction with him, the allegedly objective being par excellence, showing that what I took to be a transaction with an objective god is, or is very likely to be, a transaction with you, with a god conjured up by my appetitive nature. It is not a memorial account of something consciously done by me.

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ke explaining the manconstruction, ysis, of my excellence, nobjective with a god emorial acIt is clear now, I hope, that both, you and him, cannot simultaneously be the objects of my attention, and therefore, I cannot be afflicted with what you have called the false duality.

But how can you pray to, or worship, a being which itself depends on you for its being?

I cannot. Such a being cannot be the god I need; it cannot be my god. When it occurs to me that the god I adore is possibly a creation of mine, the immediate effect, I confess, is a feeling of dejection, sometimes very painful, sometimes not so painful, sometimes very durable, sometimes not so durable, but one of dejection it almost always is, and certainly in its first go. All this is natural because I consider him to be the bedrock of all being.

God: Then why do you entertain the idea of such a fatal, and I would say an unreal, possibility?

Truly speaking, - and there is no point in trying to conceal the truth from you because I cannot conceal anything from you, - I make the reconstruction - experiment with the fond hope that it would not succeed, that I would come across an irreducible ontological residue which cannot be accounted for by means of any reconstruction in terms of my ideas about what ought to exist, or about what would, if it existed, make the world comfortable to me. I really wish that the experiment of reconstruction fail and through its failure I transcend you, the god my appetitive imagination has created in some such manner as depicted in my account of the reconstruction process, and reach him, the god out there, and have a face-to-face dialogue with him. But there are numerous occasions when the reconstruction experiment seems to be robustly successful, and then it naturally makes me tend towards believing that there is no he, and he, whom I sometime (inadvertently) considered to be him, was only you. On such occasions I do feel, as I have told you, quite sad. Sometimes I do recover from the sadness and, using my limited ratiocinative re-

Man's 7

sources, reconstruct a picture of the world without him but good enough to live, or at least to survive, in. But sometimes 1 do and then I become very miserable indeed.

God: I am glad you do not really intend to substitute me, in your work the god created by you, for him, the god out there. As you have yourself admitted, he and I are not two beings. He is I, or land he. Why don't you address him, or me as him, directly?

Man: I very much want to. Rather, there is nothing else which I want more. But I am never sure if I am really addressing my prayes to him, or to you if you and he are identical. I am never sure of his really being there. Any way, I am willing to assume hence forth in the dialogue that you are he. May I, then, address you as if you were he, the god out there?

God: Yes, you can. That is what you should have been doing sint you started dialoguing with me. You said you never felt you were really talking to me (= him)⁴. But are you sure you have tried to talk to me?

Man: Yes, I am. I know when I am addressing my words to you, and when I know it, I know it. It is an experience of the kind for which I do not need any evidence other than (the experience) itself. If I feel sure that I am directing my words to you, I as sure, and when I am, I am directing my words to you. You also must be knowing that I am. You cannot say that you do not know since, ex hypothesi, you know everything. If you say that you not, you would no longer be the god of my understanding. There fore, you cannot say that I did not address you when I did.

God: Would you tell me when do you feel sure of having addressed your words to me?

Man: I can very easily do that. Some of these experiences are so its portant and distinct that they cannot be forgotten or misconstitute.

Not at all feeling ashamed of being called, or of even being, solitish, I would say, I do address you when I pray to you to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save to save the save t

from an impending calamity, to end, or at least to mitigate, some unbearable suffering I am undergoing, or am about to undergo very soon. The experience of suffering is a very bad thing. But it has one redeeming feature. It is something I want to get rid of as soon as I can. When I find no help coming from a natural, i.e. human or non-human, agency, I generally turn to you and pray for its removal or reduction. But many times my prayers remain unresponded to. I cannot believe that they have not been heard by you, since nothing escapes your notice. But then, if my prayers have reached your ears, why are not they responded to? Sometimes, I admit, after a prayer, my situation does improve. But in none of such cases, I am given any clear, unambiguous, indication to the effect that the improvement has been made by you and not by a natural cause. Rather, in such cases it is generally possible to explain the change in terms of natural causation, i.e. attribute it to some human or nonhuman (but non-divine) agent.

It is true that in some cases the moment I fall back on you, I do not seem to have available any natural source of help. But it is also true that, in (almost) all such cases, only a little after the betterment takes place, I find it extremely plausible to attribute the betterment to something natural, to some previously unnoticed feature of, or to some change which has taken place in my relevant surroundings.

It is logical for me to think, then, that I mistook the betterment to have been induced by you only because, due to my emotional imbalance caused by the unpleasant situation I was in, I could not properly notice or appreciate the causal role of the existing relevant natural factor, or rightly assess the probability of the natural change which soon took place. My later thoughts tend to persuade me to believe that the natural cause to which I may reasonably attribute the relief I have got was there, or was about to occur, when I cried for help from you. Only, I did not realise that it was because my perceptive, discriminative, powers had become

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dulled or overclouded by my upsetting feelings of fear, anxiety, worry, insecurity, etc. That I was then emotionally upset I cannot deny, nor can I deny that emotional disturbance weakens my cognitive and conative capabilities. The result is that the belief that the help came from you finds it extremely difficult to survive, and even if it survives, the danger of its being any time cut by Occam's razor is always hanging on its head.

What happens in the vast majority of cases is that the belief either gives place to the disbelief that you are not the cause of the relief or is greatly weakened by the suspicion tht the relevant natural cause could very plausibly be given the credit for it. Under the circumstances the validity of the belief in your agency is bound in become highly precarious. But this belief does not suffer the ignominy alone. Its fate is linked with that of another, a more basic one, the belief in your existence. When it becomes questionable, it also makes the latter questionable. Had it been unquestionable, it would very well have been a good ground, or rather a conclusive ground, for the latter. If god listens to a prayer of mine, he certainly exists. But its not being listened to inclines me to become skeptical of there really being a listener, if not to totally deny the latter's existence. Naturally, then, the belief in your existence would be very much weakened, if not replaced by a disbelief.

God: It means you begin to doubt the very existence of mine when you become unsure of my having responded to your prayers.

Man:

God: Why are you silent? Be frank.

Man: I do not want to be impolite to the being of all beings. But what you have hinted at is true. When I feel that no response to my prayers, intended to have been addressed to you, is coming, I do find it difficult to retain the belief in your existence.

God: But when you are skeptical of my existence itself, why do you call me the being of all beings?

Man's Timeless Dialogue With His God: Another Recording

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Man: I do that because of my conceptual habit, my respect for you built into the very concept of your being which I have been entertaining since the day I started thinking of you.

God: You feel respectful towards me and also doubtful of my existence?

Man: Yes, I do both, though it may look odd. In fact, the truth is much odder: I become skeptical or atheistic because I have respect for you.

God: Would you elaborate?

Man: I very gladly would. Rather, I was going to ask your permission to do it.

I do not, rather cannot, in my skeptical or athetistic mood, at tribute to you a less respectable status than the one I do in my theistic mood. To attribute to you a less respectable status would imply the belief (or assumption) that you exist. This I cannot do: My concept of what you could be forbids me to believe or assume that you exist and have any sort of deficiency or imperfection. To deny or doubt your existence is not to do you any dishonour, or to reduce your glory. When my well-meant prayers are not responded to, I may explain the non-response either (a) by believing or assuming that you are not as caring, or capable, as I thought you to be, or (b) by doubting or denying that you exist. To do the former would mean attributing to you some deficiency or imperfection. This I cannot do because the very idea of an imperfect god is (both emotionally and conceptually) repugnant to me. To think of you as not fully free from all imperfections is definitely to show a great disrespect to you. On the other hand, to do the latter would, though, mean adopting a skeptical or negative attitude towards your existence, it would do you no dishonour of considering you deficient in any manner whatsoever.

It seems to me that only to protect your status of being a perfect being,⁵ as envisoned in my concept of what you could or should be, i.e. to protect my image of your being the most exalted kind of

being, I take refuge in skepticism or atheism. I thereby avoid the torture of believing in an uncaring, powerless, i.e. an imperfect, god Is it not the best way, or at least one of the best ways, to ward off the eventuality of showing disrespect to you by calling you defi. cient in this or tht respect? To be non-existent is not to be deficient in any possible way, since a deficiency can be attributed to a thing only after at least assuming that it exists.

Your skepticism seems to be largely due to what you consider to God: be my non-response to your prayers. But why should I respond to every prayer of yours?

Not to every prayer, obviously. But why to ignore the sincere Man: ones? At least some of my prayers are absolutely sincere. I think I know when I pray sincerely, and none else can certify that I am sincere the way I can be. If I feel I am sincerely praying, I am sincerely praying. And, it is a fact that at least sometimes even a sincere prayer is not responded to by you.

> Normally, to pray is to pray for something. I pray that you let a certain state of affairs continue to exist, or replace an existing one by another. A sincere act of praying involves, on the part of the addresser, (a) his having an unambiguous, whole-hearted, desire that the prayer he is making be granted, (b) his reverence and devotion for the addressee, and (c) his belief, or at least, in a limiting case, his assumption, (ci) that the prayer would reach the addressee, (cii) that the addressee is capable of granting the prayer, and (ciii) that the act of praying would have some favourable influence on the latter in respect of his attitude towards granting the prayer, sometimes tending the addresser to think, or hope, that his prayer would be, or has a great probability to be, granted.

I may, or may not, pray, but when I do, more often than not, I know whether or not I am doing it sincerely. The experience of making a sincere prayer is not a composite set of experiences, consisting of (a), (b), and (c) with its three components, as its members, occurring simulations. ring simultaneously or successively. Rather, it is a unitary, single,

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ot, I know f making a nsisting of ers, occurary, single, experience of praying sincerely, though analyzable in terms of (a), (b) and (c). And, so is the experience of praying insincerely. I can pray even half-sincerely, or not fully sincerely, because sincerity admits of degress, but even then I pray insincerely. I pray insincerely if any one of the conditions (a) to (c) is missing.

I hope you would not deny the value of a sincere prayer and not hackle me about the accuracy of my account of it, even if you are not satisfied with the latter.

God: I do not want to. But may it not be that you feel you are sincere but are not?

Perhaps you mean that I may be guilty of self-deception, that I may be posing to myself, without realising that I am, that I am praying sincerely when in fact I am not. I would not enter into the controversy about whether or not self-deception is possible, nor about how it can be explained if it is, and explained away if it is not, though it seems to be. I would not, because, even if its possibility is granted, that would not relieve me of my dissatisfaction over a sincere prayer's remaining unresponded to. All of my prayers may not be sincere, but some of them definitely are. That is, at least some of the time I feel I am praying sincerely, I pray sincerely, and do not deceive myself into believing that I am though I am not. And, it cannot be denied that some of these sincere prayers receive no response from you. They are neither granted, nor is any indication given to me, even in an. indirect, or a remote way, as to why they are not. No indication is given even of their reaching, or not reaching, you, nor of the fact, if it is a fact, of there really being an addressee they were meant for. If still I keep praying to you off and on for help, I do so because it does not seem to be coming from any earthly source.

I do not think you would say that whenever a prayer, I consider sincere remains unresponded to, it is not really sincere, that I only deceive myself into thinking that it is. This would amount to making unresponded prayer mean the same as an insincere

one and, therefore, to denying the obvious fact that all sincere prayers are not responded to. If you do, it would hurt my conception of what you are. I may somehow bear the suffering caused by your not granting a prayer by consoling myself in this or the way. But I cannot bear the agony arising out of your denial what is too obvious a fact. The denial would imply that you are either unaware of, or inattentive to, what happens in my, or rate your, world. If I believe that you are, I cannot keep unaffected my thinking of you as I have been used to, i.e. as one who knows everything and ignores nothing.

Moreover, this use of the instrument of self-deception if allowed can make a dangerous cut at a very sensitive spot of our relationship. As I have already submitted to you, I feel sometimes, though vaguely and momentarily, that you have helped me out and that take that feeling to be some sort of an evidence of your existence. When in a credulous mood, I tend to think that this feeling is in no way less dependable than a normal means of knowledge, and that it should be stabilized. But in my self-observant, self-critical, moments I tend to find it too indecisive, too feeble to sustain the pressure of a serious rational scrutiny. At this point the possibility of my deceiving myself, if taken seriously, can very well be used as Occam's razor to cut the feeling as a means of cognition, completely off. For example, I may ratiocinate:

My emotional need for an unfailing source of help in hard times not vitiated by the limitations from which natural and human agents of help suffer, prompts me to deceive myself into thinking that I have really been helped out in the present case by a source of the former sort, i.e. by you, and not by any one of the latter sort. It is the repetetive use of the self-deceiving exercise which stabilizes the thinking that you are such and such. The stabilization emblodens me to declare at the top of my voice: 'No need to worm at all, I am absolutely safe because god is looking after me all the time!'

Man's Tim

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This kind of thinking, or feeling, is so soothing that I announce it to be trans-rational, i.e. not justiciable in the court of reason, and thereby preempt its being proven, in a cross-examination by reason, to be devoid of the evidential significance it is taken to possess. All this would, if true, show that, in taking the thinking, or feeling, to be an indication of your having helped me, I have taken what is really the result of a grand self-deception, a grand self-delusion to be a grand truth discovered in a grand transrational experience.

Your responding to a prayer has for me not only the prudential value of benefiting me, but also the epistemic value of giving me an evidence of your existence. I take my receiving your response to be a mode in which I cognize that you exist as an objective being. Consequently, when my prayers repeatedly remain unresponded to, I become doubly restless, i.e. restless because I am deprived of the advantage I expected to get if they were conceded to, as well as because I am deprived of what would have been a confirmation of, or a good support for, my belief in your existence: I then suffer both as a person and as a believer.

It seems you attach a lot of importance to your sincere prayers. God: But should every sincere prayer be granted? May not a sincere prayer be for something which you do not deserve and therefore ought not to be given to you?

Man: That is possible. All of my prayers may not be fair or legitimate. I may have no moral right to some of the things I pray for. But some of them are; at least some of the things I pray for (as well as some others for which I do not), I think, I certainly deserve. I would like to know if you think you grant me all that I deserve.

God: Yes, I do.

> Pardon my impertinence. I have innumerable experiences of legitimate prayers having not been granted. You cannot accuse me of having misjudged, in all such cases, that the rejected prayer was

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legitimate when it really was not. I have been performing judging operations of this and some other sorts since the day you blessed me with the ability to think or cogitate. I might have been me taken in some cases, or even in the majority of them, because, a my own maxim runs, to err is human, but certainly not in all them. I cannot be mistaken in all of them for the simple reason that it is unthinkable that an unfailingly truth-loving and benevolent god, as I take you to be, has cursed me with a mind which capidge only erroneously.

Perhaps you would say that what you withhold in my present you give in my future life or lives. But I am not going love easily persuaded to believe it. Any claim to my existence after the end of the present life, in any form, in this or in some other world, is fraught with its indigenous problems in no way less serious than those connected with your existence, or with m concern with you. I do not want at the moment to enter into then because doing that would deflect our conversation from the COUNTY it is proceeding on, of course, with your permission. Moreover even if I believe in the possibility of a future life, how can lk sure that I would get in it the balance of my dues? I find iter tremely difficult in view of, as I have told you and perhaps annoyed you thereby, my experience of so many cases in which I have no received what I deserved. The relevant data provided by my present life do not encourage me to make a favourable induction about my future life (or lives).

God: You think I am sometimes unfair to you?

Man: Save my soul if I do. To call you, the all-perfect creator of the universe, unfair would mean committing the dreaded sin of blass phemy. I do not have the slightest intention to be, in any wall disrespectful to you. What may look like blasphemy on my parts really the expression of a puzzlement I have failed to solve in split of my best efforts.

My reason does blurt out, on certain occasions, that you have not

given to me all that ought to have been. But the same reason, noticing that it is getting inclined to attribute thereby some unfairness to you, revolts against itself, causing in my mind some sort of a civil war. When I feel a human agent denying to, or with holding from, me what is deservedly mine, I forthwith call him unfair or unjust. Doing this does not cause in me any situation of the type mentioned above because my concept of a human agent does not preclude the possibility of the latter's being sometimes unfair. But to call god unfair is, to me, a contrd iction in terms. To think of you as unfair or unjust is to mutilate my idea of what you are, or should be. That is why I shudder from calling you unfair even in a situation I feel you have not given me what you ought to have: I tend to think that you are unfair but also that you cannot be. It is these opposed tendencies of mine which cause in me the puzzlement, the conflict, which sometimes assumes the form of what I have called a civil war.

My conceptual handicap is that I would not call an unfair being, howsoever great in other respects, a god. I would prefer believing that you do not exist, that there is no god, to believing that you exist and are even in the least unfair. If I take to this course, I may look like sinning against you, but, I hope, I have made it amply clear that I am not.

Sometimes, in order to reduce my torment, I try to rationalize the situation. I speculate (a) that I might not have really deserved what I have prayed for and have been therefore denied, or (b) that the right time of my getting the latter might not have yet arrived, or (c) that I might have been granted it in a form I have not so far been able to identify, or (d) that it might not really have been in my interest to have got it, or (e) that, for some conclusive reason, unknown or unknowable to me, the good god has denied it to me, etc. etc. None of these moves is a hypothesis waiting for confirmation or disconfirmation in experience. Rather, they are all defence mechanisms, devices, for protecting my picture of a per-

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fectly fair god against apparent empirical counter-instances any one of which would damage it if allowed to impinge on it from any side. In a few fortunate cases they sustain for quite some time. But in a good number of cases they buckle down under the pressure of reason's probings occasioned by some fresh counter-instances.

You see my dilemma: I want to retain the belief that you exist which involves the belief that you are never unfair. But facts of life pull me in another direction. To resist yielding to them I harness my rationality to generate some contrary forces, like the ones I have called defence mechanisms. But the prospect of their becoming successful is very uncertain. I make all the preparations I can to shield my belief that you are all-perfect. But I fail to stop some crude realities of the world I have to live in from eroding it and, consequently, the emotional succour I expect to drive from it. This is my predicament. I do not know how to get over it.

God: You really want to?

Man: Yes, very sincerely.

God: Do it with the help of faith.

Man: Faith?

God: Yes. Faith in me, faith in my judgement, faith that what is done by me to you is the very thing which ought to have been done, faith that nothing is done by me which ought not to have been done, which is not the best for you.

Man: But if whatever is done is the best that can, or should, be done and vice versa, there is no point in praying for anything, for something better than what is done, or is going to be done.

God: Pray for what you think is the best for you, or deserved by you.

When something is given to you and does not seem to you to be the thing you had prayed for, or the thing you thought you had deserved, use your faith to convince you that the given is really what you had prayed for, or deserved.

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Man: May be faith is my remedy. But examples are not lacking in which the gap between what I pray for, or think I deserve, and what is given to me is so great that it cannot be denied, or even ignored. It seems, therefore, that faith would not always succeed in convincing me that what I have prayed for, or what ought to have been given to me, has actually been given to me.

God: You would not think of the gap if your faith is stable.

Man: But how can it be when even the faintest ray of reason reveals the gap?

God: Your reason is prone to show you gaps and differences. Don't worry. Strengthen your faith. Strong faith would make it unprone, or at least stop it from being unduly prone.

You want me to make my reason unprone, or less prone, to noticing differences? This is a matter on which I feel tempted to disobey you. I know it would be a sin to do that. I beg you to kindly pardon me if you think I am committing the sin. The fact is that to me this sort of reason's proneness does not seem to be undesirable. Rather, it seems to be one of my most important assets. I do not know what sort of a lowly creature I would have been had I been bereft of my reason, or my reason had been bereft of its proclivity to distinguish between things of different types, or between different tokens of the same type. It is reason which helps me to avoid confusing, or to detect that I have confused if I have, one thing with another, when their difference, though important, is not obvious. Of two such things, one may be very greatly important, while the other only perepherally, as a means to achieving a worthwhile objective, or to improving the quality of life. It is only reason which can tell me which is which and help me to make the right choice.

Moreover, to make reason unprone, or less prone than what it naturally is, to recognize differences where they exist, would be something like making fire unprone, or less prone than what it naturally

Man's Tin

is, to burn inflamable materials. Fire would then cease to be fire, or normal fire, and so would reason do. Faith which flourishes on the demise, or debilitation, of reason, cannot steer me through the tough struggle for existence which living in the world you have put me in requires me to go through. As far as my experience goes, without the use of reason, or with that of a debilitated one, I cannot survive in the struggle. If per chance I do, I would only survive but not live a life worth living.

God: Faith does not cause reason's demise, nor its debilitation. It only helps it to become a little different. That is definitely for its betterment.

I do not see how the process can be described in this manner. Man: To make fire unprone to burn, or less prone to burn, is not to make it only a little diferent from what it naturally is. And, in no way it is to make it better. I can call such a fire only a little different from a natural one only if I want to be courteous towards it. But if I want to be true to the fact of the matter, I would prefer to call it de-natured, i.e. dead, or debilitated. To call de-naturing a thing making it only a little different is a grievous understatement. Proneness to differentiation between distinguishables is one of the basic properties of reason. To make it unprone, or less prone than what it naturally is, would, therefore, mean destroying or altering its basic character and not making it only a little different. And, destroying or altering one of its basic characteristic or propensities cannot be said to be a way of making it better. A reason with dead, or dulled, discriminative ability would be reason only in name.

God: Don't think faith does any damage to the capabilities of reason. It, rather, transforms reason to make reason collaborative or cohesive with it. It lifts reason to a position from which reason can work in unison with it and thereby enable you to lead a happy peaceful, life. A faith-inspired rational life would be free from the conflicts or dilemmas which have been causing in a lot of concept

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tual or emotional tension. A faith-cohesive reason, for example, would no longer be afflicted with, say, the conflict, mentioned by you a little while ago, between your conception of what I am and a particular set of empirical facts. These empirical facts your reason considers to be counter-instances to some of the constitutive features of the conception. But if it is made cohesive with faith, it would not do that. More specifically, nothing would then be a counter-instance to your thinking that I am absolutely fair by indicating or implying that I have been unfair to you by not responding to some prayer of yours, or by not giving to you what you deserve.

Yes, reason may then become cooperative, or rather compliant, with faith, because it would work under its subjection, or subjugation. and behave like a never-disobeying child. A life in which faith becomes its supreme guide by forcing, or enticing, reason to stop its probing propensities, would certainly not be very dignified or attractive. The peace which you would then bless it, or rather me, with, would not be very different from the one you allegedly grant to my soul after my (physical) death. Occasions are not lacking in my history of faith's having done the miracle of making reason subservient to it, sometimes, silencing it completely, sometimes making it speak only faith's language, and thereby giving the illusion that my life has become peaceful and tensionless. But like any other illusion, it does not last long. After every period of depression, short or long, reason revives itself and starts speaking its own language, sometimes even more assertively, or aggressively, than it earlier used to do.

I want to assure you that I have no prejudice against faith. As made by you, I am not merely a rational being. I cannot survive without using reason, but I also need faith. I cannot do without it either. Any suggestion to subjugate reason to faith perturbs me not only because I see in it reason's humiliation, but also because I see in it a danger to the power and utility of faith. Reason

Man's Tim

has built into, as I have told you, not only the power to correct but also to re-activate or resurrect itself. Therefore, if it becomes a recurrent process that faith subjugates it and then, sooner or late it emancipates itself from the subjugation, emerging each time more and more self-confident as a result of its success, it may one day make faith lose whatever influence or utility it so far had in my like

It may even happen that, as a result of the struggle, or train action, between reason and faith, reason may become more friend, with faith and faith more appreciative of the role of reason, would be an ideal situation if both work as allies, or co-opentors, in fashioning my comprehension of the relationship between you and me, or in fashioning the general course of my life. But then faith would at the most be an equal-level companion of reson, and not an unquestionable authority which it cannot question, or to which it must submit in the cases in which the two do not see eye to eye with each other. But even in the ideal situation there must be an understanding as to which would be the final adjudicator in a case of disagreement because the possibility ity of the latter cannot be ruled out of court. This role can be given only to reason because only reason, and not faith, has the ability to assess claims, to examine pros and cons for a position taken by either one, to notice agreements or disagreements, to recognise the strengths or weaknesses of its own stand as well as of faith's etc. Even to recognise, or admit, that in a particular case reason should submit to faith, or faith should submit to reason, of that a certain item does or does not fall within the jurisdiction of either one, would be an exercise which only reason, and not faith can do.

It is not in faith's interest either to reduce reason to the status of a never-dissenting disciple, or even to that of a baby affection ately held by it in its arms. This is so because, to be stable, faith must take some help from reason. I have mentioned to you some problems which stand in the way of my believing that you are a

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if it becomes oner or late ach time more may one da ad in my life. gle, or trans more friendly of reason. I or co-openship between my life. But anion of reacannot quesch the two do e ideal situawould be the the possibils role can be faith, has the for a position greements, 10 and as well as articular case t to reason, or urisdiction of

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perfect being which as per my understanding of your nature, you must be if you exist, I have also shown that I can retain the belief only if am able to solve them in a way compatible with this understanding. The stability of my faith in you depends on the solution of these (and may be some other) problems. I can have the faith only after I have the solution. Therefore, I cannot use the former to yield, or even to help me to arrive at, the latter. The predicament I expressed to you sometime ago clearly explains my point. To illustrate, I cannot use faith to solve the problems posed by your not giving to me what I deserve, or by your unresponsiveness to my prayers. Rather I can have faith only after solving them in a manner which makes them cease to be counterinstances to, say, your omnipotence, kindness, fairness, etc. No attempt to solve them can be made without using reason, and a proposed solution of any one of them would survive only if it satisfies reason. Sometimes I do accept a solution even if reason does not fully approve of it. But then the problem concerned does not really vanish, or cease to bother me. I have only made peace, or rather truce, with it. But my mental condition thereby generated is not one of faith, nor is it congenial for the emergence of the latter. Lacking a rationally satisfying solution, in this state of the mind, I quite often oscillate between superstition and skepticism. I become superstitious when I take a mere rationalization of a counter-instance to be its satisfactory explanation; I become skeptical when I discover that I have taken a rationalizatin for a satisfactory explanation and do not find the latter in sight.

Should I take it that the way to faith would become smooth if all of your prayers for the things you deserve are granted?

Man: Not very easy to give a positive answer.

Why not? Have you not been arguing for quite some time that your not getting what you have deservedly prayed for poses to be a counter-instance to my being you think me to be?

Man:

RAJENDRA PRASAD

Man's 7

Man: Yes, I have. But from this it does not follow that my getting the prayed-for is a clear evidence of your being. It would be a clear evidence it it were clear that your agency was involved in my getting it. But as I have suggested earlier, that is never the case Let me explain what I mean. It would involve repeating some of the things I have said earlier. But I hope repetitions would matter in a timeless dialogue like ours. Have I not been permitted to use the repetition, or recitation, of your name (s) as a bridge for crossing over the ocean of my earthly existence (bhavasagan)

God: Say what you want to.

My getting the prayed-for would be a good evidence of your he. ing provided it is given by you in an unambiguous manner, it in a manner which makes it clear that it is you who have given it to me. This you do not do. Whenever I get it, there are available some natural, human or nonhuman, phenomena to some of which its causation may quite well be attributed. There is no guidance available either from my world, or from you, as to how to disambiguate the cause of my having received what I have. Moreover, the causally relevant natural phenomena are observable, or if not observable, inferable from some observable, ones On the other hand, your agency is not only not observable but not even inferable equally strongly from something observable Naturally, therefore, reason feels inclined to attribute my getting what I have got to some natural object, event, or law, or at the best only weakly, haltingly, inclined to attribute it to your agency. The latter inclination very often gets overridden by the naturalistic one. or if it survives at the moment, it is generally overriden, or forgolten, in the course of time.

But, please, don't think that I value only your approval of a prayer. Your disapproval or rejection of it is evidently as important as the latter. It is true that an infructuous prayer causes in me and experience of unhappiness. But if it is made known to me in a definitive, unambiguous, manner that its infructuousness is not the

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effect of an earthly cause but of its rejection by you, my belief in your being would be as strongly confirmed as it would have been by a positive response to the prayer. I may then complain, appeal, to you against your judgement, or accept it most obediently and try to improve my performance. I would not reject, question, or doubt your existence, or even be agnostic about it. But here again, as in the case of the allegedly positive response, there is no mechanism to help me decide whether some natural object, event, or law, has caused the prayer's failure, or an act of its rejection by you. Neither in the case of a prayer's success, nor in that of its failure, I can use the method of difference to be sure that I got, or failed to get, what I prayed for because you gave it to me, or withheld it from me, and not because of a law of natural causation.

God: Would you be a little more specific?

Man: I am sure you know the kind of thing I have in mind. I believe you are asking me, out of kindness, to make me feel important.

It is easy to be specific. I do not have to dive deep to pick out examples of what I mean. Take the following case:

I am suffering from a serious disease D. The cause of D has not yet been identified, and therefore no specific remedy has been produced. A doctor tries to help me by giving sometimes the drug M, sometimes N, on the basis of the then dominant symptoms. M and N have been sometimes effective, sometimes not, and there is no dependable statistics available about the percentage of their success. I take M and N in a half-hearted manner, and also take P,Q,R, etc, on the advice of some friendly neighbours. I do some yogic exercises as well. In addition, I pray to you very sincerely and devotedly. After some time I feel much better, and a day comes when I have no complaint. The medical check up reveals that I am now free from the disease. A theist then says that you have responded to my prayer and cured me, my naturalist doctor says anyone, or a combination, of the things I did, or some natural change in my general metabolism, etc., has cured me. By studying

such data, he hopes, the cause and cure of the disease would some day be found out. He does not think it at all relevant to consider the possibility of the cure having been effected by my praying to you, or by your agency in any way.

The above is not a unique case. Whenever I appeal to you, I do not just do that. I do so many things. And, even if I do nothing else except appealing, praying, to you, so many things keep happening, occurring, coming in my contact, for example, metabolic changes occurring in my body, climatic changes occurring in my surrounding, etc.

Because of all this, it is impossible for me to isolate the role of your agency, if any, to conclude that what I have got is an evidence of your having responded to my prayer and therefore of your existence. If I have already reposed my faith in you, I would do what the theist in the above example does. But my doing so would be an evidence of my faith in you, and not of your existence. Faith in you is by itself no evidence of your existence, nor does it have any intrinsic credibility. It would acquire credibility, or dependability, only when it is based on facts, on sound reasons, if there are any, in favour of your existence. But even then it itself would not be an evidence of your existence; it is rather the facts, the reasons, which make faith credible, or reasonable, which would be, if there are such facts, or reasons.

God: You want to have faith that I am such and I such only after first having evidence that I am such and such?

Man: Yes, that seems to be right way.

God: But not the only right way. Why don't you first have the faith, lead a life guided by it, and then identify the evidence if you still feel the need for it?

Man: That won't be very rational, or even natural. Faith in you, along with the awareness that no adequate evidence is yet available for your existence, would be worse than a superstitious belief. The

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Man's Timeless Dialogue With His God: Another Recording

latter is also unsupported by adequate evidence, but the believer is unaware of this fact. Moreover, this sort of faith would be merely an adopted one without any knowledge of its ancestory, i.e. without having found its roots in reason or in facts. It would be highly unreasonable to expect it to provide, or to entrust it with the task of providing, proper guidance for worthwhile living. Moreover, if I start with faith before having any genuine evidence and then try to ascertain the evidence, if there is any, the search may be prejudiced by my faith. I may then consider something a good evidence though it is not. I think this is what I do when I become a theist on some emotional ground, without consulting reason, or in spite of the caution sounded by reason.

God: But the chances of getting your prayers favourably responded to by me would be much brighter if you have reposed in me your unflinching faith. And, when they would be responded to, you would be having the kind of evidence you need about my agency and thereby would get your faith further fortified.

Man: I have already told you that instances of my prayers, made with unflinching faith in you, but not having been responded to by you, are not lacking. However, I admit that I might have misjudged the character of such instances.

But even if Isucceed in having it, inspite of reason's resentment because of the unavailablility of adequate evidence, it is not clear how my faith would improve the chances of my prayers' faring better. Rather, it seems that it cannot, or should not. In itself it is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition for entitling me to get a favour or help I am not otherwise entitled to, nor its lack a reason for disentitling me from getting what I otherwise am entitled to

Having faith is always accompanied with, or implies, the normalive feeling that it is something worth having, something I ought not to have been without. There is also a very close link between faith and devotion though of a slightly complicated kind. To believe

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that you are what I think you are, is to believe or realize that you are the most adorable, reverable, being. Therefore, if I have faith, I admit that I ought to have devotion for you, though because of the devil of the weak will in me, I may not always have the good luck of being actually devoted to you. But unless I believe that you are such and such, I cannot either believe that I ought to be devoted, or be actually devoted. That is, my faith implies my admission that I ought to be devoted but not that I am devoted. On the other hand, my devotion implies that I actually have faith as well as that I ought to have had it, because having faith implies the latter.

Like faith, devotion also need be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for your attending to my cry for help. The cry should be attended to only if it deserves to be attended to. Neither devotion can justify attending to an undeserving cry, nor its lack not attending to a deserving one. An upright judge, like you, would not, or should not, deny what I deserve on the ground that I have no faith in, or reverence for, him, or do the other way round.

Since you have specifically asked me to have faith, I would like to elaborate in a little detail that faith in the source of help is not at all a reason for receiving a favourable consideration from the latter. May I give an example?

God: Go ahead.

Man: Thank you for your condescension. Suppose writing with excruciating stomachache (or even otherwise) on a deserted road, I cry of there is anybody somewhere near here, please help me.' I am not at all sure that there is some one; I may be almost sure that there is none. But even then, in case there is a normal person, within hearing distance, he would hear my cry and in all likelihood come out and help. He would not consider my not believing that he is there and is such and such to be a reason for not helping me, nor my believing to be a reason for helping. My believing that he is

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(there), or believing what sort of a being he is, would not entitle me to his help. Only my deserving it would. My believing would not matter even to his hearing my cry. That would depend on his hearing ability.

Coming back to my receiving help from you, i.e. a favourable response to my prayer for help, the relevant facts are the following (a) That you exist, (b) that you are capable and willing to help, (c) that I deserve the help prayed for, (d) that you know that I deserve the help, and (e) that you are fair, i.e. willing to give me what I deserve. None of these facts (a) to (e) is dependent on my having the faith that you are and are such and such. All of (a) to (e) must be facts as per my conception of what you are. And, if they are, then I should get the help even if I have no faith that you are, even if I have not cried for it, i.e. even if I have not prayed for it. I do not see, therefore, how faith would improve the chance of my getting your help, or how is it relevant to getting the help. Nor do I see how it would convince me that you always give to me what I deserve, when on several occasions I notice that what I have got is very different from what I have deserved. It is also obvious that, since faith does not entitle, nor does lack of faith disentitle, me to get something from you, you cannot, or should not, say that, if I am an atheist, a sceptic, an agnostic, or only a hesitant believer, I do not have any right to your blessings, or not as legitmate a right as I would have had if I were a staunch believer. Rather, blessing me then may be more advisable because it may help me to replace my doubt or unbelief by faith.

It is clear, thus, that a fair-minded helper, in deciding whether or not to give me the help I ask him to, would not care to ascertain if I have faith in, or devotion for, him. The only thing he would like to know, is if I deserve it. Since faith and devotion both are equally irrelevant to the validity of my claim for what I deserve, may I speak of either one though intending to mean both?

Certainly.

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RAJENDRA PRASAD

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Man: Should I then say that if I deserve something, I deserve it, whether or not I am devoted to you? I think I can because I cannot think of a more upright judge than you. But, then, may I also hope that I would get what I deserve, i.e. you would give me what deserve?

God:

God: Yes, you can. You would get what you deserve even if you are not devoted. But this does not mean that devotion is non-functional. Like other desert-yielding things, it too generates for you some entitlement, some desert, which you did not have before becoming devoted. Because of your having been devoted you would deserve and get something additional to what you would have deserved and got because of your other entitlements. The additional thing which you get, on being devoted, therefore belogns to the class of things deserved as rightfully as the other deserved things do. Thus, devotion improves your chances because it makes you more deserving, because it improves your entitlement.

Man: Does it mean on my being devoted to you, you do something for me which you would not have otherwise done, and I deserve what you do?

God: Yes, it does.

Man:

God:

This is a very pleasing information. I am grateful to you for letting it be known to me. In some of my reflective moods, I do wonder what use is my having been devoted to you, or your kindness which I expect it to arouse, if I am to get only what my own doings have made me entitled to. You say that that is not necessarily the case in so far as my devotion by itself makes me deserve something that it can help me to get something additional to what my own doings on their own can. In all propriety I should now feel delighted. I do find in me an inclination to do that. But I also notice in me a counter-inclination, extremely difficult to pacify or ignore. Perhaps you would say that it is another wayward child of my reason, the habitual peace-breaker. Would you mind if I lay it before

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Not a bit.

Let me express it rather crudely:

If my devotion for you, independently of my other doings, can persuade you to do something for me, I may very well remain contented with what it may enable me to have, and do nothing else. It is devotion for you who is a perfect being, whose powers are unlimited, who can give me anything whatsoever if it pleases him to. Then, why should I not have only devotion for you? Why should I not exclusively absolutely depend on my devotion for you, which means depending on you, and not at all on my actions, for getting everything I consider worth getting, pray for, or aspire after? There seems to be no need for my doing even such actions which are promotive of public welfare, which are morally commendable. I may not even care for my bodily existence, or only do the minimum required for its maintenance. That I have actually followed this inclination several times in my undatable history must have been known to you. It is well known to me. It is also obvious to me that I could not have done that unless you had allowed me to. Can I do anything at all if disallowed by you?

God:

Man:

I knew you would not condescend to answer my question. But since it is an expression more of a puzzlement than of a request for information, I do not mind your reticence. But I do want to say something further to infuse a little more blood in my puzzlement.

Thinking of your omnipotence, and your kindness for me, I feel that there cannot be set any limit to what you may do for me when pleased with my devotion, and therefore, that devotion can procure for me anything whatsoever, no matter what my earlier doings make me deserve. Perhaps that is why, in my prayers, I characterize myself as extermely degraded and you as extremely affection-

Man's

ate towards me, as one 'enslaved to his devotee', 7 always ready run to him in moments of need. If you were to be guided exclusively by the entitlement accured to me from my earlier doings, it from what I have done before becoming a devotee, it would meta that my devotion plays no role in my getting anything from you Even if you partially modify what my devotion has entitled me to in the light of what my other doings have, it would mean that devotion does not entitle me to anything independently of my other doings. All this would imply that you are not completely free to give me everything you are pleased to give (because of my devotion).

When you give me something because I deserve it on account of a doing of mine, you have to find out what is it that I deserve and then to give that thing and only that thing to me. For example, if I save an old man's drowning child, and you think because of it I deserve to have a son, you have only to bless me with a son, and not with anything else, say, with the power to become invisible if and when I wish to be. What I want to say is that your unlimited freedom to give me anything whatsoever need not be invoked here.

But my devotion for you works directly on you. If it entitles me to anything, it entitles me to your being pleased with me. It does that directly, by just being my devotion for you, and not through the instrumentality of anything else done by me. It establishes a direct relationship between you and me, and makes you pleased with me for my merely being your devotee, i.e. for my being what lam. Therefore, if you then give me anything, you give out of your pleasure, and not out of your sense of distributive justice. There cannot be any limit to what you may do out of your pleasure. That is why, as a devotee, I feel tempted to think that I may ask you give me anything whatsoever, even something undesirable, and to optimistically believe that you would. I sometimes characterize you as actually giving me whatever I want, sometimes as giving me the

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freedom to ask for whatever I want and then giving the thing I ask you to, no matter whether or not it is morally desirable. This sort of optimism may make me believe that devotion can provide me, even on being a great sinner, a short route to heaven, as it allegedly did to the harlot. That is why reason cautions me against the optimism, and against devotion too.

Don't let your reason misguide you in this manner. Devotion involves, or requires, moral disciplining of your personality. You cannot, on being, or while becoming, a devotee stop doing what is morally required of, or commendable for, you. Nor can you stop caring for your bodily existence because a healthy body is necessary for leading a good moral life. You cannot be a geniune devotee if you are immoral or, indifferent to morality. Therefore, when you are a devotee you would not wish for anything immoral or undesirable. There would be no question of your seeking, or devotion's yielding, anything immoral or condemnable.

Man: This would mean that I would not, or should not, being a devotee, ask for anything morally undesirable, and that when pleased with my devotion, you would not (or cannot?, or should not?) give it to me even if I ask for it. But did not the devotee Bhasmasura and Ravana, to name only a few, ask for undesirable powers? And, on being pleased with their devotion, did you not give to Bhasmasura the immoral power to burn anyone to ashes by simply putting his palm on the victim's head? And, to Ravana the power which made him so invulnerable that even your incarnation Rama found it impossible to kill him without the help of (your) Sakti, even though he was an inveterate sinner? 10

God:

Man: Have I annoyed you?

God:

Man: Pardon me, if I have.

RAJENDRA PRASAD

Perhaps there is something wicked in the problem which has led us to this unpleasant point. May I go back to it?

Do as you like. God:

I was hesitating to have stable faith in you because of inadequate Man: evidence. I told you that if my prayers were unambiguously responded to by you, they would have provided me some adequate evidence, but they were not. I proceeded to say that, therefore, in spite of my wish and need to have the faith, I was not being able to have it. You asked me to have faith even without adequate evidence because faith would improve my chances of getting my prayers favourably responded to, and the latter would then provide corborative evidence for the faith I had begun with I pointed out that faith implies devotion, and both of them were irrelevant to improving the chances of my prayers receiving any favourable response. I recited the truth that, as per your own decree, I get only that which I deserve. I then pointed out that my devotion (or faith) would be dysfunctional in helping me to get a prayer responded to if, because of my own doings, I did not deserve the response, and would be unnecessary if I did. You then informed me that devotion could make me deserve and get something so far not deserved and I tried to show that it might then help me to have even some undesirable things. At this point

God: Yes, it is.

Thank you very much. It seems to me that my original problem Man: remains still unsolved. I wanted to know how my devotion (or faith) would improve the chances of my prayers' getting responded to You have said that devotion makes me deserve something so far undeserved. This means that it gives me some new entitlement

you said that it involved good moral living as a precondition and therefore the latter possibility was not there. I replied that it was

very much there because of your having limitless powers. I also pointed out some (alleged) instances of your having granted some undesirable powers to some devotees. Is this a fair account?

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But giving me a new entitlement is very different from improving my chances of getting what I am already entitled to, to be more specific, improving my chances of getting favourable responses to the prayers for things I am already entitled to. Would you still say that it does the work?

God: Yes, I would because it does.

Man: But how?

God: I have said that devotion is not disfynctional because, though you would continue deserving what you do and getting what you deserve even without being devoted, it gives you a new entitlement. But this is not the only thing it does. It makes you a good person and thereby improves your chances of getting what you deserve.

Man: But you also said that devotion presupposes or requires moral purification. This means I have already become a good moral person before becoming devoted. My devotedness, thus, does not make me a good moral person but depends on my being one. Rather, I can be a good moral person even without being devoted, as I sometimes am when I am an unbeliever. Of two morally good persons, if one is an unbeliever and the other a believer, the former is not less morally good than the latter. I am morally good because I am morally good, and not because I am a believer or a devotee.

God: You may be a good moral being without being devoted. On being devoted you become a good person, a good being, and no longer remain a mere good moral being. The being in you would then be qualitatively better than the being in a mere good moral being. Naturally a good being's chances of getting what he deserves should be better than those of a mere good moral being.

Man: Perhaps that is the way it should be. But the truth seems to be rather different. It seems to me that the goodness which devotion brings to my being is very much, if not exclusively, due to morality in a much more important sense than in the sense that

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morality is a precondition of devotion. Devotion presupposes, or involves within itself, faith. Faith always has some content. For example, when I have faith in you I believe that you are such and such, that between you and me there exist such and such relations. that you may do such things to me or for me, on my ful. filling such and such and such conditions, etc. Devotion, or faith, can make me a better being only if the content of faith is replete with sound moral beliefs or ideas. On the other hand, if it contains a wrong moral idea, or a perverted one, it may make me a corrupt, degraded, being though I may continue (incorrectly) thinking that I am a better being than one who lacks the faith I have. For example, if I have, as a constituent of my faith, the belief that you have created me in your own image and made me qualitatively superior to other beings, I may think it justified to kill some of them if required for my survival or welfare. I would obviously have been a better being had I been an atheist with the naturalistic belief that all beings were qualitatively equal.

Similarly, if it is a constituent of my faith that renouncing social living is necessary for following the required discipline for realizing you, pleasing you, etc., my faith would make me renounce society and therefore all social actions, including those for relieving or reducing anyone's suffering. Then as well I would be inferior to what I would have been if I had been a benevolent atheist. It surprises me a lot, therefore, when you say that, 'if I am ignorant of, irreverential towards, or skeptical about, you or your words, I shall loose this world, the other one, and happiness.'11

Faith would make me a better being only if it has a sound mort content. But even atheism, or faithlessness, would do that if it has a sound moral content. This means it is not faith, and therefore not devotion which depends on it, but morality, which is needed to make me a better being. Instances of my doing condennable things under the influence of a faith with unsound moral content are extremely easy to locate. It is lamentable that the content are extremely easy to locate.

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demnable things so done look to me dignified or commendable because of their having been done under the overall patronage of faith in you. All such instances of faith cannot be called non-genuine. And if they are, I fail to understand why you let me have non-genuine faith and do the condemnable things I do, the more so because I do them in the name of, or as sanctioned by, my faith in you, i.e. virtually in your name. Do I not then do the sin of defiling you? That is what it seems to me. It is another puzzle: why do you let me commit the sin?

I hope you do not mind highlighting the excellence of morality which is a social, earthly thing, and not divine.

God: No, why should I?

But then it seems that to be a good being, and therefore to deserve and get what I deserve, I need only morality: I need neither faith nor devotion. Moreover, if morality determines what I deserve and therefore what I get, it determines you as well, or at least it should.

God: Why?

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Man: For a good logical reason.

My morality sets the limits to what I deserve.

What I deserve I ought to get, and nothing should come in the way of my getting it. Therefore, you, on whom my getting it depends, since everything depends on you, ought to arrange the affairs of the world in such a manner that I get it. The limits of my deservings, therefore, also determine the limits of your governance of the world, of your freedom to give, as well as to withhold from, me whatever you may give to me, or withhold from me. What all this means is that neither to get what I deserve, rather, to get all that I can, since as you say, I cannot get anything else, nor to improve the quality of my being, I require faith or devotion. I may not say that there would be something positively wrong in

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having them. But it does seem to me that there is nothing which obligates me to have them.

God: Fine. Dispense with faith and be an atheist. Devotion would a tomatically become unwarranted.

Man: You are giving me a threat, it seems.

God: No, only a choice.

Man: Yes, I have the choice, and I do exercise it not infrequently. If you pardon my audacity, I would say that it is not an absolutely but choice.

God: A life without referring to me?

Man: Yes, that is what it is then. Give me a minute to show how it is not all agony and anguish:

Suppose I am apprehending a natural calamity, a drought, for example. If I am a believer, I pray to you, with my absolute devoion to cause its non-occurrence. But unfortunately my prayer is not granted, and the calamity occurs with all the horrowing effects had anticipated. Now I suffer not only its effects. In addition, suffer a feeling of frustration and humiliation because of my prayers being ignored by you. I also have a feeling of resentment against you because you could have prevented the calamity's occurrence or made it less distressing, but you did not. If my devotion for you does not give way, I may not resent, or resent only in a subdued tone. I may then feel a sense of guilt and curse myself: 1 and a fallen creature, I have been given the punishment.

The self-cursing mood may alternate with a self-consoling off.

'There must be some point in his punishing me. He is really very kind. He could have made the punishment more severe, but did not. Let me pray to him to give me strength to bear it, to save the little peace I have been left with'.

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have sinned in the past, but I will be very careful now onwards. I will not swerve from the right path. I pray, help me to persevere in spite of my adversities, to curb my unruly passions pressing me to turn away from you, from the path of righteousness.'

In all the three cases, I interpret the calamity as a punishment deserved on account of my sins. I feel that I am a fallen creature, completely at your mercy, and cannot have a better future unless you allow or help me to have. These feelings increase the suffering caused by the calamity. They also hurt my self-respect, my individuality, my agency. I cannot have a respectable relationship with you as long as such feelings have their hold on me. My devotion makes me think that this is what ought to be, that it would be unbecoming of me to think of a respectable relationship between us. As I have told you, it encourages me to characterize myself in as lowly terms as I can, as 'crooked, wicked, self-centred.' 12

But the real problem is that I do not know what sort of sins I have I committed and when I committed them. Therefore, I do not know exactly what I should do to antidote them. Consequently, my self-cursing and self-consoling moods are likely to be temporary occurrences. Even the self-resolving mood is not likely to be as effective as it is in the case of earthly matters. In matters pertaining to you I do not know exactly what sort of future conduct would help me to avoid the punishment which my past conduct has led you to inflict on me. In earthly matters the situation is a bit better because relevant facts and results are verifiable or predictable to a tolerably satisfactory extent. Therefore, I know in most cases, with a tolerably good amount of accuracy, what to do to avoid or facilitate the occurrence of what.

If, on the other hand, I am not a believer, but a naturalist believing only in natural causation, there would be no non-natural agent, like you, against whom I can have a feeling of resentment or frustration, a grievance or a complaint. Natural causes are not agents I can complaint against, since I can have no communion with them.

I may only try to control or change them, and that too in a limited way. I would suffer no doubt, but my suffering would not be conpounded by feelings of frustration, sin, etc. I may take the calantity as unavoidable, as a natural event I have so far not developed means to control, and decide to work harder in that direction with greater vigour. But I would not take it as a punishment,

I am not saying that, as an unbeliever, I would, in all respects, by better off than as a believer, but only that I would not, in all R spects, be worse off.

God: You link your devotion (as well as faith) with your desires, with what you wish and expect to get from me. Therefore, when you do not get what you pray for, your devotion (as well as faith) buckles down and you tend to become skeptical about my existence.

There is nothing wrong with my having desires. You have made Man: me a being who is naturally disposed to desire so many things. Therefore, I do not see anything wrong in linking my devotion with desires, i.e. in praying you to give me something, nor it feeling frustrated and unhappy when the prayer is ignored. Ralhet. I feel like saying that, if there is anything wrong here, it is it ignoring my prayers, in not fulfilling my desires, in running world-show in such a manner that it does not let some of my worthiest desires to be fulfilled. Had it been the case that my legitimate prayers were always responded to by you, no mallot favourably or unfavourably, and unambiguous indications were always given that it was you who responded to them, I would never have felt skeptical about your existence, in spite of my prayers and devotion having been linked with my desires. If you are what I think, or want you to be, the all-perfect creator and care taker of the world, why should I not ask you to curtail my suffering and feel aggrieved when you do not? To whom, should 1 go, i not to you? what sort of a thing praying would be if it is not for something? Even praying to make me devoted to you is praying Man's

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Man

God

for the fulfilment of a desire. When I feel aggrieved for your not granting a prayer, and tend to become skeptical about you, why do you ignore me, my turning away from you, my anger towards you, my skepticism? Do I not need some attention, some cajoling, some persuading, some loving guesture, from you, so that I may restore my faith in you?

God: I never ignore you. I always care for you.

Man: But, then, why are not my prayers responded to, and I am left to become a prey to my own skepticism? I do not want to believe that you let me suffer without relief so that I may keep coming to you again and again for help. That would mean you are cruel, and would lower you in my estimation. I do not want that to happen. I do not want my god to have anything uncommendable in him. It is a pragmatic a priori for me that you are perfect in all respects.

God: As I have been saying to you all the time, your prayers are responded to, though not always to your satisfaction. Sometines you do not realize that they have been. It seems you think I am one whose primary role is to attend to your prayers. Therefore, when you feel that I have not attended to some of them you become skeptical about my existence itself.

Man: Yes, you are a role-performer. I would not say that your primary role is to attend to my prayers. But certainly it is one of the things which I expect you to do, and a thing very important for me. To confess, I take you to be one who, if real, would perform the role of the father of the universe, who would look after all of its inmates. But not infrequently I feel that you are not performing the role. Since I take the role to be central to your being, I then naturally find it difficult to sustain my faith in, and consequently devotion for you.

Make your faith and devotion unconditional, do not condition them to your assessment of my performance of what you think to be my

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Man:

God: Don't muse. If you are unconditionally devoted, your prayers would cease to be requests for something; they would be only expressions of your reverence. Even when they continue to be requests, you would not feel aggrieved if they seem to you to have been rejected or ignored. You would still remain composed, contented and happy. The agony of not having been looked after by me would not afflict you. You would be a happy man whatever may happen to you, or in your world, and your world would be a happy world to you.

Man: Yes, that is true. If I am devoted to you whatever may happen to me, I would remain happy whatever may happen to me, since I would not then care what you do to me. I would only care for the fact that you are and what you are.

God: Then, why are you depriving yourself of this golden possibility? What is the hurdle?

Man : Your hiddenness.

God: How is that?

Man: I would love to love you absolutely unconditionally. But I can only if I am clearly and distinctly aware of the fact, if it is a fact, that you are and are such and such. I expect your responses to my prayers, as I have been repeatedly saying, to help me in having the awareness. But they are either not visible at all, or are so ambiguous about their source, that I cannot be sure of their really being your responses. I keep, therefore, only groping to find out if you really are, feeling sometimes as if I were searching for a black

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cat in a dark place which was not only not there but was not at any other place as well. I knock at several doors for help with little success. In the journey I pass through several sensitive areas which throw up to my reason powerful stimulii for making me an unbeliever, or even a cynical pessimist. Sometimes I quiet it down by inventing some defence mechanisms, sometimes I simply refuse to listen to its promptings. But each time my success is short-lived and accompained with the feeling of having impoverished thereby the quality of my life.

The journey is strenuous, I know. But don't stop without reaching the destination. The time available to you is inexhaustible.

Man: I know it is inexhaustible. But I cannot reach the destination unless you come forward to help me.

God: How can I help you?

Man: By shaking off your hiddenness, by revealing yourself to me, directly, clearly, distinctly. Your hiddenness has sometimes made me an unbeliever, sometimes a dogmatic believer, sometimes a vain philosopher giving an (unsuccessful) set of allegedly rational arguments to prove your existence, sometimes an everzealous logician exulting over his alleged success in proving the latter invalid.

God:

Man: You again have become silent. Respond, my god. I pray, respond.

God:

Man:

Choose your way to reveal yourself. But reveal. Change me, my mind, my reason, if you want to, to convince me that you have revealed yourself, if you have. Don't reveal yourself only if you please to reward my unconditional devotion, as in some tales you have been depicted as doing. Reveal to enable me to have unconditional devotion grounded on knowledge of what you are. Only by revealing yourself you would dispel my disbelief, or convert my instable belief into stable knowledge.

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God:

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Man:

Silent still! Can't I break your silence? Do you reveal yourselfin silence? Yours? Mine?

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NOTES

'Man' has been used in the dialogue, in a gender -free sense, to mean a human being, and not a male, as contrasted with a female, human has been called an another recording because it has a predecessor which appeared, under the title 'Man' and Man's God: A Timeless Dialogue in Indian Philosophical. Quarterly, Vol.XII, 1985, pp. 113-42 and later in a revised form in my Normativity, Regularity and Rules of Language, Poona University, 1989, pp 165-94, and a recording because, in man's main dialoguing with God, with this or that end in view, it is constantly going on. At least, an attempt at dialoguing is seldom absent.

- 1. Salutation to your feet
- 2. My Master
- 3. God
- 4. From here onwards the duality is suspended, and the dialogue proceeds as if it were with god himself and not with the god of man's conception.
- Perfection does not admit of degrees. We cannot say that X is more perfect than Y. Therefore, though in a large part of philosophical and theological literature god has been described as the most perfect being, it is wrong to do that. The description is intended to say that nothing is superior to him which can, quite correctly, be said by calling him a perfect being, since there cannot be any Y more perfect than him simply because 'more perfect' makes no sense.

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Santa Tukārām: Quoted by Bāl Gangādhar Tilak in his Śrimadbhāgavadgītā Rahasya (Hindi Version), p.430.

'O Foundation of the Universe, listen to one thing in privacy. If my actions liberate me, what is God's beneficience?'

- English rendering of, 'Bhagvāna bhakta ke vasha mai' a popular saying among devotees.
- Māgahu vara prasanna main tātā -Tulsidasa, *The Ramacaritamanasa*, Balakānda, 176.

'Ask for any blessing, I am pleased with you': told by Brahmā to Rāvana, his younger brother Kumbhakarna and younger step brother Bibhīsana, when he was pleased with their devotion expressed in penances done by them. Rāvana asked for being unkillable by any being except a monkey or a human being, Kumbhakarna for six month's sleep at one stretch in a year, and Bibhīsana for being absolutely devoted to god. Each one was blessed with what he had asked for.

There is a story in the devotional literature of India that a harlot was uttering the words 'Rama', 'Rama', while training her pet parrot to utter them, or rather, to make similar sounds. Uttering the names of god is taken to be a respectable practice among devotees. The god of death sent his soldiers to bring her soul to hell which she deserved on account of her sinful actions. The soldiers, hearing her uttering 'Rāma', 'Rāma', thought she was uttering them out of devotion for god. They knew full well the unfailing role of devotion in making god pleased with the devotee and rewarding him. They, therefore, put her soul in heaven and not in hell to which she was entitled to: 'Suā padhāvata gaṇikā tara gai' (The herlot got liberated while teaching the parrot.)

As the story goes, Siva, being pleased with their devotion, gave to the demon Bhasmāsura the blessing that he could burn anyone to ashes by simply putting his palm on the victim's head, and to the demon-king $R_{\bar{a}vana}$ that if one of his ten heads was cut off by someone, from the drops of blood falling on the ground another would immediately spring

RAJENDRA PRASAL

up and replace the cut-off head. Bhasmāsura wanted to put his plan to the head of Siva. Siva had to run from one place to another to see himself until Bhasmāsura was cunningly persuaded to dance with his plan on his own head, thereby burning himself to ashes. In the case of Raven because of the blessing, Rama found it impossible to kill him. He the worshipped Sakti, the godess of power, and prayed her to collect in him sacred love the blood falling from Rāvaṇa's cut-off head before its reaching the ground and then to drink it. She granted his prayer and acted accordingly. Only then Rāma could kill the great sinner.

- 11. 'Ajñaścāśraddhānaśca saṁśayātmā vinaśyati; Nāyam lokoasti na panon sukham saṁsáyatmanah. The *Bhagavadgitā*, Chapter 4-40.
- 12. English rendering of a line from a devotional song.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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Kamala Jain, APARIGRAHA: THE HUMANE SOLUTION, Parsyanatha Vidyapitha, Varanasi, 1998. PP 102, Price Rs 120/-

This book is Kamala Jain's third work; the first The Concept Of Pancasila In Indian Thought was published in 1983; the second Kanikayain (Jivan Ki Chut-Put Anubhutian) came out in 1994. The present work connects to the first work where she discusses, for the first time, the concept of aparigraha (non-attachment to possessions) and icchā-parimāṇa (limiting one's desires) This book under review contains a preface and three chapters (1) Consumerism - the anti human goal, (2) Environmental degradation risk to human survival, (3) Aparigraha - the humane solution, and an Epilogue. There is an analytical Table of Contents and a detailed bibliography. The book is printed well and it has a good get up.

The title is half Sanskrit and half English. When aparigraha is translated into English, the title reads 'Non-attachment to possessions and limiting one's desires is the humane solution'. It is a solution to the problem of how to deal with the undesirable consequences of consumerism and environmental degradation. Kamala Jain makes a normative judgement here: Consumerism goes against the age-old maxim of simple living, hence it is undesirable. To avoid this consequence one should be unattached to possessions (aparigraha) and also one should limit one's desires (icchā-parimāṇa). Similarly, environmental degradation entails risk to the survival of the human race. This risk is to be eliminated. Again, the way out is aparigraha and icchā-parimāṇa. For, if one is unattached to possessions and also limits one's desires, one would no longer exploit and degrade environment. In this way both the problems of consumerism and environmental degradation can be solved in a humane way by practicing non-attachment and limiting one's desires.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.2

April 1999

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Although Kamala Jain does not argue, she regards the problem of consumerism and environmental degradation at root essentially one. She step environmental degradation as "the logical outcome of consumerism" (p.94)

The author regards sympathetically the other alternatives, e.g., l. Gandhian alternative of sustained development. She does not accept the hypocritical idea of combining environmental protection with consumerism

Kamala Jain is fully aware of the practical difficulties in carrying ou her proposed solution in terms of aparigraha and icchā-parimāṇa. She has no doubts about its feasibility. Nonetheless, she is bothered by skeplicism about its practical implementation in the present day scenario which is that acterised by obsession with consumerism. Her perception of difficulties focuses on (a) how to determine the limits of possessions and desires both as individuals and as a society? (b) how to justify such limits? and (c) who should be allowed to enforce the limits in a society in which the individual is too weak as a force and the society may function arbitrarily and/or in majority? She finds these questions difficult to answer. However, she expresses her strong conviction in the belief that an easy way out is 'to develop a spirit of appreciation for those who practice aparigraha or iccliparimāṇa" (p. 96). For, a widespread appreciation of their work would cre ate an effective opinion in favour of aparigraha and icchā-parimāṇa.

Kamala Jain's argument is indeed essentially persuasive. Further, she feels uncomfortable about its applicability. For, even if this argument is accepted and also her proposed solution somehow works out successfully at the level of the individual, how is one to know that it will work of equally well at the level of the society at large? These difficulties are in deed enormous for the author's essentially idealistic framework to work out successfully.

All said, Kamala Jain's book is a serious study. It demands at equally serious attention and further work in the field explored by her.

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Sweet, William: IDEALISM AND RIGHTS, Lanham / New York/ London, University Press of America, 1997, pp. xiv + 262.

Here is a book which I am sure, will be welcome and most apprecialed by the Indian scholars and thinkers in the field of Political Science and Philosophy because of their intellectual ties with the liberal tradition in Britain as also with the British School of Idealism for over last century and more. The subtitle of the book - The Social Ontology of Human Rights in the Political Thought of Bernard Bosanquet - will by itself make it plain why I venture to form this judgement. The fact that after the end of British Rule in 1947, the political leaders and thinkers in India could think unanimously of framing the constitution of India and evolving Democratic strucwe of Indian polity after the British pattern is evidently indicative of these ies. Although we have accepted the British legacy of political structure, the legacy itself in Britain had to pass through great philosophical debate amongst the thinkers of the entire 18th & 19th century and even a few early decades of the 20th century. During those epoch-making eventful years in the history of Eurpoe, the British thinkers like Bentham, Mill and Spencer on the one hand and T.H.Green, D.G.Ritchie, William Wallace and Bernard Bosanquet on the other hand developed two schools of thought that were deeply concerned with the issue of determining "the relation between the state and the individual and providing an adequate account of the nature, source and limits of human rights". On the backdrop of important contributions made by Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, the debate in Britain acquired a significance of no mean importance and revealed that human individual is afterall capably far too greater than 'individualism' but much less liberal than the 'liberalism' took him to be. Prof. Sweet has rightly chosen the

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.2

April 1999

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figure of Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) as the stalwart amongst the British Idealists who worked strenuously, but more effectively, to pose a serious challenge both to the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill and the Naturalism of Herbert Spencer in respect of their theories of human rights. This dimension of the school of British Idealism is not presently known to many. As a serious student of political science and of political philosophy Prof. Sweet saw a number of difficulties in the theories of rights found in contemporary liberal thought and wondered whether one could provide a satisfactory - or at least more satisfying - alternative. As a result of his pursuits he stumbled against the sterling contributions made by thinkers like T.H.Green and Bernard Bosanquet. British Idealism, a movement which, according to Prof. Sweet, is very often ridiculed and misunderstood, had addressed itself to issues in political philosophy in a significant manner. He wanted to know "what it was that had sparked the development of idealist political thought and why it had virtually disappeared from discussions of philosophical liberalism". (p.ix) The author claims that the present book is the product of his wrestling with those issues, although it is incomplete. His focus is historical but the method is analytical and reconstructive. The task which Prof. Sweet has undertaken is indeed a difficult one and arduous. I must say however that he has accomplished his task admirably well. The vast industry that he has put in to complete this work is evident from page to page. The material that one finds in the form of very enlightening and informative footnotes and references given in support of the entire argument of the book makes Prof. Sweet's scholarship more conspicuous and prominent.

The Introduction opens with the major greivance that "the political philosophy of the British idealists in general and of Bosanquet in particular, has been the subject matter of much misunderstanding and prejudice. In Anglo-American philosophical circles it has, until very recent years, been entirely almost forgotten."(p.2) Prof. Sweet draws our attention to the great influence which both Green and Bosanquet weilded but considers Bosanquet's contribution to have had greater impact on the development of British political thought of his times. Bosanquet addressed the reaction to the ideas of Green and the 'first generation' idealists with full awareness of the then pre-

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vailing political situation in Britain, on the continent and in USA. T.H.Green, who was himself Bosanquet's teacher at Oxford in 1867, had described him as the most gifted man of his generation'. The author quotes with approval Adam Ulam, the celebrated authority on English Socialism who considered Bosanquet's work, 'The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899) to have a comprehensiveness and an awareness of conflicting political and philosophical opinions which gave it a supreme importance in modern political thought. As a political theorist and a political analyst, Bosanquet was thus better poised to respond to the challenges from sturdy philosophers like Mill and Spencer and others. Prof. Sweet sketches the entire philosophical lineage of Bosanquet's political ideas right from Plato down to Hegel through Rousseau and Kant. This entire lineage has been critically preserved by Bosanquet from within the tradition to securely protect the value of an individual. We know Plato's view that state is individual writ large. Bosanquet wrote that "there is no sound political philosophy which is not an embodiment of Plato's conception." (The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 6) Bosanquet's theory has been justifiably characterised by a few thinkers as 'an applied hellenism'. Given this platonic anchoring of his political philosophy, one wonders how Bosanquet would have reacted to Karl Popper's view of Plato. Would he have treated that view with the same indifference with which he treated Hobhouse's The Metaphysical Theory of the State (1918), which was principally a critique of Bosanquet? There is no doubt that Bosanquet did enjoy a pride of place in academic sections but there seems to be a sudden turn which made the British Idealistic political philosophy to fall into oblivion. Prof. Sweet has adduced number of reasons, certainly appropriate ones, for the recession of academic Idealism and the political doctrines which they threw up as its offshoots. The story of the downfall of British Idealism is very well known, and One need not mention it here again. But there is one reason which he associales with the name of Hobhouse that he (Hobhouse) saw "idealism" as reflecting principles that led to war (which reason is favoured by Karl Popper Leslie Paul as well), needs in my view further examination. Of course, Prof. Sweet does not believe that British Idealism had such non-academic virulent political consequence. While bad philosophies can be cherished to promote good causes, good philosophies can be marred by spreading false 282 S. V. BOKU

beliefs about them. An academician has to be careful about this. Prof. Sweet's motivation is purely academic. He does say,"......given the increased interest during the past twenty years in Hegel, T.H.Green and more recently, F.H.Bradley and given the revaluation of the significance of their work and its place in the history of philosophy, it seems particularly appropriate to ask whether the standard criticisms of Bosanquet's idealist political thought are in fact, sustainable." (p. 6-7)

Firstly, Prof. Sweet delineates succinctly arguments presented by Bentham, Mill and Spencer - the arguments which Bosanquet referred to collectively as "theories of the first look". Outlining the analysis of the notions of law, liberty and individual, underlying their theories, he presents Bosanquet's major criticisms of them. Liberal individualism of the trio takes the notion of liberty mostly in negative sense as freedom from external restraint and compulsion. Liberty is the absence of restraint and for Bentham. one is free only to the extent that the others in the society do not hinder his pursuit of the good. Naturally law is looked upon by Bentham as a limit on one's freedom. Bentham does not deny the necessity of law for social order but would certainly delimit the authority of the Govt. to the framing of laws to limit the activities of individuals. On the one hand Spencer and Mill agree with Bentham on this point but import moral value into liberty either by treating it as natural or by adopting Bentham's greatest happiness principle as the norm of right action. The differences between Bentham, Mill and Spencer on all these three notions, viz; law, liberty and individual are subtle and Prof. Sweet has tried to mark them out through his careful analysis. It is important to note that while all three agree concerning the nature of the individual and the character and function of law, they differ on some important and vital matters. This gives rise to differences in the views which the three hold on the nature of rights and their role in the polity. While Bentham attacks theory of natural rights, Spencer defends it, tooth and nail, and Mill speaks of rights as "valid claims on society by an individual either by force of law or by that of education and opinion". All this debate on the nature source and role of rights in people's life with special reference to the relationship of individual and opinion. All this debate on the relationship of individual and opinion and opinion. ship of individual to the state is crucial for understanding the reaction of

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Bosanquet and Prof. Sweet does well to pinpoint the salient features of this Bosanquet and salient reatures of this intra-school controversy amidst Liberal Individualists. Bosanquet's response intra-school of these theories can give a cogent account of the nature of the individual nor a clear explanation of the nature and role of law. Thus they cannot explain adequately legal or political obligation. On two counts the Liberal Individualism was flawed. "First, it reflected a defective view of the individual and second, it contained an inadequate account of law and of state particularly in their relation to the freedom and development of person." (p. 35) Bonsequet's criticism of Mill's criterion of demarcation to distinguish the sphere of individual autonomy from the sphere of social obligation is noteworthy. Bosanquet maintained that the criterion is arbitrary, untenable, hopelessly confused and too narrow to cover the varied play of relations and obligations in society. Mill's view of individual is atomistic and has disastrous implications for the principle of value or the nature of the good. The account of the good presented by individualists and utiliatarians is too narrow and inconsistent and collapsible into a "commonplacecollectivism". Bosanquet further argued that the view of the individual and of liberty which Mill and Bentham take as the basis for antithesis between law and liberty is infounded and simply false. On the contrary, he argued that there is no a priori antithesis between liberty and law. In fact, pursuit of the good and development of one's own personality along moral dimension is possible only hrough law and the institutions lawfully reflected. Bosanquet's attack has so many finer points and Prof. Sweet has very painstakingly brought them out in his presentation. So far as rights are concerned, the brunt of Bosanquet's incisive criticism seems to be that the Liberal individualists do not adequately tiplain the importance of talking about rights and that they do not provide Misfactory account of how rights have a moral character and how they betome obligatory on others. Prof. Sweet locates the root of these criticisms in Bosanquet's full recognition of the role played by social life and the relations involves with others. It is such recognition alone that can explain the Musibility of a wide range of 'positive' rights. For Bentham, Mill and Spencer helan. te law or state action. This happens because they exaggerate the value of the human person as a standard of value. Bosanquet, like all liberal individu-

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alists, is not interested merely in philosophical exercise but also in action programmes. "A better understanding of fundamental principles would great contribute to the more rational handling of practical problems". Prof. 5 New believes as a native philanthropist that to the extent that Bosanquet can second in doing this, idealist rights theory may be able to alter the range of actions in a given society enabling its members to realize their moral potentialities fully. He therefore turns to the fuller statement of Bosanquet's theory of rights. (Chapter 2.)

In fact, chapter 2, 3 and 4 constitute the core part and the positive substance of Prof. Sweet's labour's love. Chapter 2 attempts reconstrucțion of Bosanquet's analysis of rights and identifiction of several concepts that are central to this analysis. Chapter 3 and 4 provide a more complete presentation of them through an outline of what Prof. Sweet designates as Bosanquet's 'social ontology'. Firstly, Prof. Sweet works on Bosanouel's view of the nature of a right, how rights come to be ascribed to an individual, role of the state in the existence of rights and what conditions, any, prevail under which rights may be limited. He also discusses somed the objections and Bosanquet's replies to them. What emerges out of all this is a very systematic but rigourous sketch of Bosanquet's view extending into an ideal society and state with which the destiny of a moral person is lid up. Rights cannot be considered in abstraction from the contexts in which they emerge. It's in the nexux of relationships that obtain between the individuals and the state that rights acquire their being and significance. Refer ence to moral end certainly makes them teleological in character. It is by reference to the moral end that rights derive their imperative authority. The moral end is variously referred to by Bosanquet as 'rational life', 'existence and perfection of human personality' or simply as the 'best life'. Indviduals have positions or stations and they perform several functions appropriated these positions. It is possible that in their performance they may face obstractions. cles. The distinctive action and purpose of the state lies in recognizing rights of the individuals to performances by creating legal sanctions and removing those obstacles. The state thus operates as an agency to secure rights of the individuals. In this, Bosanquet is echoing Green's definition of

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ight as the power of the individual to make a common good his own and his right as the rights have no being except in a society of men recognizing each other. Both Bosanquet and Green regard state as the "sustainer of rights". other, Bosanquet holds the view that the moral and legal sides of a right are brought together because rights are assigned by the state to positions alone and positions can exist only in a social order which is infused through and through by the moral end. Thus rights are "claims recognized by the State, ie, by society acting as ultimate authority, to the maintenance of conditions favourable to the best life." (p. 63) Rights cannot exist independently of the state. It is necessary to note that individuals acquire and lose rights depending on how their positions and responsibilities change. In view of this posiion of Bosanquet with regard to the ascription of rights to individuals a number of objections can be raised. Actually Prof. Sweet lists them and tries odefend Bosanquet against them. Rights are not inalienable; they are functional depending on individual's station in his socieity. One might complain that Bosanquet's emphasis on 'position' of individual in society does not provide an adequate account of his value qua individual. Chapter 3 and 4 are really developed to provide answer to this complaint. Prof. Sweet deals with several considerations concerning recognition of rights and limits of rights considerations which are of seminal character. He however warns us to keep in mind that although Bosanquet refuses that rights are natural and inalienable, it does not follow that he considers the individual to be of no, or of little, importance. (p. 89) One must also understand Bosanquet's analysis of state 45 a wellknit structure of individual intelligences.

Bosanquet's theory of rights has three fundamental elements: his leleology, his account of the nature and value of the individual and his notion of general will. All these three components are controversial and debatable. He interprets teleology in political life as distinctly focusing on 'best life' life of reason, of completeness and coherence. I have already mentioned that Bosanquest does not approve of Bentham's or Mill's atomistic view of an individual as a principle of value. Nor does he approve of Spencer's evolutionary teleology. Mechanistic account of the social and spiritualistic dimensions of human life is simply out of place for Bosanquet. He therefore be-

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lieved that it is by referring to the general will that one can better see to nature of, and the relationships between, the individual and the end. The total is an extension of the nature of the individual. The notion of general will enables us to explain the authority which the 'end' enjoys in generating objection on all of us. Indeed it is one's real will. Prof. Sweet is keen on tellings that for Bosanquet, "as a moral norm and as reflecting the common good, the general will is a mechanism of legitimation and all social institutions, including the state are dependent on it." (p. 146). General will being also the individual's real will, state action is not a priori opposed to individual's autonomy. "Bosanquet would argue", he continues, "that because liberal individualism misunderstands the actual character of autonomy and ignores the possibility of general will, it can turn only to force as the basis of state." (p. 146)

Though Prof. Sweet seems to carry the conviction that Bosanquets position, vis-a-vis liberal individualists is less problematic than many have alleged, he is quite open-minded on the several issues thrown up by this debate. He indicates that "while this in no way entails that all of Bosanquets conclusions are correct, this study has at least gone some way in clarifying several of the more controversial aspects of his theory of rights." (p.146)

Bosanquet's account of society, social institutuions and the state is central to his analysis of rights. Prof. Sweet's strategy in chapter 4 is to first acquaint us with the objections raised to his views by his contemporants and to restructure them inspite of some unclarity which goes with them. Though the criticism of his views has been varied and wide-ranging, Sweet holds that principally the objections are three-fold. The first set of objections concerns the nature and role of the state. The second concerns it is issue of the legitimacy of the state and extent of its authority. The third about his theory of the state itself, the relationships amongst itself, society and social institutions. Each one of these three sets includes several points of details and when we read that all these objections have come from the authorities like, L.T.Hobhouse, R.M.MacIver, G.D.H.Cole, C.E.M.Joad and authorities like, L.T.Hobhouse, R.M.MacIver, G.D.H.Cole, C.E.M.Joad and Harold Lasky (all of them his contemporaries), the task of defending Bosanquet becomes an uphill task, Bosanquet expired in 1923 and most of these critical contemporaries.

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cisms or objections were expressed almost during the fag-end of his career. Prof. Sweet undertakes this task with an academic docility because he knows that "Bosanquet was aware of most of these criticisms and did not consider them decisive."(p. 154) He believes that if we consider Bosanquet's conceptions of the state and the society as the networks of moral relationships that spiritually and mentally bring individuals together in their fold, we can make Bosanquet's theory of rights sustainable against these criticisms. Bosanquet, following Hegel, looked upon society and institutions as constituting our ethical life. These institutions, according to him, are family, neighbourhood or distirict, the position or the social class of the individual and the nation state. They are ethical ideas, each one of which contributes in a distinctive way to the intellectual, moral, social and spiritual development of the human person. His work The Philosophical Theory of the State, devotes a special chapter to the careful analysis of these ethical ideas and the role which they play. Society is neither an accidental association of individuals nor normally subject to dissolution. No institution is reducible to any other institution. Bosanquest speaks of society as a unity falling into groups with different functions and within each one of these groups each member has a distinctive position with functions and rights duly ascribed. The closest analogy that we can speak of is the unity of the human organism itself. This would make sense only if society is conceived as Mind, or, to be precise, an integrated system of individual minds. Of the various social institutions in any society, state occupies central position because the rights which individuals in the society enjoy ultimately derive their sanction from the state. Bosanquet is of the view that whatever else the state may be, it is essentially implied by the very constitution of human individual. "If you start with a human being as he is in fact and try to devise what will furnish him with.....a stable purpose capable of doing justice to his capacities....you will be driven on by the necessity of facts at least as far as the State." (p. 162) Prof. Sweet brings forth several issues which this Platonic overtone suggests squarely enough to temind us of their complexity. His handling of the nature and role of the state, Law, the moral authority of the State, the nature and limit of State action is simply brilliant. We learn that Bosanquet considered himself as a moral socialist and was opposed to economic socialism. Recent history has shown

S. V. BOKIL

Bosanquet to be right although one cannot claim wholeheartedly that his political philosophy has received wide acclaim and assent. Bosanquet's conception of state is metaphysical but he would maintain that it is still natural in the sense that platonism implied in it is itself natural.

In the final chapter of the Book, Prof. Sweet gives his own assessment of Bosanquet's theory of rights. According to him, Bosanquet's approach to human rights responds to the problems with liberal individualism and constitutes, to say the least, a coherent alternative to liberal individualism of 18th and 19th century. It is however not the last word on the subject. His only claim about this study is that it illustrates the value of an idealistic perspective on human rights and that there is much more to be said in favour of that perspective. After reading the whole book carefully, one can hardly dispute this claim. This assessment is however preceded by two things. In one, Prof. Sweet brings together all the threads of Bosanquet's perspective on rights and forcefully argues that the social ontology that he provides allows him to address a number of the subsidiary problems that arise in the articulation of a theory of rights. His views on human person, liberty, law, common good, general will, society and social institutions, state and rights are all of one piece. Prof. Sweet has done well to focus his search light on this. The second thing that he does is to throw open the debate on the question as to whether Bosanquet's theory of rights is an alternative to the one proposed by Bentham, Mill and Spencer or a development from within British liberalism. It is more of a scholarly nature and both the sides have been placed before us with all the fairness in the world. Prof. Sweet is not in a hurry to settle the issue, most probably because it is of a meta-critical level, requiring a thorough and perspicuous study of the literature discussing this issue for forming one's fair judgement on it. The value of the book certainly does not depend upon such a judgement. It depends upon the academic presentation of the problem of human rights as it was handled by Bernard Bosanquet - a problem of which the politicians and all others talk so much and make some times so much in the modern world of conflicts and confusions. Prof. Sweet makes such a presentation successfully.

One important feature of the book is that at the end of every chapter,

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we are provided by the author with a neatly drawn summary. Recaputulation of certain important sections is also provided in the course of the argument to keep our minds on right track. Further the book has a detailed index and a very useful bibiography as well, for the use of scholars and thinkers in the field. Prof. Sweet deserves a word of praise for highlighting an issue which is of perennial interest to the entire mankind.

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AN OBITUARY: PROF. N. K. DEVARAJA

With the passing away of Prof. Devaraja (11th January, 1999), we have lost one of the very few original and creative thinkers of India, born and bought up in 20th century. Today when consumerism has permeated in all hought up ... a need for an alternative vision in tune with scientific age and fice from the blind acceptance of the past, but still rooted in Indian culture, isstrongly felt. Dr. Devaraja was one of those who took the challenge and brough various works of his, both in philosophy and literature, contributed successfully to the development of philosophy relevant to the modern age. On the one hand, in 'The Mind and Spirit of India' (1967), 'Hinduism and Modern Age' (1975) and more mature 'Humanism in Indian Thought (1988) be put traditional Indian thought to humanistic interpretation, on the other, "Philosophy of Culture" (1963) he tried to develop a new humanistic philosophy of 'Creative Humanism'. Dr. Devaraja believed, like henomenologists, that man and his life-world constitute the subject matter of philosophy and a purely logical exercise was unequal to the task of exploring the multifaceted richness of the life-world. One may or may not believe in the existence of soul, rebirth or moksa, but a philosopher cannot avoid the questions of the purpose and meaning of life. To him, man is a he and creative being, his creativity is expressed in various forms; man an attain meaningfulness by selecting any one of these forms of culture for the qualitative development of his own self; that may be called man's elf-made destiny. Philosophy, then, is the self awareness of culture contived as the pursuit of higher and higher qualitative values.

Dr. Devaraja was born on 3rd June 1917 in Rampur (U.P.) He took his B.A. (Hons) with distinction from Banaras Hindu University. He completed his post-graduation from Allahabad University, also with distinction. Alongwith, he also passed examinations of <u>Vyakarana Madhyama and Vedanta Śastri</u> which enabled him to study classical Indian literature in original In 1942, he received his Ph.D. on <u>Sankara's</u> Theory of Knowledge. But

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his inquisitive mind could not accept the boundaries of Indian philosophy alone and delved deep in the study of Western philosophy too. The Ittal was, on the one hand, he accepted the critical role of philosophy toward cultural tradition, and on the other, advocated an increasing indifferent towards competitive values of modern world for realising ideals of human life. Neither could he agree with Marxism, nor could he accept spiritualism.

Starting his career as a lecturer in Arrah (Bihar), he taught at Lucking University (1948-1960) as Associate Professor before being selected as Sajage Rao Gaekwad Professor of Indian Civilization and Culture, in B.H.U. and was In-charge of the Department of Philosophy and Religion there. He also mained Director of Higher Study Centre of Philosophy in B.H.U. (1967-7). University of Hawai invited him as a Visiting Professor in 1983-84. Many of his philosophical and literary works received awards and prizes. In fifther the edited, along with others, a distinguished literary journal 'Yug Chem published from Lucknow and again launched 'Yug Sakshi' at the fage and his career with his own hard earned savings. In 1972, he was honoured at the general president of Indian Philosophical Congress. Institute of the vanced Study, Shimla had awarded him fellowship. He was also a recipient of senior fellowship of I.C.P.R., a few years before his death.

Westermark's 'Ethical Relativity', came as a shock to young Devaraja and afterwards, shaped his career as a thinker. Through his writings, is searched for a positive solution to the problem of relativity of values. It 'Philosophy of Culture he tried to establish that our value consciousness and value choices have an objective basis, whereas in 'Freedom, Creative and Value' (1988), he propounded that what we characterize as facts and value objective than values. For this purpose, he accepted subjective element as part of all facts and their gradation in objectivity and gare new definition of facts, in tune with newly emerging trends in hermeneuts. This led him to differentiate between the methodologies of natural sciences social sciences and humanities.

Being a non-believer in super-natural order, for Devaraj, human news

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and creativity are sufficient to account for creation of values. But, unlike and Sartre, freedom, for him, is not an ultimate value, but only an instrumental value. To the question, are values relative to historical time and culture, his answer was that some moral postulates are definitely relative but beyond that there are some norms of moral behaviour such as, 'Do unto others what you desire them to do for you', can be termed as universal. He emphasized that moral consciousness is universal because it is the inner necessity of human being; tendency of unselfish behaviour towards others finds its highest embodiment in saint's character. How to understand and harmonize the differences of opinions due to relativity of values between different cultures so that humanity live in peace, was the key issue discussed in his last major philosophical work. 'Limits of Disagreements' (1993). His conclusion was that no course of action could be taken to be absolutely right or wrong.

Dr. Devaraja was not only a philosopher of repute, but also an established writer, poet and critic of Hindi literature. His novels 'Ajai ki Diary' and Path ki Khoj' and collection of poems. 'Itihasa Purusha' and 'Upalamhba Patrika' are considered to be of very high standard by noted critics. His critical work 'Chhayavad ka Patan' made him almost a celebrily in the field of Hindi criticism. His style of literary criticism was closer to that of T.S. Eliot.

What amazed people was the tireless intellectual activity of Prof. Devaraja even in his old age when he was facing economic hardships along with some tragedies in the family. He was a rare combination of a razor-shap wit with an innocent heart. Always open and ready to discuss and help a budding scholar with his insights and rare collection of books, he inspired a full generation of scholars. Even with such a vast range of learning, he was always modest in acknowledging readily the contribution of others. Indeed a gentleman. One feels that, he could never get the due teognition he deserved, in literary and philosophical circles. I.C.P.R. did of the properties of the pro

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OBITUARY

Prof. P. K. SEN

We deeply mourn the sad demise of Professor Pranab Kumar Sen, eminent philosopher, thinker and Professor Emeritus of Jadavpur University, Calcutta, which occurred on 22nd June, 1999 after a brief illness. He was 68. Knowing him fully well, we naturally feel that it was rather abrupt and too early an end for an energetically enthusiastic man of his calibre and achievements.

Born in 1931, he was a brilliant student all throughout, earned his B.A. from the Presidency College, Calcutta, M.A. and Ph.D. from the Calcutta University. He started his teaching career at Bangbasi College and thereafter served the Department of Philosophy,. Jadavpur University in Calcutta since its inception for over 43 years before only formally retiring in 1996. He was Professor Emeritus at the same University till he breathed his last. He had taught several generations of students and teachers leaving to them legacy of the intellectual, search-finding and analytic traits of his ever inquisitive mind in the area of philosophic inquiry. He had a passion for philosophy and an integrity to nurse it with meticulous zeal and care. In his outstanding teaching career, Professor Sen established himself as a leading philosopher of this country and was known in Britain and USA through his invaluable contributions at several seminars, symposia and conferences. He had received several honors from the Universities abroad, prominent among them being the Visiting Professorships at the University of California in Los Angeles and Berkeley. He was also invited by the University of Poona and the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies in Shimla as a visiting Professor. He was a Fellow at the Vishva Bharati, Shantiniketan, All Souls College and Magdalen College at Oxford, and a few Universities like, Chicago, Harvard, Princeton and Pittsburg. In 1973, he was a Specialist Fellowship Grantee of the Helesinki University in Finland.

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Professor Sen was appointed a National Lecturer of UGC in 1981 and was also a Senior Fellow of the ICPR, New Delhi and Lucknow. He was a special invitee at the 20th World Congress in Philosophy held in Boston last year. For some time, he also served as a member of the UGC and was also a nominated Chairman of the Philosophy Panel in UGC. He was a member of the prestigious ICPR.

Author of Logic, Induction and Ontology (Macmillan, 1980) and Reference and Truth (Allied Publishers, 1991), Prof. Sen has edited Logical Form, Predication and Ontology (1982) Foundations of Logic and Language (1990) and a few other volumes of philosophical essays. He also co-edited The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson (ICPR, 1995). Currently he was associated with a number of Research Projects in the Philosophy Department of Jadavpur University and actively engaged in editing two volumes on 'Philosophical Concepts relevant for Science' in the PHISPC project. He had contributed several articles to the Journals of national and international repute. He has to his credit a galaxy of students who have completed their Ph.D. research programmes under his supervision and guidance.

He was a great admirer of the Indian Philosophical Quarterly and never failed to visit our Department whenever he used to be in Poona. With a rare wit and charm in his personality, softness in speech, cordiality in heart and a fine sense of humour, he had endeared himself to all and every one. The philosophic community here and abroad will certainly miss him for a very very long time.

In his passing away, the Indian Philosophical Quarterly has lost senior well-wisher, a devout friend and a sincere colleague of humane qualities. May his fond memories inspire us and give strength to move steadily on this academic mission.

Chief Editor

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LANGUAGE AND THE METAPHYSICS OF INTERPRETATION: A CRITICAL NOTE ON DAVIDSON'S AGENDA ON REALISM

AMITABHA DASGUPTA

Situating the Problem

In no uncertain terms this paper upholds a conception of realism - a conception that does not take side either with the traditional or with any of the recent brands of realism of our time. True, the focus of this paper is on Davidson's conception of realism whose significance cannot be questioned. However, inspite of its appeal, its inadequacy as a theory cannot go unnoticed. Hence, this paper provides a critique of Davidson's conception of realism. But, note, the paper does not end with such a critique. It, on the other hand, ends with a constructive proposal.

Looking back to the history of analytic philosophy, the question on realism has been chiefly viewed in the light of the relationship between language and reality. It is obvious that there is not one way of conceiving this relationship. It is a relationship which admits of different modes of conceptualisation. One thus forms a conception of realism on the basis of how does he conceive this relationship. Accordingly, depending on the nature of the relationship as conceived, the notion of realism differs. This becomes the perennial source of controversy. People differ regarding what should be the nature of the relationship between language and reality and subsequently they differ on what should be the adequate form of realism. In the absence of any agreed view on realism, realism as a theory has been questioned on the ground of its viability. The consequence of it is the development of an opposite trend leading towards antirealism.

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In the contemporary scenario, Davidson's conception of realism occupies a distinctive position. It is distinctive because it does not commit the usual fallacies associated with traditional realism. But, at the same time, his theory offers a robust kind of realism - a realism that is universally binding on us. In this respect, Davidson's theory of interpretation is to be specially mentioned since it is designed to keep the universality claim of realism intact. However, strangely enough, his theory of interpretation could not ensure the realism of the kind that he promises to offer. This is how the need for an alternative strategy arises.

The mistake that Davidson made is same as the others. He too tries to situate the problem of realism solely in the context of language/reality relationship. The result is that he could not arrive at an adequate conception of realism. In order to do so we need to take into account another order of relationship. It is a relationship between thought and reality. Language/reality relationship presupposes this order of relationship. As I have argued, there is a need to assume this higher order relationship because how we relate language to reality is largely determined by the cognitive constraints imposed on us by the thought structure. This will be a new conceptual framework for realism. In a framework where language functions through the constraints of thought can offer a conception of realism proper

In view of the outline sketched above, this paper will have four sections. In the first section, I shall discuss at a general level the relationship between language and reality and how does it influence our views on realism. In the second section, I shall discuss Davidson's theory of interpretation as forming the core of his realism. In the third section, my attempt will be to show the grounds on which his theory of interpretation fails to be adequate and thereby it fails to serve the purpose for which it is designed. In the fourth section, I shall briefly elaborate my constructive proposal where my main concern will be to argue that language functions through the constraints of thoughts and, thereby, we can avoid some of the crucial problems of Davidson's theory of interpretation. This will be reaffirming realism on a new ground.

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Language And The Metaphysics of Interpretation:

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Realism and the Language/Reality Relationship

Analytic Philosophy, barring a few exceptions, does not accept any separate existence of thought over and above language. There is simply no need to accept such a separate existence of thought because there is nothing in language which compels one to go for such a position. Hence to do this will be to accept an unwarranted metaphysics of the past. Michael Dummett, thus, while stating the centrality of language in analytical philosophy speaks of the subordinate role of thought in relation to language. This is evident from the very account of languages offered in analytical philosophy. Dummett mentions the three ways of this dependence of thought on language. They respectively point out, (1) "an account of language does not presuppose an account of thought", (2) "an account of language yields an account of thought" and (3) "there is no other adequate means by which an account of thought can be given".

As the picture shows, analytic philosophy puts language at the centte of the universe. All that matters is language. In this linguistic characterization of philosophy there is a fundamental question, and that is: How is language related to reality? Analytical philosophers belonging to different persuasions have all addressed to this question and have come up with the characteristic solutions of their own. The relationship between language and reality acts as a background conceptualization that gives rise to the formulation of the different views concerning meaning, truth, reference, intentionality and so on. These different views are the outcome of the way we conceive and define the relationship between language and reality. This implies that there are different ways through which one can approach this Problem. The approach that one adopts is largely determined by what conceptual perspective he takes while defining-his concept of language and the concept of reality. It is this perspectival character of the problem that gives rise to the possibility of conceiving the relationship between lanblage and reality not in one definite way. There are several different ways through which this relationship can be conceived and projected.

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Roughly, however, there are two dominant perspectives through which this relationship between language and reality has been conceived. The first is the perspective which defines this relationship at a purely objective level The second, on the other hand, defines this relationship from the point of view of human subject or speaker. In the former perspective, the relation ship between language and reality has been conceived mainly as a matter of correspondence between the two. Language in that sense is a picture of mirror of reality, the reality that is lying outside and independent of us. In this perspective: How is language hooked on to reality? is, therefore, a singularly important question. To this effect there are different theories which have been proposed to explain the correspondence relation holding between language and reality. The second perspective which views the language reality relationship from the point of view of the speaker understands the entire relationship in a different way. It is not correspondence or mirroring that defines the relationship. Instead of language mirroring the worlditis the speaker who mirrors the world through the use of language. The view that is proposed here is that reality is largely determined by the categories that we impose on the world. These categories are linguistic and it is through these categories that we experience the world.

The discussion on the two perspectives shows how they give rise to two distinct views on the relationship between language and reality. A common error which is noticed here is that philosophers often take these two perspectives as if they are exclusive of each other. This attitude, of course, has its own justification because these two perspectives have been developed in a totally unrelated way. This results into two extreme forms exhibiting two antagonistic ways of looking at reality. Thus, the former relationship culminates into metaphysical realism - a view from nowhere, whereas the latter leads to cultural relativism. Realism and relativism are the two extreme views arising out of our failure to see the distinctive ways in which language is related to reality. There are both subjective and objective sides of this relationship. Both of them are to be seen while assessing this relationship. A failure to do so will inevitably lead to the formulation of extreme views.

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There are few notable attempts which recognize the importance of both the subjective and the objective sides while deciding over the nature of the relationship between language and reality. In this respect, the figures that come prominently are the names of Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson. Both of them adopt a different strategy to achieve their ends. Putnam developed a new framework known as internal realism which seeks to understand the relationship between language and reality in a different way and thus claims to offer a solution to the controversy between realism and relaivism. His effort to combine these two perspectives has actually led Putnam to develop this new framework of thinking. Putnam felt the need to do so because he thought that there was no other way to combine these two. Putnam, thus, goes beyond the limits set by the controversy between realism and relativism. In contrast, Davidson uses a different strategy. Without committing himself to any third perspective like internal realism, and at the same time without committing himself either to the traditional conception of realsim or to cultural relativism, Davidson offers a new understanding of the relationship between language and reality. But, note, while doing this, Davidson has been firmly rooted to realism. The one distinct advantage of Davidson's theory is that it does not have the problem which Putnam's internal realism has. To my mind one major source of weakness in internal realism comes from Putnam's inability to resolve in a harmonious way the conflicting standpoints of realism and relativism. His internal realism could not bring unity between the two. As a result, his internal realism has been looked upon as colourless pale realism or a questionable realism. Putnam's acceptance of plurality of conceptual schemes with the idea of correspondthe principle attached to it poses a serious epistemological problem which casts doubt on the very legitimacy of his realism.

Davidson's Agenda of Realism

Davidson's claim that an empirically constructed theory of truth provides an adequate theory of meaning for any natural language is probably one of the most significant contributions in the analytic tradition of the philosophy of language. It has a deep and far reaching significance. The most fascinating aspect of it is the form of realism it assumes at the

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background.

While working on his proposal of how to construct a viable theory of meaning for a natural language, Davidson defines his conception of realism which consists of two fundamental tenets. The first says that there exists an independent world of things and the second which is an episte mological corollary to the first says that we know, in common, many of these things. Davidson provides arguments for these two theses which forn his defence of realism. His defence of realism relies on the centrality of language. Language is the means through which we know the world. As Davidson claims, our talk can correctly pickout what there is. But this does not suggest that there should be a correspondence between language and the world. True, the core of his realism consists in the relationship between language and the world. But for him the nature of this relationship has to be conceived in a different way. This makes his position on realism unique.

The uniqueness of his realism follows from its nature and the formlation of it. Keeping the relationship between language and reality at its centre, the main thrust of Davidson's realism is to offer a characterization of what we must know in order to be able to speak and interpret a language The reason is as he says "in sharing a language, in whatever sense this is required for communication, we share picture of the world that must, in its large features, be true"2. This remark makes it evident that the ultimate basis of Davidson's realism lies on a theory of the world embedded in a language. It is a theory which is claimed to be largely true and it is one which must be used by a competent interpreter. The notion of realism that is emerging must be distinguished both from traditional realism based on correspondence it lation and the internal realism of Putnam. The traditional idea of correspond ence does not work because it involves a relationship which is infinitely regressive. Whereas Davidson's response to Putnam's realism will be, so pointed out earlier, that our talk can correctly pickout what there is, and this it does not it does not create it. Equally important in this connection is to note that does not appeal and appeal appeal and appeal and appeal appeal and appeal appeal and appeal appeal and appeal appeal appeal appeal appeal appeal and appeal ap does not appeal either to intellectual intuition or to any causal mechanism to explain our ability to know what there is.

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Traditional realism starts with an explicit assumption that there is a gulf between how things are and how we take them to be. This is the reason why postulating correspondence relation becomes important in order to show that our talk corresponds to something outside. Along with this it is also accepted in traditional realism that there can be radical falsehood of all our beliefs. Davidson rejects the entire standpoint of traditional realism and provides the reformulation of the very term by which realism is traditionally understood. He offers a realism which is not dogmatic but certainly robust. This is evident from the fact that his realism offers refutation of scepticism, idealism and relativism.

In fitness with the above description it may be now asked: What is the strength of Davidson's realism? What makes it so comprehensive and powerful? As said earlier, it is the theory of the world which gives strength to his realism. It can do because it is a theory which must be used by any competent speaker and it must be largely true. This is how the theory of the world becomes significant forming the interpretive competence of man. But this does not suggest that such a theory of the world cannot be contested. One can question both the claims of Davidson's theory of the world and can accordingly ask: Why should Davidson's theory of the world be the theory used by any competent interpreter?, and: Why should it be largely live? In view of these questions what arguments can Davidson give to support his theory of the world? In the next section, I shall discuss this in order to show how his theory of the world defends his theory of realism.

II

Truth Theory and the Theory of the World: Towards a Holistic Semantics

Davidson's entire project on truth theory is based on two fundamental objectives. The first is about constructing a theory of truth for natural languages modelled on Tarski's convention T. The second is about constructing a theory of meaning and interpretation for natural languages modelled on the theory of truth developed at the first stage. These two since the constitute Davidson's holistic semantics. As we can evidently see, ince the construction of a theory of truth is primary the construction of a

theory of meaning is dependent on it. In this perspective a theory of meaning for a language is essentially a theory of truth. It is now important to see the way in which the theory of truth and the theory of meaning are linked. How does Davidson establish the link?

To begin with, in contrast to Tarski, Davidson constructs a theory of truth which is wider in terms of its scope than the theory offered by Tarski. Tarski's theory is confined only to formal language. In Davidson, on the other hand, we find him extending the scope of Tarski's truth scheme from formal language to natural language. The convention T, so conceived, can be accordingly applied covering all parts of natural language. Davidson claims that there can be T sentences for all sentences of natural language including the sentences containing indexicals. Thus, there can be a T sentence for a sentence, such as,:

"I am tired"

The T sentence of it will be:

(s) 'I am tired' is true spoken by P at time t if and only if P is tired at time $t.^3$

This is how T-sentences are adjusted in relation to speaker and time. The formulation of convention T, for Davidson, is a means through which truth conditions of sentences are spelt out. This whole exercise is a semantic exercise because to give truth conditions of a sentence is also to give an account of the meaning of the sentence. The reason is that the two are not different. For a truth theory explaining truth equally implies explaining meaning. The knowledge of truth conditions may be thus appropriately characterized as the knowledge of the semantic conditions of truth. This essentially involves knowing what it is for a sentence to be true which implies understanding the language. Further, there cannot be any understanding of the language without understanding its meaning. This is the way how the knowledge of the truth conditions of the sentence are inseparably related to the notion of meaning. In this context Davidson's claim that his lated to the notion of meaning. In this context Davidson's claim that his truth theory is empirical is significant. For a truth theory to be empirical means the claims of T sentences must be supported by linguistic evidence.

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istic evidence.

The second stage that follows from the first involves the construction of a theory of meaning and interpretation. The latter theory is based on the former. Now the question is: Why Davidson felt the need for a theory of interpretation? Why did he construct it? The need for a theory of interpretation arises due to the necessity of explaining how communication is possible between the speaker and the hearer who is called the interpreter by Davidson. A theory of interpretation is thus meant to interpret the language of the other speakers, and to do this Davidson assumes an interpreter and constructs a theory of interpretation centering around him. The interpreter is one who seeks to understand what the other speakers mean when they say something. This is the task of the interpreter and how he does it is the topic which the theory of interpretation seeks to explain. The main objective of Davidson's theory of interpretation is to work out the details of interpretation. This is necessary otherwise we cannot explain how communication is possible.

It has been said earlier that T sentences are constructed in relation to person and time. There are only person-time relativized T sentences. Now interpretation of these sentences will be impossible unless we assume, as Davidson argues, certain conditions or constraints. Thus, when we interpret the utterances of other speakers we necessarily assume a background of network of beliefs commonly shared both by the speaker and the interpreter. Between the two there must be agreement as far as possible. The interpreter must agree with the conditions under which the speaker holds his sentence to be true. In order to attain this agreement it is thus necessary to hold that the speaker and the interpreter have a similar system of belief. In view of this it may be said that the theory of interpretation seeks to understand beliefs of the speaker and the meaning of the words figured in his utterances. It may be mentioned right here that belief and meaning, for Davidson, are not two separate things. They form a nexus to which I shall come later

In the light of the above general remarks, we can specify the three conditions of interpretation. This will help us to understand in a concrete hammer the role and the significance of interpretation in the construction of

a theory of truth empirically. For a theory of truth to be empirical we need to accept that all alien speakers are like us in the following three respects. At first, they are members of roughly determinable speech communities. The second, they speak with similar intentions like ours and the third is that they believe in what we believe. These are the three conditions of interpretations. Let me briefly elaborate the role of these three conditions in order to show their significance.

First: The idea of a speech community. We have seen that the main focus of the theory of truth is the construction of T sentences of the individual speaker. Accordingly, if we think that the interpretation of the utterances of the single speaker must be based on the speaker's attitude - the attitude of holding the sentences true we may be faced with equally eligible rival interpretations. This will result into unmanageable plurality of conjoint theories of belief and meaning leading to the failure of developing a single theory of interpretation. On the other hand, Davidson's plea is that as to interpret a particular utterance we necessarily require a single theory of interpretation which will be comprehensive enough, so that the theory can interpret infinite number of utterances. What is crucially involved here is the notion of evidence. For a theory to be comprehensive it is to be assumed that the evidence for interpretation does not change. Thus, as Davidson claims, the evidence for the interpretation of a particular sentence will be same for the interpretation of all utterances of a speaker or community at large. In order to do this, Davidson4 introduces the notion of a speech community which implies speakers belonging to the same language have the same linguistic repertoire. Thus by virtue of this, speakers of the same language mean the same things by their utterances. This will help us to have a coherent interpretation. The notion of a speech community changes the notion of evidence. The earlier ieda of single sentences produced by single speakers of single occasions will be now considered from the point of view of some lar guage L which constitutes the speech community of all speakers.

Second: Similar pattern of intentions. The idea of a speech community suggests sharing of the same linguistic repertoire among its members i.e., speakers. This is the ground level assumption from which the second assumption from the second assumption from

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tion may be said to follow. Any language using creature while speaking will have the same pattern of intentions that we have, namely intentions to inform, command, request, promise and so on. Through this assumption we take others to be using language in the same way in which we use language. This suggests the acceptance of the fact that alien speakers speak with the purposes with which we speak. This assumption is necessary beacuse unless we accept that all speakers speak with intentions like ours, there cannot be any coherent interpretation. This constitutes the second condition of interpretation.

Third: Possession of a common system of beliefs.

The third condition which assumes that all alien speakers roughly believe what we believe is central to Davidson's theory of interpretation. In fact, the thesis has a wider implication since Davidson is using the idea of a holistic nature of belief for the coherentist justification of knowledge and truth⁵.

First of all, we must agree that shareability of belief is a fact rather an unnoticed fact. However, the point is the very fact that we understand each other, communicate with each other and even disagree with each other shows that we share most of our beliefs. In the absence of the shareability of beliefs people will continuously misunderstand one another leading to a situation where communication will be impossible. In the context of dispute, for example, we see only the differences among the two speakers. But we do not see the common ground that is shared by the two speakers. It is this common ground which makes the dispute possible. A dispute presupposes a system of commonly shared beliefs. An important fact about belief is that a belief is never seen in isolation from other beliefs because, it is always supported by a dense pattern of beliefs. It is within this pattern or system the particular belief is identified and described.

The above notion of belief is important while we consider the meaning of a speaker's utterance. The utterance of a speaker is determined by the three conditions. First is, of course, the meaning the speaker assigns to the sentences and the next two are the belief and the intention that the

speaker has in the situation. Interpretation is the function of these three. This nexus shows that one can get the meaning of the speaker's utlerance if he knows the second and the third. Davidson holds that the meaning we ascribe to the speaker's utterance is supported by the belief we assign to the speaker. There is a sense of inter-dependence between these two types of ascriptions. Davidson argues that in assigning belief to others we go by the principle of charity. We, as interpreters, take others as having the same belief and desires like our own. It may be equally important to mention that others hold belief in the same consistent manner as we do. If we cannot believe inconsistently so is others who too cannot believe inconsistently. This shows that for interpretation to be possible a parity must be maintained between the interpreter and the interpreted in matters of beliefs.

All this is fine. But the question is about the truth of a belief. Concurrence does not make a belief true. We require to show that not only we share our beliefs but most of our shared beliefs are true. To explain this, Davidson⁶ introduces the notion of omniscient interpreter (OI). The force of the argument is simple. In short, it states that an omniscient interpreter is one who being an interpreter shares most of his beliefs with the speaker and being omniscient his beliefs cannot be wrong. They are true. The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the speaker's beliefs are true since they are concurrent with the beliefs held by OI. This lead Davidson to claim that there must be separate place for OI in the theory of interpretation.

From the claim that most of our beliefs are true, Davidson goes further to show the untenability of scepticism. For a sceptic to doubt the correctness of our belief must satisfy the two following conditions. First, he must share his beliefs with our's and, second, such beliefs must be true. The significance of this apparently ambivalent formulation of sceptic's position can be easily seen. If a sceptic has to meaningfully doubt the correctness of others' belief he has to detect mistake in other's belief. This will be possible only through the interpretation of others beliefs. But for interpretation to be possible the sceptic has to satisfy the earlier stated two conditions. He can interpret only if he shared his beliefs with others and if such

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beliefs are true. Scepticism, for Davidson, is thus self defeating.

The veridical nature of belief is not a hypothetical postulation. On the ohter hand, their veridical nature becomes evident once we see how intimately they are related with various behavioural, biological and neurological phenomena as well as various propositional attitudes, sych as, desires and hopes. The relationship between beliefs and these elements is such that the former cannot be interpreted in isolation from the latter. As a result, beliefs assume a complicated structure which can be grasped only when they are expressed through language. This becomes obvious when we see the interdependence of belief and meaning. As Davidson argues it is not only meaning which is dependent on belief but belief is also equally dependent on meaning. To use Davidson's expression, meaning and belief are thus interlocked.

These are the three conditions to be satisfied for successful interprelation. Without this we cannot construct a theory of truth empirically. As we know the construction of such a theory really implies constructing a theory of meaning. I have, so far described the three conditions and its importance in interpretation. But now I would like to raise a critical question and will examine the notion of interpretation in the light of the question.

If constructing a theory of truth empirically implies that we will be able to understand all meaningful speech then it is necessary to show that the three conditions of interpretation are correct. To put the same thing in a different way: There should not be a context where we fail to understand the speech produced by speakers of whom these conditions are not true. That the three conditions of interpretation must be universally binding is a fundamental requirement for the claim that a theory of truth will work as a likely of meaning for any creature using language.

The problem that is posed here is ultimately related to the interprelive competence of man. How far this competence is central to man is a fluction to be resolved. Davidson claims that it is central to man. It is a claim which is based on the supposition that all human beings are interpret-

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ers and as interpreters they are alike. Davidson demonstrates this at the levels⁸. First, this ability to interpret is central to thinking. Since thinking is necessary for speaking, Davidson concludes from this that all speaking are alike. They are alike because they are all interpreters and as interpreters they satisfy the three conditions of interpretation. Second, the ability to interpret is the ground for acquiring knowledge - knowledge of how things are in the world. We come to know the world in communication - by talking to others i.e., interpretation. The same holds true of others. Hence, as in terpreters we share many items of knowledge and belief with others. For Davidson, there is nothing called pre-linguistic and pre-interpretive self of man. The very existence of self assumes a common world of thought, specifi and knowledge.

These are the two ways through which Davidson gives justification for his claim that the ability to interpret is central to man. This justifies the correctness of the conditions of interpretation. But how far Davidson's picture of an interpretive man is correct? Certainly, the picture that he is offering is appealing. But, I am afraid, he has not given sufficient proof to demonstrate the compelling nature of the picture. He did not take any step to prevent the counter possibilities. I shall now argue that Davidson's two theses, namely, the ability to interpret is necessary for thinking and the ability to interpret is the ground for the acquisition of knowledge and belief provide enough room to raise doubts. Doubts can be raised because we can always think of counter possibility. This means that conditions of interpretation are not universally held and, hence, they are not universally binding

Thinking and Interpretation: The Counter Possibility

As pointed out earlier, the ability to interpret, for Davidson, is centrally thinking a National Association and the contraction of the contractio tral to thinking. Without the former the latter will not be possible. Topilit in Davidson's it in Davidson's formulation "a creature cannot have thoughts unless its an interpreter of the an interpreter of the speech of another." Davidson offers following age ments which constitute the validity of his thesis.

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For a being to have thought implies that he must have a system of beliefs. The justification for it is that a particular thought is defined only in relation to a system of beliefs within which it has its own place. To give Davidson's example, in order to think whether the gun is loaded "requires the belief that a gun is a weapon, that is a more or less enduring physical object, and so on."10 These are the beliefs forming a system that "identifies a thought by locating it in a logic and epistemic space."11

Second:

For a being to have a system of beliefs implies that it must have the concept of belief which suggests that a belief is essentially capable of being true or false. Unless he has this idea (the possibility of being mistaken) he cannot have a belief. To have this idea "requires grasping the contrast between true and false belief."12

For a being having the concept of belief implies that he must be an interpreter and to be an interpreter means that he must be a member of a speech community. We can see that there is a chain of connections involved here which may be understood in the following terms. To start with, as Davidson 13 argues, belief existing as a private attitude is unintelligible and therefore, it must be checked as against the public norms provided by language. This brings in the notion of a speech community. A creature can have the concept of belief only when he is the member of a speech community. This is necesary because otherwise his beliefs cannot be publicly checked. This is, in other words, to suggest that "we have the idea of belief only from the role of belief in the interpretation of language."

The three arguments provide the basis to Davidson's claim that for a being to have thoughts implies that he is a speech interpreter. The ability lo interpret is then the necessary condition for interpretation. But despite Davidson's best effort these arguments could not prevent the possibility that counters Davidson's thesis.

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The main thread of Davidson's argument is that beliefs are socially shared and it is only through a common language we come to know those beliefs. Beliefs are not formed in private experiences of the individual not is there anything called pre-social and pre-linguistic self of the individual. This is essentially a social perspective where one can have thoughts only by interpreting the speech of the other.

Alternative to this is the individualistic perspective which denies the social perspective altogether. Eldridge¹⁴ pointed out that Descartes and Frege, for example, will not agree to this social perspective and thus will not accept interpretation as the basis of thought. From the individualistic perspective, it may be quite pertinently asked: Why do we need to be an interpreter in order to have the concept of belief? Further, it is not true to say that we acquire the concept of belief only by interpreting the speechol others. We can, as well, have this concept from our own individual experiences. Finally, there can be a possibility where a person can have be liefs, but we cannot recognize his beliefs simply because they are not enperienced by the person. As a result, we cannot interpret such a creature by constructing a theory of truth. Notice these counter possibilities do not show that Davidson's three arguments are invalid nor do they question Davidson's theory of interpretation. They are more like lacunas- the existence of which show that Davidson's theory of interpretation is not universally binding and, hence, it is not realistic in the robust sense of the lem

Interpretation and Knowledge: The Counter Possibility

I have already said that, according to Davidson, the ability to interpret is the condition for acquiring knowledge of the external world. In this connection the main thrust of his argument is to show that there is a correct theory of the world embodied in all natural languages. As he puls "our language - any language (must) incorporate or depend upon a largely correct, shared, view of how things are." From this it follows that all interpreters necessarily possess a largely correct theory of the world. Understanding of one another's speech is possible due to this commonly shared view of the world. In view of this unsupported claim Davidson himself raised

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Language And The Metaphysics of Interpretation:

wo fundamental questions in order to defend his thesis that the ability to interpret is the condition for knowing. The two questions are:

First: Why do we share a view of the world in order to understand the speech of one another?

Reply: Davidson's answer is that as to understand and interpret the speech of the alien speakers it is necessary to assume that they believe roughly what we believe. To say this is not to deny the mutual differences. On the contrary, we can make sense of the differences "only against a background of shared beliefs." 16 If this is not assumed we will not be able to understand the utterances of others. This provides the justification that our ability to interpret one another implies sharing of a common view of the world.

Second: Why sharing a common view of the world implies sharing of many true beliefs?

Reply: It has been argued that successful interpretation involves concurrence of beliefs. But the question is whether what is agreed is true or not? Irue, agreement cannot guarantee truth. If so, then what is it that decides truth? Davidson thinks that this is essentially a wrong way of posing the problem. The present claim regarding the truth of shared beliefs is connected to the first. Infact, as he says, the first is a basic claim whereas the second is an extended claim. We require the community of beliefs because it provided the basis for communication and understanding. From this the extended claim that follows is, to quote Davidson, "that objective error can occur only in a setting of largely true belief. Agreement does not make for louth, but much of what is agreed is true if some of what is agreed is false."

Notice that in order to establish the extended claim he is using the same strategy that he used in order to establish the former claim which according to him is the basic claim.

In my earlier discussion since I have talked about the veridical nature of beliefs, I do not want to go into it any more. However, it is important to mention in this connection the coherentist justification that Davidson the establishing his thesis that our shared beliefs are largely Davidson's argument shows that the world is what we believe it to be.

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To hold this is to imply that our beliefs in some sense must correspond to the world. But this idea of correspondence should not be understood in the sense of mirroring between a belief and the world. The reason is that we cannot directly state the correspondence relation holding between the two There cannot be any confrontational correspondence since we cannot confront our beliefs to reality. The only way to justify the truth of these beliefs will be the coherentist justification. The very fact of coherence justifies the truth because, to use Davidson's phrase, coherence yields correspondence. It is by believing coherently we touch the reality. This itself provides the ground for making knowledge claim. It is a knowledge of the world - the world that is in no sense created by us. Further, to know the world we do not have to go outside the system of our shared beliefs.

The two questions which constitute the two claims of Davidson lead to the conclusion:

Successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true, view of the world. 18

The alternative way of saying this will be that creatures who can interpret one another must be sharing many true belliefs. This is how the ability to interpret becomes the ground for knowledge.

The thesis that Davidson is offering is certainly impressive and perhaps convincing too. But like the previous issue here also Davidson could not prevent the existence of counter possibilities. These counter possibilities are not remote and thus their existence shows that Davidson's conditions on interpretation are not universally binding. I shall mention below a few instances of counter possibility. Some of them have been already cited by Eldridge.

Let us start with the basic claim of Davidson that all interpreters believe roughly what we believe about the world. This common sharing of beliefs is possible because all creatures who can interpret one another must share a common view of the world. As we can see the whole emphasis lies on the fact that all interpreters are alike because they are interpreters of another. But can we think of it as universal possibility? Can we think of

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Language And The Metaphysics of Interpretation:

situation where there are creatures who can interpret one another but we cannot interpret them? Eldridge accepts this possibility. We can conceive of a context, such as, pre-modern scientific interpreters of the world who can interpret one another, but we, on the other hand, cannot interpret them. This is reflected in our attitude where we make it clear what is our position as against their position. This instance is a counter possibility to the universal claim that all interpreters believe what we believe about the world.

Coming to the second claim, we find Davidson saying that we as interpreters share many true beliefs. But we can think of a contrary situation. Where there may be creatures whom we cannot interpret and yet they know things as they are. The context where we can conceive of this possibility is the future scientific interpreters of the world.

In order to rule out the possibility that there can be a system of beliefs which is better than ours, Davidson, as Eldridge suggests, must modify his position. The modified position will say that the creatures who have a view of the world are only those whom we can interpret. But as a condition this is unsatisfactory. As Eldridge pointed out, we cannot take this as self evident. Without any proof how could we accept that we can interpret all creatures who have a view of the world? The example of future scientists or the case of Martians will reveal that the claim made by the modified position is not self-evident.

Davidson has a reply to these counter possibilities. To explain these cases he appeals to the principle of charity. As he puts it forcefully: "charily is forced on us: whether we like it or not, if we want to understand othets, we must count them right in most matters." It is now possible that with the help of the charity principle we can rule out the counter possibilities and can reaffirm that in order to understand the alien speakers we must assume that they believe what we believe. Apparently this is fine. But the problem that we have posed remains the same. Using the charity principle we can assume that all alien speakers believe roughly what we believe. But this does not establish that all alien speakers believe roughly what we believe. As we see, there is a difference between what we believe and what is

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actually the case. This gap has to be accounted for and the principle of charity may not be strong enough to explain the gap.

We can now see that Davidson's theory of interpretation is not uni. versally binding. If this is not universally binding then on the same ground his theory of realism is also not universally binding. The reason is his theory of realism is supported by his theory of interpretation. In order to save Davidson's theory of realism we have to save Davidson's theory of interpretation. To do this we must change our orientation - the orientation that is dominated by the social perspective. From social we change to a new perspective which may be roughly described as cognitive perspective In this perspective what plays the central role is thought and accordingly we adopt a different approach to our problem. The problem concerning how we think and use language will have a new explanation. Language functions through the constraints of thought which may be called cognitive constraints. Accordingly, the relationship between language and reality presupposes a higher order relationship, namely, thought. For a theory of interpretation to be universally binding must be designed in such a way that it should presuppose those constraints. these constraints are the presup positions of the theory. The better way of putting it will be that they are the necessary presuppositions of a speaker - interpreter situation. Before discuss this it should be made clear that I am not interested in offering an alternative theory. In view of the counter possibilities there is a serious problem of how to approach Davidson's theory. My attempt may be taken as one of the ways to approach the problem.

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The Objective World and the Cognitive Constraints

At the beginning of the paper I have made a remark by quoting Dummett that in analytic philosophy there is no separate existence of thought apart from language. To hold this, thus implies that grasping the structures of a sentence inval of a sentence involves grasping the structure of the thought it expresses.

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lis evident that Davidson is not an exception to this approach. That is the reason why he never felt the urge to probe whether language presupposes any higher order relationship. I shall now try to argue that there is a higher order relationship which may be described in terms of a set of presuppositions. These presuppositions are indispensable for communication and thus they are crucial in determining the concept of truth.

Let us begin with the notion of objective truth since this is central to Davidson's whole enterprise. Davidson's concept of objective truth is really the concept of intersubjective truth²⁰ to which we arrive at through interpretation. In concrete terms, what actually matters is successful communication which is possible by virtue of a theory of the world shared by both the speaker and the hearer. However, our possession of a common theory of the world does not ensure the objectivity of truth. As suggested, the only way to do this is to go into the presuppositions that will reveal what is involved in our possession of a shared world about which we can communicate. It is this more of reasoning which will show why there is a theory of the world which is necessarily possessed by all of us. The study of such presuppositions is really meant to be the study of the conceptual structure and its bearing on the theory of the world.

A speaker forms the idea of a shared world on the basis of a kind of reasoning that involves: first, the idea of an objective temporal order and a set of basic principles which is constitutive of his thinking.

The Objective Temporal Order

The idea of objective temporal order is a proposal offered by John Campbell²¹ while he tries to explain the presuppositions of communication. The best way to approach this will be to find out what is involved in giving an account of communication. According to Campbell "an account of communication must depend on the idea of different perspectives on the temporal order." The central idea involved here is perception. My position is explained by the way things objectively are and our own the truth.

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Coming back to our central notion, the subject acquires the notion of the objective temporal order independent of whether he perceives it or not How does he then get this notion? Campbell suggests a few conditions which he calls enabling conditions of perceptions. The subject acquires the knowledge of the objective/temporal order through fulfilling these conditions. In the context of the present discussion, these conditions are crucial in forming the shared view of the world without which, as we know, there will be no communication.

The first enabling conditions of perception are spatial. In order to see something the speaker must be appropriately situated in relation to it.

The second important thing is that these spatial conditions are necessarily accompained by various temporal co-ordinates. That is, we meet these spatial conditions in appropriate time. That is, when I perceive something "perception and the perceived are in general, simultaneous." Equally important here is to accept that there are objects which are unperceived but nevertheless they are intelligible to us. Hence, for example, how do we account for the fact that 'a is F" is intelligible even though we cannot perceive it? We say that 'a is F" is intelligible by virtue of our lnowledge that a's being F does not provide us the sufficient ground to perceive that a is F. In order to perceive this we need additional enabling conditions.

The third important enabling condition is that for understanding the object we must have a sense of causal order. We know that objective order of events is not determined by the way we perceive things. As a result, we could distinguish "between perception of successive states of affairs and successive perception of coexistent states of affairs." But this distinction cannot be made by appealing to the order and content of perception. We thus appeal to the causal order. With the help of the causal order exhibiting regularities we can understand the thing in rest, in motion, and so on.

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perception form an abstract thought of objects/spatial objects which make perception perception (to use Campbell's phrase) of the world possible. This the cognitive map is more like an abstract structure. It does not concern with any particular object or with any particular point of view. It is a picture which is constituted of certain regulative principles that tell us how the world functions and how the objects behave. This account is a bare outline explicating the idea of a shared world about which we communicate. However, the possession of this shared world does not deny differences. The reason is the speaker knows that there are other points of view on the same objective order giving rise to "different courses of perception of the same world - a world about which communication is therefore possible."25

Constraints of thought

There are global constraints on the ascription of thought. Out thinking is, to a great extent, structured by these constraints. It may be said that we think at the background of these constraints.

The Intelligibility Constraint .- It says that to have a concept implies had one must have a range of concepts. It provides the context within which each concept is intelligible. To grasp a concept implies to grasp a system of concepts. This constraint thus says that a subject is a possessor of concepts.

In addition to the above claim this constraint also, as Campbell pointed out, about the permutation of thought. To ascribe one set of propositional attitude to a subject implies that he should be capable of grasping wide range of thoughts. This is possible because the subject in a situation can permule the concepts which were already ascribed to him at the initial state of Suppose if the speaker fails to do the adequate permutation then implies that there is something wrong in the initial ascription.

Second :

Generality Constraint. - This is a constraint proposed by Gareth Evans. 26 It says that for someone to have the thought that 'a is F' is to

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know what it is for something to be a and on the basis of this he must be capable of grasping the thought like a is g, a is H and so on. Similarly, \mathbb{I}_{S} have the thought that 'a is F' one must also know what it is to be E_{sotha} one can grasp the further thoughts that b is F, C is F and so on. This generates erality constraint tells us how we grasp inferential relation holding between different thoughts. This also enables us, as Campbell argues, to make different permutations among different thoughts.

Third:

Conceptual Creativity. - This is not a constraint. It is an element which is necessarily involved in inferential relations of thought. This notion has its significance, as Campbell pointed out, due to Frege.27 Conceptual creativity implies our ability to spot a new pattern in a familiar thought

To conclude, the cognitive map provides us the idea of an objective world shared by all of us together with a set of principles by which we identify, compare and interpret the thoughts of others. It is due to these basic cognitive presuppositions that we are able to understand the rival view points expressed by different cultures. The truth of these view points is that they may be incompatible and even incommensurable but they are not incomparable. This realization is the basis of our agreement in communication nication. This is the sense in which, I suggest, that Davidson's theory of the world requires higher order justification. It also makes it evident that we first interact with the world through thought because language functions through thought. The relationship between thought and reality may be this said to be prior to the relationship between language and reality. This may be taken as the realist demand.²⁸

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PHILOSOPHY - THEORY OR THERAPY?

ASHOK VOHRA

When most people ought to engage in philosopical investigation they act like someone who is looking for an object in a drawer very seriously. He throws papers out of the drawer - what he is looking for may be among them - leafs through the others hastily and sloppily. Throws some back into the drawer, mixes them up with the others, and so on. Then one can only tell him: Stop, If you look in that way, I can't help you look. First you have to start to examine one thing after another methodically, and in peace and quiet; then I am willing to look with you and to direct myself with you as model in the method.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Philosophy"

Since the time Wittgenstein's remark in PI 255, namely, "The Philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness "has been noticed, many have concluded that Wittgenstein conceived of Philosophy as a therapy. They support their hypothesis by showing that Wittgenstein uses such expressions as "Philosophical disease" (PI 593), and by quoting PI 133 which says: "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods like different therapies." Can philosophy be a therapy?; or is to be categorised as a discipline which deals with practical problems of life and offers their solutions? Or else is philosophy to be treated as a pure and simply theoretical discipline whose primary function is to deal with the abstract and abstruse problems which have no practical

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ASHOK VOHRA

ramifications either for the life of an individual or for the 'lived life' of the society? The logical prerequisite for answering these question is dependent upon a final or settled meaning of the term 'philosophy'. Even for Wittgenstein the term 'philosophy' did not have a wholly unproblematic sense. Time and again he returns to the question of the relationship between what he was doing and what has traditionally been called 'Philosophy'. To begin with I shall attempt an answer to the questions. What is Philosophy, or better still, what does one mean by philosophical activity!

Though philosophy is regarded as the prerogative of man which distinguishes him from other animals, and inspite of the fact what philosophy is a universally recognised academic discipline almost as old as human race, whose sources are considered by some1 to be "pre-verbal and often pre-cultural" there is no agreement on its nature. The first difficult in attempting a definition of philosophy is that the word 'philosophy' is used in a variety of senses. Some use it simply to connote their views on or about anything, as well as for collecting, or rather ostentatiously paraling them. In this usage of 'Philosophy' we are all in a sense philosophers whether we know it or not, because "there is none so poor as not to have a philosophy of his own; as well as there is none so rich as to be able to do without one".2 Some use it in the sense in which there can be philosophies, for example, philosophy of life, philosophy of a class, philosophy of stamp-collecting, philosophy of education etc. In a nutshell in this usage of the word 'philosophy' it is used with any activity ranging from the most flippant to the most serious. This usage presupposes that philosophy is fell by a meta-interest, that is, it comes after something has been asserted, by lieved and studied. According to Wittgenstein "one might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventional (PA) to the state of the sta tions". (PI 126) He upholds the view: "Philosophy is not laid down in sentences by the sent sentences but in a language" implying threrby that philosophy is a formal life because language represents a form of life. The term 'philosophy' is also used by some to denote the highly demanding business of rendering the contents of a subject into highly complex and difficult concepts rather than into vernous to than into vernacular language of every day life. In contrast to these work.

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aday usages, the term philosophy is also used in a technical sense. In its aday usages, and ideas contained in technical sense it refers to the preachings, teachings and ideas contained in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, St. Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Russell, Willgenstein et al, as well as the academic traditions which we describe as Idealism, Realism, Materialism, Scholasticism, Logical Positivism, Analysis etc. In this sense philosophical interest is extraordinary and out of the way. It connotes the body of conceptualised, coherent and articulated thoughts.

The second difficulty in defining 'philosophy' is that with the passage of time it has undergone a radical change in its scope. There has been a progressive narrowing of its tether. Astronomy, Physics, Zoology, etc. which in the Greek notion of 'philosophy' were subjects belonging to it, are no longer considered to be branches of philosophy. As a result the usage of the label 'philosophy' has narrowed down over a period of time. The Greeks when they used the term philosophy for the love of wisdom, by their usage of this notion, meant knowledge - knowledge of all matters ranging from the most abstruse to the most practical. In their sense, therefore, all branches of study were within the scope of philosophy. In the Seventeenth century the word 'new philosophy' was coined and it referred 10 the works of Galileo and Newton. All scientific researchers were called philosophers. It is because of this usage of the term philosophy that the official titles of some of the chairs of physics in some of the universities, especially the older universities, are still titled 'Professor of Natural or Experimental Philosophy'. Likewise it was only till very recently that the Departments of Psychology did not have separate and independent existthee. Hitherto psychologists were brigaded into Departments of Philo-

Though Popper calls specialization a moral sin, yet specialization is hevilable. The moment a subject of study reaches a certain level of spedalization it calls itself an autonomous scientific discipline and claims that leither has no relation to philosophy, or that at the most this relationship is langential. In general one can say that the moment the scope of a branch of knowledge becomes definitely settled or settelable it goes outside the

domain of philosophy. Sartre puts it somewhat elliptically when he says "no science can take philosophy's place because science applies to some already delimited subject matter, philosophy is a process of 'totalization'.4 And Russell puts it thus: "... the only difference between science and philosophy is that science is what you more or less know, and philosophy is what you do not know. Philosophy is that part of science which at present people choose to have opinions about, but which they have no knowledge about. Therefore, every adavnce in knowledge robs philosophy of some problems which formerly it had." According to him the moment a problem becomes soluble it. "ceases to belong to philosophy and starts belonging to science and becomes to a large class of philosophical minds uninteresting." He re-emphasises this distinction when he says: "those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in science, while those only to which at present, no definite answers can be given, remain, and form the residue which is called philosophy."

The third difficulty in defining philosophy is that "there are many ways of philosophising, and philosophers may differ regarding what they consider to be the best way. But if "any kind of religious, mystical, practical, psychological, political, or social 'talk' is considered philosophy, philosophy becomes amorphors, soft and loose. On the other hand if logic (mathematical, philosophical, deontic, multivalued and modal), or analysis (whether it be of 'systematically misleading expressions', 'referring', 'three ways of spilling ink', 'making something happen' etc.') or of the structure of Dasein as 'already-being-in-the-world-in-advance-of-itself, or Being-concerned-with-being-in-the-world, or the discussions of 'the-for-itself or the pure nihilation of the 'in-itself') is considered the only right prototype of philosophy, philosophy becomes restricted, technical, hard and rigorous. rigourous sense. for example, "to me", says Sartre "philosophy is every. thing. It is the way one lives. One lives as a philosopher. I live as a philosopher. philosopher, that does not mean that I live as a good philosopher, but that my perceptions are philosophical perceptions, even when I look at that lamp, or when I look at the lamp. or when I look at you. Consequently, it is a way of living and I think if

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should be taught as soon as possible in simple language". According to should be taught as soon as possible in simple language". According to him philosophy is not something which is "to be written by itself, for its him philosophy is something which fulfills the need for the interaction of own sake", but is something which fulfills the need for the interaction of the philosopher's experience, more specifically what he calls "my inner experience". Wittgenstein who in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus upheld that the task of philosophy was 'the logical clarification of thoughts', surprisingly also has a similar conception of philosophy when he says: "working in philosophy- like working in architecture in many respects - is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretations. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them)" (CV p.16) In short one can say it is a reflection of one's own form of life. Mohanty means the same when he says: "Philosophy consists of reflection on man's experience in relation to himself, to others and the world."

Reflecting upon the activity of doing philosophy Wittgenstein says: "When you are philosophising you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there" (CV, p.65), and regards the activity of philosophising to consist in: "rejecting false arguments", whose aim is to free people from the philosophical confusions in which they are deeply embedded. And to free them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections they are caught up in." 12 It does so by erecting "a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 13 Because in his view though "philosophical problems are not empirical problems" (PI 109), yet they "can be compared to locks on safe, which can be opened by dialling a certain word or number, so that no force can open the door until just this word has been hit upon, and once it is hit upon any child can open it." 14 that philosophy in his opinion "is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (PI 109)

Whereas Karl Jaspers regards philosophising to be "the act which makes an individual a total human being", Heidegger considers "astonished, meditative preoccupation with the problem of existence perceived in its magnitude: its possible impossibility" to be the best way of philosophismes, Schopenhauer too upheld the view that philosophising begins "as an interruption, a hold up which puts all in question". He regards philosophisophismes

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phising to be the "supreme spontaniety and normality". Karl Jaspers low traces the origins of philosophising to "the experience of insufficiency in communication," and according to Murty "philosophising is taking into account the totality of experience and survey it as a whole so that thought may not be initiated by abstraction and partial over-emphasis and hence lack of balance". Skalidas Bhattacharya regards philosophising to be a 'creative thought' and considers it to be "a serious struggle with the problem of life and existence, as distinct from formalistic classification". In the diverse and conflicting ways of philosophising add to the difficulty in giving a precise definition of philosophy.

The fourth and the most crucial difficulty in attempting a definition of philosophy is that one's definition of philosophy has its foundations in his philosophical position. Or one may say that in giving a definition of philosophy one ipsofacto takes a philosophical position. But the philosophical position one takes and the philosophical ideas one upholds "are actually sensitive to individual temperament, and to wishes. Where the evidence and the arguments are too meagre to determine the results, the slack tends to be taken up by other factors. The personal flavour and motivation of each great philosopher's version of reality is unmistakeable. and the same is true of many lesser efforts." 17 Moreover, as Gerald Edelman says: "There is no partial philosophy; it is complete with each philosopher. Like a child exploding into a grasp of language, the philosopher must not simply describe an environment but construct a whole world. Each time a philosophical construction is attempted, there is a world view be hind it, and a personal one at that." Each of these philosophical constructions is entitled an 'ism'. Each of these 'isms' is "likely to spell the rejourned to the spell the rejourned to the spell the rejourned to the spell the sp tion of the last, as each philosopher constructs a unique point of view. Philosophy is a graveyard of 'isms' ".18 That is why no philosophical position has been accepted as final and absolutely correct position. As Waismann put it: "No philosophical argument ends with a Q.E.D. Horney force of the control of th ever forceful, it never forces. There is no bullying in philosophy neither with the stick of with the stick of logic nor with the stick of language." 19 Nor can lession monv - whether well in mony - whether verbal or scriptural, or authority - whether of 'sruli or

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philosophical disputes once and for all, or for drawing conclusion. So there philosophical disputes once and for all, or for drawing conclusion. So there is no definite way of arriving at final conclusions in philosophy. Or as Kant said, philosophy "is a battle-field of endless controversies". Since no philosophical position can be said to be final, no definition of philosophy can be final and absolute. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that "philosophy cannot take refuge in reduced ambitions. It is after eternal and non-local truth, even though we know that is not what we are going to get."²⁰

The fifth difficulty in defining 'philosophy' stems from the fact that there is no agreement among philosophers about its placement among the other branches of knowledge. Whereas Wittgestein upholds that "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.) (TLP 4.111), Russell in The Problems of Philosophy maintains that 'Philosophical knowledge ... does not differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science, and the results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those obtained by science."

But from the above it does not follow that the term philosophy can be used in any manner one likes. One cannot mean by it anything and everything. One cannot say like Humpty Dumpty said to Alice "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean". Nor does the controversy about the use of the term 'philosophy; imply that we have had enough of it and cannot make any progress in the matter, i.e., the conclusion which humpty Dumpty reached when Alice asked him to explain his meaning. Humpty Dumpty had replied "Now you talk like a reasonable child I meant that we have had enough of the subject, and it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't mean to slop here all the rest of your life."

Following Humpty Dumpty's advice and keeping in mind the fact 'philosophy; in its history has never been given a meaning precise

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enough for it to be used unequivocally a meaning on which most people living at a given time would agree, and also using Wittgenstein's maxim that meaning of a word lies in its use and the dictum that instead of drawing clear-cut, razor sharp boundaries around a concept, we shall look for family resemblances that a word has in its variety of usages, as our heuristic principle, let us make a survey of how the term philosophy has been used. Based on this survey we may arrive at a broad definition of the lerm philosophy.

To begin with let us differentiate between philosophy and ideology. The distinction between the two has been best put by Sartre in the following words:

Ideology is not constituted, mediated and reflected philosophy. It is an *ensemble* of ideas which underlies alienated acts and reflects them, which is never completely expressed and articulated, but which appears in the ideas of a given historical time or society. Ideologies represent powers and are active. Philosophies are formed in opposition to ideologies, although they reflect them to a certain extent while at the same time criticising them and going beyond them.²¹

After this clear distinction between ideology and philosophy let us first see what a philosopher actually does. In the words of Murty "A philosopher may surely discuss, dissect and evaluate all ideas, poetical, scientific, religious, legal, political, social and educational; for among other things, philosophy is the critique of ideologies and also the rational examination and evaluation of the foundations of belief and faith". 22 Based on the type of activities a philosopher engages himself in we have two types of philosophies. One: Speculative philosophy. Two: Critical philosophy. Speculative philosophy is described by A.N.Whitehead as "the endeavour to form a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which any element of our experience can be interpreted". 23 Critical philosophy, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the meanings of concepts and evaluation of beliefs. It aims at conceptual clarification. It can be the investigation of thought in the shape of

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Irrespective of whether we talk about speculative or critical philosophy one thing is clear and that is: an activity can be called "philosophy" if and only if it has something to do with knowledge, if it is in some sense a theory of knowledge or a method of getting knowledge or at least hints in the direction in which some supremely important kind of knowledge might be found. According to Rorty "Philosophy ... understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of manas-knower of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation". Fillosophical questions are certainly not of the kind which Wittgenstein holds them to be when he says:

"Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown ups "what is that?" - It happened like this: the grown ups had drawn pictures for the child several times and said: "this is a man", "this is a house", etc. And the child makes some marks too and asks: "what is this then"? (CV p.17)

This could be nothing but a parody of philosophical questions, for philosophical questions are not childish but foundational to all knowledge, and to the life of man. They are the most serious and fundamental of all the questions that can be asked. Philosophical problems have their origin in "an awareness of disorder in our concepts" and "always" are of the form: I simply don't know my way about". (PI 123) Philosophical problems "have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep as the form of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of language." (PI 111). Hence philosophical questions are 'foundational in respect to the rest of the culture because culture is the daims..."26

Philosophical questions being fundamental, arise out of assumptions, factices, speculations and discussions which are not themselves philosophi-

334 .

ASHOK VOHRA

cal. But in order to be philosophical the questions arising have got to be about basic meanings, about logical presuppositions, implications and incompatabilities. It is because of the fundamental nature of these questions that philosophy distinguishes itself from science which is an interpretation of observable data; distinguish itself from theology which claims to possess certain facts which by their very nature are never directly verifiable, and differ from poetry and rhetoric which express a certain attitude and whose main prupose is to evoke emotions in other persons. Philosophy "has no proper subject matter of its own. Instead it scrutinizes other areas of knowledge for clarity and consistency." The questions which philosophy asks and the answers that it gives are reducible to simple propositions which are capable of being true or false. By their very nature they can be either contradicted or accepted as such. Arguments may be advanced in favour or against them.

A student of philosophy "refuses to be satsified by the conventional presupposition that every sensible person knows the answer. As soon as you rest satisifed with primitive ideas and with primitive propositions, you have ceased to be a philosopher". 28 So philosophy develops an attitude of mind not to accept anything which is given in one's experience on its face value without thorough examination. It also develops a habit of the mind not to accept any answer as the final answer. Infact, while doing philosophy one develops a faculty which starts comparing the solution offered by anyone to a philosophical problem "with a gift in a fairy tale: in the magic castle it appears enchanted and if you look it outside in daylight, it is nothing but an ordinary bit of iron (or something of the kind)" (CV, p.11). That is why there is no answer in philosophy which is left unquestioned. It is because philosophical problems have no final solutions as these solutions if at all one may call them solutions, are by their very nature interlinked and refelct the 'lived life'. That is why Wittgenstein concludes "If there were a 'solution' of philosophical problems then we would only have to call to mind that at one time they had not been solved (and then 100 000 had to be obtained) had to be able to live and think)."29 We do feel disatisfied with the old solutions and all solutions and old models of explanation but we do not change them, we

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only sublimate them. From this Russell concluded in *Our Knowledge of the External World*: "Philosophy from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer results than any other branch of learning." This conclusion has led many to say that there has been no progress in philosophy since the time of Plato. To this Wittgenstein has given a befitting reply. He puts it thus:

"Philosophy hasn't made any progress? - If somebody scratches the spot where he has an itch, do we have to see some progress? Isn't it genuine scartching otherwise, or genuine itch? And can't these reactions to an irritation continue in the same way for a long time before a cure for itching is discovered? (CV, 86-87)

Whereas Russell traced the reasons for this stagnation in Philosophy to the method adopted by it. He claims in Mysticism and Logic³¹ that if philosophy is to advance as science does, it needs to be more closely connected with science, not so much in results but in methods. According to Wittgenstein the reason for philosophy's not making a progress is to be found in the nature of language itself. He says:

"People say again and again that philosophy doesn't really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problem as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don't understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions". (CV, p.15)

A philosopher, thus, keeps answering the same questions in the light of his experiences, his life situations, and in the idiom relevant to his limes. He continues to analyse and evaluate the beliefs which are ordinary assumed to be true and keeps pressing persistently beyond ordinary light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in order to synthesize all knowledge acquired over the years of light in or

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ent whole. While doing so he is free to relate to, or refer to any other philosophy irrespective of the time or place of the latter. He aims at theory "which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences and the kind which results form a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices and beliefs."32 He primarily builds a theory of representation or reality. These theories may be classified into (i) those which represent reality well, (ii) those which represent it less well and (iii) those which despite their pretence to represent reality do not represent it at all If philosophising results in a theory of the first kind, it exemplifies a good philosophy and becomes at least for the time being universally acceptable if it results in a theory of the second type it illustrates a kind of philosophy which needs more polishing in order to become universally acceptable: and if it results in a theory of the third type then it is universally rejected. So as Ouine put it: "Philosophy ... as an effort to get clearer on things, is not to be distinguished in essential points of purpose and method from good and had sciences."33 And he considers the "tolerance of wrong headed philosophy (to be) as unreasonable as tolerance of astrology would be on the part of astrophysicists and as unethical as tolerance of uniterianism on the part of the hell-fire fundamentalist."34

However in philosophical thinking one thing is certain and that is, philosophising has to proceed on the basis of experience and rigorous consistent thinking with full freedom to appreciate ideas acceptable to the thinker irrespective of their origin. As a result any philosophical theory is an outcome of rational thinking and though it transcends the barriers of space and time yet it "comprehends *local* differences, it lives in and through such differences." That is why there cannot be a universal philosophy, a philosophy for all time to come. It is because "Even those who regard philosophy as real and important know that they are at a particular and, we may hope, early stage of its development, limited by their own primitive intellectual capacities, and relying on the partial insights of a few great figures from the past. As we judge their results to be mistaken in fundational mental ways, so we must assume that even the best efforts of our own fine will come to seem blind eventually." Sartre who said "I consider Martine will come to seem blind eventually."

philosophy - Theory or Therapy?

ism, the one philosophy of our time which we cannot go beyond..."³⁷ has been proven to be wrong by the post-Marx and post-Marxian developments in social theory as well as praxis.

Through the enterprise of theory-building a philosopher clears the cob-webs of understanding, throws out from the cupboard those skeletons which have got rotten over a period of time and which confine a man to the narrow limits of common sense and traditional beliefs. He does not show preference for any particular ideas, nor does he dislike any ideas. As Willgenstein puts (Zettle 435) "The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher." But this does not mean that engagement in philosophical activity leads one to renunciation. On the contrary it "requires a resignation, but one of feeling and not of intellect. And may be that is what makes it so difficult for many."38 The activity of philosophy thus makes an individual less selfish and less dogmatic, makes him more rational, open-minded and objective. Thereby it contributes to the society by resolving its problem in an objecive, scientific way. "The use of philosophy" says A.N. Whitehead "is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system. It reverses the slow descent of accepted thoughts towards the inactive common place".39 And according to Wittgenstein "Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the growth of (any subject) as the sunlight has on the growth of potato shoots. (In the dark cellar they grow yards longer)" (PG. 381). According to Hilary Putnam the function of philosophical reflection is not to make flashing claims to "deconstruct" truth iself or the world itself, but its true role is to "unsettle our prejudices and our pet convictions and our blind spots."40 While Wittgenstein upholds hat all that philosophical reflection "can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one for instance as an 'absence of an idol'."⁴¹ It details by in 'no way' interfering with the actual world, but by merely describing it. It "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains bernla: Simply puts everything defore ac, hexplain either. For what might not lie open to view is of no interest to By philosophical reflection 'problems are solved (difficulties elimi-

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nated) not a single problem." (PI 133)

A philosophy which is purely theoretical, and does not solve any problem, or has absolutely no practical implication either for our intellectual life, or for our wordly life can at best be called reductive and niggling. This kind of philosophy perishes sooner than one can imagine and has not takers, but only undertakers. No one takes such a philosophy seriously. Ramsey too upholds the view that "Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously. Or else it is a disposition we have to check." In contrast, history of philosophy reveals that philosophies which have practical implications, which are productive and comprehensive have at everlasting value. They are pursued by many over the ages. But by practical utility one does not have to think that philosophy aims at producing or making things or developing improved techniques for providing material goods. But if one like Shakespere's Romeo believed and said:

" ... Hang up philosophy!
Unless philosophy can make a Juliet,
Displant a town, reverse a prince's doom,
It helps not, it prevails not: talk no more"

(Romeo & Juliet, III (iii)

then philosophy by itself will not be able to help, it will offer no cure, it will not be a, therapy. But then Romeo's demand for the making of a Julie etc. was a cry of despair and it can be easily presumed that he did not mean it seriously.

If one like Marx attempts to condemn philosophy by saying, "Philosophers have variously interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it", one has to remind him and his followers that even in saying the was propounding a philosophy - a philosophy which brought a revolution in this world; a philosophy which claimed to provide a remedy to the exploited, suffering millions in the world. A philosophy which provided relief - what a relief it was time has revealed.

But that is where the charm of doing philosophy lies. According

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Russell it "consists in speculative freedom, in the fact that you can play with hypotheses. You may think out this or that which may be true, which is very valuable exercise until you discover what is true; but when you discover what is true the whole fruitful play of fancy in that region is curtailed, and you will abandon that region and pass on". A philosopher therefore is an adventurous person who "likes to dwell in the region where there are still uncertainties". He may be studying the problem not for the sake of any definite answers, for he recognises the fact that no definite answers are possible, he studies them 'for the sake of questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation: but above all because through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good."

A philosopher may not be at the helm of affairs, but certainly he is not a person who is searching for a black cat in a dark room which is not there. He is not oblivous to the problem of day-to-day life. As R.G. Collingwood said about a philosopher: "If he is not a pilot, neither is he a mere spectator watching the ship from his study window. He is one of the crew."47 Nor is philosophy as Russell said in My Philosophical Development "at best a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst an idle tea-table amusement". On the contrary "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the underslanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery." (PI 119) The business of philosophy is to show that our ordinary beliefs are in some imporlant sense dubious and the role of philosophy is either to give some sup-Port for our ordinary day to day views or to reject them if we can find no Support for them. In Modes of Thought Whitehead pointed out that philosophy is an attempt to make manifest the fundamental evidence as to the alute of things. The role of a philosopher according to Sartre "is to show ^{4 method} whereby the world can be conceived starting at the ontological

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level."⁴⁸ "The business of philosophy" according to Wittgenstein is he make it possible for us to get a clear view of.. The state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved." (PI 125) We get the clear view of the philosophical problems not by adding some new information to our already existent repoertoire of knowledge "but by arranging what we have always known." (PI 109) In short it provides a justification for what we do, or do not do, and shows "that we are not fools for doing what we want to do."⁴⁹ In doing that it serves both as a theory and a therapy, because "without philosophy, thoughts are, as it were cloudy and indistinct; its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries". (TLP 4.112)

NOTES

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- 9. "Interview with Jean Paul Sartre", The Philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, Op.cit., p.51.

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ASHOK VOHRA

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- 35. J.N.Mohanty, op.cit., p.330.
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- 42. Ibid., p.177.
- 43. "Philosophy", *The Foundation of Mathematics*, Littlefield Adams, N.J., 1960, p.263.
- 44. "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", op.cit., p.281.
- 45. *Ibid.*
- 46. The Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 624.
- 47. The Present Need of a Philosophy", Philosophy, 1934, p.234.
- 48. The Philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, op.cit., p.18.
- 49. Quoted in Gerald Edelman, Bright Air Brilliant Fire, op.cit. p.157.

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IN DEFENSE OF A DERIVATION OF 'OUGHT' FROM 'IS'

MARK R. WHEELER

Searle thinks we can derive normative conclusions from descriptive premises, and I think he may have a point. Consider the following argument!:

A Promising Argument

- P1: Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars'.
- P2: Under certain conditions C, anyone who utters the words (sentence) 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars' promises to pay Smith five dollars.
- P3: Conditions C obtain:

C1: Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle has claimed that the argument (henceforth 'PA') involves only descriptive premises but that the conclusion is a normative (what he calls an 'evaluative') conclusion. Anthony Flew thinks Searle fails to deliever the goods, and in particular, he believes Searle's project fails at precisely in regard to the analysis of PA. I think Searle's argument is better than Flew makes it out to be.

Preliminaries

It will be helpful to lay out Searle's claims concerning PA. As was

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.3

July 1999

p.XXXIV.

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MARK R. WHEELER

noted above, Searle claims that P1 -P3 are purely descriptive claims. Most of Searle's discussion of C1 presupposes that C1 is descriptive, but Searle leaves it open that someone might claim that C1 is evaluative. If someone were to urge that C1 is evaluative, Searle's project would not be jeapordized For assuming that P1 - P3 are descriptive, Searle would have shown that an evaluative claim (viz., C1) can be derived from descriptive premises (viz., P1-P3) without proceeding through the remaining premises he presents

Neither Searle nor Flew provide precise criteria for distinguishing between descriptive and evaluative claims. Searle mentions that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between statements of fact and statements of value, and he suggests that statements of fact will be statements of empirical facts and statements of value will be moral statements. Flew provides as a guide in understanding this distinction a quote from Karl Popper's book *The Open Society and Its Enemies* in which Popper makes a distinction between statements of fact and statements of norms. Popper suggests that statements of fact are statements about how the world is, while statements of norms concern standards which humans impose upon the world irrespective of the facts.

Both Searle and Flew assume that this distinction between descriptive and evaluative statements corresponds to a real distinction among statements. Searle is quite clear on this point. Flew is less obviously committed to this distinction. He claims that it "is not, and does not have to be thought to be, a clearcut feature of all actual discourse." However, is claims that the move a critic of Searle's position must make is "to distinguish normative and descriptive elements of the meaning of words like promises." These excerpts show that Flew is at least committed to their being a distinction between evaluative and descriptive meanings of words albeit one which is not a clearcut feature of our actual discourse. Given that Flew accepts the corresponding distinction among statements. This assumption that such a distinction among statements is a good one may be incorrect. It might be the case that the correct analysis of evaluative latinguage reveals that evaluative claims are, in fact, descriptive claims, of vice years. Nonetheless, for our purposes here it will be assumed that this discourse.

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tinction has merit. Searle's View

Searle claims that the inference from P1-P3 to C1 is a valid inference. Although we shall have to look into the truth of this claim when we urn to Flew's objection, prima facie it is correct to claim that if P1 - P3 are ITUE (assuming that the conditions C in P2 and P3 are spelled out) then C1 must be true.

Searle denies that C1 is presenting in oratio obliqua (in the form of indirect discourse) Jones' utterance "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars". C1 is not a report of what Jones said, according to Searle, Rather, C1 asserts that Jones has committed the speech act of promising with regard to Smith. To promise is to act in a certain way, and according 10 Searle, C1 asserts that Jones has acted in that way with regard to Smith.

Searle places constraints upon how we are to understand the situauon that Jones and Smith are in when Jones utters "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars." These constraints constitute the conditions Cin premises P2 and P3. Among the conditions C are, for examples, the conditions that (1) Jones and Smith are speakers of English, (2) Jones and Smith are speaking seriously, and (3) Jones knows what he is doing. Searle has no pretensions of having explicitly provided the complete list of conditions which are sufficient for the speech act of promising given an utterance of the form "I hereby promise you, Smith, five dollars." Nevertheless, Searle claims that the all of the conditions making up the set of conditions C are straightforwaedly empirical conditions, or in other words, the conditions C are purely descriptive conditions.

As P2 makes clear, according to Searle when the conditions C obhin, they are sufficient to make anyone's utterance "I hereby promise you, Smith, five dollars" a promise to pay Smith five dollars. Thus for Searle, the conditions C are the sufficient conditions for making the utterance in question an instance of the speech act of promising. A speech act occurs, According to Searle, when a phrase in a language has a meaning the consto Gearle, when a phrase in a language has squence of which is that the utterance of that phrase under certain condi-

MARK R. WHEELER

tions constitutes an action of a certain sort. For example, the English phrate "I would like to introduce Ms.Akins to you, Mrs.Keynes", when utlest under the right conditions, constitutes a speech act of introduction. Seatly claims that, in the situation of Jones and Smith, a speech act of promising has occurred.

Since for Searle, the conditions C are the sufficient conditions for someone's utterance of the phrase "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith five dollars" to constitute an instance of a speech act of promising, and since all of the conditions C are purely descriptive conditions, it follows that a purely descriptive set of conditions is sufficient for someone who utters the phrase "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" to Searle, need be present for someone to promise to pay Smith five dollars.

Searle asserts, "Uttering certain words in certain conditions just is promising and the description of these conditions needs no evaluative dement." Thus, we can present Searle's analysis of a speech act of promising in the following way:

- (SAP) X has committed a speech act of promising to pay Smith five dollars at t iff.:
- 1) X has uttered the phrase 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars' at t, and 2) Descriptive conditions C obtain at t.

Flew's View

Flew disagrees with Searle's analysis of a speech act of promising is.

According to Flew, the correct analysis of a speech act of promising is.

- (FAP) X has committed a speech act of promising to pay Smith five dollars at t iff:
- 1) X has uttered the phrase 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars',
- 2) Descriptive conditions C obtain, and

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3) X is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising.

Thus, Flew believes that Searle has not provided the sufficient conditions for a speech act of promising. Furthermore according to Flew, SA is fallacious because it fails to take the evaluative condition 3 into consideration. An additional premise and a change in premise P2 would be needed before C1, understood as asserting that Jones had committed a speech act of promising, would follow, Flew's reconstruction of SA would look something like this:

A Less Promising Argument

- P1: Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.'
- P2: Under certain conditions C and if the person P is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising, then if P utters the words (sentence) 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars 'P has promised to pay Smith five dollars.
- P3: Conditions C obtain.
- P4: Jones is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising.
- C2: Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.

Flew claims that P4 is an evaluative premise. Thus, if Flew's reconstruction of is correct, Searle's attempt to derive an evaluative conclusion from purely descriptive premises fails. For as we noted above, if an evaluative claim is present in PA, then Searle's large project fails.

A Closer Look

In evaluating Flew's objection to Searle's argument I will follow two lines of investigation. First, I will assess Flew's analysis of a speech act of then assess Flew's reconstruction of PA and show that, even if we accept

MARK R. WHEELER

P4 and the change in P2, the argument is not jeopardized.

Condition 3 in FAP is not a necessary condition for the speech act of promising. Condition 3 asserts that, unless a person accepts the norms involved in the social institution of promising, a person cannot commit the speech act of promising. Reflecting on what is involved in the example of Jones and Smith will help to show why this is false.

Assume that condition 3 of FAP is a necessary condition for committing a speech act of promising. Assume that every condition for a successful speech act of promising except for condition 3 is satisfied in the situation under consideration. Assume further that Jones does utter the sentence "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars." Moreover, assume that we know that Jones does not adopt the norms invloved in promising and that Smith is ignorant of this. In fact, let's assume that we know that Jones is an inveterate liar and con-man who, in order to swindle people like Smith, counts on them assuming that he does adopt the norms involved in promising.

Given that Jones is this way and that our other assumptions are true, we would have to say that Jones has not promised to pay Smith five dollars. But this is certainly not how we actually assess such situations. Rather, we would say, in this case, that Jones indeed has promised to pay Smith five dollars; it just happens that Jones is a cad. It is intuitively obvious that if anyone has made a promise, Jones has made a promise to Smith in this situation.

Since we clearly don't want to claim that Jones hasn't promised to pay Smith five dollars in the example we are considering, some one of our initial assumptions for our example must be rejected. Doubting that Jones uttered the words he did seems wrong. People utter such phrases all the time, although perhaps in a more informal way, and assuming that Jones uttered these words in this case seems perfectly acceptable. Doubting the descriptive conditions under which such an utterance constitutes a speech act seems wrong as well. Both Searle and Flew agree that some such conditions must exist for speech acts of any kind to occur. Assuming that

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Jones is not committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising, while apparently a perverse assumption to make according to Flew, is nonetheless obviously an acceptable assumption. It seems clear that many people are not committed to the norms of the institution of promising, unfortunate though this fact may be. Thus, the assumption that condition 3 is a necessary condition for committing a speech act of promising must be denied. And this seems perfectly reasonable. The fact that Jones isn't committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising while nevertheless making appearances of so doing shows only that he is disingenuous; it does not exonerate him from his promise.

Since Flew's analysis provided him with the reason for reconstructing PA in the way he did, the above assessment of FAP would be sufficient to undermine Flew's objection to PA. However, since our intuitions concerning promises are fallible, it behooves us to demonstrate that, even if we accept FAP and Flew's reconstruction of PA, Searle's large project of deriving an evaluative conclusion from descriptive premises is not jeopardized. In order to succeed in this demonstration, we must show that the premises P2 and P4 of Flew's argument are not evaluative. Since P2 is evaluative only if P4 is evaluative, we shall focus our attention on P4.

P4 asserts that Jones is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising. Thus, P4 asserts that Jones has the property of being-committed-to-the-institution-of-promising. Flew claims that this premise is evaluative. this seems false. That Jones has a commitment of some sort is a fact about Jones. We could, if need be, construct an experiment whereby we determine whether or not Jones has a given commitment, say by asking lones whether or not he has the commitment in question. As such, Jone's having a commitment is an empirical state of affairs. To use Popper's leminology, Jones' having a commitment is a way the world is and not a morm asserted by humans. Thus, P4 is not an evaluative premise. Rather, it is a descriptive premise. As such and in full accord with Searle's position, P4 could be put into the set of conditions C, leaving us with Searle's might not want to have P4 in the set of conditions C either, but this only

MARK R. WHEELER

simplifies the matter more, since we would then be left with Searle's original argument without the addition of P4 to the set of conditions C.

It is difficult to imagine how Flew can deny our contention that his analysis of the speech act of promising (SAP) is incorrect and, thus, that his objection to PA is faulty. For him to deny that the example given is a counter-example to his analysis would leave him in the difficult position of explaining our intuitions concerning this example and others like it that might be generated. But assuming that Flew opts for this line, the burden of showing how P4 is evaluative still rests with him. Unless a plausible case can be made for P4's being evaluative, Flew's objection to Searle's position fails, even given his alternative analysis of the speech act of promising.

A Possible Objection

It might be urged against the objection just presented that our reconstruction of Flew's analysis of a speech act of promising (FAP) is incorrect. It might be claimed that condition 3 of (FAP) inaccurately reports Flew's intended analysis. For, condition 3 was distilled from the following claim: "...the normative element enters...when, by using the word 'promise' without reservation, we commit ourselves to that institution." 'We', as it is used in this quote, might be understood to refer to the person(s) reporting or making observations about a speech act, or it might be understood to refer to the person(s) committing the speech act. In presenting our objection, we have followed the latter interpretation. However, it might be claimed that Flew intended the 'we' in question to refer, instead, to the person(s) calling the act a promise. In this case, Flew's analysis of a speech act of promising would be reconstructed as follows:

(FAP2)X has committed a speech act of promising to pay Smith five dollars at t iff 1) X has attered the phrase 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars', 2) Descriptive conditions C obtain, 3) There is a person calling the act a promise, and 4) The person calling the act a promise is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising.

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on this reading, Flew's analysis would include two conditions upon the on this reaction of promising which Searle left out; thus, Flew would be object Searle's analysis as inadequate. Moreover, PA would again be falaccount of the fact that it fails to take conditions 3 and 4 into consideration. Two further premises and a change in P2 would be needed before C1, understood as asserting that Jones had committed a speech act of promising, would follow. Given (FAP2), Flew's reconstruction of SA would be like this:

A More Promising Argument

- Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, P1: five dollars.'
- Under certain conditions C and if a person P called Jones' act P2: a promise and if the person P who is calling the act a promise is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising, then if Jones utters the words (sentence) 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars' Jones has promised to pay Smith five dollars.
- P3: Conditions C obtain.
- P4: There is a person P who called jone's act a promise.
- P5: The person P calling the act a promise is committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising.
- C3: Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.

Flew claims that P5 is an evaluative premise. Thus, if this recon-Muction of PA is correct, Searle's attempt to derive an evaluative conclufrom purely descriptive premises is undermined.

Once More Unto the Breach

In assessing this form of Flew's objection to Searle's argument, it is ficient to show that it admits of counterexamples and that P5 is not

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evalutive. I will address these two points in reverse order. P5 of Flexisecond argument is not an evaluative premise for the same reasons that of his first was not evaluative. In his first argument, P5 asserts that person calling the act a promise has the property of being-committed the-norms-involved-in-the-institution-of-promising. This is a fact about person in question. As such, P5 is a descriptive promise. Flew's claim to P5 is evaluative is thus false. Moreover, P4 of Flews second argument uncontroversially descriptive. Therefore, on this reconstruction of Search argument, Searle's project is not imperilled.

(FAP2) asserts two necessary conditions for the commission of a speech act of promising beyond those Searle proposes. Condition 3 (FAP2) asserts that there must be a person who calls the act in question promise before the act can become a speech act of promising. Condition 4 asserts that the person so calling the act must be committed to the normal involved in the institution of promising before the act can become a promise. Both of these conditions are objectionable. An example will make this clear.

Imagine that Smith and Jones are alone in remote area of the Mojat desert. Assume that Jones has uttered the words (sentence) 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.' Assume that the descriptive conditions C necessary for this act to become a speech act of promising obtain Let it also be the case that neither Smith nor Jones calls this act a promise Finally, assume that no person ever comes into contact with Jones or Smith after Jones has made this utterance. It is clear from these parameters has no one ever calls Jones' utterance a promise. therefore, condition 3d (FAP2) is not satisfied. It is a fortiori obvious that condition 4 of (FAP) fails to obtain. On Flew's interpretation of speech acts of promising, si must accept that in this situation Jones has not promised to pay Smith fix dollars. Nevertheless, we do not want to claim that in this situation has promised to pay the has promised to pay the has promised to pay the has promised to pay the pay the pay the has promised to pay the has promised to pay Smith five dollers. Neither the fact that Jones at Smith fail to baptize the act by calling it a promise nor the fact that person other than I. person other than Jones and Smith called the act a promise make the any less a promise. any less a promise. Natural historians of actual discourse need not be present

for promises to occur.

Changing the example slightly, we can see that condition 4 is un-Recessary as well. Assume that the situation described above is the same accessary as the facts that 1) unbeknownst to Smith and Jones, a CIA spy succept for the event to Washington where CIA operathe Lingo witnesses the transmitted event and calls it a promise and 2) Lingo is not committed to the norms involved in the institution of promising. In this case condition 3 of (FAP2) is satisfied. However, condition 4 is not satisfied. Our agent Lingo is a mean spirited member of the CIA; he is indifferent to the norms involved in the institution of promising. This should make no difference as to whether or not Jones' utterance qualifies is a speech act of promising. Our moral intuitions are that such a fact has to bearing on whether or not Jones has made a promise. It is irrelevant to Smith's and Jones' situation whether or not Lingo accepts the norms involved in the institution of promising.

Conclusion

If it's possible to derive an ought from an is, it surely isn't easy. Where analysis suggests that the derivation obtains, we need to carefully consider arguments to the contrary. Searle has given us a plausible argument, and the countervailing arguments seem weak. There is yet a good promise in his reasoning.

NOTES

The argument is from Searle's "How To Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'," Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), pp. 43-48. The article is reprinted in the widely Contemporary Ethics: Selected Readings, edited by James P.Sterba, Prentice Hall (1989), pp. 55-60. Anthony Flew's has responded to Searle's argument in "On Not Deriving 'Ought' From 'Is'," Analysis, 25 (1964), pp. 25-32. Flew's article is also reprinted in the Sterba volume, pp. 61-66.

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THE LOGISTICS OF ARGUMENTATION: HABERMAS AND NYĀYA (A COMPARISON)

P. SUDARSAN

Introduction

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ch Workin s. 50/- In any philosophical interfacing of ideas between two different traditions and viewpoints argumentation is indispensable. Both in East and West, discourse has been used tellingly to substantiate and establish systems of thought. Whereas, in the West, the argumentative tradition received a short shift during the middle ages, in India the tradition continued till much later. Socrates the master of eliciting confessions from the opponents about the weaknesses of their own arguments stands as the tallest figure in the West.

In India, since the tradition was commentarial and since it remains so even today in traditional bastions of learning, the method of argumentation was mastered by all two sought to cement their systems of thought. There were, in India too, peers for Grecian Sophists in the Naiyāyikas who honed the art of argumentation to a nicety. But Naiyāyikas were more interested in laying down the rules for argumentation since they were more concerned with logical reasoning. Though it is common in both traditions for one system to join issue with other systems, only Habermas explored the feasibility of a nunning discourse on social, political, and practical problems in the present historical context. It is but usual that a system refutes the claims of its rivals after the fading away from the scene of its towering luminaries. But it was Habermas who introduced a multidimensional approach to the complex web of issues which are not so simple as to warrant a solution after having a lete-a-tete over the table. On the contrary, there are problems which are

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as old as the human race and which will continue to haunt forever. Man has the rare gift of reconciling himself to even unpalatable situations and turning them to his advantage. It is here that the persuasive and convincing power of the argumentative skill comes in handy. But there are problems concerning beliefs, identities, ideologies, dogmatism, reification, and exploitation which beg for a more discursive and dialogical approach. In order to avoid traps and self-deceptions one needs to master the skill of argumentation. Precisely, this was the reason which prompted people like Habermas and Naiyāyikas to systematize the rules of argumentation so that it may be used for a constructive debate and in detecting and protecting oneself from deceit and manipulation from other ill-willed interlocutors. On the other hand, one can instill a positive response in the interlocutors by making them see reason and involving them in the dialogue.

The Aim of a Discourse

Habermas, says McCarthy, has proclaimed that his theory of knowledge has remained faithful to the "insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life." McCarthy writes further," ... Habermas' argument is, simply, that the goal of a critical theory - a form of life free from unnecessary domination in all its forms - is inherent in the notion of truth: it is anticipated in every act of communication."2 This view is very close to the Nyāya concept of vāda,1 type of argument which aims only at achieving truth irrespective of who triumphs in the debate.³ Furthermore, Habermas' strong emphasis on the role of communicative competence which necessarily involves argumentalive and rationalizing skills and his stress upon the acceptable way to essay one's opinion and contentions resembles the Nyāya theory of argumentation which various types of right and wrong types of discourses are discussed elaborately. It is this communicative competence which determines the achievement of the objectives of the participants along with the types of debates to be debates to be engaged in, with the opponent. If the opponent is intentionally defeating the defeating the proponent by resorting to all sorts of fallacious reasoning, the argumentative child argumentative skills of the proponent helps him in warding of the opponent

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The Logistics of Argumentation: Habermas And Nyāya

The discourse is determined by the attitude and vein of the participants.

For Habermas, communicative action is the logical consequence of the innate communicative competence. A discourse is a rational process of agumentation in which only the force of the argument prevails.⁴ Whereas, argumento of Nyāya, it is a stage by stage journey from doubt (sansaya) n uncertainty (nirnaya) in which various types of argumentation processes form a part.⁵ In communicative action, Habermas, though he distinguishes the attitudes characterizing each interaction, aims only at achieving a congasus via practical discourse in which moral-ethical questions are discussed. But the Nyāya dialectician takes recourse to various types of arguments in various types of debates. If the interlocutors set their sights upon achieving true knowledge, then it is vāda. The debators are called upon to call the bluff of the opponents if they resort to false methods. Thus, rhetoric, polemics, and sophistry all find a place in Nyāya theory of argumentation. Here 100, like Habermas' universal pragmatics there is always a need to have the proof of an established tenet of knowledge. Thus, a priori and a posteriori components of knowledge come into play. Thus, the hallmarks of the communicative action like discursivity, justifiability, and redeemabilby which is the silver-lining of all argumentative methods find a place in Nyāya theory of debates.

The major difference between Habermas' discourse and Nyāya theory of argumentation lies in the direction of thrust. While, for Habermas, the aim is to give the practical and normative actions a theoretical basis and empirical veracity, the Nyāya aim is rigorous and logically sound epistemology which leads to a final release from ignorance. This may make it appear as if Nyāya supports soteriology. But B.K. Matilal argues that the emphasis on tarka which is translated variedly as confutation, hypothetical argumentation, and logical reasoning rids the Indian philosophy, as a whole, of the tag of being soteriological. Vidyabhusana argues that this method argumentation and logical reasoning of the Nyāya philosophy has perlogical systems of Indian philosophy which were intent on systematic and logical development.

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While discussing the reasons behind Habermas' staunch support While discussing the relationship to the support of the traditional assumption that the speaker - hearer's linguistic intuition in the ultimate standard for determining the accuracy of the linguists' propos als." By advocating a "maeutic" process, Habermas wants to give equal importance to both the formal and empirical components of speech. The "maeutic" procedure consists of "questioning the subject with the aid of sytematically arranged examples (through the use of suitable examples and counter examples, of contrast and similarity relations, of paraphrases, and the like)."9 Nyāya theory realizes the chances of distortion in a debale and vividly discusses various ways of committing fallacies. The awareness of such fallacious methods of reasoning is imperative for any skilful debater And in order to meet the devious designs of the opponents the disnutant has to employ the right methods and point out the anomalies in the opponent's arguments. Thus the apporach is realistic. On the contrary, Haberman demands an "ideal speech situation" in order that a free, fair, and undistorted debate aimed at achieving a consensus is conducted. This is precisely the reason for which Habermas shifted the onus onto language instead of consciousness. Austin's institutionally bound speech acts and Searle's analysis which links the attitudinal, linguistic, and the institutional apparatus at tracted Habermas. He reiterates that the communicative aspects of speech is the fundamental telos of any communicative activity and that strategic and instrumental uses are only parasitic. 10 Likewise, Nyāya speaks of three kinds of argumentation: vāda, vitanda, and jalpa. The first is discussion and aims at arriving at a true knowledge; the second is cavilling and aims at find ing faults; and the third is wrangling and it is concerned with vanquishing the opponent. 11 As though echoing the Nyāya procedure McCarthy writes. 15

Assuming mutual comprehensibility, consensus is endangered if the truth of what one says is challenged. This kind of disturbance can be overcome within the context of interaction by pointing to relevant experiences, supplying information, citing recognized authorities, and the like.

The Logistics of Argumentation: Habermas And Nyāya

Thus, in the case of Vāda and discourse only the "unforced force of the beller argument" counts and not the victory of personal viewpoints. Vāda is for tatīva bubutsu, the seeker of ultimate knowledge, whereas discourse is for the aspirant of a rational consensus devoid of coercion, distortion, and deception.

Habermas draws a distinction between the everyday life, doxa, opinion, common sense, the unreflected, uncritical, natural standopints) and theoretical attitude (episteme, knowledge, science, the reflected, critical, phenomenological standpoints). This is the basis of his differentiating communicative action (interaction) from discourse. In the former, the validity claims are naively accepted while, in the latter, they are considered hypothetical and there is a need for them to be explicitly thematized. In a discourse, the aim is rationally motivated consensus. 13

The agreement is valid for all rational subjects.

Arguing forcefully in favour of his paradigm shift, Habermas says that verification does not end with experience but needs interpretation in language. The old experience is sublated by a new experience and this is explainable only in language. In his theoretical discourse, Habermas analyses the structure and conditions of argumentation relating to hypothetical with claims. McCarthy writes, "As such it is a "logic of truth," an examination of how claims about the world can be rationally settled." According to Habermas, discursivity and objectivity are not mutually exclusive. He sees the world of objects of experience as the "systematic interplay of sense reception, action and linguistic representation."

Habermas uses the theory of speech acts in describing the word-world relationship. The reason he attributes is that the world of objects (bodies a motion) are coordinated with the world of praxis (acting and speaking subjects). Referring to the frames of references of empitical and described realms. McCarthy says, "In one case we have a reference speech of empirical descriptions, in the other a reference system for narra-dargumentative reasoning is compatible with this differential meaning-

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constitution of object domains."17 Unlike Peirce, for whom the opinion that the truth Haberman laws which is agreeable to everyone is the truth, Habermas lays down the truth rion of rational justification and judgement of competent individuals was whom the dialogue is possible. Finally, the agreement of the participe. confers authenticity to the truth claim.

Accepting Austin-Strawson emphasis on performative aspect of the sentences, Habermas stresses that the assertions gain truth-hood only who they are asserted. Thus, he holds on to the "argumentative vindication" truth claims. By this, he makes himself the target of criticism of conjusing truth and the method of arriving at the truth. McCarthy also points to the problem of distinguishing between a false and true consensus Habermas tries to parry the objections by insisting upon the cogency of arguments employed in a discourse. Though he does not elaborately the with the falsifying aspects of an argumentation process he has indirect referred to them through his "ideal speech situation". 18 In Nyāya too, sud an "ideal speech situation" has been envisaged in which free discourse critical examination, logical justification, and rational consensus about Habermas writes, the criterion of truth is "not the fact that some consensa has been reached, but rather that at all times and all places, if only we enter into a discourse, a consensus can be arrived at under conditions which show the consensus to be grounded."19 Habermas realizes that such local claims must stand the scrutiny of metatheoretical and epistemological kriton processes.

Habermas sees the affirmation of the goal of critical theory of "god and true life" in the consensual, cooperative, and free theoretical discourse Though the ideal speech situation is far from realistic the anticipation is imperative for all those who are engaged in an argumentative activity. basic presupposition is absent there is no possibility of any meaning of any mean communicative activity, cogency of expression, and normative grounds of values. There can be no hermenutic process and there will be a complete breakdown. breakdowm in intersubjective interaction. What makes even a convertion possible is a tion possible is the avowed desire that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is this possibility of an ideal that there is the accordance to the ideal that there is the accordance to the ideal that there is the ideal that t speech situation. Hence, Habermas argues that "this is an unavoidable leading of all the speech situation."

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The Logistics of Argumentation: Habermas And Nyāya

presupposition (Understellung) of a discourse."20 While Habermas has presupposition the case of systematic distortions, there gevery possibility that the absense of the notion of the ideal speech situgevery possible to systematic distortions like neurosis, hysteria, depression, and schizophrenia because there will be no standard norms to distinguish between what is true and what is false and the human mind cannot work without a frame of reference to categorize thoughts and ideas.²¹

We cannot know a priori whether that appearance [Vorschein] is a mere delusion [Vorspiegelung]-however unavoidable, the presuppositions from which it springs-or whether the empirical conditions for the realization (if only approximate) of the supposed forms of life can practically be brought about, Viewed in this way, the fundamental norms of rational speech built into universal pragmatics contains a practical hypothesis.

Sarting from this practical hypothesis, Habermas goes on to argue for the possibility of rational approach to practical questions.

Practical Discourse

Habermas holds that "the justification of the validity claims contained in the recommendation of norms of action and of evaluation can be just as discursively tested as the justification of the validity claims implied in asentions."22 McCarthy writes that any action is performed in the background drecongized values, norms, institutions, rules, and conventions, Habermas gives the example of regulative speech acts. Practical discourse deals with problematic rightness claims and aims at achieving a consensus through alionally motivated argumentation. At a higher level, even norms and inwhich form the background of the discourse become the target of The only possible way to establish their validity is to universalize consensus. Discursivity, redeemability, and criticisability make the rightlines valid. This is possible only through the intersubjective recogthis is possible only through the simulation of viidity claims. Here, the rationality is immanent to the real intersisting states. Here, the rationality is initially states because it is a states and sincere intentions of the participants of a discourse because it is a lity of an unavoidable of adherence to the norms and regulating oneself rather than con-

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P. SUDARSAL 362

siderations of success or happiness.

Habermas goes on to stress the role of language as the bridge tween the subjective and the objective realms. Though humans have he uncanny knack of smelling the intentions of others only the language bird normatively the interlocutors in carrying out the transactions. This is precisely the reason why Habermas chooses illocutionary speech acts for is communicative action. Austin himself says that an enhancement in linguistic capabilities could help one to express one's thoughts and ideas in a be. ter manner and this also gives a methodological success. Habermas lets that theoretical and practical reasons are inextricably linked. This is became the question of "How" cannot be divorced from the question of "What"

It is to be noted with interest that both habermas and Naivavita emphasize the universalizabilty principle. Though being realistic, the Nija method not only pays attention to the world of affairs but also to the mix tical aspect of individual conduct for which it takes the cue from smi Thomas McCarthy, commenting on Robin Horton's views on African trail tion cultures, writes as follows: "In short African traditional cultures largely lack what Popper calls a critical tradition and what Habermas terms limit tutionalized discourse."23 But this is not true in the case of Indian tradtion which in essence is dialogical and argumentative. In response to pell Winch's defense of Zande tribes' lack of discursive tradition in which he clio the difference in outlooks of external observers because of their lifework backgrounds, Habermas and K.O. Apel argue that the relativistic standpoint of attributing the absence of dialogical moment to diference in practical reals is condescending. The absence of discursive tradition is only too apparent ent. It can be argued that while such a relativistic view has been aired from one side and there has not been a corresponding response from the old proves the contention that there has been a dearth of argumentalive tion in African tribes.

Nyāya method of Argumentation

The Nyāya school was the harbinger of logical hypothesizing in line hilosophy. West dian philosophy, Without exception, all other schools of Indian philosophy

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The Logistics of Argumentation: Habermas And Nyāya

have borrowed the syllogistic method of Nyaāa to establish their epistemological doctrines. Rightly, Nyāya has been variedly called *Tarkaśāstra* or the science of reasoning; *pramāṇaśāstra* or the science of logic and epistemology; *Hetuvidya* or the science of causes; *Vādavidya* or the science of debales; *Anvīkṣiki* or the science of critical study.²⁴

The Nyāya method starts with an inital doubt (saņsays) and proceeds lowards a conclusion (nirnaya). The investigation is based upon the pramāna doctrine or the theory of adequte evidence. This method attempts to resolve "the doubt of a neutral party (madhyastha- the person in the middle) through the medium of a strictly controlled debate between two parties."25 According to Vātsyayana, Anvīkṣiki is the Nyāyavidyā i.e. criticl examination of an idea or a doctrine through pramanas.26 Thus by espousing the method of adequate evidence Nyāya method destroys the allegation that Indian obilosophy is soteriological (adhyātmavidya). The great Vishnugupta, the author of monumental Arthasāstra defines Anvīksiki or philosophy as follows: "... Anvīksiki renders help to people, keeps their minds steady in woe and weal, and produces adroitness of understanding, speech, and action."²⁷ lis emphasized in the Nyāyasutra that only if the sixteen catagories are known that right knowledge is obtained. Apart from pramana and prameya there are fourteen catagories. The first seven are called Nyāya-pūrvāga, the preliminaries and the last seven containing a classification of types of debales are called Nyāya-uttarānga. The preliminaries contain doubt, purpose, observational data, doctrinal bases, the schema for argument, supportive leasoning, and decision. The last seven consist of three types of debates (vàda, jalpa, and vitanda), pseudo-eveidence, quibbling, sophistical rejoinders, and situations for courting defeat.²⁸ Though the Nyaya method mainly calers to the epistemological inquiry the logical reasoning is also used alleforically in other realms as mentioned in the purpose or prayojana of in-The subject under discussion here is the aim of human beings at various stages of their lives. These are called purusharthas in Indian philosophy. They are: dharma-religio-ethical duties, artha-wealth, Kāma dulies of a householder, and moksa-the final release.²⁹

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P. SUDARSAN

Argumentation as a method of corrective aspect of reflective activity had been emphasized repeatedly in many works far more ancient than the Greek Uponicadic) poriod of the tradition. During the sramana (post-Upanisadic) period of Indian philoso phy, the intellectual climate was ablaze with controversies and criticism were flying thick and fast between the proponents and the opponents of the vedas. Organized religion, Vedic orthodoxy, established social codes and moral norms were subjected to crucible test. Debates, slanging matches and wranglings were the order of the day and this prompted Lord Buddle to forbid his disciples from engaging in fruitless debates.30 But, iron. cally, since, other than verbal exchanges there can be no other form of communicating and establishing ideas, the Buddhists themselves had to resort to debating to counter wrong techings and rival attacks. Kathāvari (recorded at the Buddhist council at c. 255 B.C.) is a debate manual which discusses various topics. Later versions of the manuals are Upāvahrdava Asanga's Yogācārabhumi, Caraka-samhitā, and the Nyāyasūtra. The Jaina canon is Sthānanga.31

Caraka describes the friendly debate as Sandhyāya sambhāṣa whichis the 'debate among fellow-scholars and friends'. In Caraka's terminology, the debate with a disputatious person is called verbal fight (vigṛhya). In a friendly debate, a sprit of cooperation reigns. In a verbal battle, a feeling of opposition and hostility rends the air. It is here that Nyāya is realistic. In a debate, the interlocutors select the type of debate according to the attitude of the opponents. In Habermas, an ideal speech situation is necessary in which all desirable ideals are presupposed. The Nyāya method aims at arriving at truth whereas Habermas aims at consensual understanding Nyāyasutra defines the philosophical debate kathā which literally means 'speech' or discussion.'

The hostile debate is divided into vitanda and jalpa. In the formet, one tries to censure others without establishing any doctrine. In the latter, both sides try to establish their positions while refuting that of others, in a friendly debate which is held between a teacher and a student or between intellectuals in pursuit of clarification of their doubts, victory of defeal is not the end. There will be a defeat or a censure in this debate but with no

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The Logistics of Argumentation: Habermas And Nyāya

animosity, for it will be a fair game."^{3,3} Matilal disagrees with Vātsyayāna who severely criticizes Vitanda for not asserting any standpoint. Matilal argues that a seeker of truth cannot be blamed if he is not clear about his hesis. It is jalpa that Naiyāyikas are wary of because of its emphasis on rebutting the opponent's position and being solely preoccupied with victory. Thus, as in Habermas, the right to disagree and criticize the views of he opponents are given importance in Nyāya method of argumentation. In his context, Matilal differentiates between 'illocutionary negation' and propositional negation.' He gives examples.³⁴

- 1) Sanjaya said: 'I do not say that there is no after-life.'
- 2) 'There is no after-life.'

Matilal says," ... it is quite feasible for a debater to conduct an honest (non-nicky) debate consisting of refutation at 'rejection- only.' Such a debate can be called $v\bar{a}da - vitanda$." The distinction between $v\bar{a}da$ and jalpa is very much akin to Plato's distinction between 'dialectic' and 'eristic' forms of debates. The former aims at discovering the truth while the latter aims at victory. Plato reports that Socrates employed *elenchus*, a form of debate which invloves cross-examination of the opponent and the refutation of his view by ridding him with a barrage of questions so that he is forced to cede the falsity of his original position. In Nyāya, mātanujna is the contradiction of the original position. The 'dialectic' which resembles $v\bar{a}da$ is eulogized by Plato thus, in *The Republic*: the dialectic seeks "what each thing is', the abiding element in the thing. it is a search for definitions." 37

Conclusion

Habermasian discourse is metatheoretical in nature. Though in a way lisalso a search for definitions it is not as objective as Plato's Forms. It is not a search for definitions it is not as objective as Plato's Forms. It is not akin to Hegel's dialectics where the ideas evolve and devolve historically without reaching any finale. But Nyāya epistemology is a justification of a system and it is not any sort of a metacritique. As in Habermas, the not the notation of a system immense importance in the Nyaya system of notation of a nother. In Nyāya there is definitely a telos which starts from one stage and ends in another, i.e. from ignorance to certainty or truth. In Habermas,

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P. SUDARSAN The Logistics

truth is invariably interwoven with historicity, traditional conventions and beliefs, culture, religion etc. It cannot be abstracted from the socio-historical background. It is a sort of self-discovery, an estimation of the human position in the vast mosaic of the society. At every step in Habermas, the society and the individual are indivisible though the subject and the object polarisation is insoluble.

In Nyāya, various metaphysical questions regarding earthly life of sufferering, God, causation, bondage of this soul, and the liberation which is the absolute cessation of the suffering as the supreme end of the life are examined. Only the knowledge of reality could lead to liberation. The indeterminate and immediate perception of the objects are most sought after The subjective self is the real agent. Such a decidedly subjectivistic and deterministic metaphysics is antithetical to Habermas because the problem of ultimate truth and knowledge is not the subject-matter but a rather DTAP. matic and historical learning and unlearning process. The truth-in-itself is discarded for a more social, discursive, justifiable, and redeemable set of ideas, by Habermas. He, moreover, allocates truth claims to the world of affairs which is more comparable to Nyāya method of syllogism woth its evidential and argumentative potential. It is only in the aesthetic and practical realms that Habermas really wants to emphasize the presence of room for a argumentation. Nyāya is more deterministic in discussing only the means for particular ends rather than scrutinising the veracity of the means and the authenticity of the ends. For Habermas whichever linguistic activity involves justification, rationalization, and discourse the action becomes nonteleological. 38 Hence, Habermas' theory is a social theory whereas the Nyāya system is a philosophical system.

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P. SUDARSAN

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THE FAILURE IN THE PURSUIT OF FOUNDATIONAL JUSTIFICATION: AN ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE

ANANDA PRAMANIK

Foundationalism means a doxastic view of epistemic justification; the view that holds the justification of a belief for a person to be a function of of determined by other beliefs that he has. Since it is said that beliefs the provided internal states, all doxastic theories are otherwise called 'internalism' internal states, all doxastic theories are otherwise called 'internalism' into the provided has the internalist kind of justification. It cannot, however, be denied that almost every theory of justification has the aim of putting the believer in his best position for getting the truth, and foundationalism is no exception. But the best position which this theory seeks to provide us for getting the truth does not, in fact, succeed. In this paper, I shall, first, try in sketch the foundational justification to show how it has drifted itself towards its failure in reaching the truth. Secondly, I would like to conclude by saying that some soft realistic attitude should be a possible kind of response.

I

The first task is to describe the general feature of foundationalism with a view to show the failure in its style of constructing epistemic justification. The fundamental idea of any foundational theory, whether traditional or modernist, is that there are epistemically basic beliefs which conferjustification upon all other beliefs which are justificed for a believer. The intention of Sosa's view is approximately like this. For a believer Solater is a belief-system B containing as its members the beliefs B1,B2,B3, and so on such that the justifying function of B1 by B2, and that of B2 by

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July 1999

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ANANDA PRAMANA

B3, and that of B3 by still another in the series gets a stopping place, B3, and that of B3 b, some basic belief P. The fundamental idea behind it is that the regression of another find the regression. justification of any belief on the basis of another finds its halt finally a some basic belief P. The problem of infinite regress has been put formed and some basic belief. as an argument to show the need of such basic belief. But the job is to the most belief. finished here, for the basic beliefs themselves as Quinton also holds may be self-justified. Unless they are already self-justified, no reasoning from them can provide the adequate [inferential] justification to other belief He says, "If any beliefs are to be justified at all...there must be some to minal beliefs that, do not owe their...credibility to others". Therefore, is essential feature of every foundationalism is the acceptance of basic hliefs as constituting the "foundation", of our knowedge. Pollock's version exhibits this characteristic very explicitly. He says,"Foundational theories are distinguished from other doxastic theories by the fact that they take limited class of "espistemologically basic" beliefs to have a privileged epistemic status. It is supposed that basic beliefs do not stand in needd justification-they are "self-justified". Non-basic beliefs, on the other hand are all supposed to be justified by appeal to basic beliefs. Thus the basic beliefs provide a foundation for epistemic justification". 2 Its contention's then, two-fold: 1) There are self-justified basic beliefs and 2) There are non-basic beliefs deriving their justification ultimately from the basic by liefs. The vital question therfore seems to be of the notion of baisc and controversy splits the foundationalists regarding the origin and natured these beliefs, Here we have two - fold approach to this question, namely Rationalistic Foundationalism and Empirical Foundationalism. Descarta the chief exponent of rationalistic foundationalism, holds that reason alors provides the epistemically basic beliefs, and they are self-evident indubiling ble truths. They are, therefore, self-justified and as such do not depend in their justification on some other belief. The example of such a belief which Descartes admits is: 'Cogito Ergo Sum', the foundation from which is deduced all the philosophical truths. This justification, according to Descartes, is a sort of deductive justification where consequences and duced from duced from certain self-evident truths and principles. The knowledge spanned is record in gained is regarded as completely justified true belief. The justification

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be complete requires two things. Firstly, the deduction of the conclusion be complete from "Logical fallacies", Secondly, the premises from which the conclusion is deduced must be self-evident truths. But the historical nicture is something different. The epistemologists do not bother about the justification in knowing the conclusion so deduced because if one is able to follow the deductive procedures correctly, then one is justified completely in knowing the truth of the deductive results. But when they try to obtain the complete justification in knowing the empirical propositions to he true, they are found to be beset with the problems of various types. One of the reasons is that the empirical evidences which are accumulated to derive justification are not only inexhaustive but the evidences themselves are also imperfect. Epistemic justification on the basis of such evidences usually fails to be truth conducive. This empirical knowledge is notentially a case of scepticism or a case of Gettier situation. Epistemologists, therefore, are found to be busy constructing adequte justification of empirical proposition or belief to defend it from the attack of sceptics. Consequently, the empiricist philosophers subscribe to the empirical foundationalism. The contention of this view is that all our basic beliefs originate in sense-experience. Pollock says, "The simple motivation for foundation theories is the psychological observation that we have various ways of sensing the world and all knowledge comes to us via those senses. The foundationalist takes this to mean that our senses provide us what are then identified as epistemologically basic beliefs".3 The basic beliefs, therefore, come to us ultimately through our sense-experience, and hence, they are all perceptual by nature. But basic perceptual beliefs as the foundationalists hold are about the character of our sensory experience, the character about which one cannot be mistaken. Pollock says, "I can be mistaken about what color something is, but it is not so obvious that I can be mistaken about what color it looks to me."⁴ The foundationalists claim that the statements regarding our sensory experiences, or the beliefs therein, lead us to from beliefs about physical objects like "this is a chair'. Here One's reason for having a belief about physical object is having some semsory experiences as visual, tactual etc. If so, then the truth and justification ficalion of our beliefs about physical objects depend ultimately on the

ANANDA PRAMANIK

beliefs about sensory experiences called basic beliefs. So we can avoid errors in physical object beliefs if we can infer them from the beliefs $ab_{0,1}$ our sensory experiences.

II

We find so far a general agreement among the empirical foundationalists that there are basic beliefs which are about our own sensory reports. But here we encounter two sorts of interpretation, namely, | a basic belief is about the reports of the given and 2) a basic belief is about the reports of one's own psychological attitude towards the fact. The first is generally called the doctrine of the given, the view which Bonjourcally the doctrine of what is empirically given. If holds that basic beliefs are iustified by appeal to the believer's "immediate experience" of the fact which is given. Bonjour says, "If the basic belief whose justification is at issue is the belief that P, then according to the most straight forward version of the doctrine, this basic belief is justified by appeal to an immediate experience of the very fact or state of affairs or situation which it asserts to obtain: the fact that P. It is because I immediately experience the very fact which make my belief true that I am completely justified in holding it, and it is this fact which is given."5 The occurrence of a basic perceptual belief along with its truth and justification seems to have the following process: 1) The fact that P or the P-fact, i.e., the objective state of affairs: 2) The immediate experience of the fact that P or the P-fact; 3) The basic perceptual belief that P arises with its truth and justification. The "step 2" has been supposed to be constituting the ultimate source of truth and justification cation of basic perceptual belief that P in the "step3". The foundationalist who have favoured the role of the given have interpreted the "step2" as the cognitive state where the mind is in direct confrontation with the relevant fact in the external world. The empirical object here is simply given to mind. mind (or consciousness). Secondly, this experience is infallible simply because the believer immediately cognises the relevant fact that is only directly given to his mind. The supporters of the doctrine of the given claim, that the chair country is the claim. claim that the infinite regress in justification stops itself in this precentual ballot. preceptual belief. But Bonjour has elaborately discussed the problem which

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The Failure In The Pursuit of Foundational Justification

gises when these epistemologists try to interpret the immediate experience arises when the source of the given. Following Bonjour we can say that some exponents of the of the given mean by the notion "immediate experience" the "direct apprehension of the given", while others have accepted this interpretation tacitly. What he remarks in criticizing Quinton seems to be very much appropriate to mention here. He says,"As indicated above, the proponent of the given is caught in a fundamental and inescapable dilemma: if his....immediate apprehensions are construed as cognitive, at least quasi judgemental (as seems clearly the more natural interpretation), then they will be both capable of providing justification for other cognitive, states and in need of it themselves, but if they are construed non cognitive non-judgemental, then while hey will not themselves need justification, they will also be incapable of giving it. In either case, such states will be incapable of serving as an adequate foundation for knowledge. This, at bottom, is why emprical givenness is a myth"6. It is, therefore, very explicit to us that the "immediate experience of the fact (or given)", if interpreted as cognitive awarness, requires for its justification another immediate experience of the fact which will raise the same question of justification, thus leading to the regress problem. On the other hand, if this "immediate experience of the fact" is interpreted as only non-cognitive, then this state being the state of the absence of cognition stops the regress. But since it is non-cognitive, it implies at the same time that the believer does not know the fact, thus leading to scepticism. The result is that the justification which is supposed 10 be provided by this immediate experience fails to connect the belief with the fact or given in both the senses. Thus foundational justification, if understood on the above line, can not guarantee the truth of our belief. This view in so far as it has been demanding that the basic belief must be hue, and hence, infallible is called Radical or strong Foundationalism. The form of foundationalism which Bonjour considers is of this type. Now, the Problem of loose fitness between justification and truth arises in this ac-Count because this view, as Pollock argues, is based on the doxastic assumplion that the justification of a belief is always determined in terms of belief, but the fact is that the input from the objective world does not normally enter into our beliefs. He says, "The accommodation of percep-

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tion is a major problem for any doxastic theory". But our basic perceptual beliefs to be true and justified essentially require, as this foundationalism holds the input from the external world. But If we slick to the doxastic assumption, then the accidental relation between justified be lief and truth remains unsolvable. Pollock says, "Because it is their inability to handle perceptual input in terms of belief that leads to the downfall of foundation theories..."8.

III

The failure of strong foundationalism has led some recent enice. mologists to try to come out of the doxastic state (or the realm of beliefs)and to stand face to face with the fact or reality. It is argued that basic heliefs are about the reports of one's psychological attitude towards the fact Chisholm has interpreted it by introducing the concept of incorrigibility. According to him, a basic belief or proposition is directly evident, and it is about one's own current mental state. These beliefs, he claims relate to facts. The beliefs here directly confront the relevant facts but the most important feature is that these facts are only attitudinal or subjective one, and hence, they are states of consciousness. This implies that one does not have any need to go outside one's present mental state and see whether one's belief represents the fact or not. It is argued that one's present mental state is one's privileged state to which the subject alone has a privileged access, while others do not have. If so, then one cannot but be sure of this state. The belief of such a state, when it occurs, is immediately justified At the time of its occurrence, the belief is immune from doubt but may be false at some other time and place. There may be different preception of something may happen differently, yet none of them can confirm of disconfirm the status of this belief. Here the subject's current psychological current p cal attitude is an incorrigible evidential experience, and the beliefs composed of such experience, therefore, are "incorrigible". Chisholm has used "appearance I in a line" He "appearance-beliefs" in this sense, for example, "I am appeared redly" holds that if holds that if something appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then that it appears to me in a particular way, then the particular way, then the particular way is appeared to me in a particular way, then the particular way is a particular way. pears to me in that way is a tangle from which I cannot free myself. Again

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The Failure In The Pursuit of Foundational Justification

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his appearance belief is a non-comparative judgement which does not imby any other prior knowledge to justify itself. So this sort of judgement ply any other placement is to be regarded as basic belief which has the ability to stop the regress in The use of the concept of incorrigibility helps a lot. The incorrigible evidential experience gives one a temporal truth which the subject cannot but accept as only unique and irrefutable. Chisholm seems to hold this sort of truth of basic belief as opposed to the truth in the radical Sense. This trend in thought may be termed as soft foundationalism or modernism in the theory of epistemic justification. But the concept of incorrigibility which these proponents have utilized to save foundationalism is not yet free from objections. Chisholm's basic proposition "I am appeared redly" may be false and so one may be mistaken in so appearing, First, there may be a verbal mistake due to which one may say that one is appeared so. Seeing something green if I say "I am appeared redly" it is averbal mistake which I can correct if I know the difference between red and green. So one can say that one is appeared redly if one has already the knowledge of the difference as stated above. This shows that this noncomparative use is not really so but involves the prior knowledge of comparative use. Lehrer holds that any belief involves the application of concepts. And one should be previously informed to justify this use. He says,"... to be completely justified in believing it to be of that kind one must have the information needed to enable one to tell such a state from another"9. Second, the very notion of incorrigible belief is corrigible. When lthink "I am appeared redly", this very thought may be a mistake if I am not, in fact, appearing that way at all. It is obvious that there are mistakes of one's current mental state. For if there were no such mistakes then our knowledge of ourselves would be perfect and non-erroneous. So basic beliefs are fallible. Lehrer says, "....a man can make all sorts of mistakes about what is presently going on in his mind"10. So whatever interpretahin the exponents put forward on behalf of the incorrigibility of the basic beliefs, it is obvious that basic beliefs cannot be saved from being errone-The basic beliefs as they are about one's present mental state, express nothing about which one can be uncertain, yet such a belief can be false even when one's claim is sincere, It is not because the experience itself

ANANDA PRAMANIK

can be in any way fallible but because it might be misidentified or incorrectly formulated. Thus a person here understands the report of his particle chological attitude and believes it with certainty. Though this basic belief is initially certain for that person at that time, yet such a kind of being justified in believing something does not entail the corresponding fact to the objective world.

IV

The inevitable consequence of the views is that justified belief fall to capture the fact inspite of how far one is able to make oneself equine with the justificatory position. Our main issue here is the justification of basic psceptual belief, and it has been attempted to solve by trying to connect it with the relevant fact. In this sense a basic belief to be justified and true is expected to correspond to the fact, but this expectation does not fulfill for the reasons which are already known to us. First, belief and far belong to two different categories; the former is a linguistic affair and the latter is an ontological affair. Since these two are entirely different, it's impossible to connect them by means of correspondence relation. See ondly, the relation of correspondence is not determinable because we can not go out side our ideas and justification conditions to verify the comspondence relation and see whether it holds between such conditions and fact in the external world. In such a case it is not possible to determine the truth of our belief and to pick up what kind of justification is truth-condicive. So there is a tendency among the recent epistemologists not only be consider epistemic justification but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consider epistemic justification but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consider epistemic justification but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration but also to categories "truth" in a different management of the consideration of the consid manner. Ayer lends support to the notion of evidential justification which is context - relative. Chisholm also shows this tendency, On this view, belief is justified on the basis of evidences available to the believer at given time t₁. So considered, a belief may be reasonable to accept at time, while were time while unreasonable at another because the evidences at the second time to are observed. time t₂ are changing. These philosophers, therefore, define the concept epistemic justification. epistemic justification by temporal reference. So when it is said that basic

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The Failure In The Pursuit of Foundational Justification

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beliefs are not incorrigibly justified, the notion of incorrigible justification beliefs are is only context relative. On this version, a justified true belief implies only the temporal truth. Accordingly, these epistemologists belief implication to consider the sort of truth what this justification leads Thus, in recent epistemology there is the consideration of mulh in terms of its epistemic and non-epistemic aspect. The non-epistemic much of a belief is based on the strong correspondence between our belief and the relevant fact. It supports the bivalence theory of truth, i.e., a belief is either conclusively true or conclusively false. As we cannot go outside our epistemic conditions to see the correspondence with the external fact, 50 this truth becomes evidence-transcendent or independent of our cogniive grasp. That is why, it is called non-epistemic truth. As opposed to his non-epistemic truth, there is epistemic truth called evidence-bound truth. A proposition P is true even when this proposition may not be picture of the total fact in the objective world. The turth of this Proposition depends on the evidential backing that P has at the given time t₁. The recent epistemologists have called it evidence bound truth, for its status is entirely relative to the set of available evidences to the subject at a given time. When a belief that p is true in this sense, it does not imply that p strongly corresponds to the fact. As the subject's epistemic justification is only relative to the total set of evidences available to him at a particular time t₁, 50 il seems to be a quite futile attempt to connect "epistemic justification" or "epistemically justified belief" with the a-temporal truth or "non-epistemic liuth". This is because both of them are altogether different entities. This is what radical foundationalism has tried to do. Chisholm's interpretation implies the acceptance of the evidential notion of justification and truth. Consequently, it should be admitted that a justified belief in this sense logitally ensures the evidence-bound truth. One thing should be kept in mind that this truth is not created by us but that which is revealed to us under the set of available evidences. So we do not have any need to make a commit-Ment to the ontological truth; we may keep it aside from the picture of our human congintive activity. Anti-realism as propounded by Putnam and Dummett has an implication that evidentially justified belief leads to the evidence-bound truth, and this attitude does not go against realism. They

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are, however, not directly concerned with refutation of any ontological are they have criticized is the some realsim. The thesis which they have criticized is the semantical realism which asserts that the meaning of a statement consists of what has to be the case for it to be true, and hence, we can understand the statement if we know the truth-conditions. But such truth-conditions have been interpreted in such a way that they have been reduced to non-epistemic ontological realities. The epistemological implication is that there seems to be no positive relationship between human states of knowledge and such realities. Dummett says, 'The condition for the truth of a statement is not, in general, a condition which we are capable of recognising as obtaining whenever it obtains, or even one for which we have an effective procedure for determining whether it obtains or not"11. So he argues for the "semantical antirealism" or for what is called antirealism in general, He says, "According to this, the meaning of statements in the class in question (he specified) are given to us, in terms of the conditions under which these statements are true or false, conceived of as conditions which obtain or do not obtain independently of our knowledge or capacity for knowledge but in terms of the conditions which we recongnise as establishing the truth or falsity of statements of that cass"12. Putnum calls it "verificationist semantics" in the sense that the meaning of a statement is given in terms of verification conditions or justification conditions but not in terms of truthconditions understood realistically by the semantical realism. This sort of anti-realism denies that we are able to say anything about the ontological fact or reality. Therefore, the final interpretaion of the basic belief seems to depend upon the particular world-view which one holds. If we believe like semantical realism that there is a real external world independently of our epistemic capacities, and our beliefs purport to describe it as it is, the these beliefs must be fallible. If on the other hand we believe that we cannot go outside the data which our cognitive capacities provide, then the realities which are thus transcendent must be kept aside from the topic of our coginitive enterprise. In that case we should go along the line of and realism to any realism to support the view that our evidentially justified belief logically ensures the evidential or 'epistemic truth'.

The Failure In The Pursuit of Foundational Justification

379

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CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS: A CRITIQUE OF ENLIGHTENMENT RATIONALITY

R. P. SINGH

Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school is one of the philosophical schools of the much broader philosophical movement known as postmodernity'. Other such schools are structuralism of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, the cultural semiologist Ronald Barthes, the psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan, the post-structuralist Michel Foucault, the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida besides Richard Rorty, Lyotard, Levinas and others. These representatives of postmodernity, each in his own way, have attempted to go ahead of Kant and Hegel, either by offering an emendation to Kantianism and Hegelianism or by making Kant and Hegel relevant in the changed intellectual climate in Europe and America. In this paper, I shall re-assess the basic charges levelled by the Critical Theory of Habermas on the enlightenment rationality developed by Kant and Hegel.

Before I come to re-assess the charges levelled by Habermas. I would like to dwell on the question of what is the relation of postmodernity critical theory to modernity? No postmodernist will say that postmodernity is adenial of modernity. They say: 'it is a reconstruction', 'a reinterpretation', 'an attempt to give a new meaning to modernity', etc. This is what the spokesman of postmodernity, Jean-Francois Lyotard says, "The whole idea of postmodernism is perhaps better rethought under the rubric of rewriting modernity". Postmodernity of the Critical Theory and the Post-Structuralist deconstructionist retain, many aspects of the Cartesian - Kantian - Hegelian

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modernity yet they reject the norms of strict logic and rationality which che acterise the latter. This relationship could further be analysed on the best of the Central and the Marginal issues in modernity.

At the centre of modernity are such issues as human subjective (the cogito, the transcendental consciousness and the Geist), rationally unity, science, morality, freedom and so on; whereas at the margins of modernity are such issues as madness, fantasy, demon, sexuality, pluralist discontinuity, irrationality and fragmentation. Postmodernity underestimate the central issues of modernity and overestimates the marginal issues. It postmodernity, reality follows diverse models which are rich in conflict history is viewed from ruptures and mutatuions, and there is a radical negation of totalitarian thinking. In marginalizing, delimiting, disseminating at decentering the central works of modernist inscription, the postmodernist I feel, have expanded the horizons of modernity.

Modernity breaks with the endless reiteration of traditional (class cal) themes, topics and myths; and postmodernity operates at the places closure in modernity, at the margins of what proclaims itself to be new at a break with tradition. To be modern means to search for new self-to scious expressive forms. To be postmodern is to marginalize, delimit disseminate and decenter the primary and often secondary works of modernist inscriptions. It implies that the line of demarcation between modernity and postmodernity remains a matter of uncertainty because post-top dernity operates at the edge of modernity.

Postmodernity could be defined as an 'attitude' or a 'mood' of 'Movement'. Modernity could be defined as an 'ism', i.e., 'a clear self ideas' and a programme based on it. Postmodernity is not a systematic thing where you can develop concepts and relationships, precisely what the postmodernists' are against. In modernity, everything is a systematic what the postmodernists' are against. In modernity, everything is a systematic foundationalism', 'essentialism', 'teleology', 'rationalism', 'freedom' 'logocentrism' and so on.

The Critical Theory of the postmodern philosophy is the most important reaction to Kantianism and Hegelianism. Its advocates like Horkheims

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Calical Theory of Jurgen Habermas

Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas attempt to go ahead of the 'closed', 'systemic' thinking of Kant and Hegel. It is the first major criticism of modern science and the enlightenment rationality. Adorno and Horkheimer attempt to lay out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly logy out, "The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly of the critical theory is located by like dialectics or the 'immanent criticism' or the 'critical theory is neither a pure scientific theory in or a 'pure philosophy'. Critical theory is located between philosophy and science'. This makes the critical theory as negative dialectics which sets out not only to describe but also to criticize vigously the existing social norms without recourse to either the fundamental concept of the enlightenment rationality (i.e. reason, freedom, truth) or the Value-free model of science. With these clarifications about postmodernity and the critical theory, I shall come to Habermas.

The range of Habermas' theorizing is extra-ordinary. He deals with most of the themes developed by earlier critical theorists, including ostmological questions raised by Adorno. He has sought to achieve a borough going synthesis of developments in social science and philosophy-including analytical philosophy, the philosophy of science, linguistics, political science and systems theory. In 1969 Goerge Lichtheim, one of the most perceptive commentators on European cultural life, wrote about Habermas, "It is not easy to assess the work of a scholar whose professional competence extends from the logic of science to the sociology of thowledge, by way of Marx, Hegel and the more recondite sources of the European metaphysical tradition... (At) an age when most of his colleagues have painfully established control over one corner of the field, he has made imself master of the whole, in depth and breadth alike. There is no cornerquing, no facile evasion of difficulties or spurious enunciation of conclusions unsupported by research: whether he is refuting Popper, dissecting pragmatism of Charles Peirce, delving into the medieval antencedents of shelling's metaphysics, or bringing Marxist sociology up to date, there is ways the same uncanny mastery of the sources, joined to an enviable talthe for clarifying intricate logical puzzles. He seems to have been born with is the seeing the toughest kind of material and refashioning it into

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Herbermas was forty years of age and was already recognized at leading younger social theorist in postwar Germany. The most striking and impressive feature of Habermas's approach to the range and complete ties of human inquiry is the way in which he weaves whatever he analyzed into a coherent whole. There is a unity of vision that informs his work. To this extent he is greatly under the influence of Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Kan Marx, and the young Hegelians, Even before Habermas became fully aware of the Critical Theory of the 1930s, he was recreating the experience and pathway followed by Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School. Recalling these intellectually formative years. Habermas has written, "In retrospect, I sometimes have the impression has a student can recreate a segment of the critical theory of the 1930s, if he systematically works his way from Kant through Hegel, including Schelling and approaches Marx via Luckac's."

In Knowledge and Human Interests (1968 & English edition in 1971), Habermas outlines his first systematic philosophical exposition. His major theses were succinctly summarized in the inaugural address he gave & Frankfurt University (published as an appendix to the book).

In the Preface, Habermas announced, "I am undertaking a historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivity with the systematic intention of analyzing the connections of knowledge and human interests. In following the process of dissolution of epislemology which has left the philosophy of science in its place, one makes one way over abadnoned stages of reflection. Retreating this path from a positive that looks back towards the point of departure may help to record the forgotten experience of reflection. That we disavow reflection is positivism."

By 1968 the positivist tradition, from August Compte to logical positivist like A.J. Ayer, was already under severe attack. But one cannot under estimate the extent to which the positivistic thinking pervaded and dominated the intellectual and cultural life. Habermas, in this context, is specified.

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Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas

ing of 'positivism' in a broad encompassing manner. He wants to identify hal tendency to which many philosophical schools have contribited. This formulation is very close to issues that preoccupied thinkers of different philosophical positions. He advanced a provocative interpretation of a philosophic of thought that encompassed Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Dilthey, Peirce, Neitzsche, Compte and Freud. But I would like to emphasize the point hat at the roots of Habermas's philosophical formulation to reconstruct the orehistory of modern positivism, there lies an essentially Kantian paradigm of 'reason'. Habermas has derived from Kant that 'reason is self-reflective' of the self-reflection of reason upon the conditions of its employment'. This is the thrust of Kant's Critiques - where 'pure reason' can self-reflexively come to grasp the universal and necessary conditions for the very possibilily of theoretical knowledge, i.e. synthetic a priori proposition; 'practical reason' can give rise to categorical imperatives and 'judgement' can provide aesthetic judgements. Further the 'critique' is the self-critique. This is the emancipatory sense of self-critique and self-reflection. This concept could further be elaborated with the help of Kant's article in 1784 "Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" "Enlightenment is the coming out of Man from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the unwillingness (unvermogon) to serve one's own understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is self-imposed, becasue Reason itself languishes, not in lack of understanding, but only of resolve and courage to serve oneself without direction from another. Sapere aude, Think boldly, take courage, use your own Understanding to serve: This is therefore the motto of the Enlightenment."6 The attempt to get rid of 'self-imposed immaturity' is both self-critique and self-reflection with the aim to attain emancipation. Emancipatory self-reflection is dependent on giving a rational reconstruclion of the universal conditions for reason.

In other words, Enlightenment develops reason to the extent that it becomes autonomous and gets rid of restraints from tradition and authority. The way to Enlightenment, Kant emphasizes, is not to seek a mentor or authority in Thinking, in Willing and in Feeling. Kant has placed freedom and majority (Muendigkeit) at the centre of Enlightenment and contrasted it from

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tutelages. In an uncharacteristic manner Kant says, "when the question asked: do we live in an enlightened epoch (Aufgeklaerten Zeitalter) that the answer is: No, but rather in an epoch of Enlightement (Zeitalter de Aufklaerung) ".7 This is possible only by regarding 'Reason' the supremaculty.

Kant first discusses 'Reason' in general, "All our knowledge state with the senses, proceeds from thence to understanding, and ends with reason beyond which there is no higher faculty to be found in us for elab. rating the matter of intution and bringing it under the highest unity of thought".8 The distinction manifested in Kant's philosophy between reson', 'understanding' and 'sensibility' constitutes a land'mark in the whole movement of German idealism along with the German Enlightenment, Let us elaborate the nature and status of 'reason' within the general Kantian egis temological situation. As a matter of fact, Kant distinguishes 'reason' from 'understanding'. Reason is never in immediate relation to objects given in sensibility. It is understanding that holds sway in Kant's epistemology, Reason is concerned with the understanding and its judgements. The under standing throughout the use of categories and principles unifies the main fold supplied by the sensibility. Reason seeks to unify the concepts and judgements of understanding. Whereas understanding is directly related to sensibility, reason relates itself to sensibility only indirectly through understanding. As perceptions are unified by understanding with the categories so understanding needs a higher unity - the unity of reason in order to form a connected system. This is supplied to it by the ideas of reason - freedom of will, immortality of soul and existence of God. These ideas have their us and value as the guides to the understanding. In Kant's terminilogy, the ideas of reason are 'regulative' rather than 'constitutive'. They do not constitutive' stitute knowledge but merely regulate it. Critical theorists before Habemis reacted sharply to it.

Against Kant, both Adorno and Horkheimer say, "From now on, milter would at last be mastered without any illusion of ruling or inherent powers (in it), of hidden qualities. For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect." This is first

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Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas

major criticism of European Enlightenment in this century. "Enlightenment is totalitarian", declared both Adorno and Horkheimer, "the implication was in totalitarianism was a product of Enlighteenment Liberalism, whose central thrust is to establish human domination over everything, and to eliminate that which resists such domination." They have also said, "The fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The Enlightenment's attempt was to captivate Nature and to Keep it in the strait jacket of abstract Reason, which it misinterpreted as Scientific Reason."

As stated earlier, Adorno recognizes the difficulty in establishing any system of knowledge on an indubitable basis of certainty. It was Kant who had declared that Scientific knowledge was synthetic apriori. As synthetic, the subject is amplified in the predicate, And as apriori, the relationship between subject and predicate is universal and necessary. What we require in science is an ampliative element with the characteristics of universality and necessity. Kant went to the extent that "... the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there."12 The constitution of knowledge by means of categories is regarded by Kant as the activity of human mind, because, in it is, after all, we ourselves who are responsible for the formation of general concepts... our ability to render the given intelligible to ourselves, and to describe it under the guidance of general words, is an expression of genuine intellectual activity."13 Without going in to the details, I may just point out that Kant's position on scientific knowledge is very close to Newtonian physics which in turn has developed out of the Cartesian Galilean mechanics. But we have gone ahead of Newtonian physics. "Now we know hal all proof is inductive, and therefore tentative, and can be questioned by subsequent experience. We know also that there is no such thing as a hon-subjective objectivity, that all perception involves subjectivity, that the Receiver is always part of the reality perceived. No scientific theory is handed down by the objective reality; it is human subjectivity that formulate so: lates scientific hypotheses and then tests their validity by experimentation. Science is neither non-subjectively objective nor finally proven."14 Science

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as something existing and in certain respect complete is the most objective as subjective as subjective as any other branch of human endeavour.

Within this rather larger perspective that the reactions of Habermas could be reassessed. Like Hegel, Habermas takes the split between so ence, morals and art as the 'fundamental philosophical problem of modernity'. Habermas sees that Hegel "solves the problem of the self-assurance of modernity too well", because the philosophy of Absolute spirit "remores all importance from its own present age ... and deprives it of its calling to self-critical renewal." He sees the popularity of 'end of philosophy thought as an over-reaction to this over-success.

Habermas thinks that we need not be restricted as Horkheimer and Adorno were, to such mere socio-historical forms of social criticism. He views Horkheimer, Adorno and Foucault as working out new versions of 'the end of philosophy " ... no matter what name it (philosophy) appears under now-whether as fundamental ontology, as critique, as negative dilectic, or genealogy - these pseudonyms are by no means disguises under which the traditional (i.e. Hegelian) form of philosophy lies hidden; the drapery of philosophical concepts more likely serves as the cloak, for a scantily concealed end of philosophy". 16

Habermas's account of such 'end of philosophy' movements is offered as part of a more sweeping history of philosophy since Kanl. He thinks that Kant was right to split 'reason up into science, morality and an and that Hegel was right in accepting this as "the standard (massgeblita) interpretation of modernity." He also thinks that Hegel was right believing that "Kant does not perceive the ... formal devisions with culture... as diremptions. Hence he ignores the need for unification the emerges with the separations evoked by the principle of subjectivity may be recalled that unification was the fundamental philosophical procupation for Hegel. In a very remarkable manner in his early fragments titled Glauben und Wissen, Hegel has said, "Unification and Being (still are equivalent; the copula 'is' in every proposition expresses a unification are equivalent."

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Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas

of subject and predicate, in other words, a Being."19 In the process of unifying the opposites 'reason', for Hegel, touches every part of reality; 'reafying the opposition that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. Habermas agrees with Hegal that there is ments of Unification, He wants to go back to Hegel and to start it again. Hethinks that,"in order to avoid the disillusionment with the philosophy of subjectivity which produced Nietzsche and the two strands of post-Nielzschean thought which he distinguishes and dislikes (the one leading 10 Foucault, and the other to Heidegger) we need to go back to the place where the young Hegel took the wrong turn. That was the place where he still held open the option of using the idea of uncoerced will formation in a° communication community existing under constraints of cooperation as model for the reconciliation of a bifurcated civil society... it was the lack of a sense of rationality as social that was missing from the philosophy of subject which the older Hegel exemplified from which the 'end-of-philosophy' thinkers have never really escaped."20

Habermas thinks that the philosophical requirement which 'the philosophy of the subject' gratified is as real as it was during Hegel's own time, and can perhaps be fulfilled by his (Habermas's) own focus on a 'communication community'. With Hegel's overemphasis on the Geist, philosophy has become 'an isolated monastary/'sanctury' in which an individual forms an isolated order of priests untroubled by how it goes with the world. This position has certainly come from Kant's' three-sphere' picture of culture which Hegel tries to resolve. On this latter view, Kant's attempt to deny knowledge to make room for faith (by inventing 'transcendental subjectivity' to serve as the function for the Copernican revolution) was provoked by an unnecessary worry about the spiritual significance or insignificance of modth science. "Like Habermas, Kant thinks that modern science has a theoletical dynamic, one which can be identified with (at least a portion of) the halure of rationality. Both think that by isolating and exhibiting this dyhamic, but distinguishing it from other dynamics (e.g.,) practical reason or the emancipatory interest, one can keep the results of science without hereby disenchanting the world. Kant suggested that we need not let our

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knowledge of the world *qua* matter in motion get in the way of our motion sense. The same suggestion was also made by Hume and Reid, but unlike these pragmatical Scotchmen, Kant thought that he had to back up this suggession with a story which would differentiate and 'place' the three great spheres into which culture must be divided.'21

Despite being greatly under the influence of Kantian paradign Habermas remains a critical theorist. One of Habermas' most basic and challenging thesis is that "we cannot even make sense of the concepts of meaning, understanding and interpretation unless we rationally evaluate the validity claims that are made by participants in these forms of life. We must be able to discriminate what participants themselves count as reasons for their actions, and this requires a performative attitude on our part where we assess what 'they' count as good reasons for action with reference to 'our' standards of rationality."22 To illustrate it, we can say that we are essentially embodied beings. We are embodied in the family - the property, last guage and the value systems-, in the tribal community and in the ethnicity At the same time, we are able to transcend this infra-structure and bracket all judgements of the validity claims made by participants in a form of life It is this dialectic that lies at the centre of Habermas's critical theory. Habermas says, "A critical social science will not remain satisfied with this It is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed... thus the level of (non-reflective) consciousness which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transformed. Of course, to this end, a critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection tion alone render a law itself inoperative but can render it inapplicable. The methodological framework that determines the meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this category is established by the concept of selfreflection. The latter releases the subject from dependence on hyposlatical powers. Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive inleast.

Habermas's critical theory is a dialectical synthesis of the empirical analytic and the historical hermeneutical disciplines. It is a constant cogni-

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ion and vigilant criticism and this process always goes on and never reaches to any finality. There are also issues and their criticism, further issues and further criticism; but there is no final issue and no final criticism. Haberma's synthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus when we turn into the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus and no final criticism, further issues and the third type of cognisynthesis comes into clear focus and no final criticism, further issues and no final criticism. Haberma's further issues and no final criticism, further issues and no final criticism. Haberma's further issues and no final criticism. Haberma's further issues and no final criticism. Haberma's further issues and no final criticism.

Herbermas agrees with Kant that there are basic structures, rules and categories that are presupposed by reason (Kant) and communicative action (Habermas). But he is skeptical of pure transcendental philosophy which cannot transcend itself. Habermas takes the help from Hegelian dialectic which can break with the legacy of pure apriori transcendental philosophy. It is this synthesis of Kantian apriorism and Hegelian dialetic that has given rise to Habermas's critical theory of communicative action.

Although the details of Habermas's communicative action are subtle, tomplex and controversial, we can sketch some of its basic features; "Communicative action is a distinctive type of social interaction - the type of action oriented to mutual understanding. It must be distinguished from other types of social action and non-social action which are oriented to 'success', to the efficient achievement of ends. These latter action-types exhibit the form of purposive rational action where we seek to achieve an end or goal by appropriate means". 25 Habermas elucidates, "... the goal of coming to an understanding (Verstanding) is to bring about an agreement (Eiverstandis) that leminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. Agreement is based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, with two operative terms - consensus and disagreement. Habermas argues that anyone acting communicatively must, in performing a speech action,

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raise universal validity claims, and must suppose that such claims can be above quotation, there are stated vindicted. As indicated in the above quotation, there are four types of validity claims - comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness (sincerity) and no. mative rightness. In most empirical situations, we resolve our conflicts and disagreements with these validity claims. But there may arise a situaling where validity claims can breakdown or be challenged by one of the particle. pants in the communicative context. To resolve a breakdown in communicative tion, Habermas proposes to have a discourse and argumentation or dialogue where we explicitly seek to warrant the validity claims that have been called into question and replace it with a new model of validity claims which could be higher, more comprehensive than the earlier one, and to see that there is no dispute above a validity claim beyond rational argumentation by the nar. ticipants involved.

To bring this paper to a close, we can say that enlightenment reason of both Kant and Hegel is at the centre of the Critical Theory of the postmodern philosophy. Horkheirmer, Adorno, Marcuse and Haberman each in his own way with certain common features, attempt to go ahead of 'closed', 'systemic' thinking of Kant and Hegel. Habermas synthesists dialeccally the empirical - analytic and the historical-hermeneutical studies It is a constant cognition and vigilant criticism and this process always good on. Habermas takes the help from Kantian a priorism and Hegelian dialectic to formulate his communicative action. He has made an effort to develop a validation criterion in communicative action. It is quite uncharacteristic to Frankfurt Scholers to develop a validation criterion. The validation criterion. rion for physical sciences is different from the validation criterion for social sciences. This is because what is actually practised in science is different from the ideology formations.

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HOW MUCH DEEP ARE THE 'DEEP STRUCTURES'? FROM THE CHOMSKIAN PERSPECTIVE

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The conception of a generative - transformational system was introjuted by Chomsky to overcome a limitation of taxonomic or phrase - structure grammar (henceforth, PS - grammar), namely the failure to reveal the underlying conceptual scheme of a sentence. The sentences that we see whiten or hear spoken have a sort of arrangement of their components. We may call it 'actual arrangement' or 'surface structure' In PS - gramar, the unface of a sentence is the struture of a sentence demonstrated by a phrase marker (henceforth, PM) only in accordance with phrase-structure rules henceforth, PS - rules). But this visible or audible arrangement does not always reveal the full semantic content contained in those sentences. To hing out the full semantic interpretation of a sentence, we are to search for a 'underlying arrangement' of sentences, or, in other words, we are to develop the concept of an underlying 'deep structure'. Chomsky hopes that though this concept of an underlying deep structure, we shall be able to splain our intuitive understanding of many aspects of language.

The grammatical transformations embody those rules which we uply to make an actual sentence from an underlying mental system. As and meaning join together in language, similarly deep and surface further must be joined through some mental operations to enable us to the infinite number of sentences from a finite repertoire.

Notion Of 'Syntactic Description'

Chomsky introduces an abstract technical notion of 'syntactic descrip-

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July 1999

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tion' (henceforth, SD) which determines the semantic interpretation of a to the 'surface structure' are the tion' (henceforth, 3D) which tence. The 'deep structure' and the 'surface structure' are the two apropriate part and the two apropriates the semantic part and the two of the SD, the former determining the semantic part and the latter determining the latter determining the latter determining the latter determining the latt ing the phonetic part. SD is generated by the synactic component. A Dis netic interpretation is given to the surface structure by the phonological component. A semantic interpretation is given to the deep structure by the semantic component. In the grammar, then, the phonetic and semantic terpretations are associated through the syntactic component.

Syntactic Features Below The Surface Structure

The taxonomic description of a sentence cuts a sentence office continuous phonetic stretches and classifies them as constituents of one another sort. Chomsky argues that such description cannot mark a variety Compor of syntactic features because it cannot go below the surface structure of sentences. To illustrate the point, Chomsky takes up two sentences: (il 'John is easy to please' and (2) 'John is eager to please'. As per a late nomic description, both the sentences get the same syntactic analysis which fails to emphasize the logical difference between them. These two sea tences are only superficially similar, the similarity is in their surface state ture. Their difference becomes manifest when they are put under cental grammatical operations, like the conversion from active to passive forms In (1) 'John' is the object of the verb 'please' and in (2) 'John' is the subject of the verb 'please'. If we try to convert them in an exactly similar way, we lent, and will find one sentence of the two turning ungrammatical.

Even if we enrich the complexity of superficial phrase-markers, poly lems of this type will not get solved. The concept of 'deep structure' be developed within a generative - transformational grammar. It is a found by syntactic description in which grammatical relations, which are semantical relations, which are semantical relations. significant, are represented. They are shown to underlie the phonetic for the service of services. of sentences on the basis of transformational rules. As in the preceding the example: the court example; the surface - structure may not always reflect its deep structure may not always reflect its deep structure. and the deep structure may not have a direct manifestation in the special signal. signal.

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1How Much Deep Are The 'Deep Structures'?

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The Abstract Nature Of Deep Structure

The deep structure itself and the rules determining and relating deep and surface structures are abstract and remote from conscious thought. The gress lies on this abstractness, because, as Chomsky puts it,

it is on this property that our inferences about mental processes are based.1

Both the surface structure and the deep structure are systems of categories and phrases; but surface structure, unlike deep structure, is directly linked with the physical signal. Deep structure is something more abstract than the surface structure.

ark a variety Components of Grammer Redefined

The three traditional components of a grammar, namely, recursive, gemantic and phonological, may be redefined in terms of their connection with the deep and surface structure in the following way. By the recursive nles a grammar generates some strings composed of some symbols taken on of the vocabulary. By the recursive component, sentences are assigned surface structures which determine the phonetic pattern of those sentences. Underlying deep structures also are assigned by the recursive component.2

The SD is assigned semantic interpretation by the semantic componilar way, we lead, and phonetic interpretation by the phonological component. Assignment of semantic interpretation refers essentially to deep structure. ignment of phonetic interpretation refers to surface structures.²

The syntax of a language has two rule - systems: (1) base system It is a formal ad (2) transformational system. Deep structures are generated by the base semantical listern which introduces new propositions. The transformational system shonelic for those deep structures onto surface structures. In the base system the precedit are the rewriting rules of PS-grammar. In the transformational sysleep structures of PS-grammar. In the leep are the rules like deletion, rearrangement, adjunction, etc.

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lnitially, Chomsky held the view that in the surface structure we find

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linguistic dissimilarities and at the deep structure level we may expense find uniformity. He took the deep structure to be absolutely mental, so scribing the meaning - content of the sentences generated.4 the surface features of language does not necessarily reflect diversity at level of semantics.

Grammatical transformations are formal operations, through the quential application of which deep and surface structures are related. may cite here an example given by Chomsky. To exhibit the operations passivization and interrogation, he takes up two sentences, namely, (1) was examined by the doctor and (2)Did the doctor examine John, and with

... both have a deep structure similar to parapharse of Sentence (1). (3) the doctor examined John. The same network of grammatical relations determines the semantic interpretation in each case. Thus two of the grammatical transformations of English must be the operations of passivization and interrogation that form such surface structures as Sentences (1) and (2) from a deeper structure which in its essentials also underlies Sentence (3). Since the transformations ultimately produce surface structure, they must produce labelled bracketings.5

Now, if we make the sentence 'The doctor examined John' passive, we gell labelld bracketing of the sentence 'John was examined by the doctor'. If a the latter we apply the operation of interrogative transformation, we see another labelld bracketing of the sentence 'was John examined by the div tor'. So, we may say with Chomsky that

....a transformation such as interrogation maps a labelld bracketing onto a labeled bracketing.6

At this stage Chomsky is of the opinion that the aforesaid argument is plicable not only in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive and interrogative cases, but also in the passive cases of the passive cases. case of all grammatical transformations as well. All of them are structured dependent more dependent mappings' and all deep structures are 'labelld bracketings'. The phrase - marker part and the transformation part of syntax deep

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and with different tasks. For every sentence, apart from its syntactic of the structure, there is a deep structure determining the semantic intergreation of the sentence. The task of the phrase-marker part is to generate pelauting of sentences which may not be grammactically wellformed sentences. The task of the T-rules is to generate well-formed senignces out of the terminal expressions of the phrase-marker.

Change In The Concepts of Surface And Deep Structure

Chomsky has introduced several changes in his model of linguistic malysis. In his book The Logicl Structure of Linguistic Theory, the term the structure' is not found, but a notion of 'T-marker' has been used. This notion may be taken to be the ancestor of the notion 'deep structure', because this 'T-marker' determines semantic representation. In Syntactic Strucures, the meaning - determining property was contained in the deep struc-It was shown that a sentence has different meanings (Chomsky's exmole was 'They are flying planes'8) because it has different deep structures and one surface structure. And two sentences, though having different urface structures, have the same meaning (Chomsky's examples were 'Evenone in the lab considers John incompetent' and 'John is considered incompetent by everyone in the lab'9), because they have one and the same the structure. Here Chomsky did not deal much with meaning because as disciple of Leonard Bloomfield he was convinced that study of semantics would not lead to any useful result.

Within a few years, Chomsky felt the need for a change and presented litvised model in his book Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. In this model find a base component consisting of two elements - the rewriting rules the lexicon. The rewriting rules show the structure of sequences of The syntactic, semantic and phonological properties of lexical items assigned to the lexicon. This base grammar, consisting of the rules and exicon, generates the deep structure, that is, structure in which the become and all the objects of each verb are unambiguously presented. Anter component of the model - the transformational component - transforms of synlar structure into the surface structure in which words and morphemes

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appear according to the order in which we pronounce them. The base to appear according to the state part of the transformational components together form the generative part of the part of the state part of t model. Now, there are two interpretive components - the phonological and the components is joined with the the semantic. The semantic component is joined with the generative parts the deep structure level. Thus the meaning - receiving syntactic structure is formed. Meaning is not changed when the transformations are applied deep structures for the production of surface structures. So two sentences differ in meaning when there are corresponding differences in deep structure. This model is called the Standard Theory (henceforth, ST),

In this model, Chomsky upholds the view that the relation between the sounds and meanings of a language is specified by a grammar B. does not reject his earlier claim that a grammar should generate all zel only the sentences of the language concerned, but adds that all and only the sentences of the language are generated in the syntax part of the eran mar and then each sentence is being associated with both a sound and meaning.

At this stage, Chomsky is of the opinion that the logical difference between two sentences of the grammatical form can be indicated with the underlying deep structures. The deep structure of a sentence reflects: sentence as expressing a thought; the surface structure of a sentence flects a sentence as expressing its physical shape of sound sequence as initia Though surface structures fail to clear up meanings of ambiguous sentence been stat still they determine at least a part of meaning. Roughly speaking, the grant part of meaning. matical relations determining meaning are provided by the deep structure and the logical relations (along with some others) determining meaning at provided, partially at least, by the surface structure. 10

In his later writings (for example in Reflections on Language) st find that the ST-model has undergone some more changes to take the shift of the Extended Standard Theory (henceforth, EST). Here the surface su ture has been given more role to play in determining meaning. We may state the most that the most important issue that divides ST from EST is the role that grace structures planning. face structures play in semantic interpretation. From now on, surface structures AR MITRA

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pres look deeper, or, in other words, deep structures look less deep.

The change in the role of deep structure has been enunciated by chomsky in this way:

The Extended Standard Theory maintains that it is not the deep structure which undergoes semantic interpretation.under trace theory one can say that surface structure is associated directly with semantic representation. 11

A trace t has been defined as a phonological zero element. The position of an element that has been displaced by a transformation is marked by trace. The trace-theory has shown that the phonological level, the intendation is changed by the trace and at the semantic level, co-reference is blocked by it. Development of this theory has considerably changed the concept of surface structure. The word 'surface' does not mean that surface structure involves properties appearing in the physical form, rather it is being treated as quite abstract in nature. Introducing this concept of trace, Chomsky writes:

... all of semantic representation, including thematic relations, can in a sense be derived from surface structure 12

At one point, in the EST version, 'deep structure' has been renamed as initial phrase markers'. One reason for this terminological change has bus sentences been stated by Chomsky thus:

In this theory. the syntactic and semantic properties of the former "deep structures" are dissociated. Either class of properties might, then, be taken as defining the technical notion "deep structure". To avoid the issue, with the possible attendant confusion, I will simply drop the term, speaking only of "initial phrase markers" and "surface structures". 13

Along with it, Chomsky speaks of another reason for this change:

The term "deep structure" has led a number of people to suppose that it is the deep structures and their properties that are truly

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"deep" in the non-technical sense of the word This w_{as} n_{ever} intended. 14

The scope of misunderstanding still remains. 'Initial', in the term 'misphrase-marker', may mean 'earliest in time'. This again is not intended that is why, to denote the abstract underlying structures, a different menclature, namely, 'D-structure' has been tried and the observable structures have been termed 'S-structures'. 15

EST was revised and was renamed 'Revised Extended Standard Theory' (henceforth, REST). It was renamed again as 'Government-Binding' Theory (henceforth, GB)¹⁶. Apart from the change of names, several important revisions were made, particularly regarding the transformation component. Both in REST and in GB, transformations took a more general shape. In REST, transformations were renamed as 'NP-movement' etc., and GB as 'Move a' (a'standing for any constituent), and the more specific name like Passivization etc. were dropped. Questions of 'deep' and 'surface' fatures of language have become questions of points of view. We may conclude with a quotation from a recent article written by Chomsky:

..... though there is a hint of the notions "deep" and "surface grammar" of philosophical analysis, the concepts do not closely match Everything else is "deep". The surface grammar of philosophical analysis has no particular status in the empirical study of language: it is something like phenomenal judgement; mediated by schooling traditional authorities and conventions, cultural artificats, and so on. I

NOTES

- 1. Chomsky, N., 'Language and the Mind, in Aaron Bar-Adon and W.F.Lops' (eds.), Child Language: A Book of Readings, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1969, p. 430.
- 2. cf. Chomsky, N, and Halle, M., Sound Pattern of English, Harper and R. N.Y., 1968, p.6.

How Much Deep Are The 'Deep Structures'?

403

cf. Ibid, p.6.

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- Chomsky, N., 'Language and the Mind', op.cit. p.431.
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- Chomsky, N., Syntactic Structures, Mouton, the Hague, 1957, 7th Printing, 8. 1968,p.87.
- Ibid, p.76.
- cf. Chomsky, N., Language and the Mind, enlarged ed., Harcourt Brace, N.Y.,1972, pp. 110-111.
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- 12. Ibid. p.164.
- Chomsky, N., Reflections on Language, Fontana, UK, 1976, pp. 81-82. 13.
- 14. Ibid, p.82.
- 15. cf. Chomsky, N., Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use, Praeger, N.Y., 1986, pp.64-65.
- cf. Chomsky, N., Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government and Binding, MIT, NY, 1982.
- 17. Chomsky, N., 'Explaining Language Use', p.8 of the typed article. I hereby express my gratitude to Professor Noam Chomsky for sending me this article through personal communication.

l hereby acknowledge my debt to Dr. Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay (Dept. of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Calcutta) and Prof. Gautam Biswas (Dept. of Philosophy, Assam University, Silchar) for their valuable comments and encouragement.

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IS OBSERVATION THEORY - LOADED ?

TARITMOY GHOSH

INTRODUCTION:

Now in philosophy of science, it is more important question whether observation is theory loaded or not. Commensense philosophers and some realists argue that observation is an act and it is totally free from theory. According to them all observations are totally free from theory. But, on the other hand, some realists and all anti-realists argue that observation is an act but it is theory-loaded. At the same time we also notice a philosopher, Ian Hacking, who argues that some observations are theory-loaded and some are free from theories.

At first I shall discuss the above views about observation in brief, and then evaluating all the views I shall try to form my own opinion about this problem.

Observations Are Free From Theories

Commonsense philosophers argue that observation is an act. We observe the external objects with our sense organs. External objects are real. When our sense organs have contact with them, we observe them as they are in the world. For observing the objects, theory has no role. The act, observation, is totally free from theory.

We notice some realists to give the arguments in favour of theory free-observation. Among such realists the remarkables are Grover Maxwell, Dudley Shapere and Van Fraassen. Their opinions about observation are given one by one.

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A. Grover Maxwell's View

Grover Maxwell is a realist about observable entities as well as postulated entities. He argues that observation is an act. With the help of this act we can know the nature of the objects which are in the world. We can directly observe the objects which are large in shape with our naked eyes but the objects which are so small, are not directly observed with our sense organs. We can observe these objects with the help of instruments. cell virus, gene etc. are observable with the help of instruments. We can observe them with the help of microscopes. I think, it would be better to quote his view for realizing his opinion about observation. Maxwell save "...... there is, in principle, a continuous series beginning with looking through a vacuum and looking and containing these as members: looking through a windopane, looking through glasses, looking through binocular looking through a low-power microscope, looking through a high-nower microscope etc. in the order given. The important consequence is that so far, we are left without criteria which would enable us to draw a non-arbitrary line between 'observation' and 'Theory'. " 1

What Maxwell wants to say is that observation is an act which is totally free from theory and this act is conducted with the help of naked eyes in case of large shaped objects and in case of small objects it is conducted with the help of instruments.

B. Dudley Shaper's View

Dudley Shapere like Maxwell argues that observation is to see something with our naked eyes as well as with the help of our instruments. But a little difference is noticed between their views. According to Shapere observation with the help of instruments is theory-loaded while all observations are free from theory to Maxwell. Shapere argues that when we try to observe the interior of the sun, we cannot do it with our naked eyes, we do to be using neutrinos emitted by solar fusion processes and this observation is theory-bound in the sense that what we observe is formulated in terms of our theory. But, he says, observation is totally free from theory, when we observe with our naked eyes.

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C. Van Fraassen's View

Van Fraassen uses the term 'observation' in strong sense. He argues that observation is nothing but mere seeing with our naked eyes. What we observe with our naked eyes are real but what we observe with the help of observe with our naked eyes are real but what we observe with the help of instruments are images or artifacts only. Using binoculars or telescopes what we see are real, not images. We use such instruments to see the objects which are far from us but observable, not postulated. We may see them with our naked eyes if we are close enough. But, using microscope what we notice can never be observed with our naked eyes. They are images only, not real. So, they are not observable. He argues, "......an unaided act of perception, for instance, is an observation. A calculation of the mass of a particle from the deflection of its trajectory in a known force field, is not an observation of that mass."²

Van Fraassen argues that though observation is not theory bound, yet observing that is theory bound. Observing that requires learning or practice. After observation we cannot identify an object if we have no previous knowledge about it. In case of mere observation, we can only know the existence of that object which we observed. But we can know the nature and attributes of that object which we observed after learning or practice.

2. Observations Are Theory loaded:

We also notice some philosophers who argue in favour of theory-loaded observation. They argue that all observations are theory-loaded. We have no theory-free observations. Among these philosophers, I shall mention two philosophers who are most popular in philosophy of science at present: N. R. Hanson and Paul Feyerabend.

A.N. R. Hanson's View

Hanson argues that observation is an amalgam of the two-pictures and language. He has given two arguments to prove that all observational terms and sentences carry theories with them. Firstly: When we use a word, we must follow some linguistic rules. For example, when we express injury, out etc. by the word 'wound', it would imply that injury, cut etc. are the re-

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sult of fight or battle.

Secondly: When we notice something, of course we have some the pectations of a theoretical sort. Observation is not only visual awareness of something but also knowledge of it. Hanson says, "There is a corresponding gap between visual pictures and what we know. Seeing bridges this, for while seeing is at the least a visual copying of objects, it is also more that. It is a certain sort of seeing of objects seeing that if x were done to them y would follow. This fact got lost in all the talk about knowledge and ing from sense experience, memory, association and correlation."

In favour of his argument he also says, "when language and notation are ignored in studies of observation, physics is represented as resting to sensation and low-grade experiment. It is described as repetitious, monotonous, concatenation of spectacular sensations, and of school-laboratory experiments. But physical science is not just a systematic exposure of the senses to the world; it is also a way of thinking about the world, a way of forming conceptions". 4

B. Paul Feyerabend's View

Paul Feyerbend strongly opposes the views which accept theory-fired observation. He also does not accept the view that observations are theory-loaded. According to him, all observations are theoretical. In fact, he does not accept any statement as observational one. He does not want to use the very phrase 'theory-loaded', because this phrase suggests that we have a sort of observational truck loaded with theoretical component. But he have no belief in the existence of such truck. Rather, he thinks that we have only theory everywhere. Though the distinction between observation and theory is not worth, yet we may curiously accept that distinction as the distinction is not worth, yet we may curiously accept that distinction as the distinction can be made short ones. He says, "Nobody will deny that such distinction can be made short ones. He says, "Nobody will deny that such distinction can be made short ones. He says, "Nobody will deny that such distinction can be made short ones and the purpose of

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Is Observation Theory - Loaded?

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3 Jan Hacking's View

Jan Hacking a recent and famous philosopher of science, after denying all the above views about observation has tried to throw a new light on it. In fct his new account is something which is the combination of the two-heavy free observation and theory-loaded observation. According to him, we have theory-free observations as well as theory-loaded observations. Hacking has given some platitudes of observations:

- i) Noteworthy observations have sometimes been essential to initiat ing inquiry, but they seldom dominate later work. Experiment supersedes raw observation.
- ii) Observation is a skill. Some people are better at it than others. You can improve this skill by training and practice.
- iii) There are numerous distinctions between observation and theory. The philosophical idea of a pure 'observation statement' has been criticized on the ground that all statements are theory loaded. This is the wrong ground for attack. There are plenty of pretheoretical observation statements, but they seldom occur in the annals of science.
- iv) Although, there is a concept of 'seeing with the naked eye', Scientists seldom restrict observation to that. We usually observe objects or events with instruments. The things that are 'seen' in twentith century Science can seldom be observed by the unaided human senses.

Like Marxwell, Hacking also thinks that there is no clear distinction between observable/Theoretical. The entities which we can observe with our naked eyes or with the help of instruments are observable ones, ful, on the otherhand, the entities which are only referred to by theoretical stands but cannot be observed are theoretical ones. According to him, if we manipulate the theoretical entities, then they would be accepted as real they have existence. So, we may then argue that they have the possibility to be observed.

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Against Hanson's arguments Hacking says that Hanson's first at ment which is previously discussed is important in ordinary language, but in science or in philosophy it has no value. Besides this, Hanson's at ment does not imply that every observational report carries scientific theory. If a term follows a rule, it cannot imply that this term is theory-loaded. But second argument can be accepted, because it is true. But we can never so that this argument implies that every observational term is theory-loaded.

Against Feyerbend Hacking says that factual statements, observational reports and experimental results are not same. We can not equage them. If we do so, it would be impossible to notice anything about what goes on in experimental science. By giving an example he has tried to show that experimental results and observational reports are not the same in the following way. Hacking takes Michelson - Morley experiment as an example. The chief result of that experiment was a refutation of the earth's motion relative to another. This experimental result also refuted the theory which is used to explain why the stars are not quite where they appear to be. From the above example it follows that duration of experiment is more than the duration of observation. They had done the experiment during many years with their hard labours but they observed their experimental results only for three or four days.

Against Feyerabend's view that all observational reports contain of assert theoretical assumptions, Hacking says that we have many observations which are free from theories. For example, Herschel observed rather than the at in many experiments without any help of theory.

Hacking has taken an example to prove that observation is a skill. The sister of William Herschell, Caroline Herschell was a good observation. She would observe the clear sky at night very attentively. She had a specificative mind and good understanding. When she would notice with her make eyes a strange thing in the heaven at night, using her telescope she would try to see it closely and accurately and would try to recognize it. Due to the speculative mind and hard labour she could recognize eight comets in her speculative mind and hard labour she could recognize eight comets in the his single year. She discovered more comets than any other person in the his tory of science.

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Conclusion:

From the above discussion, we get different definitions of observa-One definition is that observation is only the sense-experience. When our sense organs come into contact with the external objects, we get some experiences about them and these sense experiences are called observations.

Another definition is that observation is not only the sense experience but also more than that. Observation is the picture plus language. When we observe something, we get a picture and we get this picture as something. Always we observe a thing as something. We can not observe athing as a mere thing. Hence, in observation, idea or theory has a great function. All observations are loaded with theories.

We also notice another definition where observation, experiment, all activities are rejected. We have only theory. The existence of all things depends upon our conceptual scheme. We observe a thing as we want to observe that. What we observe is totally determined by our conceptual scheme.

Now, we shall evaluate all the views to accept one as a more fruitful han the others. First definition is geratly accepted by the common sense philosophers as well as the general people. According to this view, there are two things in observation, one is our sense organs and another is the external objects. Our sense organs directly notice the external objects. When our sense organs fail to notice them, we can notice them by using instruments. But no theory is needed to see them. But now the question: bit right that our observation is totally theory-free? Can we observe a thing without any previous idea? When we say that we have an observation about something, we do not say that we have a mere sense experience about that object In that case what we want to say is that we know the object very Hence, observation is not only a mere sense experience, it has also something more than that.

Third definition is totally idealistic. According to this view, apart from mind there is nothing in the world. Mind and mental activities are only

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real and all ohter things are unreal. So, there is no question whether observation is theory-loaded or theory-free. Because if we accept observation a separate activity of human being, then we have to admit the existence of the external objects, but the philosophers of this view do not accept the reality of the external objects.

In the second definition, it is said that observation is not only visual awareness of something, it is more than that. When we observe a thing we get a picture and we get this picture as something. So our observation is theroy loaded.

Now I want to give my own exposition about observation in the following way. I think that it is not easy to say observation is mere seeing or theory-loaded. If we say that observation is mere seeing, an object would be equally accepted by two normal and educated persons. But we notice many controversies among the well-educated persons to say about a thing or an event. On the other hand if we say that observation is theory-loaded, then many problems will arise. A blind man who is educated cannot say properly the attributes of external objects. He can only say the existence of the object by touching it. If observation is theory-loaded, the well-educated blind man be able to say the attributes of an external object. But it is not possible at all.

So, I think, observation is not mere seeing, and at the same time it is also not totally theory-loaded. At first time our sense organs are in contact with the objects. and than our earlies experience help us to understand the objects. At first time we know the existence of object - this type of act is called indeterminate perception. And then we know the object related with attributes - this act is called determinate perception. Jointly the indeterminate and determinate perception is called observation.

Electron, Proton etc. are not observed with our naked eyes or with the help of instruments. But we can recognize them by seeing the phenomena which are caused by them. By controlling phenomena we can use these entities, but we can not perceive them, we can only intuit them. With the sense organs we can only observe the opaque surface of the world. But

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by intuition we can observe such things which are not possible to observe with our naked eyes or with the help of instruments. Electron, Proton etc. are such things which are observed by our intuition or reason, but not by our sense organs.

So, I think, observation is an act to know the true nature of an object of an event. Seeing is the first condition of it where intelligible thinking is the second. When a lawyer says, 'I am observing your case', the lawyer does not want to say that he is mere seeing the case; he wants to say that he will take care of the case intelligibily. When a doctor is asked what he observed about the patient, it is not said that doctor has seen the mere physical appearance of the patient. Doctor at first notices the symptoms of the patient and from these symptoms he understands the actual cause of the disease. So, observation is not mere seeing. Observation means seeing plus understanding.

NOTES

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P. Feyerabend, Against Method, London, 1977, p - 31.

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DISCUSSION - I

ARE MAHĀVĀKYAS IDENTITY VĀKYAS?

It is only too appropriate that in the specially dedicated issue of the Journal, two giants of philosophy have come forward to exchange notes with their directly contrary views on a vital question about assimilation of Advaitic Mahāvākyas with Fregean Identity Vākyas. Professor Daya Krishna² favoured assimilation if only to throw light on the analytical rigour of the identity logic behind Mahāvākyas, while Professor Dravid³ questioned its credibility. That is, while Daya locates a Fregean problematic within Advaitic thought, Dravid emerges as a defender of the status quo. Daya formulates a Fregean case for Advaitins claiming that the following pair of statements namely,

Atman = Brahman = (im)pure consciousness

Atman = Brahman = Pure Consciousness

embody the identity Mahavakyas, since they are manifestations of one and the same consciousness. So his major problem is why should there be a temporal transition scale from

Atman = (im) pure consciousness

towards

Atman = Pure Consciousness

and still they are not to be regarded as a Fregean identity Vakyas. That question is adequately answered only if we know how to explain the unique way in which both Atman and Brahman are individuated. It is not that the lwo different modes of individuation overlap, but one is a more fine-graded

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.3

July 1999

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A. KANTHMAN

form of individuation than the other is. If we read only the question about the temporal transition then Daya's underlying problematic becomes one in which the so-called spiritual transition from the difference towards an identity (and back from the identity towards the difference as evidenced in Sāmkhya's system) is much more pronounced. Overlooking the fact that the above temporal schema cannot be fitted into Frege's version for a moment, we can still stipulate that the Advaitins should be obliged to defend the spiritualistic basis of the identity if they really want to present a case contra Frege. But in doing so they should not forget that they are turning the epistemic discovery into a non-epistemic one. But, when this is precisely the target of Daya's questioning they must give him the benefit of doubt. In other words, Daya's question becomes: can be Advaitins (taking their atman-centric posit of Atman) show that the identity between

Atman = Brahman

is one that is the same as

Water = H_2O

which is a *posteriori* and necessary. In other words, can they prove it to be natural kind terms like the one above so as to fit this into a Fregeat schema?

It is not that Daya refuses to look at the differences between the two pairs of identity vakyas, but he hold them to be on a different key as if the explicate the above question. That is, while Fregean identity is about objects of consciousness, Advaitic identity is about consciousness of objects ignore for the moment the distinction is considered to be one between a mathematical identity x+y=4 and the morning star and evening star, take to be the same). An immediate fallout is that while Fregean is not about the so-called ontology of illusion, Advaitins posit such ontology. The second difference is that while Fregean identity is a posteriori, which is about physically identifiable objects, Advaitins is about psychological cognition, that is, epistemic in his sense. (It is too difficult to make any cognition, that is, epistemic in his sense. (It is too difficult to make any cognition about these distinctions and hence I ignore). On the spiritual side thing about these distinctions and hence I ignore). On the spiritual side what they say about can be couched pace Daya, as a claim about month.

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Discussion - I

(exact equivlent to the concept of Atman). Such equivalence can be granted on the assumption of pantheistic relation they hold between them. If so, their pantheistic mode of talk comes to the following pair:

Monad = Monad

which is false in the light of Leibniz's law of identity, which asserts that no two monads are alike. So they must hold

Monad = ~ Monad.

But what they say is that

Monad = \sim Supermonad (I_1)

Monad = Supermond (I_2)

which still requires an identity. On either of the above ways, Daya's point may be construed as holding that they can deny this, only at the risk of escping from Frege's distinction between sense and reference. A fortiori, samkara's problematic is Frege's problematic, wittingly or unwittingly. (We must also see if this is what they accept: if they do, they have not gone beyond the poetry of pantheism which is unepistemic, let alone defending it, that comes to naught.)

Now, granting that they are so assimilable, in Daya's way, the problematic becomes one in which the sameness and difference is nothing more than the problem of sense and reference. Considered thus, the second pair only changes the sense of the first pair. For Dravid, Daya's understanding is questionable both from the textual as well as a logical point of view, and even so, it represents a distorted version of something other than the clelbrated Advaita vedanta, and hence Daya has totally misunderstood the unity of identity and non-identity (I₂) for the precise reason that the idenlity of identity and non-identity (I₁) can never be assimilated into the Fregean mode. The precise reason why such assimilation is not warranted by Advaitians is that it commits one to make the following statement

(im)pure consciousness = Pure Consciousness

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A. KANTHMAN Discussi

as conveying the same referents and different senses. Dravid can never senses they are they embody an exhaust grant this since, Mahāvākyas as they are they embody an exhortion of spir. itual change from one level of being to yet another level. On the one hard this has nothing to do with empiricism, nor has it to do with semantics a such. Were it to be so, on the empirical side at least, this should identify

empirical consciousness = absolute consciousness

or else on the side of the semantics of suggestive meaning, it should identify

that which is material substance = that which is endowed by polings

pot = which has its locus in potness

which is an ordinary derivation (which lends a subject-predicate structure to the above sentence) from the following pair:

The pot = that which is endowed by potness

The pot = that which is a material substance

What then is the objection? Again, the Advaitic semantics in situ however goes as follows taking the following pair as suggestive:

My house = that which is on the Ganges

My house = that which is on the bank of Ganges

so as to derive

That which is on the Ganges = (is an attribute of) that which on the bank of G.

What it boils down to is that the sense of both sides are dropped while the referents are retained as shown in the following analysis of Thou arl That

Thou = That = absolute consciousness which is to be characterised as if at all non-dual identity.

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Discussion - I

In a sense the crucial issue that divides Daya from Dravid is that while the former accepts identity of identity while the latter accepts only the identity of non-identity. Thus while the opposition between Atman the identity of non-identity is one between self and non-self) is brought out by

Atman = ~Brahman.

The identity among these three namely,

Atman = Brahman = Pure Consciousness

cannot be anything but non-dual (not one and not two, but it is two in one, that is the denial of duality).⁴

On the other hand, Frege's paradox arises on account of

Morning Star = ~ Evening Star

and an a posteriori knowledge reveals that

Morning Star = Evening Star = Venus.

In presenting the above I have violated the conventions governing Frege's discussion of identity statements. Frege's query is that in between the two following statements flanked by identity sign, the choice of one rather than the other leads towards a paradox. Thus the identity is paradoxical between

Morning Star = Morning Star

and

Morning Star = Evening Star.

Frege uses this as an argument to establish that meaning of these expressions may be understood in terms of a cognitive difference. We cognise them to be same in one mode and cognise them to be different in yet another mode. This is especially so in oblique contexts where one is substituted for the other. Such a substitution Frege argues will yield a false conclusion. Thus

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I believe that Rover is a dog

Rover = Dover

Therefore, I believe that Rover is Dover (False).

One need not necessarily follow the above strong Fregean argument. can swiftly change it into a case for presenting a dynamic identity state ment in which certain awareness is generated. Accordingly, I hear fire the owner of the dog that its called Dover, and hence I can substitute will idly Dover for Rover making the conclusion as true. If this is acceptable then we can understand the two identity statements as having a focus of both the problems of identity and difference. That is to say, it is express ing an identity as well as difference. In other words, it conveys to me the identity of identity as well as identity of non-identity. This is what I true formulate in a more succinct way at the initial stage. Now my question is if this is understood as a non difference, What is the bar in calling it a non-dual. This is what I think Daya can be construed as doing: that is, if the difference is denied, then it is nothing but Fregean. If so then the point that divides their argument comes to naught. Nevertheless, Dravid claims that he has no mood to accept this, precisely because the sense of boil expressions does not jeopardise the referents of the expression. That is since they have one and the same referents, there is no significance in the statement that the senses are different. Thus the sense difference in

Morning Star = Evening Star

does hardly convey any significance. That is if

Morning Star = Morning Star

is reducible to a mere tautology, then what significance we are supposed attach to

Morning Star = Evening Star

when both stand only for Venus, Dravid asks. In support of this, Dravid puts forward

Discussion - I

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Atman = Brahman

are having radically different connotations as brought by

That = other than Thou

and

Thou = other than That.

Unless Dravid wishes to demonstrate that such a retention of reference is based on the understanding of them as natural kind words, he cannot reserve the right to dismiss the sense as devoid of any significance. Does this not say

That = ~Thou

which is the same as above Fregean Vākyās? And from a semantic point of view,

That = that which is not present before the speaker

and

Thou = the one who is addressed by the speaker

What else we do when we synchronise these two into the statement of Mahāvākya? Dravid owes an explanation as to what makes him to drop the dynamism of the identity (which reduces his problem to absurdity) so as to retain referents-only-case, without bothering to explain further why they cannot be regarded as natural kind terms. For example, he never realises that this is no different from

Morning Star = the star which appears on the eastern horizon

Evening Star = the star that appears on the western horizon admits the dynamic identity statements without demur. Moreover

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this, Dravid

A. KANTHMAN

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in the comparison, in point of refutation, it stipulates that in the follows

That = Morning Star

and

Thou = Evening Star.

The L.H.S. are demonstratives and the R.H.S are adjectives of morning and the results of morning and the results are adjectives of the results are adjectives and the results are adjectives and the results are adjectives and the results are adjectives and the results are adjectives and the results are adjectives and the results are adjectives and the results are adjective and the re 'evening'. What makes this to be different from a Fregean mode?

In lieu of the sense-meaning and reference-meaning, he argues, we should adopt a suggestive mode, which enjoins

Empirical self = absolute self

which are partially meaningful (i.e., sense) but they are dropped when it is read as

Empirical self = absolute self = pure consciousness

which retains only the reference meaning. Granting that, one may demand the proof to show that they are natural kind words, which can never entit into identity relation. No Advaitin has ever shown to be so. So we can construe it in the following way. If this is not identity, he should tell to then: what else it is ?

One wonders where exactly the difference lies, if they are construct as given at the beginning. If so there cannot be any difference between MahāVākyas and Fregean MahāVākyas, despite the spiritual anchorage which can be dispensed with for purposes of rigorous understanding. My hund is that suppose we make the identity and identity of non-identity as flipsids of the same problematic (which looks quite plausible), then the line that divides Daya and Dravid is still thinned out. Daya is not incorrect after all? Then why the hue and cry? If they want to defend, the onus is on them to prove that

is not an identity statement at all. They cannot do so, once they agreed

Discussion - I ANTHMAN

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY hal it is so (Dravid also agrees) and then try to mix it with a dose of mysticism5.

ichna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philm

The issue was dedicated to the memory of its late founder Professor Dr S.S.Barlingay, who encouraged all shades of opinion. I owe a word of thanks to Professor Dr S.V.Bokil, Chief Editor, for encouragement that kept me trying this problem.

Dava Krishna 'Is Tattvam Asi the same type of Identity Statement as The Morning Star and the Evening Star' in this Journal xxv 1 (1998)pp. 1-15.

N.S. Dravid 'A Note on 'Is Tattvam Asi the same type etc' in this Journal xxv 4 (1998) pp.527-532.

As early as 1984 Professor Bina Gupta addressed herself to this problem in the light of her research on Sāksin, translating this as Witness-Consciousness. The problem about this is that it brings in the 'Kantian contraband' (Rorty's term). For the recent treatment see her The Disinterested Witness (A Fragment of Advaita Vedanta Phenomenology), Evanston, III. North Western University Press, 1998.

According to late Professor B.K.Matilal, mysticism cannot be used to explicate unless it is for a logical illumination. He laid this as a policy of the Journal for which he was the Editor.

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A NOTE ON 'TATTVAMASI'

In his article 'Is "Tattvam Asi" the Same Type of Identity statement as "The Morning Star is the Evening star?" (IPQ, Vol.XXV no.1, pp.1-13), Dayakrishna has raised perhaps the most important issue concerning the knowledge claim made by the Advaita Vedantins regarding their metaphysical thesis, one half of which has been expressed by the statement "Tattvam Asi" that states identity between the empirical jiva and the trans-empirical Brahman (jivo Brahmaiva nāparā), the other half of the thesis being a claim about the identity of empirical world-objects and the transempirical Brahman, though it is stated in a slightly different way as "Brahma Satyam laganmithya". I shall restrict my remarks only to the identity purportedly claimed in "Tattvam Asi".

Identity of Jiva and Brahman is allegedly the cornerstone of Advaita Vedanta - a system which naturally claims the status of mahāvakya for the statement under discussion. The System stands or falls with it. Establishing the identity between jiva and Brahman or which is the same as establishing the knowledge claim to that identity therefore becomes for that system a matter of logical necessity. Defense of that identity claim would obviously involve showing that the concerned statement is true, not analytically, but synthetically, i.e. as a matter of fact. Even before that is done, it is necessary to show that it is meaningful.

The temptation to liken it with "The Morning star is the Evening star" certainly arises out of the implicit grammatical similarity between the two. That one statement comes from the pen of philosophers who belong to Indian tradition while the other has its roots in the West is strictly irrelevant for a fair philosophical debate. That the statement "Tattvam Asi"

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVII No.3

July 1999

S.V.BOKIL

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has been 'the subject of interminable controversy where the question historically corect, need not unduly deter us from taking a fresh look at it. Dayakrishna indeed wants us to take a fresh look at it. I do not howele understand what he means by his appeal in the end to widen the issue cover not only these two diverse traditions of philosophizing but that should go beyond them".(p.13) I believe that there is no philosophical is sue at which we cannot have a fresh look. In fact the beauty of any phile sophical issue lies in the possibility of its permission to look at it afree If Dayakrishna however believes that the other statement, viz., "The Moning Star is the Evening Star", does not have such a long history as the statement "Tattvam Asi" has, he is quite mistaken. That statement has he also a very long history behind it before it came to be accepted as a tree statement of identity in the field of astronomy. Certainly Frege did m contribute anything to its truth-determinant-conditions. It was not be who first formulated that statement. The fact however remains that that state ment was first used by Frege in the nineteenth century as an example in bring to the attention of the philosophical world in the West a distinction which has since become famous and has led to a great deal of philosophi cal discussion'. (p.1) If we take into account the history of the astronomic cal discovery that the morning star is afterall the evening star (and this may also mean that what appears as the Morning star in the Western here sphere appears at the same time as Evening star in the Eastern hemisphone and consequently what appears as an Evening star in the Western Hemisphere appears at the same time as the Morning star in the Eastern Hentsphere) we come to know how the truth of that statement of identity was established by following the procedures of scientific method which involve reference to observational evidence, framing up of legitimate hypothesis use of established astronomical laws and theories in the field of astronomical The case of "Tattvam Asi" differs vastly from the case of astronomical discovery discovery about the planet venus. Better to call it metaphysical hypothesis. esis. The question would then be: Whether any metaphysical hypothesis could be regarded could be regarded as an identity statement in the sense of identity and erential identity. erential identity. There is no possibility of anyone claiming analytical Discussion -11

identity for the statement "Tattvam Asi". The statement must be then identity to be informative and cognitively significant. It must also be shown claimed to the claimed to the control of proving this must lie on the shoulders of the Advaita Vedantins who staunchly believe in that mahāvākya. The following considerations will suggest that it is reasonable to think that as philosophers, the Advaita Vedntins have not taken, to use Austin's phrase. "something more nearly their own size to strain at".

In the statement "Tattvam Asi", while it is clear what the expression "tvam' refers to, it's not at all clear what the expression 'tat' refers to. The expressions 'tvam' and 'tat' are demonstrative pronouns in Sanskrit language and their referents will certainly depend upon the context in which they are used. The statement, it is clear, can occur only in a dialogue situation where 'tvam' is used to address the second person who hears, the speaker referring to himself as 'aham'. In any dialogue these two pronouns are indexical and they will change their referents depending on who the speaker is and who the hearer is. Since the context is exclusively dialogical, the expression 'tvam' presupposes that the person to whom it refers is capable to communicate and comprehend the Sanskrit language. In using his term, viz., 'tvam', no distinction is made on account of sex, age or any other physical features of human body. "Tat' is however used never to refer to persons but to material objects and material objects are never capable of having a dialogue amongst themselves. There can be dialogue about material objects amongst persons but not the other way round. One can therefore safely say that the personal pronouns 'tvam' and 'aham' (in English language,: 'you' and 'I') acquire whatever signifance they have nasically from the dialogical contexts. Since the natural dialogues are always amongst human persons, it is extremely odd to think of an identity between 'tat' and 'tvam' or again between 'tat' and 'aham'. Thus' tvam' and lat can never refer to one and the same entity and can never be the terms between which referential identity could possibly exist. The sentence Tallyam Asi' is grammatically correct but 'systematically misleading', in as much as it masquerades itself as an identity statement and takes on the garb of a very profound truth about human persons. In story-writing, people

S.V.BOKI

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S.V.BOKI

imagine dialogues amongst trees, trees and human beings, animal, and human beings gods, godd, mals and trees, animals and human beings, gods, goddesses and fare and amongst all sorts of inanimate objects but all of us know that they be and amongst an sold of a sesthetic literary pieces having no cognitive significance whatsoer the point can be a sestimations the point can be Coming to the natural human situations the point can be made in a differ. ent way. If 'x' is told that thou art the recipient of this year's Jnanapee award, or that you are the person selected to deliver Tagore lectures a University of Pune in the year 2000 A.D.or so many other things of the form that 'you are such and such, 'x' will have no problem of grasping the meaningfulness of what is being said about him (assuming of course in he knows the language in which it is being said). 'X' may have man different sorts of reactions to those statements such as, believing or to believing, getting happy or tensed, feeling great or embarrassed and so to and so forth but he will never complain of not having understood by meaning of what was said. Normally people don't have problems of the derstanding what is being said to them about themselves and how the should react to it. If on the other hand 'x' is told, "Tattvam Asi", thereby implying that "you are Brahman", 'x' would not know what is being said about himself and how to react to it. Of course, it may be explained to him that he is empirical jiva and what it means to call him jiva - what is to be a physical body, an organic one, having waking consciousness of objects outside that body, having all sorts of internal sensations like pain pleasure, hunger and thirst, feelings and emotions, having illusions, 181eries, hallucinations and dreams, having thoughts and ideas, having what we call moral and aesthetic sensations and perceptions, compulsions and freedoms to do certain things. It may be also explained to him how his organic body passes with regular intervals through the phenomenon sound sleep. And then if it is added that your jiva on account of which you do all these things in your life, is truly and ultimately Brahman; but the all that you are indulging in as a jiva in this world is unreal (mith) along with the world itself, reaction of 'x' would be that of a dumb-found He will say that he unds stands fully well his own description as Jiva but would not know what is to identify his is to identify his Jiva with Brahman because for him the expression Brahman because

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that they at whatsoever man' has no use at all. In fact Brahman is not an expression that belongs anyone's language used to speak about this world of persons, animals anyone's language used to speak about this world of persons, animals "Tattvam Asi" and Jivo Brahmaiva nāparā" - these and such other statements would be meaningless for everyone to whom we speak or have a dialogue in which we want to say something about the other person have a dialogue in a cognitively significant way. It is thus a case of Pseudomeaningfully or in a cognitively significant way. It is thus a case of Pseudomeaningfully. The structures of metaphysics and religion are all founded on such pseudo-identities. Supposing some one were to tell me that my sons and daughters were God's children, I would not know what kind of identity is being conceived because I know for certain what they are and who they are and the expression 'god's child' has no use for me. I cannot possibly conceive any situation in which the said expression can have any use for me or for any one for that matter.

That the statement 'Tattvam Asi' is a case of pseudo-identity may also be brought out in a slightly different manner on logical grounds. In Logic, 'x' and 'y' are regarded as holding identity relation (or as being identical with each other) if and only if every property that belongs to 'x' also belongs to 'y' and vice versa. This definition which was formulated by Leibnitz and which is too well known is called the Principle of Identity of hdiscernibles. One can easily see that this relation is transitive, symmetrial and totally reflexive. Most important point to note is that the relation of identity can be meaningfully conceived only in terms of properties possessed by objects. Unless we have clear notion of what should count as a property and which properties individuals can be said to have we cannot tien start thinking whether the relation of identity holds between them. It sobvious that one jiva cannot be identical with another jiva because of of qualitative and quantitative differences amongst them. They are also numerically different. It is therefore not conceivable that all these distinct and different jivas are collectively or distributively identical with Brahman. Brahman is said to be propertyless whereas jivas can be distinwished by us from one another as separate individuals only by reference the distinct properties which they possess. Can we dissolve all the diftrences amongst the several jivas into homogeneity of one Brahman? This

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reminds us of Hegel's characterization of Spinoza's substance as lion's de where one notices only the foot-prints of the in-going animals and noned the out-coming ones. How can we obliterate the vital distinctions between different kinds of jivas that escist in this world and further very distingtions the various individual. kind of defatures that characterise the various individual jivas whom we assign the highly dignified designation of human beings? Advaita Vedania introduce confusion worst confounding by identifying all the jivas with Brahman and treating them as several distinct appearances of one Brah man. The confusion can be shown to emerge in the following way,

In order to convince any disciple that 'Tattvam Asi', the Preceptor Velween or the Guru must have to have the knowledge of what is being referred to Awareness by 'Tat'. 'Tat, according to the Preceptor who is an Advaita Vedantin wmal c The Preceptor thus must have had the knowledge of refers to Brahman. or some Brahman before he informs the disciple that 'Tattvam Asi'. When the disciple is told with some insistence of his identity with Brahman, the disciple is bound to ask the question as to how the Preceptor himself came if this in to have the knowledge of Brahman and jiva's identity with Branman? am sure that each one of us will certainly allow this modest shade of skepticism in the disciple that I am talking about. I really do not set however how the Preceptor will be able to handle this skeptical doubt of onlext c the disciple? The Preceptor cannot simply dictate that he himself had be said to realised the identity between his own jiva and the Brahman - that 'Ahan Brahmasmi'. If he does that then he lands himself into solipsim of Metaphysical sort which will cut every possible route to Tattvan Asi If he cits authority of a few ancient Upnishadic Rsis and Munis and claims in their behalf that they had realised for themselves the identity between their own jivas and the Brahman, then the preceptor will land them into mataphysical solipsism which will cut routes to both 'Aham Brahmasmi' and Tallian Asi'. There is no problem in philosophy which is more important than the problem of other minds. To throw light on the nature of other minds, we cannot create solipsistic islands of individual experiences and explain the nature of this world of persons and objects. There can be no piece of demonstrative demonstrative reasoning nor any inductive model to reach the kind of identification

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which the Advaitin looks for between Jiva and Brahman. How do I which the come to know that 'Tattvam Asi'? And how do others come to know bal 'Aham Brahmasmi'? Will intuition or what is called 'anubhuti' help Can I have intuitive experience of other jivas being ever identical Brahman? Can others have any intuitive experience of me being ner identical with Brahman? The identity of Jiva and Brahman, if at all holds good, must be objective and universal but then such an identity will bye to overcome all the difficulties we encounter in solving the problem fother minds. Till such difficulties are overcome, the supposed identity Preceptor Reliveen Brahman and jiva must be regarded as a case of pseudo-identity. referred to Avareness of my own personhood can never be a matter of illusion under a Vedania, primal circumstances. A man under rare circumstances like schizoprania nowledge of a some other kind of psychosis characterized by dissociation from envi-When the nument and deterioration of personality may have mistaken identity of rahman, lk is own with some other character. I need not work out the implication imself came of this in asking someone to identify himself or herself with Brahman. Branman? | Language of appearances will also not help us. From a few cases of illuest shade of some and appearances that we have in our life, nothing can be generalised do not set bout the whole of our waking experience. The material objects in the cal doubt of which we have such experiences on only a few occasions cannot himself had to have all only an ephemeral being. We cannot deny them reality that 'Ahan A their own right. If that is the case with material objects in the world, im of Mela low can we deny reality to other jivas which, for aught we know, are if he cits modied ones? How do we know that other persons have dreams? How tims in their we know that other persons have sound sleep? Do animals have dreams? en their own have dreams? All these are troublesome questions for a phinataphysical asopher who wants to go beyond common-sense and science.

The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, on the basis of which I to develop above considerations, I am aware has not gone unellenged in the history of Logic. Issues concerning analyticity of senand the synonymity of meanings have been raised and discussed at the synonymity of meanings nave been raise. If analytical, the synonymity of meanings nave been raise. kind of iden | tsonly a truism, and if synthetic, it's hypothetical. The difficulties expe-

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rienced in applying the principle to the real world of our experience persons and things are well known in the field of Law and jurisprudity far as my where the questions involved are not only about knowing the evidence, inguage of identifying persons for dispensing justice in the light of the known to not this He ab in dence. Some times we find it extremely difficult to affirm the identities rizons of persons inspite of very good evidence for identification because we constituted reached never correctly identify their intentions in doing certain actions. Errors hasis of possible at every stage. If this is the case with our mundane existence alone wi how very difficult it is, nay, almost impossible, to identify jivas with Bris ing 'Ahai man. Philosophers have however thought they could prove their men oul to th physical claims without facing the tribunals of logic and experience

Before I close this already elongated note, I do want to refer to recently emerging trend of approaching the pure philosophical side Advaita Vedanta by applying phenomenological investigation to one's on conscious experience. Mentioning that the beauty of phenomenology that it permits us to look at experience rather than language, Prof. Been Gupta in her recent work The Disinterested Witness (A Fragment of Admin Vedanta Phenomenology), Evanston III. North Western University Pra 1998, has thought that the phenomenological approach "leads us to a principal" where linguistic and interpretive differences, though recognized, are to scended in the horizon of pure experiential consciousness and its store Prof. Ramkrishna Puligandla also in his very reces Husserli tures" (p.xi-xii). published article ('The Message of Māndukya Upnisad: Phenomenological Analysis of Mind', Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.XXVI, 10.24 has also recommended this approach very strongly in order to contain Century interpret the Advaitic position on the reality of Brahman. In this brief I do not wish, nor do I have enough preparation by way of careful states of the states scholarly study of the two references given above, to examine in details and their contract of the study of the two references given above, to examine in details and their contract of the study of the their arguments. This may be done some time later. I am glad 10 See in recommendations and the second see in recommendations and the second se in recommending to us to look at experience rather than language, they it using language to convince us of their approach. So the matter, supplemental the bandled can be handled at the level of philosophical arguments. I can use language alone to communications alone to communicate what I want to say. Phenomenological method,

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urisprudêtç evidenceh ne knowned e identities ji cause we ca ns. Errors ane existent as with Bra perience. t to refer to phical side d to one's on omenology i , Prof. Been ent of Advin niversity Pro s us to a poin glad to see it's

was my understanding goes, does not take into account the logic of the but makes exclusively an ultimate appeal to intuition, But will this appeal to intuition make philosophical argument utterly impossithe ab initio? How am I to convince myself and others too, that the honons of pure experiential consciousness that I reach are the same ones How shall I be able to convince the disciple on the hists of my own realization that 'Tattvam Asi'? Dependence an intuition done will create an iron curtain of solipsism, each individual jiva claim-'Aham Brahmasmi' with no approach to other minds. I am pointing ve their mas on this consequence as a reductio ad absurdum. Language, with logic g no logic, at least gives me free hand in getting to know other people, inderstand them, their lights and delights, their woes and miseries and to we with them in a community. We know that Husserl who introduced his method for the first time in the West, wrote, : "The 'I' and the 'we' shich apprehend, presuppose the hidden 'I' and 'we' to whom they are mesent". This is as good as saying that we are appearances unto ourklves. This assertion of transcendental subjectivity must end up with a adical sort of subjective idealism. If I mistake not, it does at least in the ase of Husserl. Phenomenological method, in the case of Husserl, makes in uncritical assumption that there are independently of any linguistic ized, are III context, objects that are epistemologically absolute data. George and its straight lakhnikian has drawn our attention to this by remarking that this is the very rectet Husserlian counterpart of logical atomist's assumption of ultimate absonomenological ble simples out of which the world is to be logically constructed (Refer to (VI, no.24) is Introduction to Part x: Edmund Husserl, in Readings in Twentieth er to correct Century Philosophy, The Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1964, pp.621this brief [18] [3]). Keeping aside for the moment the powerful criticism of this generic of careful by Wittgenstein, how would phenomenologist like to go about relatthese absolute data with the world of our experience - the world of ther minds and external bodies? Will the language of appearances help guage, they have and external bodies? Will the language of the burden away from tter, I support language and upon the self-evidently given indicates a some what naive n use language and upon the self-evidently given indicates a conform in a pure cal method state to what is intuited in its full clarity" - wrote Husserl, as if lan-

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guage were the sort of thing that the phenomenologist could create at the phenomenologist could create in the image of ultimate facts"(p.631). I wish phenomenologists lake remark seriously enough. Search for philosophical truth without languages and the pitch of darkness and is like search for a black cow in the pitch of darkness. Phenomenology route to Brahman takes us to a dead end. It does not throw any light the nature of the identity supposedly stated in 'Tattvam Asi'. Can to therefore reaffirm the claim that it is a case of a Pseudo-identity?

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BOOK REVIEW - I

Nayak G. C. UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS PHENOMENON, Banglore, Dharmaram Publication, 1997 PP. XVII+94, Price Rs. 120/-

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Understanding Religious Phenomenon is a thoughtful exposition and reflection on the significance and role of religion in our modern age, based on a life-long career of teaching and research. The author impressively intergrates insights from the Western and Eastern traditions and is at home in both of these worlds. This is particularly evident in Chapters Three and Four where he identifies some of the central criticisms against the theistic world view and where he delineates his own position. His arguments on the nature of God and problems of human language are reasonable and pragmatic. Readers in the Western world would be very interested in seeing how his arguments on these subjects are grounded in the Indian religious traditions. The author may want to consider amplifying the scope of these chapters with further illustrations from the Indian traditions and with a more detailed treatment of the positions of Vedānta Desika, Śhańkara and Rāmānuja. These commentators are briefly mentioned.

In Chapter Five, Prof. Nayak discusses the problem of language and experience (anubhava). His position is that experience is the core of what it means to be religious, and language is secondary in its role as the symbolic expression of this experience. There are many assumptions in this position. One is the possibility of pure experience unmediated and uninterpreted. In recent years, the relationship between religious experience and language has been the subject of much discussion. Some philosophers have been arguing that the idea of a pure, unmediated experience is contradictory. Interpretation is not post-experiential but is prior to and involved in making the experience itself possible. It would be inter-

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.3

July 1999

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esting to see Prof. Nayak articulate his views in relation to this critique articulated prominently in the work of the philosopher, Steven Katz.

Prof. Nayak's passionate call for religion without bigorty is one that all traditions need to heed. Religious traditions will be enriched by his emphasis on vital place of human reason in religious inquiry and the spirit of openness towards the other which should characterize religious relationships. In his final chapter, I wonder if the problem about which he is concerned is "dogmatism" rather than "dogma." I am not sure what the word "dogma" has come to signfy in India, but, in the West, it may not have all of the negative resonances which are implied in this use of the term. Perhaps religious exclusivism is what he has in mind. In any even, it may be helpful to clarify in more detail and with the help of illustrations what the author suggests by dogma.

From a specifically Hindu standpoint, I am heartened by his call for a new way of thinking about the meaning of Varṇa-āśrama, one that moves away from the traditional emphasis on birth and towards relationships of justice and equity. I am also gratified for his emphasis on love and compassion as the central expression of what it means to be religious and to be human.

ANANTANAND RAMBACHAN

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BOOK REVIEW-II

Kalz, Jerrold J. REALISTIC RATIOALISM, The M I T Press (A Bradford Book, Cambridge, Mass., 1998, pp.XXXIV + 226, Price: US \$ 47.50)

It has been usually thought that Rationalism leads to Idealism. In modern times the origins of idealism have been traced to Descartes' Cogito The career of idealism has passed through solipsism, subjective idealism and pluralistic or monistic forms of idealism with all sorts of shades and shines. Rationalistic Idealism has been always opposed by the school of Realism on empirical grounds. The dispute between idealism and realism has been age-old and the rivalry between the two was considered to be unending. A wide-ranging conviction holds in the present philosophical world that the real and the rational cannot go together. The linguistic turn in philosophy during the 20th century, no doubt, brought some relief in this controversy by tending to show that if we resort to the methods of logical and linguistic analysis, the controversy itself could be shown to be frivolous and hence unnecessary. But this respite, as every one in the field knows, is proved only shortlived and temporary. We have fast begun to realize that the philosophical problems cannot be dissolved and like the soul in Bhagvatgītā, they go on wearing new attires.

The book under review is a serious attempt towards showing that realism and rationalism can be integrated. This is indeed a new philosophical position, quite unlike Plato's or Frege's, and Jerrold J. Katz has arrived at it after almost a career-long endeavour. Katz has certainly emerged as an influential thinker of this decade, in the field of philosophy of language. He has kept himself on the front against the naturalistic strong winds of the Wittgensteinian and Quinean sail-boats. In his

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No.3

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The Metaphysics of Meaning (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990), he had offerred a radical reappraisal of the "linguistic turn" in 20th century philosophy and showed that the naturalism that emerged from such a turn to become the dominant philosophical position was never adequately proved. In that book he had criticised in detail the arguments of Wittgenstein, Kripke and Quine supporting naturalism of one sort or another and had developed, taking cue from Moore, a new conception of the naturalistic fallacy. By employing that conception, he had explained why attempt to naturalize linguistics and logic will always fail. Offering a platonistic view of such disciplines, Katz had justified it as the best explanation of their autonomy, objectivity and normativity. The present book, viz., Realistic Rationalism is a further reassessment and the author claims:

The position which Katz takes in this book is the result of his thorough disillusionment with naturalism which was the outcome of finding that "naturalist and empiricist philosophies do not provide satisfying answers to the questions that first lure us into philosophy.....and of coming to think that answering some of those questions requires a non-nalivralist position combining realism in ontology with rationalism in epistermology" (p. xvii).

The Introduction to the book presents comments on the first-order second-order distinction of disciplines and on attempts to treat philosophy exclusively as a second-order discipline with the ensuing consequence that there can't be an autonomous metaphysical philosophy. Katz is opposed to this kind of hard and fast distinction and suggests that his non-naturalise

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first-orderphilosophy quence that opposed to -naturalisthem. Katz makes it more than amply clear that the notion of intuition on the basis of a broad range of clear cases and principles derived from tematic methodology that enables us to correct unclear and deceptive cases sometimes wrong guidance, it is possible to integrate intuition into a 5/5 mathematics, logic and linguistics. Even granting that intuition gives us Wittgenstein provides ignores the genuine role which intuition plays in shuffle".(Pl:sec.213). It is Katz's view that caricature of intuition which intuition as a source of knowledge referring to it as "an unnecessari noteworthy is that he challenges Wittgenstein's criticisms which dismiss the cry of "mysticism" on the part of some radical antirealists but what is compassed within a single grasp of structure. Kalz takes care to ward oil mathematical knowledge that do not depend upon rational operations enthe use of the expression 'intuition'. There are genuine cases of basic knowledge."(p.43) A footnote to this last quote warns us not be misled by immediate apprehension as a source of basic mathematical to refer to seeing that something is the case as "intuition" and to take such respect of formal sciences. Second, In the formal sciences "it is common to hold, thinkers have not paid enough attention to a similar distinction in While this feature of our knowledge in natural sciences can be easily shown knowledge- an ascent from basic knowledge to transcendent knowledge. edge of laws and theories, which characterizes both a priori and a posterion an order of knowledge for explaining the ascent from basic facts to knowlmathematical facts to knowledge of mathematical laws and theories. First of reason that are responsible for the steps from knowledge of simple stantiates the points he makes. Further he draws attention to two aspects the example of the proposition that two is the only even prime, he sub things must be in the realm of abstract objects of formal sciences. Taking truth, and ii) Reason is an appropriate instrument for determining how points: i) Reductio proofs in the formal sciences are tests of necessary is no possibility of Gettier's problem ever raising its head. He makes lyo the confidence that in respect of the knowledge of formal sciences, there distinctiveness in the field of mathematics. The whole discussion tevesty knowledge is jessel the justification condition so as to bring out their truth condition and the justification condition so as to bring out their knowledge is justified true belief and ananlyses the belief condition, the principle of the

tealm of abstract objects."(p.34) Katz assumes, like Benacerraf, that relationship that explains how we come to stand in that relationship to elfilo: when alical reality. "The task is to provide an account of this other kind stalloneshing." oi dn a different kind of relationship between the faculty we possess and the refule buely subjective. The possibility of mathematical knowledge indicates appe 10 bunded results cannot be associated with sensory data or something which ce spal -199 .0 Malbematical intuition or the rational faculty on which mathematical Epistemolgy taking cue from Godel. ped ul asuc calical knowledge with no mystical element in it. The rest of the chappaonpo En, when integrated with Rationalism, can resolve the mystery of math-Real-smoot the confusion between mystery and mysticism. Realuo sao dopling mysticism. The charge of mysticism is laid at the doors of -IWOU) we come to acquire mathematical knowledge but it cannot be solved to agb super-natural kind. There may be some philosophical mystery about SISTOU Whor abstract objects, thinking that it would involve some connection of uo pa simulal all those antirealists who dismiss the possibility of any epistemolcal rembs. Katz makes distinction between mystery and mysticism and argues ies on Lowledge, we must have a non-empirical way of knowing mathematical here it men that in order to account for the real possibility of mathematical ICS VES where well with an empirical account of knowledge but this would simply duites menghily claims that a realist's account of mathematical truth does not CGinn malies and other formal sciences are truths of pure reason. Benacerraf грешdouble based on the rationalist's notion that the truths of pure mathscobe alon of our knowledge of pure mathematics and other formal sciences [SITTO] Junalism - ontological, epistemological and methodological -, its explawhich on provide such a long awaited defense. If realism rejects all forms of realist athless against the charge of epistemological malfeasance, and that he alised Maintennology. Katz thinks seriously that realism has yet to receive a latical My which can be questioned. Empiricism can be replaced by a rational-औ रे minimum and the prevailing empiricist outwith natural objects is a necessary feature of justification in any form the action in any form ATIS. based on false assumption that information from causal interace ipsi access nighten min. He claims that the argugiment that mathematical knowledge is impossible if mathematical ob--шехэш-11- Walvah Aood OKIL

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the basis of reason alone. edge - an epistemogy that explains knowledge in the formal sciences on facts, laws and theories in the formal sciences as purely a priori knowlreality. A realist must evolve an epistemology that treats knowledge of i) acquiantance with abstract reality, and ii) acquiantance with a concrete ality is possible only if realist avoids epistemologiges based on philosophy of mathematics is that a realistic account of mathematical rewas. The moral which Katz gleans from the contemporary studies on the original problem of the knowledge of abstract objects exactly where it non-naturalistic knowledge of such reality, the naturalised realism leaves and suggests that if the naturalistic knowledge of abstract reality requires selves. He examines the views of Alexander George and Colin McGinn for the study of abstract mathematical, logical and linguistic objects them. sciences into psychology - an empirical investigation which leaves no scope sounds too good to be true. Katz does not favour collapsing of formal ontology with an empirical epistemology resulting into a position which realism either. Naturalised realism has a strategy to combine a tealig knowledge, truth and reality. Katz is also not happy with Naturalised difficult philosophic questions that arise in the context of mathematical totelian import of her position is unable, it is claimed, to face some of the mathematical knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. The strong Ans to abstract objects in the Platonic realm on the basis of her idea that edge of sets just to avoid accept to avoid accept to avoid accept in a manage of attempt to avoid accept incs Maddy's position as a prominent example of attempt to avoid accept inc. edge of sets just as we have of any material objects. He states and example of attempt to

The epistemological challenge to realism, which is thus introduced in the first chapter, is taken up for detailed presentation and response in the second chapter entitled 'The Epistemic Challenge to Realism', Paul Benacerraf's paper published in 1973, (The Journal of Philosophy pp. 66180) is taken up for critical comments. It is argued in the first place that "although it seems clear that Benacerraf thinks that realism is unable to "although it seems clear that Benacerraf thinks that realism is unable to entitly and the first place of the explain mathematical knowledge, his aim in this paper is not to telutterapism" and that it's " to make both sides in the controversy....face up to telutte problems" (p.25), In this chapter Katz tries to show that Benacertal's

supports of mainematics our they house a posteriori knowlwhile the objects of mathematics but they locate the objects of mathwhen porarise of perceivable to extend the range of perceivable to which the transfer of mathematical than the control of mathematical transfer of extend the range of perceivable objects to include abstract objects. whe lask of integrating realism and rationalism. What one has to do is Advises realists to take a cue from him for a different strategy Suggesting further that Godel is anything but a classical Railonship because he had no epistemology to put in place of classical (Bp.16-17), and suggests that Godel could not characterize the upiculy, is not the causal effect of actions of certain things on our sense cheality in the case of sensations. Mathematical knowledge, he says eathematical reality is not the kind of relationship that we have to physimude by Godel in claiming that the relationship between ourselves and Against Classical Platonism as a kind of realism, he cites a move

"Fiction is fiction and mathematics is fact".(p.14) molves a serious logical exercise and that it's not a play of pure imagiting mathematics and those who do mathematics know very well that it mimpossible. Those who indulge in fiction know that they are not humb in mathematics, while presence of inconsistency won't make fic-Indion. This difference lies in consistency being a necessary condition which goes to show that truth in mathematics cannot be taken to be truth wing that there is essential difference between mathematics and fiction that Katz's refutation of this view is sound and that he succeeds in Milvely the view that truths in mathematics are truths in a fiction. I by the naturalism renders Field to go to the extent of holding grasping" and hence do not present any naturalistic account. gemen realists have "to postulate some aphysical connection, some giment for it. Katz finds no such argument in Field's work. Field ganitrogen if there is no supporting the question if there is no supporting the state of the supporting that it is the supporting the supporting that it is the supporting tha resultable spistemological naturalism and that presupposition, so Katz kus tenesties. But this argument would fail if Field himself does not and the societemological naturalism and that property and the property of the property o giant the indispensibility principle of ontological commitment As again to abstract observation ontological commitment to abstract observations of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological of ontological or other or oth As against Quine and Putnam, Field attempts to show that natural

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realism in question is preferable to its rival particular nominalisms and conceptualisms as an account of the objects of knowledge in the relevant formal science. Hence, to explain how a realist can argue systematically for the existence of abstract objects in the domain of a formal science, we have to look at what is involved in showing that realism provides the best account of the objects of knowledge in that science." (pp.4-5)

Distinguishing clearly between the foundations of mathematics, the foundations of logic and the foundations of linguistics as philosophical disciplines from mathematics proper, logic proper and linguistics proper tell us, philosophers are committed to the existence and linguistics proper tell us, philosophers are committed to the existence of abstract objects in the related field. The argument that the objects of a formal science are abstract and that they exist is successful if and only if it shows that the realist ontology is best suited to accommodate the full tange of facts in any formal science. Katz denies that abstract objects are characterised exclusively on the basis of the negative property of not haven a spatial or temporal location.

So far as the Kantian view of mathematics is concerned, Kait's observations are indeed penetrating and place finger on the difficulties arising out of his (Kant's) tracscendental idealism. Brouwer's mathematical intuitionism is grounded in Kant's old intuitionism but the Cepernican revolution which is the turn-key projet in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason tests on philosophical doctrines that are too dubious. Katz further mentions two important problems in this context. One is that Kant's transcentions two important problems in this context. One is that Kant's transcentions two important problems in this context. One is that Kant's transcentions two important problems and included in the finite of the finite of the finite of the finite of the finite of the problem is statements. Kant locates the grounds of necessity within us - the finite of contingent human beings but, as Frege argued at length, that does not the verificationism in Kant's position which fails to motivate an epistemic constraint on what there is.

Another form of anti-realism stated and examined by Katz is Fields Fictional Nominalism which presents argument against mathematical re-

talz's line of argument. ièm, I shall briefly summarise the contents of these chapters, and thereby Toward a Realistic Rationalism" In the remaining part of this Regeneration on the last challenge to realism. The last chapter asks us to mistenic challenge to antirealism. The 4th and the 5th, take care of with the epistemic challenge to realism, the third with the physicis. The first deals with a few philosophical preliminaries, the pure and clarifying Katz's approach, the whole book is divided into Julian in developing a proper and illuminating in developing a proper After the Introduction which, "(p.xxxii) After the Introduction which, major mer "realism without rationalism is unbelievable and rationand further that "realism si unstable." (nixxx.n)". after the contraction of th "mesilsnoitst and realism of realism and rationalism"." "Indeed of this book is inclinated as inclinational inclination in the contraction of the the of responding to them in brief. Katz claims that " one of the principle realist claim that mathematics is about abstract objects and the realist claim to them in brief. Katz claims of responding to them in brief. nentions three basic objections in the philosophy of math-

that that the also maintains that of exist and by exposing weaknesses of one or another form of anti-Firstlien his case for realism by supplying reasons to think that abstract them from concrete objects. Katz promises us to direct objects, that we cannot determinately refer to them and that we increeds to defend it against criticisms that we cannot have knowledge of tal in this book he assumes general realism for the sake of argument and battet object in realist thought from Plato to Godel (p.1), he makes clear uniy has no spatial or temporal location is the core of conception of an unnaries. Starting with the assertion that "Being an object that necesuredion and finally iv) the Moral which a realist can draw from the premay Aristotelianism and Maturalised Realism as wrong turns in the right and the Fictionalist nominalism -, iii) Classical Platonism, Contemtowi) the framework ii) two forms of antirealism - the Kantian compro-The Philosophical Preliminaries' which spawn the first chapter speak

establishing one of them is an argument to show that the particular tealism, logical realism or linguistic realism. The argument for To establish general realism, it suffices to establish mathematical

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intensionalism suggests the rejection of naturalism based on linguish free from the difficulties attributed to Fregean intensionalism. The new He also maintained that this non-Fregean intensionalism of his is determiner of referential properties and relations, like denotation and truly. erties and relations, like meaningfulness and synonymy, rather than the of sense. Katz holds the view that "sense is the determiner of sense prop-He came to develop side by side a non-Fregean and non-Carnapian definition

realism. In The Metaphysics of Meaning (1990) Katz had argued that

dations for realism."(p.xxviii) logical naturalism were based on weaknesses in the Fregean founand Quine's case for his uncompromising empiricism and methodo. "Wittgenstein's case for ontological and epistemological naturalism

moralizing effect of naturalism, skepticism and deconstructionism. The in the book are strong enough to awaken us from the unnerving and de The in all its forms but I can vouch this much that the arguments he presents has reached a final and conclusive pose to turn tables against naturalism it are simply amazing. I shall not venture to say at this juncture that kate cult task. The labours which Katz has passed through in accomplishing alistic conception of philosophy through mathematical realism is a different to the state of the metaphilosophical position which he takes. The task of restoring talion the extent to which mathematical realism succeeds and the defence of the philosophy" (p.xxix) The success of the book will certainly depend upon restoration of the traditional metaphysical conception of that " vindication of mathematical realism leads straightforwardly to the every possible argument in the camp of anti-realists. Katz holds the view of Ontological realism - a sort of metaphilosophical framework to hound in the philosophy of mathematics as a fulcrum for Katz's general defense Realistic Rationalism, the focus of the present review, vindicates realism natural languages in linguistics and the linguistic realism it implies intensionalism that is available by locating semantics within the study of cisms, Katz had argued, had no force against the radically different realism about logic and mathematics to natural language. These onliintensionalism drawing attention to its problems and failure to extend Katz had shown that their criticisms were specially tailored to Fregea

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ivxxvi) "sissified objects" (p.xxvi) In which mathematical realists claim that mathematical theories are minds - and its theories are about abstract objects in the same sense linguistics is a science of languages, collections of sentences - not

ad Other Abstract Objects (1981). In that book, Katz had argued that: holist t Chomsky to mark the first break with naturalism in his book Language concern this career as a linguist. It tells us how he moved away from Quine and suppos who book. It's a sort of charting out his own intellectual development theory us solentistic naturalism to Realistic Rationalism which he is desending is a pr with a view to explaining how Katz himself moved from the position "tonlains reflections on positivistic, Wittgensteinian, and Quinean posithe naturalistic and empiricistic positions held from Frege onwards. mended to indicate in brief the major points of difference which he holds stlended to the field of physical science. Rest of the Introduction is mainly would be a paradigm example to provide this answer which can then be nuhematics which is mainly concerned with foundations of mathematics book is devoted as an answer. According to Katz, the philosophy of 1go about doing this? This is the major question to which the entire questions about the objects in the domain of sciences. "(p.xix) How does nonceived of as a second order discipline.....nonetheless answers certain the seriously enough. Katz maintains that on his position, "philosophy, There are philosopher-scientists who take philosophical problems in their feld of science are faced by philosophers alone and not by the scientists. suce. It would be incorrect to suppose that philosophical issues in the Monship with skepticism in science which is an another philosophical dinduction e.g. is a philosophical issue and one can see its intimate remy methodology on which scientific knowledge rests. Problem One should all settions do arise. They concern the nature and validof the state of scientific investigation of rephotosome of the scientific enterprise in a hands-on way." (p. xviii). with the solut reality did not, I think, want to say that philosodiscipline The traditional philosophers who took philosophy to be an inquiry mild. The traditional philosophers who took philosophy to be an inquiry and the traditional philosophers who took philosophy to be an inquiry mild. it position are first order discipline only in asking questions about the discipline who took nhilosophers who took nhilosophers. that philosophy is both first-order and second-order in asking only in asking ones.

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Book Review

had is relevant to the proposed rationalist epistemology is that of an imhalls let and purely rational apprehension of the structure of an abstract object. It is important to note that such an apprehension of an australian apprehension also reveals the limits of possibility with respect to the abstract objects also reveals the structure. It is significant to note that Katz is an epistemic having that has nothing to do with a semantic holism such as Quine's. It nonserns the ways in which propositions in a particular system obtain their supposrt from one another and from the basic knowledge on which the theory rests. He claims that "even though justification in formal sciences is a priori, propositions in those sciences are revisable in principle." (p.48) He rejects Quine's equation of a priority with unrevisability and also with analyticity. He also rejects the Quine-Putnam thesis that mathematics is legitimized in virtue of indispensibility of numbers for natural science the methodological naturalism. Acknowledgement of mathematical objects is not restricted to their role in natural science. He claims that we could establish their existence even if there were no empirical science. Mathematics and philosophy of mathematics are certainly older than natural science. The chapter ends with discussion of the question as to whether any questions have been begged - a question that has been answered in the negative. It also points to an all-important crucial distinction between natural and formal knowledge. Nature of the objects studied in the formal sciences is different from the nature of objects studied in natural sciences. "Investigation in the natural sciences seeks to prune down the possible to the actual, while investigation in the formal sciences seeks to prune down the supposable to the necessary."(p.59) while the former is a posteriori, the latter investigation is purly a priori. Given this vital difference belween the two, it is clear that the expectation of the naturalists that for any ontological commitment we must have a perceptual contact with the object of knowledge cannot be fulfilled in respect of the abstract objects in formal sciences. It is the formal science that provides basis for positing existence of abstract objects. Our talk about, sets, numbers and other abstract objects in the field of mathematics and meta-mathematics becomes favore field of matternation and abstract objects. Katz lavours dualism of abstract and concrete entities and he claims that that

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dualism is tenable. It's much better than the monism of ontological and Ouine's empirical way of gating dualism is tenable. It's much epistemological naturalism and Quine's empirical way of getting his dealers.

In the Third chapter -The Epistemic Challenge to Antirealism hilosof Katz has an uphill task of countering the challenge posed by the natural society to the nat Whitehe ists and the empirically driven epistemologists to the special certainly driven logical t hat mat mathematical and other formal truths. Like Kant, Katz believes not only in the possibility of Mathematical knowledge but he also believes in the special certainty which it enjoys over all other kinds or species of knowledges edge. Mathematical knowledge is absolutely certain and is believed to be absolutely certain since Pythagorean times down to emergence of met odological naturalism of Quine and linguistic or philosophical naturalism of Wittgenstein. The onslaught of naturalism in the last few decades has strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicions of some philosophers even in respect of mathematical strengthened the suspicion strengthened the susp ematical knowledge to the point of the demise of their own discipling Hume's skepticism did not dare to touch the zone of mathematics and Kan was happy to characterize this as'fortunate error' on the part of that great inspirer of modern skepticism. Although Katz indicates his reasons for treating mathematical and logical truths to possess absolute certainty, is admits that it is still open for the naturalists to deny flatly the special certainty attributed to logical and mathematical truths. But they would not come forward to offer a satisfactory explanation of this feature of logical and mathematical truths on the grounds of full-fledged naturalism Katz is not happy even with Quine's holism which treats total science as a single system saving empiricism from its uncompromising stand of mathematics as a posteriori knowledge. Katz sums up the present see nario saying that "since Quine, empiricists have stopped worrying about the certainty of mathematical and logical truths "(p.66) He thinks the the two most influential forms of naturalism in contemporary philosophy are Quine's and Wittgenstein's. This is a position which he had taken it his earlier work of 1990, which I have already mentioned. Quine's naturalism is a position which I have already mentioned. ralism is empiricist, scientistic but dualist while Wittgenstein's is critically linguistic cally linguistic, ascientistic and monistic. What follows in the Section 3, and 3.4 is a very in the section 3.5 and 3.4 is a very incisive criticism of Quine and Wittgenstein on the stances

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which they have taken on giving an account of the special certainty of ahich mathematical truths. At the beginning of the 20th century, below that attempted reduction of mathematics was dominated by Frege's and Russellwhitehead Logicism that attempted reduction of mathematical truths to Whiteheas but this, as it's wellknown, ultimately developed into a view hal mathematical truth is convention. In 1936 itself, Quine had strongly matinized conventionalism, claiming that since logical truths are infinite number, they can be grasped only as instanace of more general principles and since we shall have to have some logic for this, conventionalism cannot offer explanation of logical truth. But this amounts to saying that me nature of mathematical truth eludes logicism and conventionalism implied by it. The analytic-synthetic distinction and the verificationist account of synonymy were criticised by Quine to build up an epistemology hal could do a far better job of explaining the special certainty of logical and mathematical knowledge than any earlier radical empiricistic proposals. But although Quine is right in rejecting conventionalism, Katz thinks hat "Quine's holistic conception of knowledge does not in the final analysis enable contemporary empiricists to provide a satisfactory account of he special certainty of logical and mathamtical truth because the concepion is inconststent." (p. 72) He discusses the three constitutive principles (viz., non-contradiction, universal revisability and simplicity) of Quine's mistemology and shows how 'The Revisability Paradox' mars the pros-PCCIS of uncompromising empiricism to meet the challenge posed before the antirealists by Katz. Katz emphatically argues that there can be no toistemology that says that everything including itself is revisable.

"Looked at from the right angle, universal revisability already flashes the signal Paradox! Paradox! Paradox! Unrestricted universality sanctions the dangerous move of self-application, which is a familiar feature of paradox.".......The paradox... undercuts the Quinean explanation of how truths of mathematics and truths of logic can be taken to be about natural objects in the Quinean sense of being a part of device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience." (p. 74)

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Criticism of Quine's holistic epistemology is followed by the criticism of Philosophyland in his Philosophylan Wittgenstein's naturalism. Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigation of Philosophical Investigation of Control of the Co Wittgenstein's natural movement theories and the metal traditional philosophical theories and the metal traditional philosophical theories and the metal traditional philosophical traditional philosophical traditional philosophical traditional philosophical theories and the metal traditional philosophical traditional philosophical theories and the metal traditional philosophical traditional philosophical theories and the metal traditional philosophical theories and the metal traditional philosophical philosop physical issues they concern. The traditional philosophy for him is to only bad but also non-sense resulting from the bewitchment of our interest of ligence by the snares of language. Thus for Wittgenstein, characterization of mathematical results as absolutely necessary are only a "somewhat his terical way of putting the things" as held by him in his Remarks on the Foundations where he also mainatains that the "must" that the mathematical ticians and philosophers typically use to express mathematical and logic truths is no more than " the expression of an attitude to the technique (calculation". As observed by Michael Dummet, Wittgenstein goes for full-blooded conventionalism and for him the logical necessity of any state. ment is always the direct expression of a linguistic convention. Kalz Pe marks that while Quine's position on mathematical and logical certainty unacceptable logically Wittgenstein's is unacceptable linguisitically (n/h The literal unintelligibility which Wittgenstein claims in respect of mallematical demonstration or for any logically compact proof is misleading Neither mathematics nor Skepticism about mathematics is plain 'non-sense. When we say that 2+2=4, it is certainly a meaningful utterance and not non-sense like saying 'colourless green ideas sleep furiously'. Wittgenslein's account indeed runs counter to the linguistic distinctions between mean ingfulness and meaninglessness. Katz emphatically asserts that Wittgenstein was therefore wrong about certainty. It's the job of "perlinent specialists professionals" in linguistics to tell what to say about it meaningfulness or otherwise of sentences in natural languages, and not that of a philosopher.

Thus as against Quine and Wittgenstein, Katz claims that they do not have resources to face the challenge posed by mathematics, logic and linguistics - the formal sciences in general. Realism on the other had faces the same challenge because it has the necessary resources. It is plains the special certainty of formal truths in terms of their necessity and thier necessity in terms of the abstractness of objects they are about

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Necessary formal truths are necessary because they describe unchangeable properties and relations of unchangeable objects. (p.78)

The 4th Chapter of the book under review is a reply to the semantic challenge to realism contained in Benacerraf's paper "What Numbers Could chance Be" published in 1965 which contains his famous argument for the indeterminacy of reference to numbers and symmetry claim about intended and deviant interpretations of arithmetic. Katz states Benacerraf's argument in brief as follows: "....there is no principled way of deciding which of the set-theoretic models of Peano arithmetic is the numbers, that there is no principled way of deciding what system of objects is the numbers, and hence we cannot make sense of the idea that numbers are determinate objects."(p.85) Benacerraf takes a structuralist view of arithmetic and considers it to be a science that elaborates the abstract structure that all progressions have in common merely in virtue of being progressions. It is not a science concerned with particular objects - the numbers. He ends his paper with the remark that "if the truth be known, there are no such things as numbers. " In a footnote, Katz makes it clear that although Benacerraf's paper does not reflect his present view on the subject, the paper itself is the classical statement of skepticism about the determinacy of reference to the numbers. The paper has long ago taken a philosophical life of its own, and thus has become a mile-stone in the development of skepticism concerning mathematical truth and knowledge. In order to show where and how exactly Benacerraf's argument is flawed, Katz has to use a very large canvas for analysing firstly two indeterminancy arguments in the philosophy of language - Quine's for indeterminacy thesis and Kripke's rule-following argument containing paradox which is of philosophical interest for everyone - that reveal their flaw, then for developing a conception of the structure of indeterminacy arguments in general and explaining how knowledge of the flaw in question can be used to develop ⁴ general strategy for resisting indeterminacy arguments. The canvas in the end shows that Benacerraf-style argument falls under the general con-Replion of indeterminacy arguments. It also shows how to block such ar-The justification for using wide canvas, as stated by Katz, is

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that "linking indeterminacy arguments in the philosophy of mathematics and deeper under the philosophy of and the philosophy of language provides a deeper understanding of the forms of skyticism because of the nature of such arguments and of the forms of skpticism based on them. (p. 87) The overall characterization of indeterminacy arguments is given

"Indeterminacy arguments are skeptical arguments. They claim that we lack the means to distinguish among the things we have to distinguish among in order to legitimize our belief that our talk about certain objects is talk about determinate objects. One charactertistic of such skeptical arguments is that they are based on an allegedly unbreakable symmetry between the intended interpretation of such talk and certain deviant interpretations. The skeptic challenges us to break the symmetry." (p. 87)

One needs to read original arguments of Quine and Kripke very carefully and Katz's critical comments on them in original. Katz presents the debate between them on the one hand and himself on the other hand fairly well in all fairness. Katz's competence as a linguist can hardly be a malter of doubt. We should have no hesitation in accepting the view that the question of whether there can be a theory or theories of meaning is entirely a matter for liguist research to decide. Katz brings out the paradoxical element in both - the Quinean radical translation situation and the Kripkean rule-following situation - on the basis of his competence as a linguist. One should not forget that Quine almost always had Carnap in mind when thinking about semantics. Quine places senses out of the semantic picture and Kripke's puzzle also arises because senses have been painted out of the semantic picture. Once they are incorporated in the semantic picture in both respects, the finite extensionality and the finite intensionality, it is not difficult to overcome the puzzle that would embar rass any philosopher, who is unmindful of recent developments in linguistics.

This is followed by the discussion of the general form of Indelermination nacy arguments. Here Katz is much more specific than the general characters. Book Review -II

terization of indeterminacy arguments we glean from the passage quoted above. The discussion is pin-pointed and serves as a prelude to the strategy for resisting indeterminacy. Katz spells out such a strategy and turns of Benacerraf's argument to show that it does not work. "Benacerraf's claim that The number words do not have single referents", says Katz, "follows only if number theory encompasses the full range of properties that can be used to exclude unintended models of arithmetic. Since it does not, his indeterminacy argument cannot take number theory as a complete explication of our knowledge of the numbers, and the alledged symmetry on which the argument rests can be rejected on the same grounds on which we rejected the alledged symmetries on which Quine's and Kripke's arguments rest. They underestimate our informal knowledge of the domain." (p. 110)

In the Section that follows, Katz has thrown his reflections on the 'metaphysics of Number-Theoretic Skepticism', though only sketchily. At the root of that skepticism lies the naturalistic view-point that philosophy has no subjectmatter of its own and that it is concerned merely with the semantic clarifications of ordinary and scientific language. Thus Benaceraff regards it as a mistake for philosophers to inquire into philosophical facts about numbers which fall outside the scope of mathematics proper. As Willgenstein maintained that study of such facts is in vain as it's a pursuit of chimeras. Finally, Katz reacts to Hillary Putnam's paper 'Models and Reality' (published in Journal of Symbolic Logic (45), 1980, 464-82), which says that any philosopher or philosophically minded logician has to face insurmountable difficulty in viewing set theory as a description of a determinate independently existing reality because no formal system can ever Capture our intuitive notion of a set. There is a Skolemite argument behind Putnam's move and it's Wittgenstein's rule-following argument that at the root of it. Katz is not at all happy with Wittgenstein's posture, With Putnam's. Katz's conclusion is that determinate reference to the Numbers and to the real world is possible and that it can be validated by our language, science and philsophy.

In the last but one chapter, Katz puts the realist in the docks to face

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the Ontological challenge which, I suppose, is the most crucial stage in the whole argument of the book. The ontological challenge to realism a posed by certain alleged counterexamples to the traditional abstraction crete distinction. Katz considers two kinds of counter-examples and a tempts their explanation in a manner that saves for realist the distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects. It is true that realism cannot be formulated without the concept of an abstract object and if the alleged counter-examples are not taken care of, it would threaten to least realism with no coherent formulation. Katz realizes that it is not quite easy to do this and that he has to present a long winding argument to meat the challenge before the realist.

Firstly, he sketches the conception of ontology underlying the reconstruction of the traditional abstract/concrete distinction. The intention is to understand the ontological issues properly and to extend the whole argument of the previous chapters to formulate rationalist-realist integration. He defines pure ontology as a foundational discipline of foundational disciplines, but clarifies that this conception is not foundational wittgenstein complained that since the results of mathematics are grounded in mathematical practice, they require no other grounding with the result that mathematics does not stand in need of philosophical foundations. Without raising any serious dispute about this view, Katz simply assets that philosophy is not necessary to provide underpinnings for mathematical practice but only to provide understanding of it. (p.119)

"The aim of the philosophical foundations of a science is to shed light on ontological and epistemological aspects of the objects the science studies..... and not on the aspects of those objects with which the science itself is concerned." (p. 119)

"The foundations of mathematics, logic and other formal sciences are concerned *inter alia* with whether the reality studied in those sciences is abstract or concrete.....Foundational study of such foundational disciplines ... is concerned with understanding what it is to be abstract or concrete." (p.119)

Secondly, Katz reformulates the traditional distinction: abstract/concrete.

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in the following way:

"An object is abstract just in case it lacks both spatial and temporal location and is homogeneous in this respect. An object is concrete just in case it has spatial or temporal location and is homogeneous in this respect".(p.120)

He defends atemporality, incorporeality, nonsensibility of abstract objects but rejects their transcendence in Platonic sense.

He further invokes the category of composite objects and argues that the supposed counter-examples belong to the category of composite objects and thus no longer pose challenge to realism. There is a fairly long discussion on the category of compound objects, a convincing plea for its recognition. The traditional distinction stands validated because we just can't think of formal sciences without committing ourselves ontologically to the existence of abstract objects. Use of Occam's razor may help us economize the plethora of such objects but the razor cannot clear all the abstract objects. In formal sciences, the question of using Occam's razor hardly ever crops up. Katz's contention is that since Occam's razor applies only in regard to evidence, it is as inapplicable to ontology as it is to mathematics, implying thereby that the category of composite objects that he espouses cannot be said to sin against that razor.

In the last chapter, Katz spells out his metaphilosophical reflections which broadly cover the entire scenario that has emerged owing to Frege's linguistic turn especially in the philosophical terrains of the anglo-saxon world. All these reflections are packed with deep and genuine awareness of the authenticity of philosophical problems. They have the strong potential to turn the entire tide against the positivistic, physicalistic, scientistic and philosophistic forms of naturalism, (not to mention 'bald naturalism), and to restore the ontology of abstract objects in the area of Philosophy of mathematics. Afterall, Frege's intention in boosting Logicism with the famous Thesis of Extensionality of Language was to advocate Realistic Rationalism. He did want to integrate realism and rationalism. The course of philosophical argument during the 20th century has shown that that

S. V. BOKIL

integration was irrational. Katz traces the trouble in Frege's theory of meaning which says that the sense of an expression is to be explained in terms of its reference. Katz formulates an alternative to Fregean theory of meaning on the basis of his research in the field of linguistics Intensionality of language cannot be dissolved into the extensionality of language. At no stage of his argument, I found Katz to be dogmatic or confused and unintelligible. I was happy to see that the road to metaphys. ics was not afterall closed once for all. The gates are open and Kalz has shown us the way. The main problem of Immanueal Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetics' viz., How is mathematics possible? has been answered afresh and one can say that this is a satisfactory answer until a more satisfactory one comes forward.

The entire argument of the book has been supplemented by illumi. nating footnotes from page to page which makes it extremely easier for readers to comprehend relevance of certain points and remarks made by the author in the course of his presentation. The detailed bibliography at the end will be helpful.

Jody Azzouni of the Tufts University has opined "that it is a brave book and readers will find in it (among other things) a full - scale assault on naturalism, a complex metaphysics of abstract, concrete and composite objects and a rationalist epitemology based on rich notions of Reason and Intuition", and Paolo Mancosu has said that "this book is certainly going to count as one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of mathematics of the last decades."

Realistic Rationalism, I shall not venture to say, is the last word on the nature of mathematics and mathematical knowledge. I shall say how ever, that it has brought to life the philosophical issues concerning them, which appeared to be written off to skepticism, naturalised or otherwise. In the words of Daniel Issacson, "whether or not Katz's powerfully developed loped position is ultimately accepted, the terms of the debate have been S. V. BOKIL very significantly advanced."

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WHAT IS IT TO BE A HUMAN SOUL?

R.C.PRADHAN

This essay is an exploration into the concept of soul in the light of RCGandhi's¹ analysis of it in the framework of human communication. The concept of a human soul has been of immense interest in contemporary philosophy precisely because there has been an effort to understand the human beings in terms of the concept of soul². Taking the clue from Wittgenstein, Gandhi has defined human beings in terms of the concept of a human soul so that, according to him, to be a human being is to be a communicative soul. Thus the concept of soul has been detheologized and made a part of the humanistic discourse of the contemporary times.

In this paper my aim is twofold: first, to expose the limitations of the concept of a communicative soul, and second, to draw a sharp boundary between the humanistic and the metaphysical conceptions of the soul. I am inclined to believe that the merely humanistic conception of the soul is in need of a metaphysical background that can provide a sharp edge to the notion of the soul.

The Concept of Soul and The Communicative Discourse

The arguments provided by Gandhi for a communicative account of the concept of soul hinge on the fact that human beings are necessarily engaged in the communication effort of which to address others and to be addressed by there is a significant, nay, the constitutive, part. Communication demands the Rognition of the fact that the communicator addresses the other who is either aindividual or a group of individuals belonging to the same human community. Thus communication involves the act of addressing, either actual or imaginary, are result of which is the mutual sharing of information and the reciprocity of addressing. Given this communicative framework, Gandhi finds it convenient

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to derive the concept of soul from this act of addressing in communication. He says:

The self is to be found either actually in an act of addressing, in one's being regarded quite simply as oneself, or imaginatively in act of imagining that one was involved in act of addressing, in which case it would be a sense or conviction that one was being regarded quite simply as oneself, and not merely, or at all, as a creature of a particular kind³.

The act of addressing which is something primitive and natural to have communication logically involves the idea of self: the self that communication and the other which receives the communication. One addresses and the its addressed. Both the addresser and the addressee are selves pure and since in that they engage in the act of addressing without trying to know who to there is except that she is a soul, a bare self. Gandhi makes this concept of the logical ground of the notion of addressing the other selves, He elaborates

Self-conscious thinking can only be regarded as an imaginative communicative interchange between oneself and an imagined other. And at the heart of this whole mode of imaginative activity is a fundamental act of the imagination, the act of imagining that one was being addressed by an imagined other⁴.

Thus the act of communicative exchange between oneself and the citation has the notion of self as its logical condition. One is addressed if one rectiff the communicated message, and in that sense one is being regarded as a self when she is addressed the other. The other equally is being regarded as a self when she is addressed. Thus this process yields the logical fact that both oneself and the other are simple selves.

Gandhi supposes in this regard that the selves involved a communication are the bare selves without any definite characterization, but the selves are the conscious beings who do not wear their classificatory on their face. The selves are the unique persons or souls that do not need to other identity than that they are selves. Gandhi continues:

Such an act of imagination yields the thought that I am myself, th

What is it to be a Human Soul?

being regarded quite simply as myself, and not merely, or at all, as a creature of a particular sort⁵.

This is to assert that the self need not be, perhaps must not be, presupposed to be belonging to any category of being such as the humans. The self is a more primitive category than that of the human beings. Hence the requirement that the self is the logically basic category of being that is involved in communication. It is here, however, that one encounters the notion of soul as of immense importance because of the fact that the self is just a bare particular which can be non-referentially and non-predicatively picked out. Gandhi writes:

The notion of a soul gets its foothold in our life because, in an act of addressing-in an act of establishing communicative contact with anotherwe have to imagine that our addressee is a unique but bare particular, we have to identify him non-referentially, non predicatively⁶.

That is to say that the self involved in the address is to be just the person or soul that has no predicative existence and that it loses its predicative identity for the bare logical self-identity.

Gandhi seems to think that the self itself is the soul that requires no identity other than the logical identity of being oneself. This requirement of self-identity is unique in the sense that for this no property-identification is needed. The idea of property is kept in abeyance because the self as a soul is in need of none of them. It is an attributeless bare soul that is addressed in the act of communication. The soul is picked out just as a matter of being addressed. Here is what Gandhi says on this:

Only in an actual act of being addressed do I fully suffer the experience of being uniquely picked out, called forth, of being regarded quite simply as myself, of being thought of non-referentially, non-predicatively, etc., i.e. of being regarded as a soul?

What is being suggested here is that the self or the soul is introduced without being predicated of properties and also without being named or referred to. Such a nameless and propprtylese entity is the soul that acts as the addressee or the addresser.

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Why is The Soul Attributeless?

The immediate reason as to why the soul has to be attributeless is revealed in Gandhi's argument that a soul that is predicated of attributes is likely to lose its self-identity as a unique particular. The unique particular that the soul is makes it necessary that it shares no attributes with anything else, not even with another particular of the same species. The species-identity which a particular may claim to have is not the self-identity called for in communication. Gandhi is claiming two ways of approaching the notion of soul: one is the way of withholding the attributes to the soul and the second is the way of picking out the soul as a unique entity that has no comparison with anything else. These two ways are the attributeless mode of capturing the soul and of identifying it without relating it to the rest of the world. Gandhi says:

The notion of oneself, you, and him are notions that capture the attributeless mode in which we must, at any level of depth, think of ourselves and one another⁸.

The attributeless mode of capturing the soul is such that it imposes on us to view the soul in itself rather than under some category. There is nothing that the self or the soul can be under and so there is no way of viewing it as belonging to some higher category. The self belongs to nothing because it is the very basis of all thought. It is the ground of all thinking including all self-identifying thought. This is the reason why the soul is non-predicatively understood. Nonetheless the soul has to be thought as myself or as yourself. I am myself all acts of thought and communication. In my first-person thought I cannot be missed because it is logically the basis of all my self-regarding thoughts. So:

In so far as I think- and in so far as thinking is imaginative communication I cannot fail to see myself as being regarded as a soul (as myself, a unique being, and not a certain sort of creature)⁹.

This sort of self-thinking precludes the fact that I can be anything other than myself or the soul. I cannot, for example, be identified as a human being a Indian and a male for the purpose of self-thinking. The latter way of predicative thinking clashes with the attributeless mode of thinking of the self.

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It cannot be denied that the self or the soul must logically remain attributeless insofar as it is playing the role of the ground of all thought. Self as the logical ground remains, the limit of all thought and language. In that sense Gandhi is right in telling us that the self is bereft of all predicates and that it is the unconditioned presupposition of all thought. This line of thinking is likely to preclude the fact that the soul can be thought of as a spiritual substance in the Cartesian sense. The reason is: it cannot be identified with any substance because thereby we will be bringing in attributes through the backdoor. A spiritual substance will have the attribute of thought as its essence. This is what Gandhi is challenging while calling for an attributeless mode of thinking of the self. The idea of substance brings in all the predicative ways of describing the self thus jeopardizing the non-attributive mode of thinking.

If the soul is not taken as a Cartesian substance, it cannot be taken as a material substance either. For the same reason of course. We cannot deny attributes to the soul as a material substance. Thus the notion of the soul is apparently freed of all substantiality as the soul is more primitive and basic than a substance. The soul is thus assimilated more into a logical presuppositon than into a reality that can be captured in language. Gandhi, however, has little realized that his idea of a bare particular still has the proneness towards a substance, itself being picked out, though non-predicatively. There is a lurking paradox underlying the idea that the self is a particular, without being a particular of any kind.

Paradox of Self-Reference

Now the question is: can one think of oneself as a particular soul without at the same time not committing the paradox of self-reference? That is, can one be conscious of oneself as a unique paticular without being aware that there are certain attributes which the particular would necessarily have? The paradox is this: the self in thinking of itself as a soul is already referring to itself as a particular, as belonging to a certain kind and as having some properties. The kind of particular it is known from the fact that it shares certain properties such as being self-conscious, self-identical with any other soul. All souls alike share the same property of being a unique particular. Thus there is little that can save the

R.C.PRADHAN

particularity of the soul at the cost of its universality.

It is necessary to emphasise against Gandhi that the so called attributeless mode of thinking of the self is a myth since in every act of self. thinking one is aware of the fact that one is a unique particular and that it has the attribute of not having any attribute at all. To think of the self is already to think in an attributive mode because one cannot get away from the fact that one is describing oneself as a soul, or a person who is being addressed. Since the basic frame of reference for the self is the communicative act, it cannot be denied that the self is already taken as the addressee or the addresser. Thus the fact that the self is a human being who communicates cannot be denied. The self is posited as one who is cared for and "minimally valued" Thus there is already a descriptive mode of thinking about the self. Gandhi's strategy to isolate the self as an attributeless particular fails for the obvious reason that there is no way we can escape predication while talking about the self.

The problem now is that Gandhi is willy-nilly drawn into the descriptive mode of talk of the self and is thus committed to the fact that the self is a soul rather than a body, or that the self is a communicative agent rather than a passive spectator. Thus there is already a descriptive view of the self and the discourse of communication has already introduced the self as a conscious communicative soul. This view of self cannot at the same time accommodate the fact that the self is a bare particular and that it does not belong to a class of creatures. If it is a bare particular, it cannot even be called a soul, let alone a communicative agent. There is thus no reason to believe that the idea of soul is metaphysically innoces such that the soul is just a bare propertyless particular. Had it been attributeless it would have been beyond the language of descriptive predicates. In that case it would have been indescribable and ineffable to say the least. But for Gandhi the soul is not ineffable at all. In fact it is the communicative soul engaged in the act of communicating with others.

The argument that the soul is not a substance and that it is not even an embodied self does not carry conviction because soul being a bare particular already makes room for its characterization as some thing, or some unique entity. In that case, it is a substance in the minimal sense of the term. The soul

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ultimatically qualifies to be a spiritual substance in this sense. As to its its modiment, Gandhi cannot deny that the communicative soul is an embodied elf because admittedly no communication is possible among the disembodied spirits or dead persons¹¹. The fact that souls are communicative agents shows that they have bodies and that they are endowed with linguistic faculties. Language is at one level a physical phenomenon and so the language-using being must have a physical location. From this point of view, the soul must have the physical properties which are necessary for being a communicative agent. Thus Gandhi has to admit that the soul has not only the spiritual property of being conscious but also the physical property of having a linguistic faculty.

Gandhi's argument that the soul has nothing to do with a class of biological creatures or that it is not a creature of any kind does sound hollow because in an important sense it brings in the idea of a human being. The idea of soul as a communicative agent brings in the idea of a human being in the sense that only human beings can be communicative in the defined sense of the term. Gandhi has taken the concept of human being as a basic category in the sense that the self or soul is that of a human being and that the communication teelf is a human phenomenon. Thus Gandhi's concept of a soul cannot pretend to be non-related to the human species. The soul is supposed to be a human being engaged in the act of communication. In this sense Gandhi's idea of soul is strongly anthoropocentric.

Is The "I" Non-Referring?

Gandhi takes it for granted that the concept of "I" is unlike a proper name and that it does not stand for a person as a proper name does. This idea is organily Wittgenstein's 12. Wittgenstein is emphatic that the logic of the experssion "I" is very different from that of the other expressions like "L.W." "R.G.", etc. which are abbreviated proper names. The latter are meant for picking a person from among other persons. They are referential in an overt sense. But not so is the "I". It does not pick out a person, nor does it name somebody. It is a reflexive pronoun indicating the fact that the speaker is referring to himself the first-person singular judgements are not descriptive statements of any kind in that no soul or person is being described as having such and such

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properties. Wittgenstein is well aware of the fact that the "I" like the "self" dig not stand for any entity¹³, let alone a spiritual entity. The idea that the "I" stand for peculiar spiritual entity is grammatically misleading in the sense that the is not a naming expression at all.

But the fact that the "I" is not a naming expression does not deny 6. fact that it has an obvious connection with the speaker, that is, that it has a logic role to play in referring to the speaker in the first-person. It is no doubt true the it does not pick out a person for that matter from among other persons. But does not mean that it has no identificatory role at all. The I is the self that speak thinks and communicates. In that sense it is true to say that the word "I" is m an empty term: it speaks of the self that speaks. Wittgenstein is anxious to avoid the Cartesian implication that the "I" stands for the soul or the spiritual entitle standing alongside the body. He is interested in the grammar of the reflective pronouns such as "I", "you", "me", etc., since he believes that these expression have often misled the philosophers. The correct grammar of such expression does suggest that there is no reason to believe that any spiritual entity is its referrent of these expressions.

Wittgenstein, however, takes the self as the logical limit of all though and use of language. The idea of the self as the limit is carried forward from Tractatus where it is asserted that the self does not belong to the world and the it is the limit of the world14. This idea of the self as the limit implies that the sl is not a thing, that is, not even a human being: it does not stand for a biological entity, nor does it stand for a spiritual entity either. In a sense it is the transcendental presupposition of our thought and language. In that way is self keeps away from the world. For that reason, the Tractatus called it is the metaphysical subject 15 without calling it a Cartesian soul. Wittgenstein in a similar material subject 15 without calling it a Cartesian soul. vein characterizes the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the following like the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendental limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the world in the self as a transcendent limit of the self as a tran passage in the Philosophical Investigations:

Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. -Someone asks " Whose house is it?" - The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house (section 398).

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Here the analogy of the farmer who cannot enter his house is apt. It suggests Here the house has an owner who is not part of the house. The self likewise does hal life house the world, though the world presupposes the self as its metaphysical owner. That is to say, the self is the limit of the world in the sense that it stands sils metaphysical-transcendental- presupposition. s not deny the

Now the question is: How does the self as the limit help solve the moblem of the identity of the owner? This limit self has no other identity than the fact that it is a bare presupposition and that it is a bare metaphysical presence. This idea of self has found favour with Wittgenstein because of the fact he denies hal we can ever speak of the self as such. We have to remain silent about the very presupposition of our thought and language. That is why he is conscious of the fact that there is no language that can express what language itself logically presupposes. So there is no talk of self-identity or the identity of the self as the owner of the world. All such talk is metaphycally idle.

In view of this it looks metaphysically suspicious that Gandhi should all the self a soul which is a bare particular. Gandhi has reversed completely the Wittgensteinian concept of self by bringing it back into the world though as a unique paricular entity. Whereas Wittgenstein makes the self a transcendental presupposition, Gandhi has made it an embodied soul in the world engaged in communiction. This not only denies the transcendental nature of the self but also makes it vulnerable to the vagaries of the anthropological pinning down of in the world. Gandhi's at best is the anthropological soul that self-consciously make communicative gestures to the other souls in the world.

Gandhi's concept of "I" is not really non-referring because it in fact refers us called it to the soul that has no specific first-order predicates. It is neither material nor material. Yet it has second-order predicates such as being self-conscious and in the following self-identical. Therefore it is a full-fledged referring term in the second-order language and as such has the metaphysical character of being represented in Because of this the soul in this sense cannot be free of predication at Only a transcendental self could be free of predication as conceived by Villgenstein, for example.

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The Limits of Anthropocentricism

Gandhi's concept of soul suffers from the fact that it is anthropocential and so is bogged down in the limitations of the humanistic conception of the soul. For Gandhi, the soul is a communicative agent and therefore is available only in a communicative framework. Thus there is no way we can transcend the limits of the communicative framework. Gandhi, true to his basic framework suggests that the soul be conceived as the addressee in communication. Neither God nor the non-human species could claim to have the human soul.

But this itself is an admission of the fact that the human soul is a limited being and that it is bound to the spatio-temporal world like any other entity. It becomes at best like the Strawsonian persons 16 who are capable of thought and language. Like these persons they share a common world and a common language and thus are engaged in interpersonal communication. But that does not absolve them of the limitation of being in the world. These persons or the souls are necessarily human in the sense that they are bound to live in the human space and are thus imprisoned in the communicative network. There is a factor-face encounter of the souls so far as they are in the space-time world and are constrained by the fact that they speak a language for the purpose of communicating with one another. In this sense the idea of a communicative sed is necessarily limited.

Let us see now why such a view of self can never be the one philosophers can aim at. Philosophy cannot be satisfied with the fact that it self is a human being or that it is at best the mental being in the sense psychology talks about it. The "I" of the psychologist does not fulfil the demands of logic because it at best refers to the mind's "I" that is nothing but a mental construction. The self as the mind's "I" reminds us of the Cartesian invisible soul or such like entity. But this itself does not fulfil the philosophical demands because it only presents a partial view of the self. The self as such need not identified with a substance of any kind, since it is presupposed by any such characterization. Thus the notion of self has to be transcendental in the sense of being taken as a logical presupposition of the world.

There are two ways in which the anthropocentric view of self fails. First

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of all, it does not recognize the fact that the self is not a human soul since the human soul still needs the self as its presupposition. The human soul must belong to the self which is its transcendental presupposition. Secondly, the human soul is necessarily emodied and has the capacity for communication. If it is a necessary fact that it is embodied, it cannot escape the fact that it is one of the entities in the world on a par with other material bodies. Therefore it cannot escape the fate of being contingent in the world Thus the self as the human soul is a self-negation of the idea of self itself as it does not capture the transcendental use of the idea.

Gandhi's notion of soul thus falls short of the transcendental account of the self as it brings in contingent features of the human soul into the picture. The human soul as the communicative agent is only a contingent phenomenon and so there is no way it can stand for what the notion of self stands for.

Possibility of Self-Knowledge

The idea of self-knowledge which is itself a difficult but intelligible concept makes it obligatory on us to provide for the ways of knowing oneself since it is undisputed that we have knowledge of ourselves. It will be illogical to deny that we know ourselves, that is, that we are aware that we have such and such mental states. At no stage of our mental life we are denied of access to ourselves which has no connection with what we do and think otherwise. Some philosophers following Descartes believe that there could be a special intuitive access to the self, that is, a privileged access 18 to the self.

Gandhi has rejected the idea of knowing the self in a privileged way: he in fact rejects the very idea that the self can be observed or intuited in a perculiar way. The philosophers who hold the view that the self could be observed believe that the self is an entity that can be seen in a mysterious way, that is, could be revealed in introspection. This observational view of self is the result of the confusion created by our ordinary language which takes the self as some sort of a object to be known. To know the self is not to know a special mysterious stilly. Gandhi writes:

lt is a profound illusion that in thinking one literally talks to oneself,

R.C.PRADHAV

addresses oneself. And it is illusion which is responsible for the further illusion that in self-consciousness one finds oneself regarding oneself as a soul. But I cannot address myself. In order to do so I would have to invite myself to invite myself to...invite myself to attend to myself. And all this is impossible and absurd 19.

The illusion persists because it is believed that the self is given directly in self. consciousness. The self is supposed to be an object: the soul is that object which is intimately given to me. If this way of talking to the self and addressing it is permitted, then there nust be a privileged way of knowing oneself. But the fact remains that the self is not given in self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not a process of revealing the self in a mysterious way.

It is now well known that there is no special epistemological problem regarding self knowledge²⁰ because there is little that one gains in knowing the self as a matter of information. There is no information that we do not have ourselves, so there is nothing to discover about the self. All that remains is the higher order sense of understanding the self as one logically self - identical and self-conscious. But this is only a logical way of understanding the self as the limit of our thought. So in self-knowledge there is no way of knowing the self as one and -so and such-and-such²¹. The self is the logical and, in a sense the metaphysical, reality which cannot be described in any form.

It is this idea that lies at the heart of the new move to make the self blogical desideratum of self-knowledge. Gandhi advocates the view that there is no ontological fact involved in the exercise of self-knowledge. The reason is that if the self is ontologically situated, then there will be the possibility of knowing the self as such-and-such, thus predicatively and descriptively. This seems impossible because it will lead to infinite regress as each description of the self will presuppose another description and so on. But, as already shown. Gandhi has made an ontological move towards locating the self as the human soul, the human soul is a metaphysical entity and thus is amenable to description. Thus Gandhi has made the logical defence of self doubly deceptive, first, by concealing the fact that there is a metaphysical reality underlying it as the soul and secondly, by concealing the fact that a description of the soul is possible.

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It is no doubt true that the soul is not the right ontological equivalent of the self and that the grammatical identification of the self and the 'I' does not entail that the self has to be a communicative human being. Both these steps taken by Gandhi are retrograde: first, because the soul is not the entity that the self wants to become; secondly, because the self is not logically a communicative agent. The self is an ontological or metaphysical reality not by taking refuse in the concept of the soul. Self is autonomous in the sense that no particular identification of it is adequate or even necessary. It is the transcendental reality for that matter. Besides, under no circumstances, can self be a human soul which can be in effective communication with others. The self is ontologically more primitive than the human soul.

The Audience Stance Vs. The Advaitic Stance

There is an underlying audience stance that constrains Gandhi's notion of self so much so that there is no escape from it for a wider view of the self. Gandhi hints at the audience stance in the following passage:

In thinking the thought 'I' 1 perform an act of imaginatively adopting an audience-stance.. When I am addressed by somebody, a speaker, I am uniquely picked out, I am non-referentially identified, I am called forth²².

This way of the self being taken as the addressee makes the audience stance clear in the sense that in every act of self-consciousness I am the audience of somebody's calling and so I am the object of somebody's address. This makes me a special category of being and allows me the privilege of being the soul that responds to that calling.

But the audience stance chains the self to the moorings of the human world and thereby makes it historical and anthroloposical in character. This stance puts the self right in the midst of history in the sense that it is the temporal self that merges itself with the human soul. The human soul has a history of its own and it treads the path of time in its evolutionary trajectory. This is the fate of the souls as a phenomenal being in time. It becomes the temporally isolated soul that the stablishes communication with the rest of the souls in similar temporal isolation. Thus there is a communication space of the temporally isolated souls in the world.

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The soul in such temporal isolation loses its cosmic stance and becomes the focus of a local world of communication. It becomes the centre of the linguistic world of other-communicating beings. But the soul loses its cosmic significance in the sense that it has no knowledge of its sharing the same nature with the other souls. Its cosmic significance is realized when there is the Advance understanding of the oneness of all souls. The Advaita tradition does emphasize the fact that the self is the cosmic, ahistorical reality that accounts for the diversity of the temporal human souls²³. The temporal souls are the limited souls engaged in time and language. They are the local centres of communicative collectivity but are thereby limited in their non-local significance. It is the non-local significance that matters for a transcendental view of self.

Wittgenstein did realize the importance of the cosmic significance of the self by detaching it from the world, including the historical communicative world. The latter is a burden for the unencumbered self that posits itself ahistorically outside time and history. The self is metaphysically unencumbered by the world according to Wittgenstein. He says:

What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world $(NB_pp.82)$.

That is to say, the I has no history of its own; it has no temporal location and we there is no specific relation with the world. For it there is only world and that is "my world", Wittgenstein adds:

It is true: Man is the microcosm. I am my world (NB,p.84).

Thus there is the realization that the world ultimately is 'my world' which is not different from 'me'. this seems to be the culminating Advaitic realization that there is nothing other than the cosmic self. The world itself as the not-self is not different from the self. In that sense the historical and the communicative world ceases to be real. There is the cosmic reality of the self that manifests itself in Equipment to the purity as the non-dual reality.

The Advaitic stance opposes the anthropomorphic tendency of the audience stance proposed by Gandhi. The latter keeps the soul tied down to the latter keeps the latter keeps the soul tied down to the latter keeps the la

limited space of interpersonal communication and the resulting minimization of the cosmic significance of the soul. The human soul is the human being as engaged in communication Therefore there is no more value to the soul except that accord to it in the communicative space. It is because of this that the soul loses its autonomy and thus loses itself in the crowd of multiple communicative agents. The soul is lost in the cacophony of communicative noise from which it has no escape.

The Advaitic standpoint, on the contrary, liberates the self from the selfdom to the contingent chain of communication and makes it stand as the autonomous background of all communication. Self as the cosmic background of thought and language is the limit of communication rather than a participant in it. The self is the witness ($s \bar{a} k \, s \, i \, n$) of the interpersonal communication and not the communicative agent. Thus the self as the cosmic reality is distinguished from the human souls which are contingent beings located in the human world. The Advaitic stance thus cuts at the root of the historical and the communicative being of the human soul. It rejects the very duality of the self and the world and also of the self and the other. It allows communicaticiton to disappear into silence. Language ceases to be operative at the level of the cosmic self, not because language is inessential, but because the self needs no communication with the non-existent other.

The "I" of the Advaitic stance is the ahistorical other-negative self that sweeps away the reality of time and of the historical other. It brings down the entire reality to itself and thus cancles the supremacy of the other. The world lapses into the self leaving behind the other. Thus the idea of the world embedded in the communicative language becomes a non-reality in the Advaitic standpoint. Thus we have a transcendental perspective which makes a short shrift of the communicative notion of the human soul.

Concluding Remarks

The notion of self as the human soul does not survive the scrutiny of logic because it makes the self an illusion by keeping it in the realm of the contingent world. Gandhi's attempt to locate it in the human world of communication fails to take account of the fact that the human soul excludes the

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souls of animals and other species and denies the cosmic metaphysical significance of the self. The self is reduced to a particular spatio-temporal being called the human soul.

Gandhi's notion of soul as examined above falls short of the transcendental dimension which has been part of the notion of the self both in the Western and Indian traditions. It has been limited to the local region of interpersonal communication in its bid to realize the importance of the human being. The cosmic notion of self is a far cry from what is presented under the category of the human soul²⁴.

NOTES

- R.C. Gandhi, *The Availability of Religious Ideas* (Macmillan, Delhi 1976), Chapter
 (To be abbreviated hereafter as ARI).
- See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tarns. G.E.M. Anscombe (Bast Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), Part II, iv.
- 3. ARI, p. 28.
- 4. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
- 5. Ibid., p.29.
- 6. Ibid., pp.29-30.
- 7. Ibid., p.29.
- 8. Ibid., p.32.
- 9. Ibid., pp.32-33.
- 10. Ibid., p.37.
- 11. Cf.Ibid.,pp.38-41.
- 12. Cf, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sections, 404,410.
- 13. Ibid., section, 410.

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- Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F.Pears and B.F. MeGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961), 5.632.
- 15. Ibid., 5.633.
- 16. See P.F.Strawson, Individuals (Methuen, London, 1959) Chapter III. See also A.Quinton, "The Soul", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.59. No.15 (1962), pp.393-400.
- 17. See Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992), Chapters 9 and 10.
- 18. See Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Penguin Books, 1963; ofiginally published by Hutchinson, 1949).
- 19. ARI, p.33.
- 1. Cf. Akeel Bilgrami, "Self-Knowledge and Resentment" in The Philosophy of P.F.Strawson, ed. P.K.Sen and R.R. Verma (ICPR, New Delhi, 1995), pp.213-233.
- 21. ARI, p.23.
- 22. Ibid., p.25.
- 13. See Kathopanishad, II, 20-25. See also Sri, Aurobindo, The Life Divine, Book One (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1973), Chapter XVII, pp. 150-58.
- 4. This paper was presented and discussed in an ICPR Seminar entitled "Addressing the Soul" held at Bangalore in December, 1998. I am thankful to all those who participated in the discussion.

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WILLIAM JAMES' THEORY OF TRUTH AND ITS LATER DEVELOPMENT

Md .ABDUR RAZZAQUE

William James (1842-1910) is one of the most discussed and debated philosophers whose philosophical enterprize has been both stimulating and baffling. The core of his philosophy can be summarized in his three philosophical concepts namely: 'the pragmatic method', 'the theory of truth' and the theory of radical empiricism'. This paper endeavours to substantiate William James' theory of truth which is an application of his pragmatic method, where in order to make philosophy concrete and practical he completely identifies truth with utility or workability.

William James designates his 'pragmatic method' and 'theory of truth' as pragmatism and contends that pragmatism consists of "first, a method; and second, a genetic theory of what is meant by truth." ¹ In his view, "the word pragmatism has come to be used in a ... wider sense, as ... a certain theory of truth," ² Thus James' 'theory of truth' is an application of his pragmatic method where he vindicates truth as mutable and ever changing which grows and changes according to the needs and desires of individual.

James develops his 'theory of truth' from Peircean concept of meaning. Peirce in his article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878) asserts that the aim of pragmatism is to clear our concepts and to determine the meaning of a proposition or statement by its conceivable practical effect. James turns Peircean heory of meaning as a theory of truth by explicating meaning in terms of cash-value. While Peirce emphasizes on the practical effect of a concept and general

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ideas or a habit of action i.e., the idea of the general habit in which the concept could possibly modify by pruposive action, ³ James, on the contrary, looks to particular practical effects and locates the meaning of a concept in particular experience ⁴. So he formulates truth as practical and relative to individual satisfaction, that is to say, a belief is true if and only if it yields sensitive satisfactory result in experience.

In James' days there had been prevailing two major theories of true namely, 'correspondence theory of truth' and 'coherence theory of truth' Correspondence theory in its traditional form holds that an idea becomes true when it copies or is in correspondence with or agrees with an object. It is a agreement or conformity between ideas and reality. According to this theory truth is an experience of two factors determinately related to one another. Correspondence, therefore, means being related by a one to one relation, that is idea of mind corresponds to fact. And coherence theory in its traditional form upholds that the truth of a proposition is determined by its relation to other propositions i.e., a proposition is true when it coheres with all known propositions and is false when it does not. This theory explicate reality as a system of propositions or judgements when the truth of a proposition is determined by the degree to which it coheres with the absolute system.

James criticizes both theories as "vague and uniformative." Since thee "theories are concerned with the formal definition of truth", that is, an abstract analysis of truth, "while James is interested in their pragmatic meaning". So James' theory is not to be seen as competing with traditional account of truth, at the queries of traditional philosophers and James are not identical. James envisages correspondence theory as misleading because its underlying most of mental activity is passive, non-interesting and non-evaluative. According him, ideas of natural sciences like energy, power, as well as concepts of sories sciences, such as, justice, equality etc., cannot be affirmed as true on the base of correspondence theory. Moreover, it cannot adequately cover all the cases which we naturally talk of truth. It may function only in a simple object like clock, but it cannot account for a complex notion of 'agreement', such as the clock, but it cannot account for a complex notion of 'agreement', such as function of clock as a time keeping mechanism. How can an idea be a copy of the complex reality? It cannot be so since there is no image that adequates

conveys this function. 6

And James criticizes coherence theory for its metaphysical foundation and contends that coherence theory involves idealist conception of truth because in it the truth of a proposition is determined by its relation to the absolute system. James' objection to coherence theory is its acceptance of absolute system James' objection truth. He alleges that both correspondence and coherence theory conceive truth as 'ante rem' ⁸ means prior to thing, that is to say, truth is obtained prior to things and consequently it is independent of human enquiry and experience. James cogently argues that truth cannot be prior to human experiences and beliefs, rather it is a satisfactory relation between our ideas and the rest of our experiences. In other words, truth is an experiential property, and that there is nothing about it which is inaccessible to us.

James in order to explicate truth of utility, usefulness or workability in a concrete life situation identifies truth with reality, verification and verifiability. For James truth is a "property of certain of our ideas". 9 What sort of property is it? James adduces: "It means their (ideas) 'argeement', a falsity means their (ideas) 'disagreement' with reatity". 10 Therefore, James opines that truth is a property of agreeing i.e., an idea is true if it agrees with some reality. It may be noted that by property James does not mean either a stagnant or inert essence of an idea, or any underlying quality in the object that can be attached to an idea. Rather he seems to mean "a predicate, (that) must apply to the idea and not to the object." Thus 'truth is a property' means that, it is a predicate' that must be applied to our ideas. For him our ideas are part of our experiences and the use of our ideas is to help us to get satisfactory relation with other parts of our experiences. Ideas are the subjective part and reality is the objective part of our experiences. Here it seems that James is echoing correspondence or copy theory of truth. What does he mean by copying or agreeing? James claims that his use of the term copying or agreeing is different from as what is admitted by correspondence heory; since correspondance theory regards'reality' as given once for all, whereas lames' reality is not absolutely given, rather what he calls constantly becoming. So for him, to 'agree' with reality is not to copy it or otherwise to represent it. By agreement he denotes a relation between the concept and the world, i.e., a relation between one set of item in experience and another. He construes 'agreement' in

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terms of dynamic line of working 'agreement' between the various segments of experiences rather than as a static relation between the cognitive item and the world. 12

To eloborate this point let us first explain Jamesian use of the term reality By reality he does not mean a close, stagnant and inert 'reality' but a reality having many facets. This imports that his conception of 'universe' is not a block 'universe', it is 'multi-universe', a plastic one which possesses dynamic character and is ever chamging. According to him, this sort of universe moves, modifies and advances within the sphere of experiential limit. He spells out that "our field of experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view Both are frigned foreover by a more that continously developed, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds". 13 So, in James' view, the universe is open having an open character which signifies that it is not ruled by some static or fixed laws, rather it is sometimes ruled by concrete, sensible present sometimes by objective relation and so on. He further enfolds that there is m objective reality beyond the sphere of the reality of which we talk and opins that "the limit of our thought is the limit of our reality". 14 Similarly, it is observed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "The limit of language means the limit of world." For James the limit of thought and reality is not bound by fixed laws. It may augment its sphere with the amelioration of our thought and experience. Thus, it seems that James does not use the term 'agreement' in the sense of copying or correspondence. He uses it in a very wide sense.

However, for James, 'agreement' is the guiding principle of our beliefs achieve the goal, that is, agreement is necessary to obtain a relation between idea and reality. We can obtain such a relation only by putting our beliefs into working touch with reality. In the view of James, truth is relation between one part of our experience with another, what he terms, "terminus a quo" to "terminus ad quem." ¹⁶ James envisages the former as the subjective part of our experience and the latter as objective part of it. And the agreement' between these parts can be maintained by the application of pragmatic interpretation of our idea, as James enfolds, is a plan or guide for action. And if the application of this plan leads us to the terminus ad quem, that is, objective part of our experience, then the idea is true. He spells out: "Pragmatists are unable to see

William James' Theory of Truth And its Later Development

what can possibly mean by calling an idea true, unless you mean that between it what can possess a quo in some one's mind and some particular reality as a terminus as a terminus as a terminus as a terminus ad quem', such concrete workings do or may intervene." ¹⁷ Therefore, our ideas become true through a series of termini and truer idea is one that pushes us further, that is to say, truth is not something which is given once for all, but that which becomes true. In other words, truth is relative. James divides experience as subjective and objective, with the implication that when an experience works or helps in attaining a useful goal, it becomes true. In the view of James the successive series of our experiences lead us to anticipate an ideal limit of our searches, which would be an absolutely satisfactory terminus. Agreeing with James, C.H. Seigfried argues that "the ideally perfect truth would thus be an absolute identification of idea and the reality in which it terminates."18 Hence truth means satisfactory relation between one and the another part of our experiences, that is, any idea on which we can ride, speak or that can carry us prosperously from one part to another part of our experiences and linking things satisfactorily is called a true idea.

Apart from this, James claims that "the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events." ¹⁹ This imports that an idea makes itself true by the way it works, that is, by acting upon it and putting it to the test of future experience. He spells out, "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, and corroborate and verify. False ideas are those we cannot." ²⁰ James, thus, opines that to be true an idea must assimilate, validate through previously acquired truth. The function of new idea is to mediate between novelty and previously acquired knowledge. And if an idea performs this function, the idea would be true. James slates: "The reason why we call things true is the reason way they are true, for 'to be' true means only to perform this marriage function." ²¹ Therfore', the idea which enables us to deal effectively with the rest of our experiences, assimilating the past, and on the basis of it anticipating the future, can be said to be working agreement with reality, hence true.

James further identifies truth with verification to signify the relation and espouses that truth emerges when a belief is verified. He states, "Its (truth) variety is... a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification.

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Its validity is the process of its validation." ²² In the view of James, truth of a belief is made by verification and validation. He depicts verification of a belief in the experimental sense, that is to say, the verification of belief is performed when other ideas associated with it, follow a particular pattern of succession within individual's experience. So the pragmatic understanding of truth leads us to a sensible experience and establishes the connection from point to point within a series of experience in order to make a belief true. Hence, for James, truth is a collective name for verification process, just as health, wealth and strength are collective names for other processes in life. To quote James: Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification processes.....Truth is made just as health, wealth and strength are made, in course of experience." ²³

It may be noted here that Jamesian understanding of verification is different from that of positivists' understanding of verification principle. For the positivists the unit of verification and falsification is given in individual experience. For them, verification is the name of a single process and it is concerned only with the autonomy of a proposition. But James does not consider verification as fixed process. For him, it always leaves the door open and it is not concerned only with a single proposition but with a series of propositions. Hillary Putnum points out that "the pragmatists applied their pragmatic maxim to whole metaphysical systems and to religious and ethical beliefs as well as to scientific utterances and theories." ²⁴ The positivists uphold that knowledge must be reduced to the knowledge of sense data. To be meanigful an idea must be capable of conclusive verification which must exclude metaphysics. But Putnam argues that "for the pragmatists the idea (verification) was that it should apply to metaphysics, so that metaphysics might become a responsible and significant enterprize." ²⁵

Since the positivists are concerned with the meaning of a single proposition, the pragmatists reject their verification, that is, their claim of autonomy of proposition.

James sometimes uses the term 'verifiability' to expatiate truth. But his use of the term is different from its normal sense. Generally speaking, verifiability of a proposition refers to its ability in principle, to prove or disprove the same by experience. But James refers verifiability only in a positive sense, where

individual's beliefs are verifiable means to bring them increasingly confirmed in the course of our experiences over a period of time. In other words, verifiability depends on the concrete situation of a particular believer, and that it may chage from person to person or from time to time. This imports that beliefs which are verifiable in one person's experience in a particular span of time may not be verified in another person's experience in another span of time, or even to the same person it can differ. James cites an example, "If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what looks like a cow-path, it is of the utmost importance that I should think of a human habitation at the end of it." Why vital interest here is to get myself out of the wood and possibly a cow-path may lead me to an inhabited area, where I may get probable help. Here my idea is a plan of action, that is, my action verifies or validates the idea. Thus for James, the process of verification constitutes the truth of an idea. But he further enfolds; in another situation or another span of time I may not consider it as true, because in that context it may not be my purpose to look at a cow-path and so on, hence not useful for me.

Thus James' functional standpoint leads him to analyse truth as verifiability then actual verification. His use of the term verifiability refers to truth as analysable in terms of actual and possible experience. While explicating Jamesian notion of verifiability E. K. Suckiel spells out: "verifiability is analysed exclusively according to the way in which individual's belief is or could be experienced as verifiable,.... for a belief to remain verifiable it must be increasingly confirmed in the individual's experience." ²⁷ This corroborates the fact that verifiability continuously satisfies individual's demand and interest, that is to say, it is only the verifiable beliefs that can satisfy the believer. Satisfaction therefore, is not extrinsic to a belief's verifiability, rather is a part and parcel of it. In other words, true belief is generated by us in the process of verification of our beliefs to fulfil our demands and desires

J.B.Pratt in his article entitled "Truth and Its Verification" criticizes James' identification of truth with verification and verifiability. He cogently argues that the conception of truth as verifiability is essentially non-pragmatic and inconsistent with ordinarily accepted pragmatic view of truth since "verifiability is not a process, it is not included within any one's experience, but is a general condition or set of conditions which transcends every single finite experience" 28

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So verifiability and verification are not the same thing. Verifiability is a totality of relation which is not concerned with finite experience, rather it excels finite experience whereas verification is within the realm of finite experience. Hence, in Pratt's view, it is impossible to identify truth with verification and verifiability. We cannot capture truth altogether and that it excels experience.

Apart from this James' use of the expression 'truth is a process of verification' is also confusing. If truth is nothing but the process of verification, or the process by wihich it is pursued and attained, then what is it that is verified what is it that is pursued and attained? The answer that naturally emerges is that we are verifying verification and pursuing pursuit. J.B. Pratt is of the opinion that truth cannot consist in the process of its own verification, consequently it is hard to see the consistent use of the term verification. ²⁹

According to James, truth is not an attribute of reality, rather it is our ideas or belief about reality. Our beliefs become true and provide satisfactory result by their functional use. He writes, "It is useful because it is true or that it is true because it is useful." ³⁰ Here both phrases mean the same thing: that our ideas get fulfilled by their functional use, hence become true. But the question is what concrete difference a true belief can bring to our lives or what is its cash-value in experience? James argues that truth lives on system, and our thoughts and beliefs are good currency to lead us to a successful conclusion. He ferrels out: "The true...is only expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only expedient in the way of our believing." ³¹

James' use of the term satisfaction cannot be envisaged as a sufficient condition for truth. According to James, the successful working of an hypothesis depends on the satisfaction of interest. Frederick Copleston is of the view that since for James, a belief is true if it causes a subjective feeling of satisfaction it opens the door to every kind of wishful thinking, that is to say, an idea is true simply because one wishes it to be true. ³²

James does not accept truth as ideal or final. He opines that no theory can be a complete transcript of there reality and that there need not be any ultimate or final truth. In this context he spells out,

....truth is made largely out of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time

ar so much experience funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the world's experience, ... reality means experienceable reality, both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly, in process of mutation. ³³

Since verification refers to particular fact of experience, there can be no universal or absoluate truth: it has to be particular, relative and subjective i.e., truth is mutable, everchanging, temporal. This implies that our beliefs or ideas that which we profess to live by, are effective for a limited span. It is based on previous truth, for example, once Ptolematic system of astronomy was true now it is replaced by Compernicusian system. hence, truths are modified by new discoveries in accordence to our needs and desires and new truths are capable of providing more satisfaction for the individual. And we retain them so long as they lead us to fruitfully fulfil our desires and intersts. James, thus, endeavours to depiet that all our ideas or beliefs are human construct and are designated to serve human needs and satisfy his demands.

G. E. Moore raises question against Jamesian notion of mutability. For lames, truth is mutable i.e., one and the same idea may be true at one time and false at another time. Moore opines that truth cannot be mutable since it is a permanent property of our ideas. He contends: "Many true ideas seem to occur but once, and, if so, they, at least, will not actually be true at one time and false at another time." ³⁴ So for Moore, there are certain classes of ideas which are not mutable. Hence according to him, we cannot hold that "all true ideas are mutable". ³⁵

From the above exposition of James' theory of truth it seems that he exclusively characterizes truth as personal, subjective and it functions only with the domain of individual's experience. But there are passages in both *Pragmatism* and *The Meaning of Truth* where he claims to show the possibility of objective luth. The argument which James provide to elucidate the objectivity of truth is more or less similar to what J. S. Mill adopts in his *Utilitarianism* to illustrate the objectivity of hedonistic principles. Both of them endeavour to vindicate the objectivity in their theory through subjective criterion. For Mill, an individual's subjective pleasure is the criterion of goodness, just as, for James, individual subjective usefulness is the criterion of truth. Now the question is how to obtain

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objectivity in truth or goodness? Mill cogently argues that objectivity consists in the greatest happiness of the greatest number which he considers as moral standered. In *Utilitarianism* he contends: "By happiness is intended pleasure and absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain and privation of pleasure" in Therefore, for Mill, rightness or wrongness comprise in conduciveness to pleasure or pain. This is pure subjectivism.

Mill supports altrustic hedonism and considers that egocentric pleasure cannot be moral standard, the collective happiness is the moral standard. But if every body seeks his own happiness, then how shall we generate collective happiness? According to Mill, everybody desires his own happiness, implies that everybody desires collective happiness and since individual's own happiness is good to him, general happiness is good to everybody. Hence Mill begins with individual pleasure and transform it as a general criterion to achieve the objectivity of pleasure. Mill's account of greatest happiness of the greatest number invites severe criticism. In the first place why shall everybody desire other's happiness? Mill does not have satisfactory answer to this question. William Lilly adduces that Mill's argument is tantamount to the statement: "each man in a city has the right to open the door of his own house; it follows that all in the city have the right of opening the door of any house as they fancy." ³⁷ Thus, Lilly repudiates Mill's claim of objectivity of goodness or pleasure.

William James launches the same kind of arguments to generate objectivity of truth. In *Pragmatism* he spells out, "You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on each other truth." ³⁸ In a similar strain in *The Meaning of Truth* he writes,

....truth, concretely considered, is an attribute of our beliefs, and that these are attitudes that follow satisfactions ... men seek to spread their beliefs, to awaken imitation, to infect others. Why should not you also find the same belief satisfactory? Thinks the pragmatist, and forthwith endeavors to convert you. You and he will then believe similarly; you will hold up your subject-end of a truth, which will be a truth objective and irreversible if the reality holds up the object-end by being itself present simultaneously. What there is of self-contradiction in all this I confess I cannot discover.

The above two quotations seem to corroborate James' claim that truth is not only relative and personal but objective as well. For him a belief is true if it is set to the appropriate test within the context of personal desires and interest, that is to say, 'true belief is that which the individual takes to be true'. This appears to substantiate Mill's view that good is that which individual takes to be good.

James claims to extend his theory of truth from the individual to a group by balancing and harmonizing, as fully as possible, the conflicting demands among the individuals on the basis of what the individual takes to be true i.e., by sharing and comparing each others' true belief. He adduces that in a society knowledge of self is impossible apart from other selves with whom we can compare and contrast our beliefs, ideas, etc., and share common interests. In his context he states, "We exchange ideas; we lend and borrow verifications, get them from one another by means of social intercourse. All truths thus gets verbally built out, stored up and made available for every one." 40

So for James truth develops in a community through social intercourse; we share our beliefs with each other and develop sets of beliefs having greater degrees of truth. This implies that the member of a community accounts for and anticipates a greater number and variety of experience that transcends the personal or relative truth. James, thus, claims that we begin from personal truth and through the intermediatory stages we establish an ideally perfect objective truth. In other words, objective truth is attainable through the acceptance of our belief by the community, that is to say, if everybody in a community accepts a particular belief as true, then there would be none to count it as false, and since there would be none to reject it, such a belief would be pragmatically true one. 41

James' claim of objective truth, like Mills utilitarianism, raises its own sets of questions. For example, why every body in a community shall share their beliefs or ideas with other? James could not adequately explain this issue. That apart, James' theory of truth faces severe criticism from different angles by a number of Phiolsophers. Most of the critics raise objection to James' use of the expression that an idea is true if it agrees with reality. The critics are of the view that this echoes correspondence theory which James has criticized for its

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vagueness. Moreover, it has been pointed out, hereinbefore, that James discards correspondence theory since it regards reality as given once for all, whereas James discards portrays reality as everchanging. C. H. Seigfried agrees with James and repudiales the claim of the critics. He upholds that James does not employ the expression 'our ideas agree with reality' in the sense of correspondence theory rather, he uses it in the sense that by acting upon ideas we are led to satisfactory consequences. He states that "the correspondence theory has actually been reduced to a pragmatic one. 'Working' replaced by agreeing." 42 Again, Graham Bird criticizes James' employment of the term 'satisfactoriness' or workability as a criterion of truth, that is, truest idea is that which performs satisfying conditions Bird maintains that James' use of the term 'satisfaction' "is ambiguous" 43 and it is not sufficient condition for truth. It has been used narrowly to signify our emotional satisfaction. Besides, what gives satisfaction felicitously to one person may not give the same satisfaction to another person or even to the same person at another point of time. James, thus, wipes out the objective standard of truth and his workability criterion cannot be considered as viable because 'an idea or a belief that works is true' leads us to the conclusion that even a false belief is true if it works.

That apart, G. E. Moore in his article entitled "Professor Jame's Pragmatism" is of the view that James' identification of truth with verification and utility may have some truth since some of our true ideas are verified or can be verified and many of them are useful. But this does not lend support to James' claim that all our true ideas are useful or can be verified. Moore's objection is that by identifying truth with verification or utility or usefulness James over simplified the age old problem of truth. Moore cogently argues that there are some ideas which cannot verify but are true and it is impossible to verify all our ideas. ⁴⁴ For example, on a certain issue or even if a polemic arises and if we do not have documents on that event or if all documents have been destroyed, then how to verify our ideas about that event. Moore illustrates with a number of examples on this issue in his article and concludes that we cannot always verify our true ideas.

In a similar vein Moore criticizes James' notion of usefulness. He opines that all our true ideas need not be useful. There are times in which a particular

idea is useful and certainly there are times it would not be so. Moore does agree with James in saying that true ideas are useful, but not always, sometimes. He spells out that. "true ideas which are sometimes useful, nevertheless sometimes occur at times when they are not." ⁴⁵ Hence James' identification of truth with utility is not tenable, for utility is not a permanent property of our ideas, while truth is always truth.

The above accounted criticisms of Moore have brought to fore the basic differences between the two philosophers. In case of Moore, truth is an objective property of ideas, that exists independently of human desires, needs and interests whereas, for James, it is a subjective property dependent upon men's conscious purpose, needs interests etc.

Apart from Moore, Bertrand Russell in his article entitled "William James's Conception of Truth" criticizes pragmatism as "absolutely dogmatic." The reason he put forth is that it does not allow erroneous hypotheses to enter into pragmatic competition. For pragmatists a hypothesis works means: the effect of believing in the same is good, and provides satisfaction for individuals; consequently true and valid. Russell repudiates this position and argues that "we cannot agree that when we say a belief is true we mean that it is a hypothesis which 'works'." ⁴⁷ For Russell working hypotheses are only a small part of our beliefs, not whole as pragmatism seems to consider. It may be pointed out that although Russell criticizes Jamesian notion of truth in the above article, in *History of Western Philosophy* he remarks it as "a new definition of truth." ⁴⁸

Besides these philosophers, in the recent time Richard Rorty who claims to be a new pragmatist also criticizes James' theory of truth. Rorty considers pragmatism as vague and ambiguous albeit he gives credit to the tradition while he says, "it names the chief glory of our country's intellectual tradition." ⁴⁹ He is influenced by philosophers like James, Dewey, Quine, Davidson etc. and envisages his own work as a continuation and elaboration of pragmatic tradition. James departs from Humean atomistic philosophy and ardently advocates holism while Rorty departs from analytic philosophy. The point of departure is precisely in his critique of analytic Philosophy For Rorty pragmatism is not mere "holistic corrections of the atomistic doctrines of the early logical empiricists." ⁵⁰ He and the same of

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Kantian, epistemologucally-centered Philosophy ⁵¹ Rorty questions the value of epistemologically centered traditional philosophy and says: "The great pragmatics should not be taken as suggesting an holistic variation of this variant, but rather as breaking with the Kantian epistemological tradition altogether." ⁵² Therefore, Rorty's new pragmatism on the one hand embraces the American theme of breaking with an European tradition and on the other hand he shatters the epistemology centered philosophy. Rorty, thus, becomes a staunch anti-epistemologist while James is an anti-intellectualist.

For traditional philosophers the object of philosophical theorizing in truth, knowledge, morality etc. But Rorty considers the search of truth as fulland would like philosophers to abandon the pursuit of truth, because in his view those theorizings do not have any essence. He expatiates this point with reference to James' definition of truth: 'what is good in the way of belief. Rorty conceives this definition as deflationary which, he believes, is not really meant to be a definition at all, rather it serves as a warning against all definitions of truth. 9 For him, it is of no use to hold that "truth corresponds to reality"54 because we have no access to reality which is independent of those beliefs and theories la other words, there is no possibility of competing our beliefs with reality. One should concern onself only with how things are, instead of proliferation of truths.55 In the view of Rorty Jamesian definition of truth suggests that "there is nothing deeper to be said: truth is not the sort of thing which has an essence 56 This implies, Rorty claims, the pursuit of truth is absurd since "truth is in the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about."57 He opines that it is James and Dewey who recognize the impossibility of acquiring objectively true knowledge. It is pointless, Rotry holds, to try holds, the try holds, establish a theory of knowledge or of truth. Hence, no difinition of truth would be possible. Furthermore, for Rotry, "there is no... epistemological way 10 direct or criticize, or underwrite" our experiences, "... it is the vocabulary of practive rather the contract of the rather than of theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can specific something week. somthing useful about truth."58 So, only through the practise of vocabular of action one sees the action one sees the usefulness of truth. Rorty states: "When we turn from individual senter." individual sentences to vocabularies and theories critical terminology natural shifts from metanhana shifts from metaphors of isomorphism, symbolism, and mapping to talk of utility convenience; and like 11. convenience, and likelihood of getting what we want". 59 This quotation affinish that the vocabulary of practise is uneliminable, that is, truth lives through the yozabulary of practise. Here it may be asked to Rorty that if the pursuit of truth is absurd why does he not adopt any theory of truth? Why is he working on the line of pragmatist theory of truth? Rorty does not have adequate answer to these questions. Richard Manning agrees with Rorty that the pragmatist theory is a deflationary one but he contends that it still can be a theory. 60 It is difficult to agree with Rorty, Manning and James as well since these philosophers deny the possibility of objective knowledge and truth, which results in individualism, and subjectivism. Moreover, Rorty's denial of epistemology shatters the cognitive activity of human being through which he moulds the universe and forms world-

James' theory of truth seems to characterize human being as goal positing, interest seeking being, and thus pictures his rational and cognitive aspects to be subservient to the emotional and passionate aspect of his nature. Therefore, in his view, individual's interests, desires, perferences mould his cognitive activities, such as, concept formation, belief acquisition, theory construction etc. According to him, human beings are impelled towards the fulfilment of their practical end and analyse everything in terms of cash-value. lames' individual is one who does not seek any social whole but his own selfdesired goal. He depicts his philosophy as narrowly utilitarian and reductionsitic, and ignores the universal characteristic of human being, that he is a creative and rational being, who by his reason and conscience looks for others' interests as well, that is, he also works for humanity, altruism and compassions, in spite of his self interest. James' pragmatic attitude, thus, denies the universal characterization of human being and designates good actions in terms of the fulfilment of egocentric mentalistic end. The basic thesis of Jamesian pragmatism that "knowing is a way of being in the world"61 and James endeavours to give Specification of the way in which true beliefs function in human life, that is, "an idea is true so long as to believe in it is profitable to our lives." 62

It is true that James' theory of truth has been severely criticized for its tuphasis on the subjective interests of individuals and his view of the objectivity of truth also fails to convince its critics, nonetheless James can be credited for bling into his account the practical import of our experiences. James departs

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from the traditional view (true propositions accurately represent realing accomplishing on the second realing accomplishing acco independently of human experiences) for its accentuation on the transempine concept of truth by asserting the experiential property of truth, that is, truth canny be obtained prior to our experiences and beliefs. It is a satisfactory relation between our ideas and the rest of our experiences. The significance of Janes theory lies in the fact that if truth is separable from our experiences, there would be no reliable basis upon which truth could be ascribed. He, thus, diverts the attention of philosophers to the consideration of action or ideas practically James' rejection of absolute truth and his concern for subject's experience depicts truth as temporarily expedient. This fundamental relativity is the core of lame! theory of truth which is essential to form our thinking and action to change thin unfinished world into a better shape. James believes that man is free to decide which of various conflicting interpretations, ways of interpretations and hypotheses to accept; if the choice is of vital concern to him and if he cannot rationally decide or setle a question then it is right and necessary to follow his inclination. He pleaded with great skill and logical ernestness for the fulfilment of human aspiration and exhibited those things that are useful for life, individual and social.

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The purpose of this paper is to maintain the thesis through analysis that Lewis' counterfactual account of causation is not logically well grounded because the relationship which he assumed between counterfactual dependences and causes does not hold much water.

Lewis D. in his article entitled "Causation" ¹ claims that an event c causes an event e only when e depends counterfactually on c and not otherwise. If e does not depend counterfactually on c, he says, c ceases to be the cause of e. This view of his is quite clear from the following statements which he firmly upholds in the article cited above.

- (1) An event c is a cause of an event e iff e depends causally on c.
- (ii) An event e depends causally on an event c iff the family o (e), ~o (e) depends counterfactually on the family o (c), ~ o (c).
- (ii) The family o (e), $\sim o$ (e) depends counterfactually on the family o(c), $\sim o$ (c) iff the counterfactual conditionals o (c) $\square \rightarrow o$ (e) and $\sim o$ (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim o$ (e) are true.
- (iv) The counterfactual conditionals o (c) $\square \rightarrow$ o (e) and \sim o (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim$ o (e) are true. iff o (c). \sim o (e) and \sim o (c). o (e) are not true.

If this be the case, then the first counterfactual conditional $o(c) \square \rightarrow o(e)$ would be true on the Lewis' account only when e occurs in the occurrence of c. If e does not occur in the presence of c, the counterfactual conditional $o(c) \square \rightarrow o(e)$ would be false and in that case c cannot be said to be the cause of e; not can e

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 4
October 1999

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be said to be dependent causally on c. Because c can be said to be the cause of e or e can be said to be dependent causally on c on his account only when e depends counterfactually on c. Likewise, the second counterfactually conditional ~ o (c) □→ ~o (e) would be true on the Lewis' account only when e does not occur in the absence of c. If e occurs in the absence of c, the counterfactual conditional ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) would become false and in that case e cannot be said to be dependent counterfactually on c. Because the non-occurrence of e can be said be dependent counter factually on the nonoccurrace c only when c and e do not actually occur. So if the non-occurrence of e does not depend counterfactually on the non-occurrence of c, c cannot be said to be the cause of e; nor can e be said to be dependent causally on c. Thus for Lewis the truth of the causal statement'c caused e' consists in the fact of the truth of counterfactual conditionals (c) □→o (e) and ~o (c) □→~o (e). In other words, for him the truth of counterfactual conditionals o (c) □→o (e) and ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) entails and is entailed by the truth of the causal statement'c caused e'.

But then the question here arises: Does the truth of counterfactual conditionals o (c) □→o (e) and ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) really entail and is entailed by the truth of the causal statement 'c caused e'? So far as the truth of first counter factual conditional o(c) □→o (e) is concerned, it does entail to my mind the truth of the causal statement 'c caused e'. Because it becomes true only when e occurs in the occurrence of c. If e does not occur in the presence of c, it becomes false and in such case c cannot entail e which is logically required for the first counterfactual conditional o (c) • → o (e) to be true. But the occurrence of ein the presence of c would be possible only when the occurrence of c gives guarantee for the occurrence of e and not otherwise. If the occurrence of c does not give guarantee for the occurrence of e, the occurrence of e cannot be said to be following from the occurrence of c. But the occurrence of c can give guarantee for the occurrence of e only when the occurrence of c is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of e and not otherwise. If the occurrence of c is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of e, the occurrence of e cannot be said to be following from the occurrence of c even if c constitutes a necessary condition for the occurrence of e. In such a case the occurrence of c fails to give guarantee for the occurrence for the occurrence for the occurrence of c fails to give guarantee for the occurrence for the occ for the occurrence of e. When the occurrence of c fails to give guarantee for occurrence of e, the occurrence of e cannot be said to be following from the ne cause of ally when e conditional e does not neterfactual cannot be trence of e ally when c not depend ne cause of the truth of unterfactual

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OCCURRENCE of c and in such case the first counterfactual conditional o (c) $\square \rightarrow 0$ (e) becomes false. That is the reason why for it to be true, the occurrence of c (e) become to be assumed as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of e. Then and then alone it could validly be said that the truth of the first counterfactual conditional o(c) □→o (e) entails the truth of the causal statement 'c caused e' and not otherwise. But assuming this, however, does not give any guarantee for it that e cannot be caused by anything other than c. So unless it is proved that there is no cause other than c which causes e, c cannot be said to be the only cause which causes e. And this cannot be proved on the ground of this assumption that c is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of e. The reason why it cannot be proved is that because c's being a sufficient condition does not by itself rule out the logical possibility that e cannot be caused by anything other than c which is logiclly required for the second counterfactual conditional ~0 (c) □→ ~(e) to be true. If this be the case, then the truth of the first counterfactual conditional cannot be said to be entailing the truth of the second counterfactual conditional which Lewis uses to define the notion of causation. Although it is true that Lewis throughout in his analysis of causation does not say any where that the truth of $o(c) \square \rightarrow o(e)$ entails the truth of $\sim o(c) \square \rightarrow \sim (e)$. But he does definitely use the second counterfactual conditional to define the notion of causal dependence. For him an event e depends causally on an event cjust in case c had not occurred, e would not have occurred. And this claim of his to my mind does not hold much water because it does not consitute an essential condition for c to be the cause of e. Because the truth of the first counterfactual conditional does independently capture the meaning of causal dependence which c requires for it to be the cause of e. But in spite of this Lewis preferred to choose the second counterfactual conditional to define the notion of causation. Here one might ask this question: Why did Lewis do so? No doubt, there might have been some good reasons, best known to him, behind his choosing of the second counterfactual conditional to define the notion of causation, But one of the reasons which comes to my mind at the moment is his; He must have thought that when we use the second counterfactual conditional to define the notion of causation, it not only captures the notion of causal dependence but also eliminates the problem of over determination. However, whatever the reasons there might have been the fact still remains that

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Lewis preferred to choose the second counterfactual conditional to define the notion of causal dependence which he thinks holds only among the actual to causally on c iff, if c had not been a more than actually on c iff. events. For him e depends causally on c iff, if c had not been e would not have occurred. It is on this ground Lewis claims that the truth of ~0 (c) 1 + ~0 (e) entails the truth of 'c caused e'. But then the question arises: Is it a valid claim? The answer to my mind seems to be negative because of the following reasons,

The second counterfactual conditional ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) could be said to be true only when e does not occur in the absence of c. If e occurs in the absence of c, it cannot be said to be true. It becomes false. But the nonoccurrence of e in the absence of c would be possible only when c constitutes as a necessary condition for the occurrence of e and not otherwise. If c does not constitute as a necessary condition for the occurrence e, the occurrence of would be possible to conceive in the absence of c. So for it to be true, the occurrence of c will have to be assumed as a necessary condition for the occurrence of e. Then and then alone the second counterfactual conditional-(c) □→ ~o (e) could be said to be true and not otherwise. But assuming this however, does not prove this point that the truth of \sim 0 (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim$ 0 (e) entails the truth of 'c caused e'. It only proves that e cannot occur in the non-occurrence of c and to say this is not equivalvent to saying that e occurs in the presence of c If this be so, then the truth of \sim (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim$ 0 (e) neither entails the truth of 'c caused e' nor the truth of o (c) □→ o (e). Furthermore, when we say 'c caused e', we simply mean to say that the occurrence of e follows causally from the occurrence of c and to say this is not to say that c is necessarily a necessary condition for the occurrence of e which the second counterfactual conditional ~0 (c) [] + ~0 (e) logically requires for it to be true. In fact for c to be the cause of e, it is not a all logically required that c must be a necessary condition for the occurrence of as Lewis says. Because to say that certain conditions are necessary and certain conditions are not is not to say that the former are causes while the latter are not. To think so is to commit a mistake because the notion of cause as such does not essentiaby include in it's meaning the notion of a necessary connection. What it includes in its meaning is the force of causing and the causing and the force of causing and the causi does not essentially include in its meaning the notion of a necessary connection.

Because a thin Because a thing can be conceived to be having the property of the force of

define the g the actual uld not have) [] - ~ (e) alid claim? ng reasons. ould be said ccurs in the ut the nonconstitutes e. If c does urrence of e be true, the tion for the onditional ~ suming this, e) entails the ccurrence of esence of c. of 'c caused aused e', we e occurrence ondition for (c) □→ ~0 e, it is not at currence of e and certain he latter are ause as such connection. e of causing connection. the force of

causing certain events without being necessarily connected with them. If this is 50, then from this it is quite clear that the causal statement 'c caused e' cannot be said to be logically equivalent to c is necessarily a necessary condition for e. Because e can happen in the presence of c even when c is not a necessary condition for e. If this be the case, then for 'c caused e' to be true it is not at all logically required that the second counterfactual conditional ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) must be true. Because 'c caused e' can be true even when the second counterfactual conditional \sim o(c) $\square \rightarrow$ (e) is not true. This possibility can be ruled out only when it is assumed that c causes e iff the second counterfactual conditional ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) is true and not otherwise. But assuming this is to commit a mistake. Moreover, to say that c is a necessary condition for e is not to say that c gives guarantee for the occurrence of e. Becuse what is a necessary may or may not be a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a thing which is logically required for it to happen. So if the occurrence of c is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of e, e cannot be said to be following from c even if c constitutes as a necessary condition for the occurrence of e. And in such a case the truth of the causal statemnt 'c caused e' cannot validly be claimed to be following from the truth of the counterfactual conditional ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) as Lewis does. In fact the assumption on which the truth of the second counterfactual conditional ~o (c) □→ ~o (e) rests, the truth of the causal statementc' caused e' does not rest on it. For proving the truth of the second counterfactual conditional ~ 0 (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim 0$ (e), we will have to assume that c is a necessary condition for the occurrence of e which we need not assume for proving the truth of the causal statement 'c caused e'. Because when we say 'c caused e', we simply mean to say that e follows causally from c and e can follow causally from c only when the occurrence of c gives guarantee for the occurrence of e and c does give guarantee when c possesses enough action force for causing e without even being having any necessary connection with e. If whatever I have said is true, then from this it is quite clear that the truth of the second counterfactual conditional ~ 0 (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim 0$ (e) neither entails nor is entailed by the truth of the causal statement 'c caused e' as Lewis says. When we consider two sequences family of the form o (e), ~o (e) and o (c),~o(c) where c and e are distinct (non-overlapping) events, the former sequence depends counterfactually on the latter just when o (c) $\square \rightarrow$ o (e) and \sim o (c) $\square \rightarrow$ \sim o (e) are true. When two such

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counterfactual conditionals hold, says Lewis, c is a direct cuses of e and no otherwise. Which means that if two such counterfactual conditionals do not be I away to the I away t hold, c cannot be said to be the direct cause of e on the Lewis account. However it does not matter for Lewis whether a cause of an event is a direct or an indirect it is nonetheless a cause of the event provided that the event counterfactually depends on it. In other words, when something is either a direct or an indirect cause of an event, it is nevertheless a cause of the event. So for any thing to be a cause, it need not be a direct cause according to him. If this be the case, then for c to be the cause of e, c need not satisfy the truth conditions of the both first and second counterfactual conditionals, that is o (c) $\square \rightarrow$ o (e) and ~ 0 (c) $\square \rightarrow \infty$ (e). Because an event c can be the cause of an event e if the sequence of e depends counterfactually on the sequence of c and the sequence of e does depend counterfactually on the sequence of c when the first counterfactual conditional o (c) □→ o (e) is true and for that the second counterfactual conditional ~o(c) □→ ~o (e) need not be true. This cannot be said on the Lewis' account that for c to be the cause of e both such counterfactual conditionals of (c) $\square \rightarrow o$ (e) and $\sim o$ (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim o$ (e) must be true. If it were the case, Lewis would not have drawn the distinction between direct and indirect causes of an event But since he draws the distinction between direct and indirect causes of the history of an event, it cannot be said on his account that c to be the cause of e, e must depend counterfactually on o(c) and ~o (c).

In fact, so far the nature of the relationship of counterfactual dependences is concerned, it is the same in his view in both the forms of such counterfactual conditionals, o (c) $\square \rightarrow$ o (e) and \sim o (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim$ o (e). They differ only in regard to their forms of components on which the counterfactual dependence operator operates and not in the nature of their relationship. And this condition c fulfils for to be the cause of e when the occurrence of e depends counterfactually on c, that is, o (c) $\square \rightarrow$ o (e) is true. So c can be said to be the cause of e when the occurrence of e rather than not-e depends counterfactually on the occurrence of c rather than not-c and c and e are both events. Above all, the notions of causation and counterfactual dependence are not co-extensive notions. The notion of counterfactual dependence is a wider notion than the notion of causation. Because it also holds among such propositions which to f e and not nals do not . However an indirect terfactually an indirect thing to be case, then e both first (c) □→ ~n uence of e of e does interfactual nterfactual the Lewis' ditionals o ewis would f an event uses of the

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not have any concern with any occurrence of events. For example, consider this proposition "If wishes were horses (they are not), then beggars would ride". This proposition no doubt is a counterfactual proposition. But its component propositions do not have any concern with any occurrence of events. If this be the case, then it is wrong to say that the truth of counterfactual conditional always entails the truth of the causal statement as Lewis claims. Not only this, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that counterfactual dependences hold only among occurrences, the occurrences need not be the occurrences of causal events. They may be numerical occurrences. For example, change in the volume of gases depends counterfactually on the change in the temperature, and yet their relation is not a relation of cause and effect. The Boyle-Charles law of gas is not a causal law because it does not assert that a change in the temperature is followed (or preceded) by some change in the volume or in the pressure. It only asserts that a change in temperature is inconcurrent with changes in pressure or volume or in both. But the law nonetheless does satisfy the conditions of counterfactual dependence. So to define the notion of causation in terms of counterfactual dependence is to commit a logical mistake because both the notions are not co-extensive as Lewis does. For him counterfactual dependence is causation. This view of his is quite clear from the statements of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) themselves. While the fact is that the notion of causation cannot be analysed properly in terms of counterfactual dependence which is defined in terms of the notion of necessity. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that counterfactual dependence is causation, it does not establish the point that causation holds only among events as Lewis defines. Because it also holds between objects and events. The agents, for example, do cause actions and actions are a kind of events. But on the ground of this we cannot say that the agents are events. The agents are not events. They are substantive beings. We cannot analyse them in terms of events. Furthermore, to assume that a cause necessitates an event is not to say that a cause is a necessary relation of an event because the former is possible to conceive even without conceiving the latter which would not have been possible if causes were necessary connections. When it is said 'e follows causally from c', from this it does not necessarily follow that c from which e is said to follow is necessarily connected with e. It follows only when we tag the notion of causation with the truth of such counterfactual

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conditional ~o (c) $\square \rightarrow \sim o$ (e) and not otherwise. But to tag the notion of causation with it is to commit the same mistake as that of Lewis as the course of events gets modified by some unforeseen interfering factors of which we may not have any knowledge at all. This possibility we can never rule out. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that every event necessarily has a cause, it does not follow from this that what causes is necessarily connected with that what follows from it. It also does not follow that the cause of a cause also has a cause. The cause of a cause need not have any cause. This is prefectly quite possible. Action of the force of causing is such a kind of property which does not essentially involve in its meaning the notion of a necessary connection or condition.

In the view of above discussion, thus, we can say that Lewis' counterfactual account of causation is not logically well grounded because the relationship which he assumed between them does not hold much water.

NOTES

1. Lewis, D. 'Causation', Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 70), 1973, pp. 556-567.

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A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

SYED ABDUL SAYEED

When can we say that we know something? This question has been traditionally answered in terms of an analysis of knowledge which stated that S knows that p if and only if (1) p is true, (2) S believels that p and (3) S is justified in believing that p. These three conditions, known as the truth-condition, the helief-condition and the justification-condition were generally considered to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient, thus constituting an adequate account of knowledge, until Edmund Gettier generated some counter examples which seemed to show that these three conditions, while individually necessary, were not jointly sufficient since there can be cases of justified true belief which cannot, in any meaningful sense, be considered as cases of knowledge. This apparent challenge to the traditional analysis evoked a variety of responses from philosophers, ranging from attempts to question the validity of the counter examples, through efforts to circumvent them by offering slightly modified versions of the traditional analysis, which in turn gave rise to the construction of yet other, even more effective counter examples. This process has been going on, and will presumably continue to do so, at least in some quarters, until change of philosophical fashion or sheer fatigue puts an end to it. However, one salutary effect of all this has been a renewal of rigorous interest in questions relating to the meaning of knowledge.

The present paper is set against this backdrop. However here I shall altempt neither a defence of the traditional analysis of knowledge nor a construction of Gettier type examples purporting to expose the inadequacy of the traditional analysis. My intention in this paper is to draw attention to certain

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 4
October 1999

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aspects common to most analyses of knowledge, a consideration of whom, I think will open the possibility of a more balanced perspective on the problem of defining the nature of knowing.

Let me begin with a brief look at the notion of analysis itself as it is practised in contexts such as the one we are now concerned with. In these contexts analysis is usually performed on and with the help of concepts whose sense is extracted in either of the two ways: through recourse to ordinary usage or through idealized definition. The success, or at any rate the relevance, of the analysis depends on the validity of these two methods of extracting the meaning of the operative concepts, and that, in my view, cannot be ensured without taking two important points into account.

The first point concerns the possible limits of percision. Concepts such as belief and justification, not to speak of the concept of knowledge itself are inherently imprecise and function with a context-dependent flexibility. They are, therefore, unamenable to logical analysis in their original form. On the other hand, when it is attempted to impose a certain degree of precision on them by rigorously delineating the boundaries of these concepts, their behaviour begins to obey a kind of uncertainty-principle. That is, the more precisely we try to define the boundaries of a concept, the fuzzier its relations with other concepts become Conversely, the more rigorously we try to define the relation of two concepts, the more we find a corresponding loss of precision in the concepts themselves. As a result, we end up with an analysis which is logically rigorous but philosophically irrelevant or at least uninteresting. This in fact seems to me to be the chief drawback of most discussions regarding the analysis of knowledge. It is hard to see what epistemological objective they are intended to serve. Ally discussion on the analysis of knowledge, if it is to be worthwhile, should focus itself such that it increases our understanding of knowledge and related epistemic standing concepts in their application to the practical contexts of acquiring and evaluating knowledge.

The second point concerns the intuitive grounding of epistemic concepts. In most cases a logically related network of concepts is treated as a closed autonomous system, an exploration of whose structure does not require reference to anything outside it. But such an approach, even if it is valid in

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some cases, is far from meaningful in the case of epistemic concepts. Insofar as these concepts are concerned with the range of relations between consciousness and reality, unless guided by attention to their grounding in the intentional activity of consciousness, an exploration of them is constantly in the danger of going astray. In saying this I am not suggesting that philosophical analysis is circumscribed by psychological analysis. My point is that a logical analysis of epistemic concepts, unless regulated by a phenomenological analysis, becomes arbitrary and its results will be found to be mere logical curiosities devoid of philosophical relevance.

I shall be guided by these two considerations in my following discussion of the three conditions of knowledge. I must stress this fact because unless it is remembered, the discussion is likely to give the impression, at points, of confusing certain fairly obvious logical distinctions.

Let me begin with the truth-condition. Inasmuch as this condition is treated as stipulative, there is nothing to object in it. You cannot know what is not in the first place true, and that's all there is to it. However, if we wish the analysis to help provide a criterion which can be applied in problematic cases of knowing, we must look at the relation between truth and knowledge from a different angle. When we do so, we find that there is a lack of coherence in the claim that the truth of the belief is a condition of knowing. In order for this claim to be coherent, it is necessary that we be able to assert the truth of a belief without reference to knowledge. But this is obviously impossible, since someone has to know that a particular belief is true. This line of argument may seem to lest on a very elementary sort of misunderstanding as regards the nature of analysis. Keith Lehrer² has taken this approach and argued that we must not tonfuse the analysis of knowing, whose task is to specify the conditions of knowledge, with a receipt for ascertaining whether one knows. Lehrer is right in maintaining that the analysis is not such a recipe, but my point is that the analysis would be meaningful only if it can adjudicate among different recipes. It can do only if it is not already biased in favour of a theory of knowledge, based on a Particular hierarchisation of epistemic concepts. It can be argued that the helusion of the truth-condition in the analysis shows its inherent bias towards and duli-condition in the analysis personalist epistemology, for bijectivist epistemology. In Michael Polanyi's personalist epistemology, for

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instance, truth is derivative of the act of knowing.³ That is to say, while the relation of truth to knowledge remains stipulative, in this type of epistemology is reversed such that knowledge is a condition of truth. That is, p is true if any only if S knows that P. Again, in the epistemological theory implied in the Kuhnis concept of paradigm-relativity of science, the notion of truth is almost redundant Kuhn's approach can be interpreted as holding that the network of knowledge claims subsists in a paradigm which itself is not subject to truth since the later is a function of the activity of the paradigm. The example of these frameworks shows that the concept of truth does not enjoy undisputed primacy as is implied in the inclusion of the truth-condition in the analysis of knowing. It means that such an analysis must at least be complemented by an analysis of truth in which knowledge is a condition. Such an attempt is more than likely to show the mutual dependence of truth and knowledge to be capable of much greater symmetry than is implied by the hierarchisation of this relationship in the traditional analysis

Let us now turn to the belief condition. Traditional analysis assumes that believing is a prerequisite to knowing. Even those philosophers who have questioned the adequacy of this analysis have accepted this assumption. But it is not at all evident that this assumption is tenable. There are two senses in which believing might be said to be prerequisite to knowing, belief as antecedent to knowledge and belief as a logical condition of knowledge. We can set aside belief as antecedent because analysis is not concerned with the various stages in the epistemic journey towards knowledge. Further, even in those cases where belief precedes knowledge, when knowledge is achieved, belief is left behind. The relevant question for us, therefore, is whether belief is a part of knowledge. To examine this, let us take some statements in which belief and knowledge at juxtaposed and see if the assumed relation between them is obtained.

- (1) I know that p and I believe that p
- (2) I know that p, moreover I believe that p
- (3) I know that p, therefore I believe that p (or)
- (4) I believe that p because I know that p

 For one thing, none of these statements ring natural when taken by

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themselves. They sound natural only when they are made in response to rhetorical persions expressing doubt or incredulity with regard to our knowledge claims. To take statement (1), to say, 'I know that p' has a finality about it so that adding believe that p' becomes quite superfluous. If one makes that statement at all, it would be to invent one's knowledge claim with some vague sort of rhetorical force with a view to carrying extra conviction, or sometimes in a formal context with a suitable solemnity of tone), performing some kind of what Austin calls an epistemic ritual (Austin maintains that the statement 'I know that p' constitutes such an epistemic ritual, but I think Austin is mistaken and I shall come to this point later), as in formally certifying something or making a declaration under outh and so on. In such contexts, the rhetorical point of the statement consists inexplicitly and emphatically committing oneself to one's knowledge-claim. The same can be said about statement (2), except perhaps that on some occasion one can imagine its sounding rather comical, as in someone saying, 'I know that the lady in question is my wife, moreover I believe that she is my wife (!)', (Which only confirms what we have said above).

Statements (3) and (4) are somewhat different. They also involve metorical emphasis, but they point to the important fact that often knowledge and belief are curiously juxtaposed on account of their arising from different viewpoints or perspectives. That is, they are obtained when two people adopting mutually exclusive standpoints with regard to a possible fact are trying to communicate with each other. Imagine a person asking another- most likely with an air of rationalistic condescension - 'Do you really believe that faith-healing works?' or How can you believe that faith-healing work? The other person may relort by saying, 'I know that faith-healing works, therefore I believe it.' Or 'I believe that faith-healing works because I know that it works'. Here the speaker is at pains to assert the rationality of his belief. Or more accurately, he is speaking from two standpoints - his own and that of his interlocutor. He is saying in effects, As far as I am concerned, I know that faith-healing works, but since it appears by ou to be a matter of mere (irrational) belief, you may take it that I believe it'.

At all events, the assumed relation between knowing and believing is obtained. If someone were to seriously ask you, 'I quite understand that that you wrote this paper, but do you believe it?', you would be at a

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loss to understand what the point of the query is, and rather conclude that the person asking the question either does not know or is pretending not to know what knowing means. At all events, your most natural answer would be, Look l know that I wrote this paper, so the question of believing or not believing just that philosophers have d does not arise'. The fact of the matter is that philosophers have drawn too hearly on the fact that it is absurd to say, 'I know that p, but I do not believe that p'. But all it proves is that knowing and disbelieving are incompatible. It does not prove that there is any kind of overlap between knowing and believing. In this connection, Lehrer ⁶ has maintained that, to say 'I do not believe it, I know it'is analogous to saying' 'It is not a house, it is a mansion.' and suggested that just as being a mansion entails being a house, knowing entails believing. I think here Lehrer is oversimplifying things. While it is perfectly true that the apparent inconsistency between knowledge and belief in that statement is rhetorical and not logical, it does not follow that knowledge entails belief. For this to obtain there has to be a stronger relation between the two, such as a part-whole relation or membership - class relation which is not the case here. However, Lehrer's analogy is very interesting in another respect. It is suggestive of the prejudices that form the background of assumptions with regard to the relation between knowledge and belief. The statement 'It is not a house, it is a mansion' when divested of its rhetorical apparel can be seen to derive its consistency from the fact that a mansion is not only a sort of house but a superior sort of house. Its analogy with the statement 'I do not believe it, I know it.' derives its plausibility from the common, unexamined assumption that knowing is a superior soft of believing. The origin of this assumption lies in the fact that in most matters we regard knowing as superior to believing. But there is considerable difference between knowing being superior to believing, and knowing being a superior kind of believing. The former implies that knowing and believing are two distinct members of a species (insofar as the two can be compared as to their relative status as cognitive concepts against some common yardstick) whereas the latter implies that knowing is a member of the species called believing. The latter involves entailment while the former does not.

Austin recognized this point in his 'Other Minds'. But using this point of departure, he develops a view, which in my view rests on a confusion between

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ne prejudices ion between ansion' when ancy from the of house. Its s plausibility perior sort of at matters we le difference g a superior et two distinct their relative eas the latter this point.

ing this point sion between knowing' and 'claiming to know'. He suggests that the locution 'I know' does knowing a some epistemic attitude stronger than belief, but is a performative like I promise'. When I say that I know something, I am performing a kind of epistemic ritual through which I give my word that something is so; I give others epision of the saying that something is so. Here, I think, Austin confuses the epistemic act of knowing with the at least partly social act of laying claim to knowledge. The latter may very well be a performative utterance, but I do not think it makes sense to deny that prior to this performative, there is room for a locution describing the act of knowing After all, it is perfectly possible for someone to ask himself, 'Do I know this' or do I merely belive it?, and answering I know this. Here obviously one is not giving oneself the authority to believe what one is thinking. So, even this view that knowledge is some sort of warranty for belief does not appear convincing, except in the sense that if we believe that someone knows something, then it is only rational to believe that something. This, however, has little to do with the question as to what constitutes knowledge, and whether knowledge implies belief.

Lehrer gives what he believes to be a conclusive proof that knowledge implies belief in his book Knowledge, which deserves attention.8 His approach consists of first showing that if S does not believe that p, then he does not know that p, and on this basis inferring that equivalently, If S knows that p then he believes that p. But I think there is a problem here which needs examination. First, I do not think there is sufficient evidence for assuming that there is a symmetry between "knowing-believing" and "not believing-not knowing, which is required for equivalence. In the case of 'not believing' it has the sense of 'not entertaining the possibility', whereas in the case of believing in the latter statement, believing has the sense of being convinced of the truth. In this sense, S's believing that p may very well be the consequence of his knowing that p. This still does not show that believing is a part of or a condition of knowing. However, this argument of Lehrer illustrates the observation I made at the beginning legarding analysis. By narrowing the scope of a concept or by exploiting its connotations in different contexts, it would certainly be possible to show that a concept implies another. But such an analysis would amount to an arbitrary adjustment of concepts without intuitive grounding and consequently of no intrinsic philosophical interest. It is therefore necessary, as I suggested earlier,

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to insist on the conceptual analysis being guided by a phenomenological analysis so that the concepts we employ are delineated in the light of their grounding in our phenomenological intuitions. I do not propose to engage in such an analysis can provide a corrective for a purely logical analysis.

Phenomenologically, knowing and believing are both relations between consciousness and its objects. If we pay attention to the intentional mode of each, we become aware that they are distinct and that there is no overlap between belief-consciousness and knowledge-consciousness. In the case of knowing there is a consciousness of direct access to the object. There is a sense of presence without mediation. In the case of inferential knowledge the whole chain leading to the object similarly becomes accessible. This directness gives a sense of certitude, of self-justification. In contrast, in the case of belief-consciousness there is a sense of lack of direct access to the object of belief, as if there is a wall between the consciousness and the object. There is a further sense of absence. a sense of unilaterally coming to a conclusion about the object without the complicity of that object. In other words, in belief-consciousness, the object of belief is absent, but in such a way that its absence is framed by the presence of those (intentional) objects which support it, which qualify it for consideration, which render it plausible and credible. Belief, in this sense, is always circumstantial.

This kind of attempt to capture the distinction between belief and knowledge no doubt sounds very hazy and lacking in the reassuring perspicuity characteristic of the defined concepts with which philosophers of the Analytical tradition prefer to operate. But I am not suggesting that this kind of description can or ought to replace traditional conceptual analysis. My point is that those rounded concepts are ultimately grounded in these intuitions, and to that extent the validation of concepts must involve the testimony of the phenomenological experience. In this case, phenomenological intuition offers grounds for questioning the claim that belief is a part or condition of knowledge.

Let us now turn to the justification condition. It is this condition which has proved the most vulnerable, and it would be fair to say that the whole debate regarding the analysis of knowing and in particular the Gettier-type attacks on

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on which le debate ttacks on the traditional analysis are centred on the inadequacy of the justification condition, and motivated by the feeling that this condition needs to be fortified, either through modification or through supplementation. The thrust of my discussion, however, is that we must look at this condition in terms of our broader epistemic concerns in order to prevent the analysis from becoming a sterile exercise.

Let us take an example: S holds a proposition p which says that x (whom Shas never met or known) has three children. There are two persons A and B. who are intrigued by this, and after enquiry find that x indeed has three children. They ask S how he 'knew' that p. S shows them a crystal ball and says that if he thinks of a person while gazing into it, he can see how many children that person has. Now suppose A believes in crystal gazing and B is a hard-nosed sceptic. A maintains that he knows that S knows p, while B maintain that he knows that Sdoes not know p. Let us concentrate on the knowledge-claims of A and B. It is obvious that we can not decide between them without making a judgement regarding S's knowledge-claim. That is, we must judge whether either of them is justified in accepting that particular criterion of justification for qualifying belief as knowledge. In other words, we need to distinguish between the subjective feeling of justification and the objective right to justification. Or more accurately, between believing oneself to be justified in believing something and actually being justfieed in believing some thing, I feel that most discussion on the analysis of knowledge suffers from an insufficient appreciation of this distinction. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that justification of beliefs always refers to, or is grounded in, an already accepted theory of belief-justification as an integral part of an entire epistemology. It also draws attention to the fact that the question of justification is related to the issue of our theories of possible methods of arriving at truths - logicl and factual, as well as to the fact that validation of knowledge is essentially conducted in an intersubjective context. Let us take a brief look at this distinction. Take the case of the subjective belief One's justification: A person believes that he is justified in believing something. How does his belief about, his being jusified get jusified? There seems to be a legress here. Or suppose we say, a person knows that he is justified in believing Something. Here, insofar as we are asserting that he knows, we are maintaining

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that he is justified. But we cannot maintain it without reference to some criteria which in turn refer to the correctness of the belief in question, or which appeal to the fact that a similar procedure of arriving at a belief has been found from past experience to be effective. In either event, there is an indirect reference to knowledge. If we try to avoid all reference to knowledge of the truth of the belief, we would be left in a position where we would have to explain whether there can be justified false beliefs and if they can, what would 'justified' in such a context mean. Any explanation of this would depend on realizing that 'justified' in such contexts exploits the ambiguity due to the two senses of the term, viz. 'justified by the truth of the belief and 'justified by available evidence'. (In fact several of the Gettier-type counter examples do depend in part on this ambiguity). Only the latter avoids circularity but it makes sense only against a backdrop of intersubjective epistemic consensus involving the question of what constitutes adequate or justifying evidence in a given context. My point here is that knowing involves the criteriological question of justification which in turn involves the notion of truth as well. Hence, in the phrase 'justified true belief' the term 'justified' splits into two senses, one of them dependent or parasitic upon the next 'term' true, and the other which appeals to other criteria for its meaning; but this letter sense too becomes part of the circle of these concepts because the criteria to which it appeals in their turn invoke the notion of knowing as a 'given'. And the entire circle of these concepts derive their related meanings together from their being a part of an intersubjective practice of acquiring and accrediting knowledge.

Let me conclude with two points: one regarding the analysis of knowledge and another regarding analysis in general. The first point is that the concept of knowledge cannot be reductively analysed in terms of belief, truth and justification since all such epistemic concepts constitute a network and it is impossible to define or even understand any one of them in isolation from the other concepts. In this respect, the traditional analysis as well as the Gettier type of attacks which accept the essential rightness of that mode of analysis and only doubt its adequacy are equally misdirected.

The other point, relating to analysis in general arises from the first point, and in a sense, is a generalisation of it. All our concepts constitute a structure, an interrelated system. The notion of atomicity of concepts is dangerously

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misleading. No concept is an autonomous unit which can be analysed in terms of its putative constituents, without reference to other concepts. When we dismantle a concept to expose its internal structure, we find that what we take to be its external relations to other concepts are inscribed within that internal structure. Therefore, an analysis which isolates a concept, and engages in a linear, reductive practice can never be helpful in enchancing our understanding. What is required is a structural, systemic mode of analysis which takes not an artificially isolated concept but the total structure of concepts as a unit and proceeds to illuminate the mutual interdependence of the conceptual elements. If we wish to avoid sterility in philosophical practice, we have no choice but to strive for such a mode of analysis.

NOTES

- 1. Gettier, Edmund. 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, 23: 121-123, 1963.
- 2. Lehrer, Keith. Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 48.
- 3. Polanyi, M. Personal Knowledge, Chicago, 1953.
- 4. Kuhn, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1970.
- 5. Here two points deserve mention. The first is with regard to the distinction between 'believing' and 'believing in'.

We believe a proposition. Even when we say that we believe a person, we essentially mean that we believe what he says, the proposition that he utters. On the other hand, we 'believe in' phenomena - the possible existence of phenomena or their putative efficacy. When we say that we believe in a person, we usually mean it in the sense of believing him to be a phenomenon extraordinary enough in some respect for some one else to be sceptical about it. In the light of this distinction, we have to concede that in this context the more exact statement should be 'I believe in faith-healing'. However, important as this distinction is, I don't think it makes much difference to the question of the relation between belief and knowledge: the same relation obtains between 'I believe that faith-healing is efficacious' and 'I know that faith-healing is efficacious'.

The second point is that when belief is juxtapposed to knowledge as a polar opposite as in this context, it is given the connotation of there being something unusual about that particular act of believing - this unusualness may range from 'as yet nothing is known', through 'it is something ultimately unknowable' to 'it is downright crazy to believe it'. This point becomes even more clear if we look at contrasting instances such as 'knowable' versus 'believable' and 'unknowable' versus 'unbelievable'. So, the 'belief' which is given the role of a constituent of knowledge is not identical with the 'belief' that is contrasted with knowledge.

- 6. Lehrer, Keith. Op. Cit., p. 50.
- 7. Austin, J.L. 'Other Minds: Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Vol. XX, 1946, Reprinted in Classics of Analytic Philosophy, Ed. Robert R. Ammerman, Tala McGraw Hill, Bombay, 1965.
- 8. Lehrer, Keith. Op. Cit., pp. 58-59.
- 9. Post-structuralist philosophers such as Derrida have engaged in a radical critique of the fundamental assumptions of the phenomenological project. To wrench an intricate argument from its original discursive context and drastically simplify it, Derrida argues that the notion of 'presence' is a metaphysical illusion. Hence, from his point of view the 'presence' in knowledge-consciousness and the apodicticity that it bestows are the effects of the necessarily metaphysical structurality of all thought. However, this antifoundationalist problematisation of the notions of truth and knowledge does not at any point posit such hierarchisation in which knowledge is the superior pole in the duet of belief-knowledge. On the contrary, dismantling such hierarchies and exposing their conceptual illegitimacy is a crucial part of the post-structuralist programme. Moreover, specifically with regard to the question of belief and knowledge, this theory comes closer to reducing the category of knowledge to the status of belief than to treating belief as a part of or an inferior version of knowledge.

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KARL MARX'S' THESES ON FEUERBACH': TOWARDS AN ANTI - HERMENEUTIC STUDY.

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Marx's' Theses on Feuerbach ' are eleven small notes written in 1845 and theoretically spaced as the mediating text between the 1844 philosophy of alienation and *The German Ideology* (1845 -6) that lays the foundations for the theory of historical materialism. Its importance lies as an epistemically mediating work that articulates the Marxist conception of humanity and praxis, as well as poses the question of the Marxist subject that is able to have dialogue with classical German philosophy in particular and the history of philosophy in general.

Louis Althusser had described the 'Theses on Feuerbach' as the few lightning flashes that announce a major event in philosophy, breaking the night of an idealist past by glimpsing at the new world through the discovery of an unknown continent of knowledge. This metaphor of the lightning flash has since become the signifying zone that lays bare the birth of the new philosophy of Marxism. Yet the paradox is that this new world found in the eleven theses would be concealed in the mist of diametrically opposed and numerous displaced readings.

The principal theme stated is of interpretation and change. Consider Marx: "The philosophers have only interpreted (interpretiert) the world in various ways, the point however is to change (verandern) it." Two distinct epistemes emerge from the site of change: Gramsci's philosophy of praxis and Althusser's different practice of philosophy. Despite the great stress that post

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Marx-Marxism has laid on these theses, the epistemological mechanisms of the 'Theses on Feuerbach' would not be examined.

The task of this paper is to explore the very mechanism of the eleven theses and relate these with Marx's critique of estranged significations. Principally the paper inquires into

- (1) the nature of change, truth and interpretation in the theses,
- (2) The relation between sensuous human activity (sinnlich menschliche Tatigkeit) and reality (die Wirklichkeit) appearing in the object form (der Form des Objekts),
- (3) the structures of theory and praxis announced since the 1843 4 A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction, and
- (4) interpretation as the hermeneutical estranged gaze of reified labour.

There are two displaced sites functioning in post- Marx-Marxism. The first deals with the theory - praxis dialectic. Thus Marxism has hitherto asked what is theory and praxis, but it has tended not to probe in depth on the liberating meaning of Marx's conception of praxis with specific reference to the questions of "form of the *object*" and "sensuous human activity"; and has not asked why Feuerbachian anthropology regards praxis as a *mere* "form of appearance "(*Erscheinungsform*). It has tended not to inquire into knowledge in relation to humanity's *being-with-objects* and consequently why sensuous reality appears in *object-form*. It is at this nodal juncture where one inquires into Marx's assertion that both materialism and idealism displace real action. The 'Theses on Feuerbach" is an examination of the conditions of the possibilities of praxis. In raising the question of praxis this text becomes the mediating zone between the 1844 works on alienation and the production of historical knowledge in Capital.

The second displaced site reads Marx's works according to the logic of self-sufficient endogamy. Thus Althusser in the quest for the exemplaric Marxist text would fracture Marx's works according to the celebrated *epistemological break*. In this Althusserean episteme the theses become the midwife that ruptures the scientific Marx from the embryo of the ideological Marx of 1844. This self

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 $_{\rm sufficient}$ endogamous reading would give rise to two antagonistic schools of $_{\rm thought}$:

- (1) the structuralists who seek the exemplaric text devoid of all Hegelian and Feuerbachian remnants,
- (2) The historicists and humanists, most notably the post-Lukacsian thinkers that read the complete history of Marx's thought in terms of the 1844 problematic of alienation.

It is with reference to these two distinct schools of thought that our analytics of the theses proceeds. In contrast to the endoganeous textuality we present the questions of interpretation and change in Marx's episteme that runs from the 1844 critique of alienation to Capital.

Firstly we refer the question of change (Veränderung) with the logic of the Aufhebung (sublation-supersession - transcendence) and Verwirklichung (realisation) of philosophy stated in the 1843-4 critique of Hegel. We shall stress the two German original terms Aufhebung and Verwirklichung in order to highlight their importance as they emerge from classical German philosophy. It is with this young Marxist theme in mind that three other sites are discovered

- (l) Philosophy as onto-theology and the hegemony of estranged significations in the history of class societies,
- The philosophical discovery of the rational kernel hidden in the mystical shell, explicitly stated in the 1873 Afterword to the second German edition of Capital, VOL. I, where Marx develops his theory of reading Hegel, and,
- The political economy of use-value, value and exchange value that relates itself to the linguistics of referent, signifier and signified, and the Lacanian psycho-analysis of the real, imaginary and symbolic. It is the *combination* of all these sites working together that Marx's conceptions of praxis and change fully reveals itself. It must be noted that a simple binary opposition between theory and praxis is not recognised by Marx. Thus it is not the case that philosophy has hither to dealt with theory, the point is to apply

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this theory into reality. One recalls Marx, "to develop a science by criticism is an altogether different thing from applying an abstract ready made system of logic "5 . Thus there is no instrumental rationality where pure reason is applied onto practical reason. Nor is praxis defined as what the Young Hegelian August Von Cieszkowski called "post-theoretical praxis".

On the other hand, the theory-praxix dialectic is complexly and differentiatedly structured. Its eveness and uneveness works in a combined and disjoint manner. To talk of a "complexly and differentiatedly structured logic" is to stress that there is no even relation between theory and praxis. Both theory and praxis have manifold structures, each continuously in a state of perpetual becoming.

For Marx, knowledge is not posed in terms of the dualistic site of theory and praxis. Neither is it posed as an identity of theory and praxis. On the contrary, the logic of the sites of *complex differences* would be the answer to the questions of praxis and change grounded in the critique of contemplation and interpretation.

The dominant question running in the works of Marx is: how are discourses dominated by idealist signifiers? Now it is imperative to understand Marx's claim in the first thesis that both idealism and materialism are the groundworks of idealist significations. The importance of Hegel and Feuerbach is that nodal points are found where the possibilities of the meaning of idealist significations are decoded. Because discourses are surrounded by the aura of the *ideal*, deconstructing, the *real* is largely left suspended. With Marx's reading of Hegel however, the storm and stress of idealism surface and the tensions and conflicts repressed in the archives of the idealist text surface. Cracks emerge in the master idealist Hegel where the double sites - the mystical shell and rational kernel - are made to function.

Keeping the question of the mystical and rational in mind, we relate change (Veränderung) of the eleventh thesis to the Aufhebung (sublation) and Verwirklichung (realisation) of philosophy. The new philosophy has to be read in terms of this dialectic of aufheben and verwirklichen. Yet we disagre

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with the traditional workings of the sublation-realisation dialectic. Principally his dialectic is understood as the sublation of philosophy in theory and its realisation in practice. Matters may not be all that simple.

On the contrary the logic of complexly - differentiated site shall claim that all four domains outlined above: (1) Aufhebung - Verwirklichung of philosophy. (2) Philosophy as onto - theology, (3) rational - mystical dialectic and (4) the political economy of use-value, value and exchange - value analysed together in its concreteness shall be able to illuminate Marx's conceptions of interpretation and change. Principally the Aufhebung of philosophy is the mediation towards the site of estranged discourses. It studies the genealogy of estranged and contemplative discussive practices.

That is why it is imperative to state the paradox that Marx does not understand philosophy as a mere contemplative text, but an experimenting field where in humanity labours with truth (Wahrheit). In Capital the human being appears as a tool making animal, a being - with - tools. With these tools humanity chips out the untruth clustered together as "form of the object". The epistemological mechanism of the eleven theses and the workings of Marx's production of knowledge follow.

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These principal categories appear:

reality (Wirklichkeit), real (Wirklich) and work (wirken). Reality (Wirklichkeit) is a product of work (wirken). In the first thesis Marx says that malerialism sights reality appearing as "form of the object" and praxis as "form of appearance". Now these two ideal signifiers: object - form and appearance - form displace the subject working with truth. In this object world the subject is devoid of tools. The subject also loses its sensuous activity. The sole reality available in contemplation (Anschauung),

Thus the first thesis traces the chief defect of the history of materialism, feuerbach included, as presenting " the thing (Gegenstand), reality (Wirklichkeit), Sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit) only in the form of the

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object (Form des Objekts) or of contemplation (Anschauung), but not subject ively. " 8 In this estranged dilentate the subject regress into the " imaginary world" (4th thesis) of " abstract thinking " (5th thesis). The world is now the world of contemplation and object (Objekt) appearance (Schein) and filth (Schmutz) (1st thesis)

In this paradoxical field Marx works out his epistemology. The episteme of the theses not only chides philosophy for idle theoretism and calling them to arm themselves with the weapons of praxis. This anti - hermeneutic work claims that the very mode of philosophy is constituted within idealist significations. Strange then that orthodox Marxism would follow the logic of idealist significations. Engel's Feuerbach and the End of classical German Philosophy and the works of Plekhenov shall be laying the foundations of idealogical philosophies within Marxism. Ideological philosophies operate in terms of an inward exchange between signifier and signified. The historical referent is missing from ideological philosophy. Thus questions are raised in terms of Being - Consciousness- Matter-Substance-Presence etc. Its chief functions are antihistorical hypostatisations and transfigurations. Althusser had understood this issue and called it "philosophical ideology". 9

On the other hand the eleventh thesis shows a rigorous difference between ideological philosophy and historical mutations. A historical mutation is that (to recall Walter Benjamin) which "blows open the continuum of history". And this mode of knowledge is constituted within both pure and practical reason. To recall the second thesis, in praxis the truth (Wahreit) must be proved. There are two significant parts of this thesis:

- (1) objective truth (gegenstandliche Wahrheit) is a question of praxis, and
- (2) isolating the question of the reality (Wirklichkeit) or non-reality of thinking from praxis is a scholastic question (scholastische Frage). 10

From both these aspects of the second thesis it is clear that Marx is working on the questions of objectivity and praxis in Hegel and Feuerbach. Both objectivity and praxis are liberative categories for Marx. Whilst both these are raised by Hegel and Feuerbach they relapse as estranged signifiers. On the other hand Marx consistently mentions deconstructing the reified referent before

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having dialogue with estranged signifiers located as the "purely scholastic question". And Marx claims in 1844 that this grand deconstructionst gesture is carried out in the paradigm of an expressionist philosophy. Thus the Marxis "objective" and "praxis" are moulded in the labour of expressionism. In section III we shall highlight Marx's philosophy of expressionism.

On the other hand the non-expressive site can only be an estranged scholastic possibility. It is here that we must emphasie that Marx is drawing out lines of demarcation in order to demonstrate the difference between the emancipatory and the reified. Whilst sensuousness, objectivity and praxis are liberative; scholasticism and interpretation are enslaved reifications.

In the third fourth and fifth thesis Marx shows how a schism takes place in which philosophical arguments are constituted in duplicated, imaginary and abstract worlds. Interpretation is the culmination of the logic of this duplicated imaginary. In this strategic zone one recalls another grand gesture - this time from The German Ideology - where philosophy is said to have no history. 11

It was Althusser who had worked on this irony. Recall Althusser: philosophy is nothing but repetition of two fundamental tendencies (materialism/idealism). Philosophy is consequently the Gestaltung of repetition: "history of philosophy is merely the history of these forms...... to become a game for nothing. Ultimately, philosopy has no history, philosophy is that strange theoretical site where really nothing happens, nothing but this repetition of nothing." As philosophy leads nowhere, Althusser calls it (after Dietzgen and Heidegger) Holzwege: Paths leading nowhere.

That is why the young Marx in 1843-4 wrote that the Aufhebung of this pathless philosophy cannot be act of negation of philosophy by merely uttering angry phrases and turning one's back on philosophy. The Aufhebung is carried out through the act of "practical overturning" (praktischen Umsturz). This overturning method is a process carried out in actually. It dismantles the imaginary and symbolic worlds to reach the concealed archaeological site of sensuous reality.

Despite Derrida's criticism of translating Umsturz as "subversion" instead of the traditional rendering of "overturning" 14 , one ought to stress the

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subvertive aspects in Marx's notion of "real, sensuous activity" (1st thesis) Real action thus qualifies Marx's other great methodological remark of making Hegel stand on his feet. When Marx works out Feuerbach's Umkehrungsmethode as a real critique of idealsit significations the epistemic aspects of inversion, transformation, overturning, subversion are clearly outlined.

It is in this way that the praxical aspect of real sensuous activity comes to the forefront. The master idealist Hegel has to be deconstructed on the site of real praxis. Real praxis claims that the battle has to be fought not with abstract theoria but with alienated praxis. Thus in 1843 Marx distinguishes two forms of praxis 15: alienated (constituted in the binding zones of value and exchange - value, signifier and signified, imaginary and symbolic) and de-alienated (use - value, referent and the real).

In this way Marx challanges the dualistic schizzy splitting of discourses into theory and praxis. On the other hand Marx insists that philosophy is the narrative of fragmentation and splits. Hegel earlier had taken up the challenge of reading this story of the split (Spaltung). In fact he celebrates this Spaltung. But the celebration of this act is constituted within the theory of contradiction (Widerspruch) that lives in the life- world of the "whole".

For Marx the principal question is: how does one avoid all these fractured estranged discourses without regressing into monistic metaphysics? How is the dream world of the Holzwege overcome? What is the nature of the subject postulated in the first thesis when Marx claims that materialism has ignored subjectivity? And why does this paper claim that the subject found by hermeneutics is an infantile disordered subject more akin to Judge Schreber's disjunctive hallucinations as outlined by Freud's case study on psychosis? 16

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Hermeneutics is essentially the critique of the "structure dominated problematic. For example the structuralist anthropologist Levi - Strauss talks of a "complete system". a "complete system" to be presented in terms of "Unconscious infrastructure" and "general I = "17" "and "general laws". 17 Likewise Piaget says that the concept structure signification as "self - regulation." a "self - regulating "system that denotes three key ideas, (1) totality, (2) MURZBAN JAL.

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dominated ss talks of astructure e signifies tality, (2) transformation, and (3) self-regulation. ¹⁸ The logic of structuralism become even more transparent when one considers Durkheim who talks of considering "Social facts as things", and the most important characteristics of a "thing" is the impossibility of its modification by a single effort of the will. In fact these "things" determined the will "from without; they are moulds in which actions are inevitably shaped". ¹⁹

Now these methodological remarks are important in understanding: how the classical hermeneutics of Schleirmacher, Dilthey and Weber, would influence Feuerbach, Lukacs and Habermas would start from a critique of abstract structures, only to follow the pattern of these abstractions.

Even post-Marxism poses the question of praxis in abstract terms. On the one hand one wants to put " the will at the base of philosophy " (Gramsci), on the other hand one understnads the will as the " bearer " (Träger) of the scientific structures of history: productive forces-relations of production (Althusser).

In contemporary discourses this aporia can be traced to Dilthey who makes a methodological distinction between the cultural sciences (Geistewissenschaften) and the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften), Whilst the latter is said to deal with law like regularities in the natural world, it is the task of the Geistewissenshaften to grasp the meaning of the human life - world. Likewise Dilthey's colleague in the Heidelburg School, Weber introduced the method of the Verstehen hermeneutic as the discursive practice for sociology. Thus sociology is an "interpretative understanding of social action." Further: in "'action' is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches subjective meaning to it." 20

Yet this subject and consequent subjective meanings emerging thereafter would not be a redeeming factor that would be able to critique the reification of positivism.

On the contrary the heremeneutical subject would be a transcendent subject refusing to encounter the real world. The subject and the real world would lie in diametrically opposed worlds of Geist and Nature. The interpretive subject is thus different from the real sensuous subject of Marx. In 1844 Marx

had outlined his conception of the subject as an "objective being" (gegenstandliche Wesen), a being that objectifies itself in the world²¹. The subject diffined as an objective being does not epistemologically split itself from the world, whether in the structuralists sense of reading "history as a process without a subject", positivism's search for "objective laws independent of the subject" or the hermenutical Geistewissenschaften's solipsist closure of the subject.

It is at this nodal point where one outlines the mechanisms that explain how interpretation has become the dominant discourse in the history of philosophy. Interpretation operates on the site of the "alien object" (fremde Gegenstand) not the "real object", thus its mode of functioning is at the level of "estranged objectivity " (entfremdeten Gegenstandlichkeit) and not at the level of "objectivity as such " (Gegenstandlichkeit als solcher). 22

For Marx the realm of the objectivity does not signify a "structure without a subject " but the site of expressionism. In 1844 Marx draws this equation: objective (gegenstandlich) = site of expression (Auperung). That is why in Section II of this paper we claimed that Marx interpellates the discourses of Hegel and Feuerbach with the philosophy of expressionism. When one sutures the first two theses stating the questions of "objective activity" and "objective truth" with the 1844 philosophy of expressionism we develop the above equation to: objective = expression = praxis site of humanity itself. On the other hand there is the silent zone of the interpretative text which negates the above equation and thus postulates: alien objectity = repression = contemplation = site of dehumanisation.

In the eleventh thesis Marx is clear that interpretative discourses can only emerge from the splitting of the world into either a subjectless structure or structurless subject. That is why Marx would insist that "objectivity "does not signify the site of a reality that is "independent "(Selbständing) of the mind, where the estranged mind interprets an independent world. On the other hand Marx demonstrates how the interpretative text signifies the schizzy reflection of estranged discourses, thus merely miming the estranged signifier. Interpretation consequently becomes a reflection of a reflection, a copy of a copy, a gaze of a gaze. It is a primitive accumulation of reified gazes. That is why the first thesis claims that in the interpretative zone, knowledge appears in object (bjekt) form.

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Marx approaches philosophy not in terms of transcedent signifing systems, but in terms of the analysis of the historical being-in-the-world. This is the way the ideological philosophical questions of superstructural abstractions are deconstructed in the base of the abstractions. In the fourth thesis Marx calls these questions "self - alienated "(Selbstent - fremdung). Whilst the base is the wordly foundation (Weltliche Grundlage) understood in terms of its self-cleavage (Selbstzerrissenheit) and self -contradictoriness Sichselbstwidersprechen), the solution is found in what Marx calls "revolutionized becoming "(revolutioniert werden)²³, In the site of this revolutionized becoming Marx examines the conditions for the emergence of emancipatory praxis.

The 'Theses on Feuerbach' is the strategic zone in which the sublation (Aufhebung) of Hegel and Feuerbach is made possible, highlighted by the emancipatory significance of Marxist praxis. When it is remarked that the point is to change (verändern) the world, one explores the genealogy of praxis, Veranderung and Aufhebung. Of great importance are the epistemic sites created that show how a Marxist Aufhebung and Werden are different from the Hegelian logic, and what Marx means by a materialist conception of history that is different from a traditional materialism and idealism.

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DESCARTES: EPITOME OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

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1. The Tradtion

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(a) The publication of Newton's *Principia* in 1687 inaugurated the era of supremacy of science. But the great scientific revolution had been accomplished in the first half of that century. For, it was during that period that the scientific thought was systematically organised and given its now-familiar shape. Descarte's (1596 - 1650) life spans those glorious fifty years.

An incalculable transformation in man's view of the world and his relationship with nature occurred in that wonderful half century. The scientific thought has, since then, been dominating our intellect completely. It is now well nigh impossible to imagine that there once was a totally different worldview and a foolproof and comprehensive Philosophy. The domination of this per-scientific world-view was so pervasive that the struggle of the incipient scientific thought against it appeared as hopeless as that of a tender blade of gass against a slab of stone.

(b) The tradition pictured the man as being central to, the scheme of hings. His immediate surrounding, the nature, was open to his direct, scrutiny and ready to serve his ends. The prima facie experience of nature, full with colour, fragrance, sound, warmth, and beauty was authentic and indubitable. There was no need to go behind it. His farther surrounding was the finite cosmos, which revolved round the earth, man's abode, with its stars and planets.

Science changed all this. The immediate experience of nature with its tolours, fragrance, sound, and warmth was a subterfuge which hid the real

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working of nature. One had to go beyond it and discover the mathematical formulae that governed the process of nature. Nature was immediate yet apar and did not serve man. His farther surrounding was an infinite universe without any centre. Man occupied an insignificant planet which orbited round a minor star called the Sun. Nature and nature's processes, the universe and its vast clockwork went on relentlessly paying the least heed to man and his aspirations.

This immense change in outlook developed over two-hundred years, and several generations of thinkers contributed to it. Descartes was a prominent leader in the final phase of the new movement. Like many of his contemporaries, he worked in many areas from optics to anatomy and from mathematics to metaphysics. But his immortal fame rests on the well-organised and succinct presentation of the scientific revolution in his such mature writings as The Principles of Philosophy. Here we are going to appraise Descartes as an epitome of the scientific revolution.

2. The Classical Thought in the Middle Ages:

(a) Extreme religiosity and repressive Christian dogmatism are characteristics of the society of the middle ages. It is, therefore, puzzling to find that the scholastic education was saturated with the Greek Philosophy which was a product of a pagan civilization. The puzzle, however, becomes less inscrutable when we realise that the classical philosophy was skillfully appropriated by the Church very early after Christianity reached Europe.

The early priests believed in the Gospel; but they wanted to justify their belief on rational grounds in their debates with non-Christians. They, therefore, had to study the Greek philosophy to achieve their polemical ends. St. Augustine (354-430) is one of the first theologians who attempted a synthesis of Christian doctrines with Platonism and neo-Platonism¹.

The excuse was that they were grafting on the Christian belief those sprouts of Greek philosophy that were worth preserving.

Until the twelfth century, Christianity did not have a worthwhile contact with Aristotle's thought and the Christian philosophy was more Platonic and neo-Platonic. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Aristotle's writings became fully available in Latin translations and many of the most famous exponents of

 $_{Scholasticism}$ set themselves the task of achieving a synthesis of Aristotle's $_{philosophy}$ and the Christian doctrine. The most famous of these Aristotelian $_{Scholars}$ is Thomas Aquinas 2 .

(b) However, very few read Aristotle in the original or even in Latin translation. Much of the scholarship was based on commentaries written by medieval scholars like Toletus (1532 - 1596), Fonseca (1528 - 1599) and by the Faculty of the University of Coimbra in Portugal. Many of the commentaries put so free a construction on the original Aristotelian doctrine that it verged on distortion³. Descartes observes "they (i.e, commentators) frequently corrupted the sense of his writings and attributed to him (i.e, Aristotle) various opinions which he would not recognise as his own were he now to return to the world" 4.

The school curricula were exclusively based on Aristotle's teachings. Out of ten courses, five used Aristotle's treatises as texts. Thus the alumni of the schools were soaked in Aristotleian philosophy. Naturally, most of them became staunch followers of Aristotle and even those who were critical of Aristotle used him as the reference point to measure their divergence. Descartes observe, "Those who did not follow him (i.e, Aristotle), among whom are to be found many of the greatest minds, did not yet escape being imbued with his opinions in their youth, as those from the staple of instruction in the schools" 5.

3. The Traditional World-View:

(a) The tradition had a well-knit set of theories which explained everything from the structure of the cosmos to the motion of a falling stone. Moreover, these theories conformed to immediate experience. Thus, it was consistent with experience to ascribe motion to planets and stars and to keep the earth stationary. Both those features of the traditional cosmology, namely, a well-woven scheme of ideas and their conformity with experience, made it a formidable target to its opponents. Here we shall mainly discuss those parts of the tradition that deal with motion.

According to the tradition the cosmos was a series of spheres centred on the stationary earth. The sphere nearest to the earth contained the moon and the farthest sphere that formed the boundary of the cosmos was studded with the fixed stars. The space between the lunar sphere and the boundary was called

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the celestial sphere; while the space enclosed by the lunar sphere was called the terrestrial sphere.

In the celestial sphere were the spherical shells on which were studded the planets, namely, the Mercury, the Venus, the Sun, the Mars, the Jupiter, and the Saturn. The space between the planetary spheres and the boundary sphere was filled with what were called the reagent spheres. The boundary sphere was kept rotating by God and the reagent spheres carried that motion to planetary spheres. All celestial bodies were formed of 'the fifth element', which was a type of matter that was transparent and weightless.

The matter in the terrestrial sphere comprised four elements, namely, the earth, water, air, and fire. The earth stood at the centre and was enveloped in layers of water, air and fire, in that order. Thus, matter in the cosmos was of five types, and each type of matter had an assigned or natural place.

(b) Motion in the sense of displacement of a body was called the local motion' and constitued just an instance of the wider concept of motion which was defined as the actualisation of that which was potentially as such⁽⁶⁾. Thus, education of a child, blooming of a bud, and fall of a stone were all instances of motion (in this wider sense), while the last instance was of local motion.

The placing of local motion in the locus of the wider concept distorted it in several directions. Firstly, motion is taken as a process of change and, therefore, it becomes transient and terminable. Secondly, a change is either due to an internal source as in the case of blooming of a bud or may be due to an external as in the case of schooling of a child. The same applies to local motion also. Thirdly, change produces a transformation in the body that undergoes a change and, therefore, the local motion is also expected to produce a change in the body that is displaced. Hence, the model for motion, including the local motion, is biological and not mechanical ⁷.

Let us see what kind of understanding there can be of a local motion, like the fall of a stone, in this set-up. When a stone falls its motion is terminable on reaching the ground. It is a process which exhausts when the stone reaches its assigned position. The source of motion is inside the body of the stone, namely, its desire to regain the natural position. The motion produces a change

in the body for the desire to regain the assigned position that resided in the body is removed at the end of the motion.

The fall is a natural motion and the stone rests permanently on the ground, unless it is removed by an external cause. The motion thus generated is a violent motion. In this case, too, as in the case of natural motion, the source of motion must act in contact with the body in motion, e.g. in the case of a flying kite, the breeze acts in contact with the kite.

In studying local motion in this set-up we are more interested in the source of motion than in the speed or path of motion, i.e., we are interested in kinetics and not in kinematics. Further, what attracts our attention more is the change that occurs in the body and not the change in location.

(c) We have seen that originally the Christian Tradition was strongly influenced by the neo-Platonism. Neo-Platonism had a potent component of Pythagorean philosophy, which emphasized that the world was made of numbers and physical phenomena could be expressed in terms of mathematics ⁸. But in the later middle ages Christianity became thoroughly informed by Aristotelian philosophy, and then the attitude of the tradition to mathematics became very ambiguous.

Aristotle postulates three classes of entities. Physical entities lead an independent existence but are subject to change. Metaphysical entities have independent existence and are unchanging. Mathematics studies objects that are abstracted from sensible things. Such objects have dependent existence and are immutable. Principles governing entities belonging to one genus cannot be expressed in terms of the principles that govern entities in another genus. hence, mathematics cannot be used to express physical phenomena.

Every corporeal body comprises matter and form, and physics studies both. The form gives the body its qualities such as colour, fragrance, weight, shape, etc. Therefore, physics studies material body with all its properties. Mathematical concepts are incapable of capturing a body with all its physical properties. In particular, mathematics cannot explain qualities and motion of a body for "there is no quality and no motion in the timeless realm of figure and humber" 9

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Nevertheless, Aristotle proposes a category of mixed and subordinate sciences such as optics, where one may use the geometrical principles to study the path of light. Other sciences that fall in this category are harmonics and astronomy⁽¹⁰⁾.

4. The Revolution:

(a) Descartes' *Principles of philosophy* was published in 1644. These principles succinctly summarise the scientific thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The principal architects of the scientific thought were the great thinkers like Copernicus (1473 - 1543), Kepler (1571 - 1630), and Galileo (1564 - 1642). But several less known figures like Gassendi (1592 - 1655), Mersenne (1588 - 1648), and Beeckman (1588 - 1637) also made significant contribution to the development of science.

The main theme of the new thought was the concept of motion. There were three approaches to the centrality of this concept. Firstly, the study of physics was reduced to the study of motion. Secondly, the motion was shom of its trappings which it had acquired as a part of the wider concept of change. Thirdly, the motion became expressible in mathematical terms, and this set the trend for subsequent development.

(b) The scientific thought presented a rival world-view right at its inception. The Copernican theory replaced the finite cosmos by the infinite universe and, instead of the earth, took the Sun and the fixed stars as its points of reference. The cumbersome system of planetic spheres and reagents had been replaced by equally complicated system of epicycles and equants. It now gave way to elliptical orbits of planets. The new world-view had devastating implications for the traditional conception of motion and these implications are methodically worked out by Descartes.

In the twenty-first principle Descartes declares "the extension of the world is indefinite". This means that the universe has no centre and elements have no assigned places. In the twenty-second principle Descartes asserts "the matter of heavens and earth is the same". This repudiates the traditional division of the world in the celestial and the terrestrial spheres. It means that the motion of the celestial bodies and of the terrestrial ones are at par.

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According to the tradition, physics was concerned with the nature, i.e. the matter and the forms of corporeal bodies. under the new theory form alone important, since there was only one kind of matter. Descartes states in the twenty-third principle that the diversity of form is due to the motion of matter. "All properties of matter....can arise from the motion of its parts." 13 Thus, the central theme of physics is the study of motion.

(c) Tradition regarded the local motion, i.e. the displacement of a body, as an instance of change. Descartes dismisses this wider conception and says that by motion he understands "nothing more than the action by which a body passes from one place to another". 14 The classification of motion into natural and violent motions loses its rationale when the notion of the assigned place of an element is rejected. Since motion is only the displacement of body and not a change in it, motion is treated as a mechanical phenomenon and not as a biological process.

A consequence of this reasoning is that *motion and rest* become parallel phenomena. Motion is no longer a process, in that it does not exhaust on its own. If a motion ends, then there must be an external source for it. The same is true of rest. Rest does not end on its own; there is some external source that moves a body out of rest. It means that rest and motion are states of a body, and a body does not change its state on its own. This is the famous law of inertia, which Descartes states as the thirty-seventh principle.

An objection to the Copernican theory was that it did not mention the source that kept the planets moving round the Sun. The tradition had worked out the source of the motion of planets round the earth, to God. The law of inertia provides a neat answer to the objection against the Copernican theory. The planets move because there is no source that stopes them. In fact the question of source of motion becomes insignificant under the new dispensation. Instead of kinetics it is the kinematics of motion that assumes importance. Descartes takes both, the circular as well as the rectilinear paths as the paths of inertial motion.

5. Primacy of Mathematics:

(a) The medieval tradition originally carried the stamp of neo-Platonism.

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Neo-Platonism had a kind of mysticism at its core and this mysticism was in close affinity with the belief of the Pythagoreans in the mathematical structure of the world. It was therefore, believed that mathematics was the key to understanding of the world. 17

Later, the Christianity appropriated the Aristotelian philosophy, and the neo-Platonist slant in the early tradition disappeared. Mathematics was replaced by logic. In the curricula of schools, logic formed an important part. Logic was supposed to serve two purposes. One, it was a science of demonstration, that is, of proving conclusions from the premises. It was believed that the syllogism was an instrument of deriving factually new information. Two, logic was supposed to provide a nomative theory of thought. Commentators on Aristotle regarded it as a psychological theory giving an account of how mind should function. 18

In spite of the oficial suppression of the original mathematical current in the tradition, several schools in Europe had kept the belief in mathematics alive. ¹⁹ The scientific thought that began with the Copernican theory was informed by this faith in mathematics. Indeed, there was no basis for the postulation of a heliocentric universe and for Kepler's laws of planetary orbits except that they displayed a beautiful mathematical harmony. There was no empirical evidence that supported the heliocentrism.

Galileo was a great exponent of mathematical demonstrations of physical phenomena. He continuously expressed his astonishment at how natural events followed principles of geometry. ²⁰ Galileo created the mathematical science of local motion. For him it was "a simple and natural extension of the exact mathematical method to a field of somewhat difficult mechanical relations". ²¹

(b) We have noted earlier the two objections that tradition raised against the use of mathematics in physics. The first was that the mathematical concepts were inadequate to capture the qualities in corporeal bodies. Galileo observes that a distinction must be made between that which is absolute, objective, immutable, and mathematical on the one hand, and that which is relative, subjective, fluctuating, and sensible, on the other. He then declares that only the former can be the object of knowledge. Number, figure, magnitude, position.

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Descartes: Epitome of Scientific Revolution

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and motion are intrinsic to corporeal bodies, and hence, the primary qualities.²² Descartes puts this in a nutshell when he states: "the nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, colour, and the like, but in extension alone".²³

The second objection was that the subject matters of mathematics and physics belonged to different genera. Descartes meets this objection by saying sall sciences form an organic unity and that all must be studied together and by amethod that applies to all. This method must be that of mathematics". ²⁴ In the sixty-fourth principle, Descartes emphatically states that in physics one need not use any principles other than those of mathematics.

Not only the underlying structure of the world was mathematical but the method of discovering facts was also mathematical. In this connection Galileo and Descartes repeatedly express their dissatisfaction with logic, especially with that logic that was taught in schools. For logic merely "teaches the mode of expounding to others what we already know". The new facts can be discovered only by the mathematical method. The new facts can be discovered only by the mathematical method.

(c) The scientific revolution accorded primacy to mathematics. It repudiated the authenticity of experience if it was not consistent with mathematical calculations. The qualities of bodies like, fragrance, colour, or laste were ignored, and only extension was declared as essential, because it was amenable to mathematical treatment. One may rightly ask if we are justified in paying so much of price to buy mathematical consistency. Is mathematics more tredible than experience?

The imdubitability of mathematics was questioned by Descartes also in his early researches in mathematics. The problem was one of expressing solution of an algebraic equation in terms of a line-length. A line-length was "clear and distinct", and, hence, indubitable. But Descartes found that except in very simlple cases it was not possible to express a solution of an equation as a line length.²⁷

There was a deeper objection, too. It may be convenient and fruitful to issume that there is a mathematical structure that underlies the phenomena. In implifies calculations and presents a harmonious picture of the universe. But this does not mean that the world is in fact heliocentric. It will be intellectual

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arrogance to insist that, because we understand the world in mathematical terms.

God must have made it so.

Descartes himself entertained such an objection. God could have created exactly the same world as the one we have and yet have made different things true in it. As an illustration he suggests "God was free not to make it true that the radii of the circle are equal." ²⁸

These objections became alarmingly real when Galileo was condemned in 1633 by the Church for holding heliocentrism as factually true instead of as a mere expediency. Descartes, therefore, turned to metaphysics for the justification of science.

6. Justification of Science:

(a) Right from antiquity there had been two opposite attitudes to knowledge. The justifictionists maintained that there was indubitable knowledge and man could attain it. This was countered by the sceptics by a two-fold argument: (i) There was no indubitable knowledge; and (ii) if there was any, it was not attainable. By the seventeenth century the Christianity had answered the first part of the sceptic doubt. Since God created the world in a particular way, He had the objective knowledge of the world. The Church had the answer to the second part also. Though the difference between God's knowledge and rational mode of inquiry was unbridgeable, one could reach it through faith. This latter answer was a complete antithesis of scientific revolution.

Science had discarded the prima facie experience as untrustworthy. It was the mathematical formulations of the experience that carried conviction. Descartes had started with the belief that mathematical ideas were clear and distinct. But this belief suffered a set-back when he failed to express solutions of an equation as line-lengths. Further, though mathematical formulation of the world might appear convincing to us, there was no reason to believe that it conformed to the actual structure of the world. It was, therefore, necessary to find a justification for the scientific enterprise.

(b) We can give here only a brief outline of the arguments that Descartes advances to meet this difficulty. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, a full

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sketch of the argument will take much space; and, secondly, we are familiar with it because it informs our scientific activity even today.

The criterion that Descartes applies to test the veracity of a knowledge claim is of clarity and distinctness. An idea is clear when it lets itself be seen, but it is distinct when it thrusts itself upon our attention, 29 i.e., when it is convincing. This criterion has a long and complicated pedigree in the tradition. Aristotle believed that there was a natural way of functioning of our sense organs, which revealed the nature of the world to us. By the seventeenth century this doctrine came to be described as the "natural light of reason". Descartes adopted it as the criterion of clarity and distinctness. An idea was indubitable if it was perceived clearly and distinctly.

But this criterion was under cloud now; because, what we may find clear and distinct in the natural light of reason, may not objectively exist. For, our ideas may not be in conformity with God's design.

(c) Descartes begins by taking on the sceptics. Let us start by doubting each and every opinion. But this doubting involves one indubitable fact, namely, that there is someone who doubts. "Accordingly, the knowledge that I think, therfore I am is in fact the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophises orderly". This entity I which thinks, is not a corporeal body. It is the thinking mind.

The thinking mind reviews all the different ideas it has. When it starts to explore the idea of perfection, it concludes that the mind itself is not the most perfect; for, to know is more perfect than to doubt. Now the mind by itself cannot contemplate of something more perfect than itself, it can only think of something less perfect than itself. therefore, there is something more perfect than the mind that gives the mind this idea. This something is God, the most perfect. Because, He is the most perfect, He exists.

God gives us the sense organs and through it the knowledge of the world. "He is absolutely veracious and the source of all light, so that it is repugnant for Him to deceive us". Therefore, "all that we clearly perceive is true" 31 Thus God is the guarantor of the criterion of clarity and distinctness. True, we do make errors and our knowledge of the world is incomplete. But

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our errors are due to our privations and our eagerness to pass judgments before we have clear and distinct idea of a phenomenon, while incompleteness of our knowledge is due to our finiteness and God's infiniteness. But, in spile these shortcomings, there is hope. We have clear and distinct ideas about some phenomena and we can build upon this knowledge. Though we may never attain complete knowledge, there is a possibility of progressing towards in indefinitely.

(d) In this study of Descartes we had to pass over some of his important contributions to mathematics, to optics, and, the most important, the separation of mind from body. We also ignored some of his ideas, such as his theory of vortices, which were later proved to be erroneous.

My intention was to appraise Descartes as an epitome of the scientific revolution. I picked up a few prominent ideas in Descartes' philosophy such as the new world-view, the distinction between primary and secondary properties, the primacy of mathematics, and the criterion of clarity and distinctness, and showed that these ideas can be used as milestones in mapping the development of the scientific revolution.

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THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL ANALOGY IN PHYSICAL SCIENCES: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

R. S. KAUSHAL

1. Introduction

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Broadly speaking the concepts, feelings or explanations of certain phenomena in Nature, if cannot be put to a scientific test through experimentation, remain subjective in character in spite of their logical foundation. On the other hand, this is also not untrue that every concept, feeling or explanation can be put to a scientific test. May be large varieties but only a countable number of phenomena in Nature undergo this kind of test and thereby constitute the so called "objective" sciences. With regard to the understanding of these natural phenomena the use of models and analogies in recent years has become unavoidable in view of the degree of success achieved in their scientific tests. Sometimes in diverse fields and by using alternative methods. In view of the fact that these models and analogies constitute a scientific theory and work well only within certain set of assumptions or postulates (may be small or large in number). it remains questionable as to what extent they can provide the absolute (ultimate) reality in Nature even in the asymptotic limit.

As a matter of fact there remains an un-understood element (hidden in the murky depth of ideas) of truth in the complete understanding of these phenomena mainly due to the limitations either on the scientific laws or on the capabilities of human faculties of understanding. In this regard, while the first category of limitations can be attributed to the acceptance by a (scientific) community and the second to an individual, they both have a common origin in the background. It is only in this spirit the present philosophical survey of the

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role of structural analogy in human understanding of physical sciences is carried out. In fact these two categories of limitations. in general, respectively suggestive the concept of "outer" and "inner" domains with reference to the human facilities of understanding and subsequently that of the "objective" and "subjective" components of the ultimate absolute reality.

In general, the analogy means some kind of mental construct which is useful in understanding the "unknown" in terms of the "known". Literally, the word "analogy" means similarity or parallelism. This similarity could be of just a concept, or of a sequence of concepts, or of a description through a model or of the phenomenon as a whole. Further, these analogies could be well within the same discipline or in different disciplines of knowledge. As far as the meaning of the structural analogy is concerned, to some extent, the same can be attributed to the realization of space, time and geometry-which basically are the creations of human consciousness. Note that since the human consciousness is not only different for different human beings but also of varying degree (i.e. of relative nature) even for the same individual, these realizations of space, time and geometry could be different at different levels of human faculties of understanding.

Once the concepts of space, time and geometry are created with reference to the "outer" world and at the level of senses of knowledge and action or at the level of biological body, they are settled or stored into the inner essences of life (i.e., at the level of mind, intellect and ego). These concepts once stored, are used again to understand or to describe the outer world through the principles of action -at-a-time and/or action-at-a-distance. Once the information about or the description of a natural phenomenon goes in, in the first stage, it comes out again in the second stage through the analogies as the degree of consciousness by this time has been changed due to the change either of the being (human or otherwise) or of the realizing faculty of the same being. In going information may correspond to the "known" situation where as the one coming out will generally correspond to the "unknown" situation. The first being can be termed as the "user" and the second one as the "analyser" of the structural analogy.

The human being, while realizing the realities of the inner and ouler worlds, plays a dual role in the sense that it also acts as a describer of these

worlds. As a matter of fact for the purposes of understanding the role of structural analogy a philosophical understanding of the human being himself is essential. The Indian philosophy has thrown a lot of light on this aspect and its modern version² could be further helpful in this regard.

The concept of structural analogy is intricately interwoven in different hranches of science and engineering. This concept is capable of providing not only new laws but also new disciplines and horizons of knowledge. With a view to exploring the role of this important concept in objective sciences in general and in physics in particular, in this article we first make a brief survey of some representative examples to this effect and then suggest a possible framework within which the merit of these examples of structural analogy can be analysed in a quite general manner.

In the next two Sections, we highlight some typical demonstrative examples of structural analogy from the fields of mathematics and mathematical and physical sciences. In Sect. 4. we look for the basic contents of a structural analogy which help not only in defining its merit but also suggests a way to classify the examples of structural analogies at a somewhat deeper level. Sect. 5 is devoted to analyses, within this framework, the process of abstraction (i.e. the step by step effort to putting the available knowledge in a nut-shell) which has been prevailing through all these years in both mathematics and physics. The change of contents taking place in the process of using a structural analogy, is also discussed in this Section. The extent to which a given structural analogy can be exploited while using the same for an "unknown" situation, in fact, depends upon the degree of development of faculties of understanding of the analyser. This fact is demonstrated by analysing a few examples in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7, various manifestations of the structural analogy in the form of symmetries and models are presented. Finally, the ideas are summarized and the question of ultimate (absolute) truth is discussed in Sect. 8.

2. Examples of Structural Analogy in Mathematics

While the mathematical structures and constructs have an inherent beauty in their own right in the abstract sense, their applications to various disciplines in mathematical sciences are mainly through the concept of structural

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analogy. Here we cite some examples from both pure and applied mathematics and make some possible remarks towards their applications in sciences.

2.1 Pure Mathematics

In the language of set theory one can define an abstract system by introducing³ in addition to the elements of the set, the concepts of relations, operation, postulates, definitions, theorems etc.. Depending upon the nature of these latter concepts, the given abstract system is identified with other mathematical systems like field, vector space, group, topology, ring etc. These constructs are liberally used in applied mathematics and in mathematical sciences mainly through the structural analogies and finally undergo to their experimental tests and that too sometimes in completely disconnected disciplines.

While these ideas are applicable as such to a variety of situations in various disciplines of mathematics through the structural analogy, some of the constructs provide foundations to several branches of mathematical sciences. For example, the applications of the concepts of group in the form of Lie groups, vector space in the form of Hilbert and Banach spaces are well known in quantum mechanics and (physical) field theories. For that matter, various types of algebras and geometries also have their origin in these abstract systems. In fact, the knowledge of groups developed in an abstract form, when applied to a physical situation through the structural analogy gives rise to a variety of new atomic and molecular spectral lines, nuclear states, crystal symmetries, elementary particles and resonances, and unification of fundamental interactions which are easily verifiable in the experiments performed in these disconnected areas. Sometimes even the gaps appearing in the systematics in the properties and features, can be filled on the basis of group theoretical predictions, While we postpone the details to the next Section, it should be noted here that indeed all this happens through the concept of structural analogy.

2.2 Applied Mathematics

Some of the abstract constructs of pure mathematics mentioned above are further reduced and specialized to the level of their wide applicability through various branches of applied mathematics. In a nut-shell the methods of applied mathematics. mathematics can be projected as follows: Note that the vectors of the vector space, defined in the spirit of their magnitude and direction in finite space dimensions, have given birth to vector algebra and vector calculus at somewhat lower level of abstraction (cf. Sect. 5.) Such vectors along with the rules for their product which define tensors, have applications in different branches of mathematical sciences mainly through the structural analogy. A special class of transformations (namely the linear ones) defined on some abstract systems (such as vector spaces or groups) give rise to integral transforms, integral and differential equations through the concept of linear operators. Further, out of the varieties of each of these integral transforms, integral and differential equations, only some are indentified so far for the purposes of their applications to different physical situation. However, in recent time the importance of nonlinear transformation or operators have also been noticed in this context. The manifestation of these transformations and mappings respectively in the from of matrices and functions or functionals has also suggested4 the study of these topics in applied mathematics. Also, the study of extrema of these functionals and/or of function through the calculus of variations or other similar methods basically conform to physical requirement of natural principles like the principle of least action or the conservation laws. In these studies however many side concepts like those of differentiation, integration or of analysis are introduced through definitions.

The use of tools of whole of the applied mathematics in sciences is mainly through the concept of structural analogy, and many examples can be cited²¹ to this effect. However, for the purposes of a philosophical development of this concept at a later stage only a few representative cases are mentioned here. In general, it should be noted that while mathematics provides the same rules of the game, the symbols and subsequently the quantities or the expressions obtained by applying these rules of the game, appear to be quite different in terms of their physical and philosophical contents (cf. Sect. 4). Further, in mathematics rules of the game are important and not the symbols; in science, however, both symbols and rules of the game provide deep insight into the physical content of the natural phenomenon. Moreover, the symbols and also the relations amongst them in science speak a lot about the phenomenon itself.

No doubt, plenty of examples can easily be traced²¹ from amongst the

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vectors, multiple integrals, linear and nonlinear differential equations (both ordinary and partial), power and exponential functions transforms etc., here however we remind the reader of only the following a few cases:

(i) Consider the case of the differential equation

$$p(x) = \frac{d^2y}{dx^2} + q(x)\frac{y}{dx} + r(x)y = 0,$$
(1)

which has provided⁵ a variety of special functions and orthogonal polynomials with appropriate forms of the functions p(x), q(x) and r(x) based on the symmetry of the coordinate system used, mainly on the basis of structural analogy. For q(x)=0, again a variety of situations exists⁶ where the resultant form is used on the basis of analogy.

(ii) Next consider the differential equation with contant coefficients,

$$\overrightarrow{\nabla} \cdot \overrightarrow{f} + \frac{\partial g}{\partial t} = 0 \qquad \qquad \therefore \dots (2)$$

This peculiar type of partial differential equation has been of special interest. In adition that this equation represents a relation between a vector function f and this scalar function g, it speaks a lot of conceptual insight of various phenomena appearing in altogether different branches of mathematical sciences mainly on the basis of structural analogies of different order, for example, in fluid mechanics \overrightarrow{f} = mass density (p_m) x vel. vector (\overrightarrow{v}) , $g \equiv p_m$; in electrodynamics \overrightarrow{f} = current density (\overrightarrow{J}) , $g = \text{charge density } (p_c)$; in quantum mechanics $\overrightarrow{f} \equiv \text{probability}$ current density (\vec{s}) , g = probability density (P); in electromagnetic field $\vec{f} =$ vector potential (\overrightarrow{A}), g = scalar potential (ϕ) in appropriate units. In fact, in fluid mechanics, electromagnetics and in quantum mechanics while eq.(2) represents the equation of continuity, in the case of electromagnetic field it however displays the Lorentz condition - a condition necessary to decouple the underlying differential equation satisfied by both scalar and vector potentials. On the other hand, with p as a distribution function of the phase points and \sqrt{as} the velocity vector of the flow in the phase space, eq. (2) offers a basis for the Liouville's equation and thereby suggests⁷ a conceptual foundation of statistical mechanics. Another important aspect of the use of equation of continuity is in The F

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the realm of car traffic⁸. For a one-dimensional model, in this case, if p = the density of cars (measured in number of cars/km), $v \equiv$ velocity of cars (in Km/hr); then eq. (2) is satisfied with $g \equiv p$ and $f \equiv Q(p)$, describing the number of cars going past a given point in an interval of time.

(iii) While some analogous applications of the partial differential equation,

$$c_1 \nabla^2 \phi = \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial t} \tag{3}$$

where c_1 is a constant, in different disciplines are listed in Table 1, similar applications of Schrodinger equation

$$[c_2 \nabla^2 + f(x)] \phi = i \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial t}$$
 (4)

where c₂ is a constant, can also be found ⁹ in the literature.

(iv) Analogous applications of the exponential function

$$f(x) = f_0 \exp(-\alpha x), \qquad (5)$$

in different branches of science are listed in Table 2.

(v) The study of nonlinear dynamical systems in terms of mathematical and geometrical tools, particularly through the topological methods or phase space trajectories, has opened ^{10,12} the vistas of another interesting class of structural analogy. very recently, efforts have also been there to make ¹¹ use of these tools in understanding the different aspects of human behaviour.

3. Examples of Structural Analogy in Physics

From the point of view of highlighting the examples of structural analogy in physics and allied fields we broadly categorize our survey here in terms of (A) Mathematical disciplines (consisting of classical, quantum, statistical and stochastic mechanics and also classical and quantum field theories), (B) conceptual disciplines (consisting of condensed matter, molecular, atomic, nuclear, quark and elementary particle physics, and astrophysics, (C) conventional disciplines (like heat, sound, optics, electricity and magnetism), and (D) the technological applications i.e. engineering, despite their intermixing. Although some examples of category (A) are already listed above in Sect.2 from the viewpoint of mathematical content, however, a few more cases will be mentioned

R. S. KAUSHAL

here. While this category suggests a working (mathematical/conceptual) framework for the categories (B), (C) and (D), the latter ones, to some extent, appear as the modelling games as far as the understanding of Nature is concerned. It may be mentioned that the category (B) deals with micro-physics and (C) with macro-physics. Further, as one traces back from the category (D) to the category (A) the abstraction in terms either of mathematical formulae or of concepts increases. The category (D), clearly as an applied version of (A), (B) and (C), deals however with the down-to-earth problems of day-to-day life, particularly in making the life more comfortable.

As a matter of fact, while the category (A) from the viewpoint of the knowledge content gets a feedback from the study of the systems in categories (B) - (D), it also prepares a ground for the structural analogies of different orders which later help in understanding the physical systems appearing in categories (B) - (D). In particular, for a given conceptual setting, the category (A) suggests a variety of mathematical formulae which are readily applicable to the systems in (B), (C) and (D). This happens with minor variations at the input-conceptual-level in (A) and with seemingly different major variations at the output-levels of experimentation and their subsequent applications in the practical life in (B)-(D).

The history of physics reveals that there has been a common practice to jump to newer disciplines of knowledge without really understanding the older ones in totality. Further, this has happened not only with the categories (B) - (D) which are prone to more frequent experimental tests but also with the category (A). For example, without understanding the classical mechanics completely¹³ for three hundred years and more (after Newton), quantum concepts were floated only about 100 years ago and subsequently quantum field theory grew up in the same vein. Same is also the case with the development of conceptual disciplines of category (B) and to some extent with the conventional ones in category (C). As a matter of fact the degree of understanding of ctegories (B) and (C) turns out further one order less as compared to that of (A) since by and large it forms the basis of study for (B) - (D). Fundamental and challanging questions remain even today almost in each of these disciplines. This is how the physical sciences have progressed. In fact, the conceptual disciplines are

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hasically the immediate applictions of the structures which appear in the mathematical disciplines along with certain types of modelling games. In spite of all this, note that both the actual physical concepts (which normally are the succome of modelling games) and the concepts derived from rigorous mathematical tools (which can be attributed to some kind of structural analogy of mathematical nature) have come true under experimental tests. It appears that these concepts could well be the preferences of nature over the other. Also, the inquisitive nature of a scientific mind for these preferencial concepts forces me to these rather quicker jumps in the understanding of Nature without actually exploring the remaining other concepts. The subject of nuclear physics is one such immediate example 23 of this general trend.

While a huge list of examples of structural analogy from among these categories can be drawn²¹, we list here only a few representative cases:

nStructural analogy exists¹⁵ in the equations derived in particle and rigid-body nechanics by treating respectively the mass (m) and the moment of inertia (I) nan analogous manner. Other analogies to be noted in this context are through the role of velocity (v) and angular-velocity (w) in the definitions of linear nomentum (p) and angular momentum (L), linear and rotational kinetic energies the, respectively in linear and rotational motions by the relations

$$p = mv$$
 ; $L = l\omega$,

$$E = 1/2 \text{ mv}^2$$
; $E_{rot} = 1/2 \text{ l}\omega^2$.

The concepts of specific heat and several other quantities introduced once usically in the context of thermal phenomena occuring in gases, have now then extended to various other apparantly disconnected situations like in the thermodynamics of rods, magnetics, dielectrics, radiation, water, and of plasma, mainly on the basis of structural analogy of various physical antities. In the same way, the analogy also exists in the literature regarding to concept of entropy in several disconnected fields such as in the theories of the same way and of fluids

As a matter of fact the Weber-Fechner law, used in psychology in the form, In R, (where S and R respectively are the intensities of sensation and

R. S. KAUSHAL

stimulus and K is a constant), appears analogous to the famous Boltzmann entropy law, S=K In W.

(iv) The concept of a classical field variable is specifically discussed in and also borrowed from the theory of continuous systems. In fact, in the limit when the separation 'a' between the mass points becomes infinitesimal and the number of mass points (and hence the degrees of freedom) becomes infinitely large, the variable n_i , describing the position of the i-th mass point at any time t_i is replaced by the functional $\phi(x)$, called the field - variable. This replacement of the integer index i by the continuous position variable x leads to the spacederivative terms (in addition to the time-derivative ones) in the Lagrangian of the system and subsequently to the field equations satisfied by $\phi(x)$ instead of by n_i .

In some situations the quantized version of a field theory is developed independently of the classical version (e.g., the nonabelian gauge field theories). In that case one looks for the classical analogue¹⁶ of these quantum theories. On the other hand, the problems of double-well and triple-well potentials studied at the classical level¹⁷ have provided clue for several interesting mechanisms and phenomena (like Higgs mechanism and spontaneous symmetric breaking) at the quantum level, mainly on the basis of structural analogy.

- (v) The Feynman diagrams found useful in field theory and elementary particle physics to reveal the schematic details of the underlying fundamental processes, are basically the analogue versions of the electrical circuits. The importance of the role of this diagramatic technique has also been noticed not only in many body problems like nuclear and condensed matter physics but also in other areas like biosciences and human behaviour¹⁸ mainly on the basis of structural analogy.
- (vi) Analogy of somewhat lower order worth mentioning here is that of the equivalence of the terminologies¹9 used in mechanical or acoustical systems and also in electrical circuits. Here, charge ≡ displacement, current ≡ velocity, inductance ≡ mass are frequently used in the mathematical structures.
- (vii) Following Achinstein²⁰ some cases from conventional disciplines can be listed here:

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(a) With reference to the interference and diffraction phenomena, the analogy frawn by Huygens between waves of light, sound and water is worth noting.

(b) In connection with the kinetic theory of gases there exists an analogy between a gas and a container of billiard balls in which the molecules in the gas are inkened to perfectly elastic billiard balls striking the walls of the container as well as each other.

(c) The analogy drawn by Maxwell between the electric field and an imaginary incompressible fluid flowing through tubes of variable cross-section.

(d) The analogy noted by Kelvin between electrostatic attraction and the conduction of heat.

(viii) Some cases of structural analogy from engineering are the following:

(a) As far as the application of a physical principle and its converse is concerned, the analogy exists between the two different mathematically idealized situations, namely the case of a refrigerator and the heat engine and that of an electric generator and the motor. In the former case it is the mutual conversion of heat and mechanical energies whereas in the latter it is that of the electrical and mechanical energies.

(b) Analogy with respect to the working principle and the construction between the human eye and the camera (if one ignores the role of human consciousness) exists.

(c) Analogy with resepect to the working principle and the construction of a slying bird and the aeroplane (if one ignores the role of consciousness of the bird) exists.

(d) Certain degree of analogy exists (may be at the level of working principle) in a variety of laboratory instruments used in different contexts, e.g. different types of galvanometers which again work on the same principle as that of an electric motor, different types of oscillatory systems work again on the same principle as that of a pendulum.

^{4 Contents} and Classification of Structural Analogies

In this section we introduce in general and extract in particular, the

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essential contents of an analogy. This will not only allow the study of this 'important concept at a deeper level but also suggest a way to categorize these analogies in terms of their fineness. By and large most of the analogies presented in the previous Section can be understod in terms of only two contents, namely the "objects" and the "rules of the game"; however, for a variety of situations one also needs the third content and that is the "scales". Let us analysee the process of using an analogy as such.

Whenever an analogy - a given "known" situation, is going to be used in another 'unknown" situation, the former is bound to consist not only of "objects" but also of their mutual interactions or correlations or the criterion for their compatibility. These correlations are termed as the "rules of the game". Again note that both "objects" anied "rules of the game" can be charaterized by or qualified for according to their merit with respect to the human faculties of understanding. In fact, the "known" situation can exist any where, at any time, in any form and at any level in the spectrum of understanding of Nature with reference to these faculties. On the other hand, the "unknown" situation for which the "known" situation is going to be used, can also belong to these domains of understanding which, in fact, are very well covered by the realm of objective sciences but only in parts²¹ and not in totality since the subjective components²² of human faculties of understanding start entering at this stage.

From the point of view of "understanding", the "unknown" situation, no doubt, is expected to be more difficult for the human faculties than the "known" one. However this is not always the case mainly because the understanding of one is used into the other (or *vice versa*) only in a limited sense, often in the form of models or in terms²¹ of suppositions. Also, the question of quality of these models demands further classification of these contents.

In view of the fact that both user and analyser of a structural analogy have to use their inner faculties^{1,2} of understanding for the purpose and the quantity of understanding vis-a-vis the development of these faculties of the individual also come on the way, the contents of structural analogy can further be categorised. It is also not difficult to analyse the role of these sub-contents (namely physical, mathematical or geometrical and philosophical with reference to the objects and the rules of the game, whereas of space, time and mental with

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
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Proper "object interaction reference to the scales) in various examples listed in Sects.2 and 3. Schematically, these contents can be represented as follows:



To elaborate the feeling for these contents the following examples would suffice at this point.

(i) The knowledge of groups of pure mathematics is used to describe "unknown" situations in physics, chemistry and biology. Clearly, the group elements form the examples of "objects" and the basic axioms regarding the group elements (namely, associativity, closure, existences of inverse and identity) form the example of "rules of the game". In another case, in the use of Pythagoras theorem, the three numbers a,b,c form the example of "objects" and the relation, $a^2+b^2=c^2$, forms the example of the "rule of the game". An appropriate identification (depending upon the "unknown" situation) of these objects in both the cases form the example of suppositions in using the analogy.

(i) In the analogy of the atomic nucleus²³ with a liquid drop, while the drop as a whole could be the example of "objects", the set of some of its physical properties (like mass, volume and surface) can also form the example of "objects". On the other hand, the Coulombic (as the drop is charged) and other interactions among the constituents of the drop also form the example of

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"objects". With regard to the rules of the game, the first category of objects offers one type of "rules of the game" whereas the second category offers another type (perhaps the finer ones) of the "rules of the game".

(iii) The concept of scales, no doubt holds clearly for the example of inverse sequare law (used in gravitation, electrostatics, magnetism and quark physics) can as well be visualized for several other cases like that of harmonic oscillator (time independent case) system $x^{oo}(t) + w^2_0 x(t) = 0$. This system, besides involving analogy in mathematical terms (cf. eq. (1) for q(x) = 0, p(x) = 1, r(x) = 0constant) and that too by accounting only for a mathematically idealized situation, has described a variety of phenomena at different scales. Here the scales may differ either for the position variable x(t) or for the frequency w or for both in different disciplines of science Recently, in this context a different type of structural analogy (to some extent similar to the one as it occurs for the electrical and mechanical systems) for a time dependent oscillator system described by $x^{\infty}(t) + w^{2}(t) x(t) = 0$, is explored²⁴. Another striking example where the concent of scales is involved, is the theory of collisions where the rules of the game remain more or less the same but only objects and scales keep on changing for mega, macro and micro systems alongwith some conceptual modifications. Al least, for the scattering process of micro systems like molecules, atoms, nuclei and elementary particles, there exists25 a common analogous machinery.

It may be noted that such a scheme of contents of a structural analogy also helps in the classification of analogies in terms of its fineness or the order. First stage classification could be way of the presence or the domination of either one, two or of all the three contents, out of objects, rules of the game and scales. At second stage, however finer classification arises from the study of subcontents. As it will be argued later, the search of these contents in an analogy will very much depend on the degree of development of faculties of understanding of an individual.

5. The Process of Abstraction and Mental Constructs

Another context in which the structrual analogy plays a dominant role in the physical sciences (or in general in objective sciences²¹) is the process of abstraction. In fact, in the physical sciences (or in general in objective sciences²¹) is the process of a science of the physical sciences (or in general in objective sciences²¹) is the process of a science of the physical scien abstraction. In fact, in both mathematics and physics there have been consistent

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efforts, as the histories of these subjects reveal, to condense the available inowledge at a given point of time in a nut-shell if possible, by way of finding a generalization of both "objects" and "rules of the game" in this process, while new vistas and horizons of knowledge are very often opened, however the contents of the underlying structural analogies change more or less at every gage of abstraction. Also, the analogy becomes finer in terms of its content. The following examples from both mathematics and physics would elaborate these intricacies of the abstraction process.

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The well known arithmetical rules of playing with numerals, no doubt, aught in abstract manner, are however frequently used in different contexts only through the examples of structural analogies. The algebraic relization of the numbers and the rules is a first step in the direction of abstraction. A variety of number games and numerical problems finally culminate or condense in to an algebraic formula. Though such formulae, in their particular form are ready for applications to various disciplines through structural analogy, they are normally subjected to further abstraction through possible generalizations.

Example: Consider the numbers and the underlying operations:

 2×3 , $2^2 = (2 \times 2)$, $3^3 = (3 \times 3 \times 3)$, They are the special cases of xy, $(x + y)^2$ or $(x + y)^3$, where x and y are the appropriate numbers. The latter two are further special cases of $(x + y)^n$ for n = 2, x = 3 and so is the first one of x^m or x = n = 1.

Other examples of algebraic realization of numerals could be in the form of equations, inequalities, sequences, series, and what not. Note that at the level of algebraic realization not only the objects become different but also again new rules of the game need to be framed. It is needless to emphasize that these algebraic structures are used frequently not only in science but also in other disciplines²¹ (like economics, commerce, social science etc.) by virtue of structural analogies.

An alternative step in the direction of abstraction is in terms of set theory. As mentioned before, one can define an abstract system by introducing

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in addition to the elements of the set the eoncepts of relations, operations, postulates, theorems etc. Operations on two sets further bring in the concept of mappings and subsequently that of functions and functionals. While these ideas are applicable as such to a variety of situations in various disciplines through the sructural analogy, some special classes of the abstract systems in the form of fields, vector spaces, rings, groups etc. have very wide applicability in mathematical sciences, again through the structural analogy (cf. Sect.2.1).

5.2 Physics

Next we turn to the discussion of philosophical component of the physical concepts from the point of view of abstraction process.

Look at the Newton's laws and the corresponding equations of motion. While the discussion of the first and the third law can easily be extended to the philosophical domain of human behaviour through the structural analogy the second law can be considered as a special case of Euler-Lagrange's equation of motion. Note that this latter equation is basically the special case of a generalized equation derived by extremizing a necessary functional (in case of dynamics this functional is the action integral) in the calculus of variations. The use of the variational principle as the basis of formulation to express the "equations of motion" (whether they be Newtonian equations, Maxwell's equations, Einstein equations or the Schrodinger equation) in diverse fields offers the example of a much deeper analogy²¹. In fact, just an alteration of the physical content in the theory of one field gives rise to the results which are verifiable by all together different sets of experiments. Perhaps, the Nature likes such structural analogies.

While all this is possible through structural analogy in mathematical terms, the concept of extremising the functional (in dynamics) is again extended to the philosophical domain through the Hamilton's principle of least action-a fact well known and in-built in the human nature as well. Thus, all the three laws of motion have their origin in philosophy in one way or the other. Another important analogy is through the Noether's theorem where the objects become the field variables and the rules of the game remain more or less the same. The consideration and an account of space time symmetries lead, in a naive manner, to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy, momentum and angular to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy, momentum and angular and angular to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy, momentum and angular to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy, momentum and angular to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy, momentum and angular to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy, momentum and angular to several fundamental laws in physics (like energy).

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n extended action - a I the three r. Another ets become same. The ve manner, and angular momentum conservation laws) which are not only useful in classical mechanics but also in the domain of quantum physics and quantum field theories. Interestingly, an account of gravity by modifying the metric in the action integral and subsequently its extremization through the same structural analogy of mathematical nature leads to what is known as Einstein's equation in the theory of gravitation. This all happens through the structural analogies of different orders in mathematical, physical and philosophical terms and covers in fact all three domains of physics namely macro-micro- and mega-physics.

Another striking example of structural analogy which offers a backbone for several branches of physics and starts from the mathematical level is the inverse square law of forces in the form $F = CQ_1 Q_2/r^2$, where C is a constant; Q_1, Q_2 are the measurable physical quantities characterizing the physical objects separated at a distance r units apart. To a fair degree of accuracy this law works in disconnected fields like in gravitation, electrostatics and magnetism where Q_1, Q_2 respectively are identified with masses, electric charges and magnetic pole strengths and the constant C takes appropriate values in these branches. This law found to work in quark physics at short distances and with some modifications in the field of photometry, however, again has mathematical origin. In fact, for the central field problems the closure requirement of the phase space trajectories demands the solution of the Euler-Lagrange equation only in this power law form. Experimental verification of this law in different contexts further adds to the Nature's liking for the structural analogy.

In the first case while both objects and the rules of the game keep on changing during the process of abstraction by maintaining certain common feature (may be at the philosophical level) in the later example of inverse sequare law however objects keep on changing by maintaining the same rules of the game. Another situation where objects remain more or less the same but the rules of the game keep on changing in different fields is the case of electrical circuits. Only on the basis of structural analogy Richard Feynman suggested the use of these circuit diagrams in field theory where they not only speak much more than the necessary from the point of view of exploring new ideas in the field of particle physics but have also brought out the inherent intricacies of Nature to an understandable form.

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6. Use of a Structural Analogy vis-a-vis Human Understanding

6.1 Change of Contents

Whether it is the process of abstraction or the use of structural analogy, in both the contents change. This change can occur not only in all the three major contents (namely, objects, rules of the game and scales) but also in their finer components²³. As a matter of fact the changes in the contents can be stated precisely only if the "unknown" situation is best (exactly) known either form the direct or indirect experimentation. The description of changes in contents is partly subjective in the sense that it has bearing on the development of essences of life of the individual analyser. To support these statements following examples will be sufficient:

(i) Consider the case of nuclear models, particularly the liquid drop model (cf. Ref. (23)). While the structural analogy used for the volume and surface terms in the mass formula is of somewhat lower order, it is of finer level for the Coulomb, asymmetry and pairing terms. Note that in the first three terms rules of the game (with reference to their mathematical and physical contents) remain essentially the same, however the objects in the corresponding terms change in addition to the space (geometry) content of the scales. The structural analogy in this case, could be good at the physical livel. This model although explains so many observed facts, however, seems to be far from reality.

With regard to the shell structure of micro-systems (atom, nucleus and nucleon) note that the objects (like quantum numbers characterizing the energy levels) more or less remain the same but the rules of the game (i.e.,-the nature of the potential) keep on changing. In addition to this, space- and time-contents of the scales for atom, nucleus and nucleon also change without affecting much the mental (conceptual) scale. As far as the physical, mathematical and philosophical contents in both objects and rules of the game are concerned they remain more or less the same in all the three systems.

With reference to the Fermi gas model²³ of the nucleus and its comparison with the electron gas, the rules of the game alongwith all the three contents remain the same. However, both the objects and the scales with some of their contents change.

(ii) Look at the example of analogy in the definitions of linear and angular monents (or for that matter of kinetic energy expressions for linear and rotational motions) in eq.(6). From the first look objects (in terms of mathematical symbols) are different, rules of the game (i.e. arithmetical operation of multiplication) are the same. In the second look, while the mathematical content of the objects changes and it remains the same for the rules of the game, the physical content (in the sense that p relates to linear motion and L to rotational motion) of both apparantly changes. With regard to the philosophical content note that one can open the Pandora's box. In fact, p can be visualized for a point particle of mass m moving with velocity v and L for a rigid body having the moment of inertia I about a direction in accordance with that of the angualr velocity vector w. For further finer detains I turns out to be the principal value of a second rank tensor - a mathematically complicated object. On the other hand, during the motion, at a particular instant and in the infinitesimal limit of the arc length, the angular motion can be considered as the linear motion for point particles of which the rigid body is constituted.

Thus, in the above analyses the structural analogy appears only at a few levels of understanding i.e. at the level of the rules of the game in the first look and at the level or philosophical content in the second look. Accordingly, the merit and the category of the analogy could have different meanings for the school-level, college-level and research-level users/analysers. Moreover, this was the example when "known" and "unknown" situations are the best known to the author.

6.2 Structural Invariance

Before extending the concept of structural analogy in the philosophical domain, the invariance of structures with respect to scales needs a discussion. No doubt, several physical phenomena in nature are understood in terms of analogies of different order but sometimes the structures appear to be the same with respect to a certain content inspite of their different underlying meanings. For example, look at the following formulae used in physics

(a)
$$\frac{1}{R} = \frac{1}{R_1} + \frac{1}{R_2}$$
 (b) $\frac{1}{\mu} = \frac{1}{m_1} + \frac{1}{m_2}$ (c) $\frac{1}{C} = \frac{1}{C_1} + \frac{1}{C_2}$...7

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(a') $\overline{R} = R_1 + R_2$; (b') $\overline{M} = m_1 + m_2$; (c') $C = C_1 + C_2$,8 In terms of the rules of the game and with reference to the mathematical content in mind all the three cases in (7) and (8) are separately identical. However, form the point of view of the physical content the 3 cases of (7) differ not only mutually but also differ from (8). Also in (a) and (c) (or in (a') and (c')) R_i and C_i (for i = 1,2) are the resistances and capacitances belonging to the field of electricity whereas in b (or in (b')) m_i are the masses of two particles in the area of mechanics. Thus, in some sense there exists a structural invariance with respect to the mathematical content and the use of the analogy in different disciplines. However, it is not so at the level of physical content or in terms of mental scales as the objects carry different meanings. Further note that for the same definition of symbols on the right hand side of (7), formulae in (8) also make sense.

Now consider another class of examples in this category from optics i.e.

(a)
$$\frac{1}{f} = \frac{1}{f_1} + \frac{1}{f_2}$$
 ; (b) $\frac{1}{f} = \frac{1}{u} + \frac{1}{v}$,....(9)

for which the rules of the game (especially the mathematical content) are the same as for the type (7) above but there is no analogous counter part of the type (8) for the same set of objects mainly from the point of view of physical content of the objects.

One more class of examples in this category is from mathematics. In algebra, if a, b, c are in harmonic progression, then (1/a), (1/b), (1/c) will be in arithmatic progression and the corresponding arithmatical mean be expressed

(a)
$$\frac{2}{b} = \frac{1}{a} + \frac{1}{c}$$

For this structure again there does not exist the counter part b = a + c for the same definition of symbols (or for the same physical content of the objects). On the other hand, at the mental scale, the philosophical content of the rules of the game in all the cases, namely the cases (a), (b), (c) of (7), (a) and (b) of (9)

and (a) of (10) is the same i.e., they all represent the addition of inverses of two quantities. This latter realization represents the case of a structural invariance at a higher level and leads²¹ to the construction of a content-matrix to make these changes more transparent.

7. Manifestations of Structural Analogy: Symmetries and Models

In general the models and/or symmetries, as used all over in objective sciences and helped a lot in understanding Nature, basically are the incarnations of the structural analogy. As a matter of fact after understanding the subtlities of structural analogy in terms of its contents, it is clear that only a fraction of structral analogy manifests through these models, symmetries or through both. Although now and then a mention of models is made in the above survey but their birth along with that of symmetries can be understood as follows:

With regard to the role of human being in understanding Nature, two (complementary in reality but alternatives in practice) approaches in Indian philosophy are well known namely, "One in all" ("Vyasti" in "Samasti") or "all in one" ("Samasti" in "Vyasti") i.e. by considering either the human being as placed in the universe or else the universe as exists in the human being. It is the second approach which scientists (particularly, the objective scientists) have been following all along. Perhaps most of them are not properly trained to think even of the first approach in which the philosophical/subjective component of "understanding" Nature has to dominate the scene. And it is within the framework of this approach Einstein's words²⁷. "What does the fish know about water? After all, it spends all its life in there" will come true. It is also true that none of these approaches is superior to other, rather complementary to each other. For a complete understanding of Nature an amalgamation of the two in the human being is essential. Perhaps for this reason only all great scientists in the last part of their active life start realizing the individual's limitations as far as the understanding of Nature in totality is concerned.

For the objective scientists, in the second approach, Nature appears highly complex in spite of the fact that it works on the basis of some well defined (perhaps only for Nature itself) principles. These principles are so subtle and real in the absolute sense that they always remain asymptotic as well as

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beyond the domain of any kind of objective experimentation- a basis for the objective science. The objective scientists, on the other hand, try to understand the "infinite" with their finite potential, capabilities and the development of faculties of understanding with reference to the essences of life. Alternatively, they want to project the "infinite" onto their "finite" and that too with "finite" tools. One but important of these "finite" tools is that of the structural analogy. Logically speaking, since the projection of an object cannot be greater than the object itself (at the most it can be equal in the limiting case), the understanding of Nature by the objective scientists remains limited or the absolute truth for them remains asymptotic, implying thereby the birth of models, symmetries or in general that of structural analogies. As a matter of fact, in such a situation, no alternative is left for the objective scientists except for using models, symmetries, analogies and what not, to understand nature even in parts.

Here we first comment on the mutual relationship between models and symmetries and then discuss their place in the spectrum of analogies.

Apparently visible irregularities during the study of a natural phenomenon in totality, in spite of having their roots in some much deeper and subtle, but precise and systematic principles (which perhaps are not within the reach of objective methods of present sciences), however turn again into regularities when the phenomenon is looked into in parts by objective methods. The symmetries in physical sciences basically are the manifestations of these partial regulatrities (or the order) in Nature. On the other hand, the models are the tools to investigate these underlying partial systematics/symmetries in Nature. While the search for these symmetries gives birth to models by way of framing postulates/assumptions for this purpose, both (models and symmetries) have their origin in structural analogy. As a result, both models and symmetries can also be analysed in terms of the contents of Sect.4.

It may be mentioned that the symmetries (or some sort of orderliness) in the objects and the scales are no doubt often transparent, their search in the rules of the game however has not always been easy; once if it is found, then it provides a better way of understanding the corresponding phenomenon. As a matter of fact by using symmetry one needs to compute every thing or else one computes only a few and derives the conclusions about whole (every thing).

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The symmetries and also the tools of their study (namely the models), can further be analysed at the level of sub contents of a structural analogy. In summary, the availability even of these partial symmetries at any level of study of a phenomenon provides a glimpse of the underlying beauty in Nature and thereby encourages the scientists of different specialization to search them further. This is how the objective sciences progress.

8. Summary and the Question of Ultimate Truth

With a view to exploring the role of the fundamental concept of structural analogy in the studies of objective sciences in general, and that of physical and mathematical sciences in particular, a survey of modern advancements in mathematics and physics is carried out at a philosophical level. From the cases of analogous structures cited in Sects.2 and 3, it appears that this concept is distributed all over in these disciplines and only a few glimpses of them are presented in this article. While only a brief account of examples from mathematics is given, a variety of examples from physics are cited under four categories, nemely, mathematical. conceptual, conventional and engineering. Further, a philosophical basis is saught to understand these varieties of examples of structural analogy in terms of a few basic contents and subcontents. Also, a way to classify these analogies within this framework is pointed out. It is noticed that in general the contents of a structural analogy change in both the situations, namely in its use and aslo in the process of abstraction. This latter process (also known as generalization in literature) however has been prevailing in both mathematics and physics through all these years as the histories of these disciplines reveal. In spite of the changes, some features of these contents remain unaffected during these processes and this leads to what is termed as "structural invariance". It is argued as well as emphasized that the concepts of symmetries and models (also intricately interwoven in the objective sciences) not only are the manifestations of the structural analogy but also often appear as special cases within this general framework of study.

The concept of contents of a structural analogy, no doubt, is derived in this survey from the examples in mathematics and physics, but it is quite general in the sense that the same can be used to study the role of structural analogy in other hard disciplines like chemical and biosciences and also in the soft disciplines

566 R. S. KAUSHAL

like literabure, humanities, social and economic sciences. As a matter of fact the concept of structural analogy in literature already exists and manifests through the use of figures of speech (particularly through the use of simile and metaphor), examples (used to elaborate the deeper philosophical meanings pertaining to life and human behaviour), quotations etc. On the other hand, the structural analogy in the forms of models also dominates²⁾ the modern studies of both social and economic sciences. It may be mentioned that in the case of literature while mathematical (or geometrical) contents of objects and rules of the game are often absent, physical content of both of them corresponds to the practical aspect of life and human behaviour unlike their philosophical content. Further, here and also in social and economics scienies, the space and time contens of scales should be considered, respectively in the contexts of geographical and historical situations prevailing in the phenomenon under study. Some of these studies are under way and will appear elsewhere²¹.

Achinstein²⁰ while discussing analogies in the concepts of science, classifies models into four categories, namely (i) Analogue models, (ii) representation models, (iii) theoretical models, and (iv) imaginary models. To some extent, this classification by Achinstein is phenomenon-based in the sense that the merit of a model cannot be assessed at an absolute scale. On the other hand, it is also not difficult to rank these models and their finer points of distinction among themselves, in the present rather broad (and perhaps deep too) framework of contents and subcontents of a structural analogy. Such details however we postpone for future studies²¹.

The order of an analogy in the sense of its fineness can be understood better in terms of the patomic model² of the buman being. As mentioned in Sect. 1, it is the human consciousness which creates the space, time and geometry and makes the physical world realizable to the human being, normally through the analogies of different orders. For example, for an event taking place in the domain^{1,2)} of wordly objects WO as a result of its space-time creation (and in the presence of consciouness) and subsequently its realization by the faculty¹⁰ of memory E (of course through the roles of the biological body B, the sense of knowledge and action SE, the mind M and the intellect I), the interpretations for the same (in the form of an anology) can be advanced again from different

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levels (i.e. at the levels of SE, M, I and E) of the human faculties of understanding, depending on their development in the analyser.

In view of the fact that objective scientists have been following the "all in one" approach (cf. Sect. 7) with regard to understanding Nature and "one in all" component is either missing or followed to its minimal in the wholistic approach, the role of structural analogies become important not only in the studies of objective sciences but also that of soft disciplines in such situation. When one looks at the scientific advancements which have taken place in the modern times and their utility to the human race, one cannot believe that this all is the role of structural analogy in general, or of models in particular, besides a few fundamental principles distributed all over in different branches of objective sciences. On the other hand, similar is the case with the varieties of human (or of other beings) experiences and behaviour in the understanding of which the structural analogies again play21 the important role. Indeed, the former hints towards the objective reality in Nature and the latter gives a clue towards the subjective reality through the same game of analogies. These two types of realities basically are the two sides of the same coin, i.e., of the absolute reality or the ultimate truth in Nature. To some extent, the analogies for the human being do not appear more than the means of communication with Nature. As far as the search of ultimate truth is concerned it remains the matter of realization only and perhaps much beyond the language of analogies and that too for a "man of perfection" only.

NOTES

Acknowledgements

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R. S. KAUSHAL

- Radhey Shyam Kaushal, "Modern Physics in the Philosophical Domain: The Role of Structrual Analogy " Presented in National Level Seminar on Philosophy of Science, Jaipur, March 5-7, 1998: With reference to the inner world of human being the faculties of understanding are categorized besides the worldly objects (WO) as biological body (B), sense organs responsible for knowledge and human action (SE), mind (M), intellect (I), ego (E) and above them all is the soul (SO), in accordance with their fineness and subtle character. With these essences of life as ingredients a philosophical atomtype model (called in brief the patomic model) of the human being is proposed in Ref. (2) below. In this framework the being (b) while "revolves" around the nucleus WO. also is free to perform transitions both upward and downward (depending on the value of the meditation parameter μ) in the frequency states B, SE, M, I, E and SO. This kind of modelling of the human being which has strong bearing on the Vedantic philosophy, explains a variety of human actions and behaviour at its most fundamental and absolute level by way of describing the interactions among the human beings [cf. Ref.(18)]. For further details of the patomic model, see Ref. (2) below.
 - Radhey Shyam Kaushal. "The Philosophy of the Vedanta: A Modern Scientific Perspective". Sri Garib Das Oriental Series No. 179. Shri Satguru Publication. Indian Book Centre. Delhi - 7, 1994: Also see, Journ. SC & Ind. Res. (New Delhi) 49 (1990) 78.
 - See, for example, D.T. Finkbeiner II, " Introduction to Matrices and Linear 3. transformations" (D. B. Taraporewala Sons & Co. Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1968).
 - Here the concept of mapping should be understood for sets and that of linear 4. transformations for other abstract systems.
 - R.S. Kaushal, " Classical and Quantum Mechanics of Noncentral Potentials: A Survey of two Dimensional system" (Jointly Published by Narosa Publishing 5. House, New Delhi and Springer-Verblag, Heidelberg 1998.)
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- A. Ghatak and K. Thiagarajan in "Progress in Optics" ed. by E. Wolf (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1980): M. Hashimoto, Opt. Commun. 32 (1980) 383.
- See, for example, Ref. (9) and D.W. Jordan and P. Smith, " Nonlinear Ordinary Differential Equations" (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1988).
- 11. See, for example. " Nonlinear Dynamics in Human Behaviour" (Studies of Nonlinear Phenomena in Life Sciences-Vol.5), ed. by W. Sulis and A. Combs. (World Scientific. Singapore, 1996).
- N. Minorsky, " Nonlinear Oscillations " (D. Van Nostrand Co. INC., 1962, Indian ed.).
- Particularly, the systems admitting nonlinear equations of motion or those involving either an harmonicity or noncentrality or both are not yet understood completely. Moreover, the systems involving explicit dependence on time alongwith these features also require special investigation even at present times. For further details see Ref. (5) above.
- See, for example, Y.B. Rumer and M.S. Ryvkin. "Thermodynamics, Statistical Physics and Kinetics" (Mir Publishers. Moscow 1980) Chap. 1
- H. Goldstein, " Classical Mechanics " (Addison-Wesley Pub, Co., 1981) 2nd ed., Chap. 12.
- See, for example, G.K. Savvidy, Nucl. Phys. B246 (1984) 302: J. Villarroel, J. Math. Phys. 29 (1988) 2132. and the Appendix I in Ref. (5) above.
- S. Coleman, "Aspects of Symmetry", Selected Erice Lectures (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) p.234: R. Rajaraman, "Solitons and Instantons" (North Holland Pub. Co.. 1982) Chap. 2 and 5.
- R.S. Kaushal, "Human Communication and Cognition: A Scientific Outlook in Vedanta Philosophy", Int. Jour. Common. (Delhi) 5 (1995) p. 111-124.
- H.F. Olson, "Solution of Engineering Problems by Dynamical Analogues" (Von Nostrand, New York, 1966).
 - Peter Achinstein, " Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis" (The John

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- 21. Radhey Shyam Kaushal, " Structural Analogy: A Useful Concept in Science and Philosophy" (in preparation).
- 22. Roger Penrose, " Shadows of the Mind: A Search for Missing Science of Consciousness" (Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
- 23. R.S. Kaushal, "Understanding the Atomic Nucleus through Structural Analogies: A Philosophical Survey " *Presented* in the National Seminar on Nuclear Physics and Engineering held at I.I.T. Kanpur (India), April 17-18, 1997; also in Physics News (Bombay) 29 (1998) 127-135, Sept.-Dec. Issue.
- 24. R.S. Kaushal and D. Parashar. Journ. Phys. A: Math. & Gen. 29 (1996) 889.
- M.L. Goldberger and K.M. Watson, "Collision Theory" (Johj Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964).
- Newton's first law of motion, in fact. defines the law of inertia. It states that if a 26. body is at rest or in motion it will remain in the same situation unless an external force acts on it. Same is true as far as the human nature is concerned. Human activities in terms of its routine work remain unaffected unless some external guidance is brought in the routine. It may be noted that while "physical" body can work under only contact or action-at-a-distance type forces (no question of memory), the "human or living" body can work under all three forces namely contact, action-at-a-distance and action-at-a-time type forces (for details see Chap. 6 of Ref. (2)). Newton's third law states that action and reaction on a body in the same inertial frame are equal and opposite. This is also true for human nature. There is a reaction for every action on a human or living being provided the inner essences of life of the being are in a matching tone with the external (living or nonliving) agents. As far as the equality in Newton's third law is concerned it is again a mathematically idealized situation in the sense that the variations in the "physical conditions" during the acting or reacting times are being neglected.
- 27. Albert Einstein, "The World as I see It" (1935).

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Table 1: Some analogous applications of eq. (3)

S. No.	Constant c ₁	Dependent Variable (\phi)	Remarks about eq. (3)
1 0	(k/cp _m)	temperature (T)	Heat flow equation describing the distribution of temperature in solids (c ≡ specific heat: p _m ≡ mass density : K ≡ thermal conductivity).
2	(1/μό)	current-density vector J	Skin-effect equation used in electromagnetic theory and electrical engineering (μ = magnetic inductive capacity: equation also holds for the electric and magnetic field
	asdeom	Moro omile	vectors E and R. respectively.
3	K	concentration (U) (in gm/cm ³)	Used in physical chemistry (K = diffusivity constant measured in cm ² /sec.)
4	C _v	ecxess hydrostatic pressure (U)	Used in the theory of consolidation of soil. ($C_v \equiv$ coefficient of consolidation)
5	(1/RC)	potential (e) and current (i) along an electrical cable	Equation governing the propagation of potential (e) and current (i) along an electric cable. (R = resistance per unit length: C = capacitance per unit length).

R. S. KAUSHAL

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Table 1 (contd): Some analogous applications of eq. (3)

S. No.	Constant C ₁	Dependent Variable (φ)	Remarks about eq. (3)
6	D	relative concentration c	Study of diffusion in gases. (D ≡ diffusion coefficient: C ≡ no. of gas molecules in unit Vol./no. of gas molecules in total Vol.).
of the	C ₁	To the hixe	Stochastic quantum mechanics. ($c_1 = h^2/2m : h = Planck$ constant $/2\pi$. $m = particle mass$)
8	od osie kod dynasio bi dosa os A	P	Describing an aggregation of slime mold Amoebae
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Table 2: Some analogous applications of the function (5)

	Table 2: Some analogous apprications of the function (5)								
S. No.	independent variable x	constant α	function f (x)	remarks about the function (5)					
1	time t	decay constant λ	No. of atoms present at any time t:N (t)	Describes the law of radioactive disintegration : $(f_o \equiv N_o$, the no. of atoms present at $t = 0$).					
2	time t	inverse of the capacitative time const. Y _c (= RC) ⁻¹	charge on the condensor at any time t: Q(t)	Describes the discharge of a condensor in the RC -circuit. ($f_o \equiv Q_o$). the charge at $t = 0$).					
3	time t	some constant	.temprerature at any time t:Q (t)	Describes the Newton's law of cooling with surrounding temperature (θ) as zero. ($f_0 \equiv \theta_0$ some constant temprature at $t = 0$).					
4	distance x	absorption coefficient (y)	intensity at the point x	Describes the law of absorption of sound or light ($f_0 \equiv 1_0$, the intensity at the point $x = 0$)					
5	height z	inverse of the characteristic lenght h of the Boltzmann distribution in gravitation field	density at height z: p(z)	Barometric height formula $p(z)=p_0 \exp(z/h)$, which describes the variation of density with height in gravitational field: $(f_0 = p_0)$ the density at $z = 0$.					
6	energy E(x,y,z,)	(=kT/mg) α≡(κT) -¹ k≡Boltzmann constant and T≡abs.	probability per unit volume: n(x.y,z,)	Describes the Boltzmann distribution in classical statistics: $(f_0 \equiv n_0$, the normalization constant)					
7	inverse of temperature (=T-1)	temperature (E/R) with E=activation energy R≡gas cons.	rate constant (k)	Arrhenius eqn, describing the behaviour of reaction rate as a function of temperature.					

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SAKA - IT'S NATURE, ROLE & STATUS IN ADVAITIC TRADITION

SANJAY KUMAR SHUKLA

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The concept of Sākṣī is of crucial importance in Advaitic epistemology. It is considered as the highest observer in me, the most unaffected witness of my activities. The attitude of impartial spectator or neutral seer truly depicts the real nature of witness consciousness (Sākṣī Caitanya). The consciousness is considered as the very nature of self. Advaita Vedānta like Sāmkhya makes a distinction between the consciousness which is the nature of the self & the consciousness that is due to a mode of the mind. The self is consciousness as (Svarūpa jñāna), where as the mental mode leads to consciousness of (Vrtti jñāna). The objective knowledge requires mental mode and prototype consciousness which is also described as the witness consciousness (Sākṣī Caitanya). When I say "I know this is a pot," how is the knownness of the pot known? The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view is that it is known through reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya jñāna). But this will lead to infinite regress: The Advaitic position is that the knownness of an object is revealed by the witnness consiousness. It is directly manifest to the Sākṣī without being objectified. This is self manifestedness (Svaprakāśattva) of knowledge in the true sense. While cognitions manifest object, it is the witness that manifests cognitions. It is not cognitive modes alone, but also all modes of the mind such as desire, pleasure and pain etc, are directly revealed by the Sākṣī. There is one more significant instance where there is awareness because of the witness, without the instrumentation of a cognitive mode - the awareness of the absence of objects as in deep sleep. Here unknownness is also known due to the revealing principle - the witness self. It is the eternal, immutable, pure awareness (cinmatra),. It is on the basis of the self that all empirical knowledge takes place, involving the disinction

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October 1999

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of cognizer, means of cognition and object of cognition. Rāmānuja does not accept the Advaitic standpoint that the ātman_is only onlooker (Sākṣī) while the ego (ahaiṅkara) is the real knower, doer and enjoyer. The nature of ātman is to be the I - consciousness (ahamdhi) but not mere consciousness (jñāna) or mere witness consciousness (Sākṣī Caitanya). The I is always the I - consciousness and as the "I", the ātman itself is the agent of all the functions. The ego as the product of prakṛti cannot be the knower, the doer, and the enjoyer, for it is unconscious like Prakṛti.

śamkarācārya establishes identity between the Brahman and the jiva and for his reason what falls within the range of the object is a superimposition on subject, is interpreted as subjective idealism. To remove this misconception, it had only to be pointed out that the subject which finds itself confronted by an object is also a super imposition on the brahman like the object The Jīva experienced as the "I" is superimposition on the Sākṣī, Sākṣī on Iśvara and finally Iśvara superimposition on the Brahman. The author of citradīpa maintains that the Brahman is pure consciousness not limited by māyā and Iśvara is the same reflected in the impression left in māyā by the intellect of the jīvas. Sākṣī or Kūṭastha is the pure consiousness limited by the gross and subtle bodies of the jīva, while jīva is reflection of mind positied in Kūṭastha. Iśavara is conceived with reference to the jīva but Brahman is without this reference. Sākṣī is unaffected perceiver of the actions and enjoyments of the jīva of empirial individual.

Every individual is aware of himself as a doer and as an experiencer. But in his self recognition (Ātma bodha) no subject object relation is involved. The self shines of itself and is not objectified. He is aware of the empirical self; the ego, but not of the changeless luminous self ever distinct from the psycho-physical adjunct as its witness. The realization of this identy leads to the immediate apprenhension of the self as nondual, non relational consciousness that Brahman is. The whole world of phenomena is grounded on pure consciousness which is idential with pure Being (Brahman). Behind the ever changing ego Brahman shines as the immutable self (Kuṭastha.) While the individual self (Jīva) functions as the experiencer (bhoktā) and the doer (kartā), the immutable (Kūṭastha) stays behind as the witness (Sākṣī) of all cognitions and actions. The witnessing self that transcends the ego illuminates all that is known and unknown to him!

Sāk ṣ ī - It's Nature, Role & Status In Advaitic Tradition

The individual self finds expression as the ego (Aham Vṛtti or ahamkāra), a mode of mind that transmits consciousness. By introspection and an act of witharawl which can be compared with phenomenologocal method of epoche and reduction, a person can aprehend himself as witness of his mental states. Indeed a jñāna is the basic limiting adjunct of an embodied being. It forms his causal body, which is the root of the subtle and the gross body. Ajñāna rests on the Kuṭastha, the immutable self, its witness (Sākṣī) which is uncontaminated by it. One and the same indwelling self is experiencer (as reflected consciousness) and the witness (as immutable consciousness). So self is distinct from the ever changing psycho-physical constitution. Waking, dream and dreamless sleep are the primary states of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa). The luminous self as the witness under lies them all.

II

It is from the preliminary discussion of sākṣī that we are now in a position to reflect upon its nature. It is that which remains self indentical in all the three states (waking etc.) which resides in the two bodies gross and subtle, but without undergoing any modifications². Avidyā has two fold functions of obscuring and projecting - it obscures the Kūṭastha while projecting the jīva. Being obscured, its intrinsic characteristics like unrelatedness, blissfulness etc. remain hidden. I itself is not the nature of Kūṭastha, but is only imposed on it. Jīva or cidābhāsa is the reflection of kūṭastha. Avidyā is known by the self consciousness and is directly known in itself (Svarūpa). Sākṣī is that consciousness which is reflected in avidyā vṛtti. Like an eclipsed sun, avidyā is revealed by that consciousness which it covers3. The Mundakopanisad gives a beautiful imagery of differentiation between the jīva and the Sākṣīin in the following lines - "Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self - same tree. Of these two, the one eats the sweet fruit and the other looks on without eating4. So sākṣīin is one who is free from the agency etc. and as such a non-involved consciousness. It is pointed out in Vedāntakaumudi that Prajnā issāk sī, as he is deviod of cause, attributes etc. and has particular nature of God. He is the motivator of attachment and detachment of human desires but he himself, remains non-involved. The Svetāśvatara upanisad Puts the nature of Sākṣī in this way - The one God hidden in all beings, all pervading, the inner self of all beings, the ordainer of all deeds, dwells in all beigns the witness,

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while jīva eference to erceiver of

encer. But olved. The al self; the no-physical mmediate trahman is. a is idential ines as the ons as the ays behind g self that the knower the only one devoid of all qualities. The concept of sākṣīn is a typical notion of Advaita Vedānta which may be called the principle of objectivity. By the principle of objectivity it is Meant that it reveals an object or state as it is in non-personal way, Ācārya Śamkara defines Sākṣī in this sense - it is witness of all meaning threby omniscient - Sarveṣū Bhutānām Sākṣī Sarvadṛṣṭā. Sākṣī is conscious reality which is the seer or witness of the mental modification and that what we are in ourselves. Sākṣī is different from I consciousness which resides in all and is considered to be one immutable and eternal. Jīvais knower, doer and enjoyer while Sākṣī is neutral seer and is self evident. Jīva has to undergo different stages of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep while Sākṣī is immutable (Kūṭastha) by nature. It is from this that we are not justified in inferring that Sākṣī is ultimate reality (Brahman). The argument of Suresvara is that in Brahman the predicate of Sākṣitva is beyond human imagination because Sākṣī is always in need of other to witness it. It is quite logical question to be framed at this crucial juncture that if there is neither jīva nor Brahman to be called as Sākṣī then can there be the possibility of third which is fit case for being called sākṣī. The reply of Sureśvarācārya is on expected line - The immutable atman limited or conditioned by ignorance is sākṣī. The real import of this statement is that the distinction of knower and object known (Jñāta & Jñeya) is index of ignorance, but sākṣī is truly speaking conscious in nature.

Sarvajñātma Muni has made serious attempt to explain how sākṣī sees the world. Sākṣī or Kūṭastha sees the phenomenal world of ignorance in a unique way, as conscious in nature, passively, unaided by senses and finally as witness or non-involved conciousness?

Śaṁkarācārya maintains Sākṣī to be self evident or self proof which cannot be cancelled. No proof is needed at all for establishing sākṣī as it is self luminous. Swami vidyāraṅya in Nātak dīpprakaraṇa of Pañcdaśi analyses the nature of sākṣī - That consciousness which reveals at one and the same time the agent, the action and the external objects, such conscious reality is called witness. It illumines the all like lamp placed in theatre - Bhasyate Sarva Nṛṭyasā lāstha dīpvat. It is universal in spatial context while it is witnessing in reference to witness, but it is beyond speech and categories of intellect (vāg Buddhihagocara). The light in the dancing hall uniformly reveals the patron, the audience and the dancer even when they are

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modi of be absent the light continues to shine¹⁰. In this illustration the patron is the ego, the various sense objects are the audience, the intellect is the dancer, the muscian playing on their instruments are the sense organs and the light illuminating them all is the witness consciousness¹. The witness consciousness lights up the ego, the intellect and the sense objects. Even when ego etc. are absent, it reamins self luminous as ever¹².... The unchangeable witness is ever present as self luminous consciousness; the intellect functions under its light and dances in a variety of ways. As the light reveals all the objects remaining in its own place so the witness consciousness itself ever motion less, illumine the objects within and without¹³.

Advita Vedanta in order to reach the very foundation of knowing arrives at the notion of witness self (sākṣī) which stands behind everything that is known, which reveals eternally and without the break. The saksi is the ground of the notion 'I' the reality to which the 'I' is ascribed. Our experience is a stream of conciousness. Knowledge is not merely a succession but also a fusion or a synthesis. To know things to be different we require an indentical knower for all the different, Which therefore must also be different from the differents. The Kantian transcendental unity of pure apperception is logical presupposition of all our knowledge and experience and in similar fahion Advaita Vedanta has to accept the concept of sākṣī as the very foundation of knowledge, but it is something substantial or ontological, not merely the frame of reference for the variety of mental states held together. It is sui generis and remains self identical amidst all change. Husserl also talks about transcendental ego or subjectivity which is decidedly ontological in nature, but the major difference between Sākṣī and transcendental ego is that in Advaitic tradition we have foundational consciousness while in phenomenology consciousness is always intentional.

Ш

According to Advaita Vedānta, in the perception of an external object the mind (manas or antaḥkaraṇa) goes out to the object through the senses (indriyas). The sense therefore act as the vehicle of the movement of the antaḥkaraṇa towards the object and on reaching the object the antaḥkaraṇa is identified with it. The modification of mind (antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti) cannot amount to knowledge on account of being unconscious and has therefore to be illumined by the ātman, the cit, which is there as the observer (sākṣīin) of all changes. It is therefore held that the activity

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of the antaḥkaraṇa is case of perception consists in rending the veil of ignorance (āvaraṇābhibhāva)¹⁴. In all knowledge situations there is present self shining transcendental light of consiousness which imparts to the object its character of immediacy. Consciousness in this aspect is called the sākṣīin or the witness. It is so called because it is conceived as the impartial spectator which takes no part in the ever changing process of knowledge, but only lights it up or passively witness it. The sākṣīin which participates in the process of empirical activity is not taken completely as transcendent in character. But sākṣīin need not exhaust itself within the confines or the empirical individual (jīva). The common import of Sākṣīin is seen or experiencing without being agent of the act concerned (akartṛtve sati draṣṭrvam). Even as evidencing it is a unique activity - an activity that implies no agency. The said evidencing principle may prove to be the transcendental precondition of all particular instances of perceiving.

The Advaita refutes the Naiyāyika contention as to the possibility of mental perception (manaspratyakṣa) of self as qualified by mental states. The position that self as endowed with the attributes of pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. is knowable by the same self through mental perception would involve the fallacy of contradiction of subject and object (Karma-Kartṛ Virodha)¹⁵. Again to treat self under two aspect - pure and qualified -in order to avoid such contradiction would be too sophisticated an approach. Thus behind the physicomental complex commonly called Jīva there is to be traced the invariable background of consciousness subsisting essentially in unmediated evidencing¹⁶. This alone may be regarded as the inner essence of individual which evidences the series of mental states (aseṣa -Svapracara-Saksi). The constantly evidencing character of the inner self makes itself felt with immediate certitude, ever indubitable and uncancelled¹⁷.

Though Jīva and Sākṣīin are not two different entities, both being grounded in consciousness, they still indicate two perspectives in which the foundational consciousness operates in mental life. While in the case of Jīva, pure consciousness in all appearance is circumscribed by mind - antanḥkaraṇa -vacchinam-as the qualifying attributes, in the case of Sākṣīin mind can at best serve as just limiting condition - antaḥkaraṇa - upahita Caitanya. Thus while the qualifying attribute (viṣesaṇa) differentiates its subject as directly related to the function predicated of it Kāryānvayi Vartamānam Vyāvartakam, the limiting condition (Upādhi)

differentiates but is not connected with the function (apparently) predicated of it - Kāryanvayi Vartamanām Vyāvartakam. This can be regarded as an appropriate fromal syntactical translation of the phenomenological situation pertaining to Jīva and Jīva Sākṣīin. Extending this model of division to the cosmic level in total perspective of Māyā the distinction between the God (Is'vara) as qualified by his power of creation, (māyāvacchinam Caitanyam) and God (Is'vara) Sākṣī) conceived as the detached witness of his creative power - māyāpahitam Caitanyam can be made. In other words, it is an analouge of what prevails on the Jīva level-pure conciousness remaining the foundational stream in both the contexts. Jīva Sākṣī is to be distinguished from Is'vara Sākṣī which is associated with cosmic creativity (māyāpahita Caitanyam) and is one.

IV

Sākṣī is selfevident principle so to construct proof for its existence will be excercise in futility. We can at best offer philosophical justification for accepting it-

l. what really happens when one goes to sleep? There seem to be intermittent periods of lapsing into total unconsciousness. Had there been a break in the flow of consciousness one could not on waking resume the threads of personal identity¹⁸. On waking up one says "I slept soundly, I didn't know anything". Paradoxially this not knowing of anything is itself known. Consciousness does not remain ignorant of its own ignorance. The sleeping self is thus revealed as revealing the darkness (Ajñāna) which is a kind of loose embodiment for the self, and which is the matrix of all distinctions and differentiations of the waking life. Therefore revelation is absolute and timeless, depending in the adventitious fact of their being something to be revealed. Advaita makes a basic distinction between consciousness and knowledge. Knowledge is the revelation of objects by means of modifications (Vrttis), while consciousness is the principle of revelation it self, without their being a principle of revelation the entire world would be plunged in darkness (Jagad Āndhya Prasanga).

2. Dreams are a unique experience in many respects. Its contents though being shown up as external, are really pulsations of the mind. The mind or rather avidyā ilself as associated with the sleeping self gets directly transformed into the dream

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objects. The importance of dream state lies in the fact that it is here that the nature of consciousness as selfluminous becomes most explict. Since during dream all external illumination ceases and yet perception of objects is not hindered. This light can be of none other than the self itself. The most plausible hypothesis is that it is Sākṣī consiousness on which all dream experience is based. The Sākṣī witness what are essentially its own creatures.

- 3. Illusion is a private experience; the appearance of something which should not have appeared. The illusory object being non-empirical, so it cannot be known by any pramāna. The illusory object is however never hidden, it has no unknown existence and finally its sole existence is in being perceived (Pratibhasamātra. Śarirvatva) - esse est percipi. The illusory being non empirical cannot be known by the empirical I (pramātā). Illusion is thus a highly complex affair. Its content is not real as it is sublated, nor is it unreal being identical with real ground. Advaita speaks of two Vrttis in explaining the genesis of illusion - the antahkaran Vrtti and avidyāvṛtti In rope snake analogy the antaḥkaraṇa pertaining to the 'this' part which is real. Avidyavritti. pertains to the ascribed part- Snake. Since the contents of the two Vrttis belong to different levels they are cognized by two different 'selves'. The 'this' is known by an empirial I (pramāta) in normal way, while snake cannot be known by empirical means and therefore really perceived by the transcendental self (Sākṣī). So the judgement 'this is snake' is both true and false, true in referring to the real this and false in referring to an unreal ascription. The real and unreal are both equally objects of Sākṣi which reveals everything.
- 4. Internal states like feelings of pleasure and pain, emotion of anger and grief and other mental states occupy a peculiar place in the economy of the ordinary experience. They are qualities modification (Upādhi) of intellect (buddhi) in which the real self is reflected. In knowing pleasure I percieve, not the self as such, but only the self as characterised by this quality. A vṛtti is still involved as consciousness has not shed its intentionality, but it is a vṛtti of a very different kind. The Sākṣi has no covering (āvaraṇa) and its knowledge does not depend on that type of Vṛti which functions by destroying covering (āvaraṇa abhibhāva). Finally the vṛti does not have to go out, as pleasure is in immediate contact with the Sākṣī.
- 5. Knowledge is revelation of what is already there (Vastutantra) and does not add to and distort it in any manner. The object however is inert (jada) and must be

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not add must be evidenced by something else. There is no experience that is not witnessed no nihsākṣika anubhava. The principle of illumination is consciousness (caitanaya). Revelation of the object is not adding anything to it, but it is only removing the covering that obstructed knowledge. The obstruction that hides things is ignorance (Ajñāna) and what removes the obstruction or limitation is a Vrtti. The subject or knower is consciousness, but limited by egoism (ahamkāra) having the adjunct of T-is pramātr caitanya. The object too is essentially consciousness (viṣaya caitanya) again circumscribed by various limiting conditions. Here is the crucial role of vittis penetrating through the covering of ignorance and showing the nature of hoth as the same consciousness. There must be some consciousness from which avidyā cannot hide anything, and always everything is revealed to it. This is Sāksī caitanya which is ultimate principle of revelation on which is imposed all plurality, all epistmeic distinction of knower, known and knowledge. It reveals everything without exception, whether known or unknown, it is called omniscient. (Sarvajña) How is such trancedental consciousness to be apprehended? Objects are known by paramāṇas, which themselves presuppose the self, and cannot prove the latter. How can the knower itself be known? It canot be known by other consciousness there cannot be knower behind the knower, without launching an infinite regress. Nor could it be known by itself; the subject cannot be its own object. The self is not the subject and object at once (Karma Kartrtva Virodha). The seer of seeing cannot be seen (Na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāram paṣyeh). The knower remains unknown (Avijñātam Vijñātṛ). Since who will know the knower (Vijnātarām are kena Vijāniyāt.) It can be only discovered regressively, as the presupposition of the very possibility of knowing. The self is therefore described as pratyagātman the inward or backward (pratyak) principle of knowledge. It is evident in itself, unknown yet immediate. Though unknown, its existence is however undeniable, Since denial itself is the Vindication of awareness. Advaida Vedānta makes a distinctiona between self luminosity. svayam Prakāsa) and self consciousness (Svasamvedanā). The essence of consciousness is its unrelatedness (asanga), it is so pure that it is not even related lo itself in terms of self consciousness. It is in itself (en soi) but not for itself (Pour Soi). It does not require the intervention of any vitti or pramāṇa to make its self luminosity evident. Finally Advaita Vedānta distinguishes empirical I (Pramātā) from the witness consciousness (Sākṣī -Caitanya). The empirical I cannot remain indifferent to what it sees. It is itself involved and cannot be neutral and therefore

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will reject and illusory. But the illusory is revealed by witness consciousness and therefore witness reality and illusory with equal indifference²⁰.

V

It is now time to discuss ontological status of Sākṣīin. Some advaitins draw a distinction between the dual aspects of Sākṣīin - treascendent and immutable (Kūṭastha) on the one hand, and immanent and functional (Taṭastha) on the other. According to this distinction in the immanent and functional aspect alone does the notion imply evidencing function and correspondingly the evidenced continuum (dṛṣya). In its ultimate nature as pure consciousness, however, self would involve no reference, even detached. The status of Sākṣīin iṣ defined in two fold way epistemologocal and ontological, the former pertaining to jīva and the latter to Brahman. In anticipation of the ontological, the two aspects are sought to be reconciled by Jñānaghana in Tattva suddhi - Parmārthato Brahmāt yepi Pratibhāsataḥ Sākṣinaḥ Saṁsāri antarbhāva eva.

The Sākṣī is the pure nonrelated consciousness, the impartial and timeless witness of everything. But it is not proper to equate it with Brahman. Thoughin itself unrelated, the Sākṣī is discriminated only in a relational context. It cannot be evidenced in the absence of something to be illumined. Brahman is not the seer, since there is no other to be seen. Brahman is the utter beyond the turiya, it is not Sākṣī, as even ajñāna is not there to be witnessed. The relation between the transcendental self (Sākṣī) and the empirical self (pramātā or jīva) is peculiar in nature. They are not really two independent selves leading their own private and parallel lives. The subject or the seer or rather the principle of seeing is pure consciousness or the ultimate self (Sākṣī). Brahman is not the subject, since the subject object distinction is meaningles in that context. It is a seer transcendence of all duality. So far as the empirical self is concerned, Sākṣī is the real self. It cannot however be apprehended in isolation, since egoity is always super imposed on it. It is not distinguished by the empirical subject (Jīva), because ignorance hides the self and projects the ego instead. Sākṣī is the ground which underlies the Jīva illusion.

There may be disagreement regarding the number of Sākṣī which can be easily resolved through critical analysis. - The pramātā or I, is defined as

antaḥkaraṇavācchinna or anthakarana viśiṣṭa, but the Sākṣī is either described as antahkaranopahita or avidyopahita. In the first case it would be individual and many. But who is to witness the different Sākṣīis? The proposition is not, assertible, being self-stultifying. There can be only one Sākṣī, and it is therefore avidyopahita, not antaḥkaraṇo-pahita. Isvara is described as māyopahita. Though it operates within the framework of ignorance, it is not deluded by the latter. He sees thus the real and unreal at once, and nothing remains hidden from him. For Isvara there can be no unknown existence. In all these respects the concept of Isvara is comparable to that of sākṣi for which knowledge is direct revelation. Here we can make distinction hetween Iśvara and sākṣi. Iśvara is not bound and has never been in bondage. Sākṣī 100 may be said to be free, but it is not conscious of its freedom, and cannot even make distinction between bondage and freedom. Sākṣī is witness consciousness as it passively witness real as well as illusory and can therefore be said to be neutral. Isvara apart from being neutral seer (Sākṣī or dṛṣṭa) is immanent inner controller (antaryāmi) of cosmic process, while the Sākṣi is bare witness of the Jiva and his actions. So in the ontological framework of Advaita Vedanta apart from adhoc distinction between the Jīvas and the Brahman two other principles are recognised · Iśvara and Sākṣī in which Sākṣī comes in between Iśvara and Jī va.

NOTES

- Sarvam Vastu Jñātatayā vā Ajñatatayā vā Sākṣī Caitnayasya Viṣaya Eva 52 Pañc Pādika Virvaraṇa.
- Adhişţhānatayā Dehadvayā Vacchinna Cetanaḥ Kuţavan Nir Vikārena Sthitaḥ Kūţastha Uchyate - VI 22 Pañcdaśī.
- Ate Evocyate Rāhuvat Svāvṛta Citanya Prakāśyā Vidyeti page 575 Advaita Siddih.
- Dvā Suparņā Sayujā Sakhāyā Samānam Vrsam Parisasva Jāte I Tayor Anyaḥ Pippalam Svady Atty Anasannanyo Bhicākasiti II III 1.1 Mundaka Upanisad.
- 5. Eko Devah Sarvabhūteşu Gūdhah Sarva Vyāpi Sar-Vabhūtāntarātma I Karmādhyakşah Sarvabhūtādhivāsas Sākşī Cetā Kevalo Nirgunaśca II - VI, 11 Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

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- Aham Pratyaya Vişaya Kartā Vyatirekena Tat Sākṣī I. Sarvabhūṭastha Sam Ekah Kūṭastha Nityaḥ Puruṣaḥ II - 1.1.4 Brahmsūtra Śāmkara Bhāsya.
- Tamsā Vinirmitamidam Sakalm Caturah Na Paśyanti Paraḥ Puruṣaḥ I
 Avikāri Bodhavpuradvyakaḥ Kāranervinā sakal sākṣītmyā II 2.29 Saṃkṣepa Sārīraka.
- 8. Svayam Siddhasyā Ca Sākṣino Apratyābhaye Yatvāt I 2.2.228 Brahmasūtra Śāthkāra Bhāsya.
- 9. Kartarām Kriyām Tvad Dvyā Vyāvrtvişayānapi Sphoraye Dekyatnena Yo Sau, Sāksyatra Ci Dvapuḥ II x 9 Pañcadaśī.
- Nṛtyasālā sthito Dīpaḥ Prabhum, Sabhyām Srava Nartkim I dīpyed Viseşena Tad
 Abhāve Api Dīpyate II x II Ibid.
- 11. Ahamkāraḥ Prabhuḥ Sabhyā Vişaya Nartaki Matiḥ Talādi Dhārinya Kṣāni Dīpah Sākṣya Avabhasakaḥ II x 14 *Ibid.*
- 12. Aha mkāram Dhiyam Sākṣī Viṣyān Api Bhāsyet I Ahamkār Adyabhave Api Svayam Bhāsyaeva Pūrvavat II x 12 *Ibid*.
- 13. Svasthān Sansthito Dīpah Sarvato *Bhāsyedyathā* Sthir Sthāyi Tathā Sākṣī Bahirantaḥ prakāśayet. II x-15 *Ibid*.
- 14. Jivasya Jagad Upādānatve Āvaraṇābhibhāvārtha: page 479 Sidhdhānta Vindu quoted in Advaita Siddhi.
- 15. Mānas Pratyakṣa Vedyatve Iccādeh Karma Karṭṛvbhāvasya Bādhakatvāt -W, page 381 f. Cit -Sukhi.
- 16. Tam Pracāram Aśesam Asangitayā Avikāritvena Ca Hanopādān Sunyaḥ Sɨkṣāl Avyavadhānam Avabhās Yati citidhatuḥ Page 35 Pañca Pādika.
- Asya Sākṣinah Sadā Asandigdha, Aviparītasya Nitya Sākṣātkāratā Anāgantuka Prakāstave ghaṭate -II Pages 28 Bhāmatī.
- 18. The concept of Sākṣi In Advita Vendānta A.K. Chatterjee & R.R. Dravid, Page 49.
- 19. Ibid. Page 50
- 20. Ibid. Page 93

Sākṣī- It's Nature, Role & Status In Advaitic Tradition

587

21. Draşţrtvaghatitam Sākşitvam Na Svarūpam Apitu Udāsinobodhātmakameva Sākşitvam Svarūpam, Tasya Nispratiyogika Svarūpatvāt: Page 441. Advaita Dīpikā.

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BOOK REVIEW-I

Hetu-bindu of Dharmakī rti. Sanskrit text, English translation, Introduction and detailed Notes by Pradeep P Gokhale. Sri Satguru Publication/Indian Books Centre, Delhi, 1997; pp. i-xxxv, 1-146.

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The original Sanskrit text of Dharmakī rti's Hetu-binduis lost in the antiquity. Rahula Sanskrityayana and Ernest Steinkellner have brought out independently two versions of the text in Sanskrit using the available Tibetan materials. Pradeep Gokhale's edition is a reconstruction of the text based on Rahula Sanskrityayana's and Ernest Steinkellner's versions supported by his own independent research on the authenticity and correctness of the text. Gokhale's is the first English translation of Hetu-bindu. The work is enriched further with his 20 page Introduction, 45 page extensive Notes, and 4 page Glossary of technical terms. All this makes the book really an impressive production, and I am sure it will certainly become a proud possession of the scholars of Buddhist logic and epistemology the world over.

Gokhale's English translation is literal and readable, although at places it seems to do violence to the common sense. For instance, "Hetu-bindu" i stranslated as "A Point on Probans", and "svahbā va" is rendered as "self-nature". I am not a Sanskritist, but given a choice I would have translated "Hetu-bindu" as "The Nature of Arguments" and deleted "self" as redundant serving no useful communicative purpose form the rendering of "svabbā va" as "self nature". However, literality of the translation preserves textual fidelity of the work, and this itself is worth having.

Apart from the text, Gokhale's extensive Introduction and detailed Notes contain rich material on Dharmakīrti's theory of hetu(arguments, justification) and also on his theory of knowledge and reality.

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In the Introduction and the Notes Gokhale's interpretation of Dharmaki rtij's trairūpyamakes me much uncomfortable. He seems to hold that $k\bar{a}$ rya-hetuand anupalabdhi-hetuare "explainable in terms of s v a b hā va (-hetu)"(p.xxiii). He appears to use the expression "explainable" in the strong sense in which his view turns out to be a reductionist interpretation of $trair\bar{u}pya$, a reductionism of $k\bar{a}rya$ and annupalabdhi to svabhā va-hetu. I do not know why he suggests this. His gloss on it (pp. xxiii-xxv) does not help much; for it requires acceptance of another set of assumption, e.g., (p. xxiii) uniformity and indivisibility (svabhā va) of a thing, which themselves are in need of clarification and substantiation. I believe that Gokhale's motivation to explain trairūpya in terms of svabhā va-hetu lies in his ambitious program to show that the "doctrine of svabhā va (self-nature, essence) is central to Dharmakī rti's philosophy", that Dharmakī rti "presents his doctrine of momentariness in terms of this concept" (p.xxii). He adds: "One of the important features of Dharmaki rti's acceptance of s va bhavava da is that he accepts it in a logical sense and not a metaphysicl sense (p.xxv). On. Gokhale's construction, s vā bhava vā da in its logical sense takes the form of the law of identity and double negation..... "Every thing is such that it is what it is.....symbolically, "All A is A". The other side of the same coin is "Everything is such that it is other than what it is not", symbolically, "All A is not not A" (p.xxv). Thus, on his view, "s vā bhavavā da as accepted by Dharmakīrti, can be called logical essentialism". (p.xxv). One need not go into the argument for this thesis. One would like, however, to remark that this thesis does not go well with Dharmakī rti's Buddhist world view of sarvam antiyam and sarvam kşanikam. Dharmakī rti defines vastutvam in terms of kṣaṇikatvam (Yet sat tat Kṣaṇikam) p.11), and not the other way round. The principle of kṣaṇikatvam is conceptually primitive to Dharmakī rti's philosophical framework, and the principle of satt vam is derivative within the framework. This quotidian understanding of Dharmakī rti is quite recalcitrant to accepting Gokhale's interpretation that Dharmakī rti presents his doctrine of momentariness in terms of s $v\bar{a}$ $bh\bar{a}$ va (logical essentialism). In effect, his interpretation turns out to be an \bar{a} Buddhist and equally false of Dharmakī rti' overall theoretical framework and is intuitive presuppositions.

Again, I am not sure if Dharmakī rti formulates s v a b hā va -hetu as the law of identity "A is A", or as the law of double negation. "A is not not A". I am

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afraid he does not do this. Not in Pramā ņa vā rtika not in Nyā ya-bindu, not even in Hetu-bindu. For him, hetu has to be synthetic and significant statement. It is conceptually significant as in svabhā va-hetu, causally significant as in Kā rya-hetu, and contrafactually significant as in anupalabdhi hetu. A law of logic, e.g., identity or double negation, may not be synthetic; and as such it is of no use to Dharmakī rti, particularly when he regards anumāna explicitly as an instrument of knowing facts in and about the world.

Dharmakī rti clearly specifies the meaning of svabhā va when he speaks of svabhā va-hetu. We have svabhā va-hetu when $s\bar{a}$ dhya-dharmasya vastutas - tadbhā vatayā $s\bar{a}$ dhana-dharma-bhā vamā tra-nubandha-siddhih (p.11). Thus, the conceptual relation between ksanikatvam and vastutvam instantiates svbhā va-hetu (antitye kasminscitsā dhye sattvamiti(p.14). To show that something is anityam, one cites the hetu (argument) that it is ksanikam (or sattvam where sattvam is defined in terms of ksanikam). Alternatively, we have svabhā va-hetu when there is tā tā tamya relationship between ta tahana and ta tahya as between 'being a simsipā 'and 'being a tree'. To justify that something is a tree one has only to show that it is a simsapā.

From what I have said so far it follows that Gokhale' interpretation of svabhā va-hetuis quite at variance with Dharmakī rti's analysis of it besides it carries conceptual encumbrances which Dharmakī rti's theory does not.

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explain the relevant argument structure involving a contrafactual conditional. The argument, then, would read like this: Something is not the case. (Thesis). All the conditions under which this would be the case are satisfied, and yet this is not the case. (Hetu). (Therefore, that thing is not the case). If I am right in this thinking, it follows then that Gokhale's attempt to show that trairūpyais explainable in terms of svabhāva-hetu alone is not only tenuous but it is false of Dharmakīrti's account of it.

In his Notes, Gokhale comments at length on anupalabdhi and anupalabdhi-hetu. He observes that Dharmakīrti rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika view that non-existence (a b h ā v a) is a separate category, and also the Mimamsaka thesis that non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) is an independent pramāņa. I believe that Gokhale is right in this observation. But, then he adds: "Non-existence is the existence of the other and non-apprehension is apprehension of the other. So. basically, non-apprehension (i.e., non-perception) is a kind of perception, a kind of pratyaksa". (p. 124). Thus, on Gokhale's view, Dharmakīrti "reduces 'perception of non-existence' to 'perception of existence (of the other alone)" (p.124). I'm afraid Gokhale invites an argument here. If I am reading him right, he appears to suggest that, for Dharmakīrti, anupalabdhi is indeed a matter of perception (pratyakṣā, although it is perception of the existence of the other. If this is so then Gokhale's interpretation becomes, more or less, akin to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. Dharmakīrti would be the last person to buy this argument. It seems to me that Gokhale unwittingly isolates anupalabdhi from its natural context of justification of negation asserting statements, and he gives in to the temptation of treating it as a metaphysical category. But, he need not do this if he keeps in focus the context of justification in which Dharmakīrti discusses anupalabdhi. Dharmakīrti regards anupalabdhi as a type of hetuwhich a Buddhist of Dharmakīrti's persuasion cites for theses like "there is no vase on this table", "the table is not brown", "the soul is not etemal," "there does not exist a sky-flower". He does not consider it as an item on the list of padārtha-sor as one of the pramāṇa-s. He examines anupalabdhi as a type of hetu, an argument. We would do pretty well if we consider it in the justification context, and do not make it a part of pratyakşa as the Nyāya and Vaisesikas do. Making it one or the other form of pratyaksa would be simply false of Dharmakīrti theory of anupalabdhi, it may well be true of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,

Book Review -I

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In discussing $trair\bar{u}pya$, Dharmakīrti considers the questions of justification $(pram\bar{a}n\bar{a})$ and how these can be answered within his theoretical framework. He defines the different kinds of hetu-s (arguments) in support of different types of theses-one to which $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetu applies; second, to which $k\bar{a}rya$ -hetu is relevant; and third, for which anupalabdhi-hetu alone is acceptable. In his statement of $trair\bar{u}pya$, he legislates the kinds of hetu which could be said to be relevant and acceptable justification within his methodological framework. How the hetu statements themselves are validated and why these and no others are acceptable are questions at a different level of empirical and conceptual inquiry. The questions, e.g., how vyapti-s (generalities) are reached, what are the conditions to formulate them, and what are the criteria by which we accept them as reliable for purposes of anumana are questions asked at this higher level. Dharmakīrti examines these and other related questions in his discussions on the methodology of anvaya and vyatireka. But that's another issue, and. I need not go into it in this short review.

Despite some of these difficulties, the careful reader will find Pradeep Gokhale's book very rewarding in widening one's perspective on and understanding of Dharmakīrti's theory of reasoning epistemology and metaphysics.

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BOOK REVIEW-II

Svabhā va, Svabhā vahetu etc.: A clarification

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I am thankful to Prof. Vijay Bharadwaja for his compassionate and careful reading of my work on *Hetubindu*. I take this opportunity to clarify my position on some of the points raised by the reviewer.

While translating the *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti I was always in search of apt words and even today I cannot say that I am fully satisfied with my translation. I can very well understand the dissatisfaction of Prof. Bharadwaja. So far, I have not been able to convince myself of any better translation of the title 'Hetubindu' than the one I have provided. (For my reasons vide pp. 95-96 of the book.) The translation of 's vabhā va' as 'self-nature' could be reconsidered, though translating it as 'nature' can be misleading if we compare 's vabhā v a' and 'Parabhā va'.

Bharawaja's objections to my treatment of Dharmakīrti's doctrine of $svabh\bar{a}va$, however, seems to rest on some misunderstanding. I have said that the concept of $svabh\bar{a}va$, however, seems to rest on some misunderstanding. I have said that the concept of $svabh\bar{a}va$ operates as a central concept in both ontology and epistemology of Dharmakīrti. I have also pointed out that according to him not only $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetubut also $K\bar{a}rya$ -hetuand anupalabdhi-hetuare explanable in terms of $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetu as misquoted or alleged by Prof. Bharadwaja in his review). Here my approach is not reductionist. I have never wanted to suggest for instance, that $K\bar{a}rya$ -hetuaccording to Dharmakīrti is reducible to $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetu. My simple claim is that the notion of $K\bar{a}rya$ hetu when analysed, can be seen to contain the notion of $svabh\bar{a}va$. It is not reducible to $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetubecause it is more complex than that. Apart from the notion of $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetubecause it is more complex than that. Apart from the notion of $svabh\bar{a}va$ -hetu is concerned with the inferential knowledge of an aspect of a thing based on the knowledge of another

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 4
October 1999

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aspect of the same thing. $K\bar{a}ryahetu$ on the other hand is concerned with the knowledge of one thing or event on the basis of the knowledge of another thing or event which is caused by it. A basic variety of anupalabdhi viz, $svabh\bar{a}v\bar{a}nupalabdhi$, it may be urged, can be considered as a special variety of $svabh\bar{a}v-hetu$ because it is concerned with two (negative) aspects of one and the same thing. But we need not dilate on this point here.

Prof. Bharadwaja also seems to think that sat for Dharmakīrti is defined as kṣaṇika. This, I think, is a wrong interpretation of the statement viz. 'Yat saṭtat Kṣaṇikam' which is not a definition but a thesis which Dharmakīrti tries to prove. Sat according to Dharmakīrti is defined as $arthakriy\bar{a}$ $k\bar{a}$ ri (i.e. that which has a concrete function) from which Dharmakirti tries to derive momentariness. What I have observed is that Dharmakīrti's essentialism which is not metaphysical like the one which eternalists hold, but is logical, is compatible with his doctrine of mementariness.

Prof. Bharadwaja is also unhappy about my statement that non-apprehension (i.e. non-perception) is a kind of perception, a kind of pratyakṣa_I only urge him to concentrate on Dharmakīrti's own explanation of anupalabdhi-hetu. Why should otherwise Dharmakīrti say: "The absence of a thing is proved by the very proof of the existence of the other, because the exclusion of the other thing is proved by the same means of knowledge which establishes the thatness of the thing" (p.61)? 'The potless table' ('the other thing'), for example, is established by perception which does nothing but establishes the absence of a pot from the table is not a separate entity from 'the potless table'. Similarly the non-perception (i.e. absence of perception)

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of the pot on the table is not a separate entity from the perception of a pot-less table. So non-perception (which is a kind of perception) does not act as a probans (i.e. means to indirect knowledge) for the absence of a pot from the table (i.e. for the potless table) but as a means to direct knowledge. This is the reason why Dharmakīrti maintains that svābhcvānupalabdhi is a probans not for provingabhāva butabhā vavyavahā ra, as the former is directly and the latter is indirectly known by it. This is not a place to go into more details. But Prof. Bhardawaja's fear that my explanation of non-perception as a kind of perception is akin to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, is baseless, because Nyā y a -Vaiśeṣikas do not reduce 'absence of a thing' to 'existence of another thing' as Buddhists do. Nor do they identify non-perception with a kind of perception as the latter do.

Prof. Bharadwaja seems to be hesitant to appreciate this epistemology of perception and non-perception as found in *Hetubindu*, because Dharmakīrti, according to him, was concerned in this work with justification and not with cognitive epistemology. Though, I admit, Dhamakīrti is *primarily* concerned with the problem of justification in this work, he is not isolating this problem from that of cognition. His views on perception and non-perception as explained above may be taken as a part of his cognitive epistemology which is at the background of and hence inseparable from his justificatory epistemology.

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BOOK REVIEW-III

Madhuri Santanam Sondhi, *Modernity, Morality and The Mahatma*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt, Ltd, 1997. 254pp. ISBN 81-241-0565-0 (hardback).

"This above all, to refuse to become a victim" Margaret Atwood

Gavin de Becker in his now much-publicised book, *The Gift of Fear* advocates a practical philosophy to avoid victimhood. This is a lesson which Indian commentators have failed to recognise in their assessment of India's achievements or deficiencies over the last fifty years. The basic ingredients of modernity and morality enumerated with reference to the Mahatma, Aurobindo and Mallik could not have come at a more appropriate time. Dr. Sondhi provides an excellent overview of the ethical considerations of the processes and institutions of modernity. The overriding concern of this book is the degradation of the moral quality of social and public life in contemporary India, in the context of the Gandhian heritage.

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Dr. Sondhi provides an interesting summary of modernity as perceived by Gandhi, Aurobindo and Mallik. Whereas, Gandhi's synthesis of ideas about the transformation of spirit to a higher level of purpose was based on dharma. Aurobindo's synthesis of matter and spirit called for a distinctively universal quest and for spiritual regeneration. Here, the construction of a moral sense eschews a specific epistemological position, whereby a philosophical viewpoint dictates an ontology of purpose and action. This book reiterates the visceral qualities of the problematic of modernity fifty years after India's Independence. These issues become all the more relevant when tolerance of plurality has been consigned to the rubbish bin of the past and all forms of righteousness have been patented and orchestrated as another form of Swadeshi. In the last year we have witnessed a number of events that have caught the popular imagination of

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 4
October 1999

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the common public, for example, the controversial play Mi Nathuram Godse Boltoy which justifies the assassination of Gandhi. While few would distance themselves from what Gandhi stood for, fewer still would like to practice what he preached. Indeed, the image of Mahatma Gandhi has undergone a metamorphois, from being declared an avant-garde prophet of post-modernism, to being one who has been condemned as having forced a "cogealed mass of atavistic aspirations and prejudices to surface in the minds Indians and non-Indians alike" (Chaudhuri, 1997; Dasgupta, 1997).

The book is divided into four main chapters. Chapter I sets up the *Problematic of Modernity*, and then serves as the basis by which to evalutate the issues of modernity in India.

It is no doubt true that at the end of the twentieth century, we have been reduced to societal polarisation between a transplanted modernity and a defensive traditionalism. Here the author skilfully navigates through the Gellnerian eurocentric discourses of modernity. However, only the problematic of modernity is developed and one would have expected a more completely-reasoned critique as well, given the current topical emphasis on post-modernism. The monster of modernity is flogged as usual, as being self-defeating in social, cultural and human affairs(p.26). Can social violence be attributed only to modernisation and urbanisation? To equate modernity largely with imperial humiliation would lead to an essentialist viewpoint and would deny all civilisational advances till date (p.30). A systematic critique of modernity should embrace many more of the philosophical paradoxes underlying the modernist enterprise. In a sense, Gandhi decried the shift from the absolute, from Truth to method. After all, the primacy accorded science is out of proportion to its capacity to provide answers. Can philosophy replace science? The recent debates around realist positions (Bhaskar, 1989; Sayers, 1997) are cases in point. That science demands rationality, but is not defined by it, is a wonderful example of the limitations of method. Indian modernity has been characterised as a reaction against religion and its cultural attributes. Imperialism, having introduced individualism, tended to de-legitimise culture as well as traditional philosophy. Post-modernism is an essential reaction to this critique.

Chapter II, provides the Gandhian Point of Departure. This is based

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on the critique of modernity as provided by Gandhi himself in *Hind Swaraj*. The canvas is a metaphysical setting, within which the critique of modernity is applied on the basis of religion, morality and politics. A particularly useful summary is provided (pp. 115-117) on the political philosophy of modernity and Gandhi's departure from it. There is a clear elaboration of Gandhi's experiments in India. Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* focuses on these issues in an indirect manner. While Gandhi sought to democratise Indian politics, he was not able to moralise the same in any measure. This has been reflected in the recent precipitous decline in the Indian polity, where probity, morality and truth were last on the agenda of public and private action. Gandhi's fixation with a moral civilisation, located in the rural regions of India, remained for him transfixed in time and space. However, even during his own lifetime, rural India was undergoing rapid transformation and could no longer be idealised as a moral landscape.

Chapter III, places Gandhi's ideas of Modernity in the context of his two contemporaries, Aurobindo and Mallik. This is a rich and insightful chapter and provides much scope for future analysis. It is an excellent precursor to the debates on post-modernism and end of capitalism currently being discussed throughout the social sciences and humanities. Gandhi, as a conservationist, wanted to retain the best of the past traditions and introduce limited doses of modernity in a moral society. Aurobindo was both spirtitual and cultural, whereas Gandhi's philosophy was moral and socio-political. While there have been numerous studies of Aurobindo, by contrast, Mallik's thought has received little attention to date. Mallik was, however more interested in locating the problematic in a philosophical and social theory of history. He was more structural in his analysis and focused on the primacy of agency in transforming these structures. The peculiarity of the Mallikean position of holding individualism as the root cause of all ills of both Hindu and Muslim identity is an exciting alternative to the existing staid arguments. Mallik's individuals embody reality, not it an absolutist sense, but rather as part of the interdependent or dependent originational sense.

Chapter IV sets out the *Ethical Dynamism and the future society*. This chapter is designed towards a normative prognosis, and presents a somewhat prescriptive agenda for the future of India. A Gandhian approach toward the

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reconstruction of a moral society is advocated here. The author sets the terms for a debate on the contentious issues of gender, moral society, non-violence, extreme religiosity, of national purpose, for and against industrialisation and of rural-mindedness, and concerning village republics (in a Mainean vein).

However, a few caveats need to be noted. First, the contention of this study has been that the rationale which inspired a critique of modernity in Hind Swaraj is still applicable to India. However, given that Gandhi, Nehru and Jayprakash Narayan have become irrelevant to the modern generation, how can fairness and welfare be guaranteed by the state or by individuals (working for the state), with an heightened sense of social responsibility? Secondly, is it possible to establish moral renewal along with political freedom and economic growth, where corruption has become a national pastime? Can self regulation be introduced in any viable form? Thirdly, is there really any scope for a common moral space? And if so, can it be determined where it is to be located, or how it is to be created? Particularism of all kinds (especially Hindu and Muslim), has reared its ugly head from time to time. How far is it realistic to fit everything into the ambit of a moral space? Fourthly, would a greater redistribution of material goods reduce forms of violence against women, minorities and individuals who desire a liberal co-existential space in a democratic India? Finally, there is no doubt that, along with its neighbours, India has been more particularistic in values that are traditional, rather than espousing a universalistic identity.

Indeed, as Oommen states," the hegemonising tendency of globalisation leads to a resurrection of roots of identity, of traditionalism, where religious fundamentalism becomes predominant form of cultural relativism". The current danger to which we are exposed is one where a plurality of traditions is continually forced into a monolithic straight-jacket of intolerance. "The conflict between tradition and modernity is a conflict between hegemonic tradition and a hegemonising tendency of modernity" (Oommen, 1998). Is there a need to undermine traditional groups, both in the rural and urban space which still exhibit mutual trust even in worst circumstances?

The author ends on an emphatic, optimistic note that "the goal of India's freedom was not to make a near total shift from India's civilisational past, but to enhance her spiritual and material order." This nostalgic assessment of the past

Book Review -III

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resonates with the questions of social and economic dignity, cultural creativity, and spiritual integrity. The moot point is whether any of these can be achieved without an adequate and correct philosophical outlook. Ultimately, philosophy allows us to pose the right questions and elicit the answers appropriate to the social and moral dilemmas we face as we move towards the twenty-first century. Our history, as in the West, is replete with examples of hedonistic lifestyles and to deny it leads to a rather antifoundational historical stance. Identity, as Sen (1998) has remarked, is in no way fragile or a unique attribute, which can be destroyed by cultural invasion. Our commitment to democracy, pluralism and tolerance is the only way to assert cultural identity and values in rapidly globalising world. Can we refuse to become victims of the current forms of traditionalism and of cultural relativism unleashed in most parts of the world today? I think this book offers us possibilities for the future.

M.SATISH KUMAR

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BOOK REVIEW - IV

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The Modus Vivendi:

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The most common way of characterising postmodernism is given by the Lyotardtian injunction about the 'incredulity towards metanarratives'. Likewise, feminism is against the trait of being called a feminine, and possibly its cognates(e.g. the male principle). Obviously, there is a common front against the universalising paradigms. In recent years, however, there is a growing corpus of literary output, which explores exactly this relation between postmodernism and feminism in the West. Some of them at least tend to question the *modus vivendi* as described in many different ways, by posing a dilemma. Such a dilemma, is well articulated by Seyla Benhabib, in the book under review. If they are alleys of postmodernism, the theoretical back-up must be sacrificed, or if they are not, the relationship will become questionable. Reconciling feminist theory with an emancipatory ideal thus poses a question as to on what grounds they theorise except the goal of emancipation of women.

Sabina Loviband drew ire from many critics for her realism, which combines both of the above strains, so as to foist an emancipatory metanarrative. Characterising this as self-contradictory, Richard Rorty (1998) pursues a strong practising ironist path, which rejects any hegemonic theory of discourse including philosophy in favour of small narratives. Nevertheless much as he is inclined to trace the subtext of ironism back to Hegel, he turned out to be *aufgehobonist* (Kanthamani, *Ms.*). For Benhabib, to pursue a different approach, the glory that is Rorty consists in the civility of conversation, which not only allows conversation to go on, but also fulfils the ideal of embedded self with other in

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVI No. 4
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interactivity. This is exactly the narrativist episteme that feminists require. For an anti-Kantian like Rorty, what underlies the above reconciliation is the acceptance of appearance-reality distinction and hence it stands for a total rejection. Within his outlook, not only philosophy, but also an analytical strain survives: his mininarrative is only a metanarrative in civil dress (*Ibid.*). Contra Loviband, Rorty starts assuming that pragmatism has all the dialectical advantages of postmodernism minus the self-contradictory assumptions of post-modernism. In perfect tune with this, Rorty's way of overcoming this impasse is to marry feminism with a Deweyan type of post-pragmatism. The message Rorty wants to deliver is that first linguistify Deweyan ethics so as to explain how to make new beings out of it. Rorty's answer is given in terms of what he calls new uses of language ('don't call me feminine') or what he calls 'creative misuses of language'.

Even granting that it is not reasonable to expect that Benhabib's appropriation must go the whole hog with Rorty's recent reflections, her minimal ideals are questionable. Apprarently, Benhabib does not nourish Deweyan hopes, but she is considerate towards Mead. Neither found favour with Habermas's postmetaphysical account of dialogical interactivity, which rejects Dewey for its functionalist traits and expands on Mead's ethological credentials. Just as for Rorty what we need from Habermas is 'less dryness', for Benhabib, what we need from Habermas is the agonal features which will befit feminism. Neither of these is feasible from her point of view. Invariably, Rorty gives the impression of being strongly post-modern (no reality deep down), but for him, this does not amount to appropriating postmodernism in any way, but rather look at it as providing another metanarrativist trap. Contrary to expectations, many feminists overlook Rorty's proclaimed animus against episteme and tend to fuse feminism with a Rortian theorising about conversation. Benhabib is one of the foremost among such feminists, who successfully combines them in a bid to develop what Rorty calls a post-Enlightenment interactive universalism. The ethics she develops takes the form of post-conventional Hegelian Sittlichkeit (good life), which meets Rorty only half way.

For Benhabib, the only way this could chime with Rorty's own rejection of enlightenment ideals is to read it as containing the seeds of the 'post-

Book Review -IV 607

metaphysical' attitude (5). In what sense, this would mean literally toeing the line of Rorty's appropriation of postmodernism is not clear. However, Benhabib wants to derive home the conclusion that feminism is an alley of Rortian type of small narrativist episteme. It is strongly supported by the latest studies in gender-oriented psychology of cognitive-moral development. Supported by another latest Rortian trick, it is equally poised to display a much pronounced aufgehobon (sublating) intention of overcoming the two opposing ethical orientations, namely, the orientation of justice (John Rawls) of the public sphere and the orientation of care (Okin's critique of Rawls) of the private sphere. The former view is contractarian and it is vulnerable to communitarian onslaught for the difference principle, which invalidates the disembodied self and the latter is not sufficient enough to generate the required public sphere. Rorty's ideal helps to steer a middle course between a strongly deontological ethics of communication theorists which posits self with others in dialogical communication, and the weak deontological ethics of communitarianism, which posits self with others in a community with self minus femininity. In sum, if she is a Rortian, then she is not going beyond and if she is going beyond, she is not a Rortian.

Within Benbabib's essentially integrated approach, the concrete identity of others, called as the otherness of others, is sought to be restored to a point of reciprocity of sympathy, empathy and care. The communitarians practice only a via negativa and the communicationists like Habermas is modernist in their version of discourse ethics, and hence Benhabib is locked in a dialectical battle with both of them. On Benhabib's reading, Habermas is a modernist metanarrativist and a radical proceduralist in ethics. In sharp contrast to Habermas's brand of postmetaphysical thinking, which takes the Hegelian identity of the non-identity as accessible in every day communication, sans the Hegelian metaphysical trappings, where the identity of non-identity is not to be paradoxically taken as a sublating non-identiary, and thus recovering either the complementary reciprocity or ordinary reciprocity simpliciter ('I have a right to be X, you have a right to be X'), Benhabib might require a sublating clause ('I have a right to be X, you have a right to be Y, let us exchange X for Y'). It is only on these two aspects, namely the otherness of others and complementary reciprocity just mentioned above, that Benhabib's defence of feminism rests. Its

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major shortcomings are to be located exactly at the spot where the above thesis is defended. While communitarians like Charles Taylor thrive on the generalised others, Benhabib thinks that she needs a hard and fast distinction between the above categories. Generalised others is substitutionist in that it substitutes one for the other whereas Benhabib wants to take the interactivity of the concrete others. So, her first thesis is raised on a certain distinction between generalised and concrete others, which seems to be *ad hoc* thus making the complementary reciprocity highly ambiguous or even making it patently contradictory, from a Habermasian point of view. So, there is a double-failure in the project of socially situating the self: on the one hand it is afflicted by the narrowness of the Rortian model, and secondly the question about the otherness of others seems to require the Hegelian trappings and the conflation of *episteme* and morality.

So, in tune with Rorty's recontestualisation of Dewey's pragmatism, Benhabib pursues a line of thinking advocated by sociologist Mead according to which the socially situating self ('Me') must provide the necessary rallying point. This sharply contrasts the way Habermas recovers the 'I' (from 'Me'), which is rather fragmented. But seen from the viewpoint of Hegelian critique of Kant, the former may still require an *aufgehobonist* stance. Further, Benhabib can hardly accept Dewey's ethological (cognitive agent is in relation to his specices-specific environment) and this was rejected by Mead taking this as no other than the discredited egological view. Can Bebhabib succeed to reconcile such disparate tendencies into a coherent account of feminism without making her account to sharply contrast with Habermas's (1992) more interesting recovery of Mead's account, through a third personal account, in the linguistic way, within his account of ethics and politics. This is the contrast that I want to highlight in my criteism of the above model in this Review.

On Benhabib's view, the way feminists take postmodernism as a 'conceptual and political' (228) or 'theoretical' alley (225) suggests that there is more than 'elective affinity' (213) so much so that the term, used by Fraser and Nicholson, namely 'postmodernist feminist theory' (220) no longer seems to be a term of art, however much their arguments for social criticism without philosophy may receive support from Lyotard's postmodern criticism without philosophy' (24). Fraser and Nicholson (1990), on the other hand, want to develop

Book Review -IV 609

a strong and robust criticism without philosophy as against the weak and inadequate conception of social criticism by Lyotard (34) which they found to be ambiguous (24) in that it rules out general categories like gender, race, and class (*Ibid.*). For example, the way Lyotard writes like a disillusioned marxist is discouraging for developing a marxian feminist critique.

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For Benhabib, on the other hand, the escape route from this gender blindness is suggested by thinkers like Richard Rorty, in his narrativist account of epistemology, and it becomes thus relevant in this context, simply because it takes philosophy as involving an interactive sense of conversation. Benhabib goes so far as to eulogise Rorty saying that his is the clearest articulation of politics of postmodernism (123) within the framework of contextual pragmatism. Accordingly, this view, seen in sharp contrast to the mere political gesture of Lyotard's neoliberalism, and in a much more interesting way than Habermas who scratches where it does not itch, becomes the model. This is questionable once you compare Rorty with Habermas. Thus, it is wrong to accept that both are counter-theoretical and are to be used in lieu of, or against, metanarratives. Secondly, it is equally wrong to hold that the 'uneasy alliance' between postmodernism and feminism is better explained by taking it as a narrative in the exact sense in which it is a form of social criticism without the requirement, or addendum of philosophy as an overarching discourse of legitimation. This is the ideal termed as Rortian, in that it draws its inspiration from his critique of episteme. For Benhabib, this means that there is yet another additional advantage namely that one need not share the worry about whether philosophical conclusions follow from such a social criticism. I wonder how all these can lend credence to a full-blooded Rortian form of feminist theory in which the modus vivendi also operates beyond doubt. From this point of view, Benhabib's critique of Fraser and Nicholoson may also require a drastic review.

Against this, Benhabib argues, what we need is a post-postmodern episteme, that is, not the one which Lyotard provides, which is performatively self-contradictory, especially when it attempts to reconcile the two domains of philosophy and language, into an agonal philosophy of language. Contra Lyotard, which unites agonal character of language with a post-modern episteme, in an evoctive medium, we must settle for a cognitive medium, which provides

norms for agonal co-ordination. For Benhabib, in such a context, it is agreeable that the rudiments of such a form of critical theory that is provided by Habermas's model of communitarian or discourse ethics. A fusion between them may therefore be called for. However, as she later diagnoses, the two defects of pure communitarian ethics that block such a move are stated as: one, it has overtures towards a hermeneutic monism. Secondly, it will not serve any purpose whatsoever so long as it is not interested in recognising the postconventional or agonal Sittlichkeit, rather than mere normative accounts of justice. What exactly the sense of agonality Benhabib requires? So she concludes that this is to be dismissed as an altogether unimportant ingredient in feminist critical theory. Hence, the only option is to Rortianise it so as to evaluate the earlier understanding of postmodernist feminist theory, in the light of the above. We need a social critique with philosophy but not any agonism in philosophy of language, thus using it as a leverage against Lyotard. This forces her first to desert Habermas's dialogical ethics, but finally coming to terms with it. Omitting unwanted details of the above, the prospects of a feminist critical theory is also broadly communitarian and interactive in Habermas's sense, but it should be more in the Rortian sense. But the manner in which this is worked out into a theory by Benhabib requires careful evaluation as this takes Rorty rather than Lyotard or Habermas as her hero.

The Strong versus The Weak:

As a first step to the above, it is necessary to counter Jane Flax (1990), who in her book, characterises postmodernism with the subscription to the strong version of the following three theses: death of Man, History, and Metaphysics, which also characterise postmodernism. Benhabib wants to have a recourse to weaker version of the above. In Flax's feminist terminology, all these traits correspond to death of the male subject, of a metanarrative, and the skepticism towards the claims of transcendent reason. As against this, Benabib wants to avoid a strong reading of postmodernist in the above way simply because it cannot be reconciled with the kind of feminism she desires and suggests that the weak version of the above can be readily reconciled with feminism. She further explains that such a requirement will sustain the situation of the self, as against the loss of selfhood and autonomy, even while subtending an acceptance of

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small narratives, and a consequent version of moral epistemology should subserve feminist critique and also back up the idea of emancipation as well. In Benhabib's articulation, such is the nature of Rortian ideal that comes to: 'social criticism without some form of philosophy is not possible, and without social critism, the project of a feminist theory which is at once committed to knowledge and to the emanicipatory of women is inconceiveable'.

So the dilemma of feminists, namely that: if they accept, postmodernism, they cannot accept emancipation, is resolved by taking it by the horns. It means that a theory of emancipation must be reconciled with a small narrative, in Rorty's sense. One only hopes that an extension of this thesis embodies the idea that such a reconciliation can capture both the theory and practice of postmodernism as well as feminism. The problem is how to reconcile a small narrative with women's aspiration for emancipation. The initial answer given in this context recommends what is called a situated criticism, which stipulates that such and such culture requires such and such ways of tackling women's problems. Even while granting that all criticism is au fond situated criticism, immanent or situated criticism cannot subserve social criticism as they tend to assume a monolithic tapestry of meaning or what is called a hermeneutic monism which enjoins that there is universal consensus of meaning. But this will defeat the very purpose of the requirement of philosophy. Social criticism needs philosophy precisely because the narratives of our cultures are 'so conflictual and irreconcilable'. Secondly, cultures are not so neatly reified as to embody a frozen set of assumptions. It follows therfore, Philosophy itself cannot provide transcendental standpoint for social criticism. Incidentally, it may also be noted that the marxian feminist theory, along with neo-conservatists, commits a fallacy because it accepts theoretical framework of Marxian critique, which is itself a metanarrative. Lyotard was consistently against any of these forms of critical theory.

Both Frederic Jameson (1990) as well as T. Adorno are not altogether acceptable to her and hence they came in for criticism. The former ignores Lyotard's philosophical break with marxism (in an effort to be a post-Marxist), and the latter does not fulfil the epistemic function, while valorising aesthetics. Both are flawed for their seeking the otherness of the other under the guise of

logic of the identity of non-identity and the non-identity of the identity (euphemistically called the logic of identity and non-identity) in the realm of aesthetics and politics. Benhabib needs a notion of identity, which is completely reversible in order to make coherent the distinction between you and me, as required by Rorty's sense of conversation. It is this theoretical accomplishment that I want to question: while the framework advanced by Habermas has all the potency of this, the Hegelian trappings of Benhabib's Rortian project do not reach up to expectations for the simple reason that Rorty's social theory is a theory without philosophy. One is left to wonder what is purported to be achieved by terming it as *episteme* in Rorty's sense. I shall not discuss the fallout for the sound theoretical base for feminism.

The Paradigm of Interactive Universalism:

So Benhabib's Rortian paradigm is to be called interactive universalism, which is at once a small narrative as well as a pragmatic social criticism which is backed up by a narrative of epistemology, without falling into the trap of the Lyotardian gay science. The paradigm of interactive universalism within democratic societies, offered as a corrective to the idealisations of both Rawls and Habermas, will not have a recourse to proceduralist reform a la Rawls. The reason is that at least recent Rawls is an anti - metaphysicist, and has no sympathy for a metaphysical account of person. On Benhabib's view, Rawls's definition of identity behind the veil of ignorance can hardly guarantee the human plurality, and besides, this has bad consequences for the criteria of reversibility. Secondly, Rawls definition of veil of ignorance without the framework of ideal observer theory ignores its own identity by making it disappear behind the veil. Thus, it also does not recognise the otherness of others or the concrete others. In other words, the way others are different from us is made to disappear within such a scheme. In a sense, Rawls's original position does not confront the otherness of others, except by modulating it as putting oneself in the place of others, or what is called reversibility of roles. So, thirdly and finally, such a definitional identity is only sufficient for an incomplete reversibility, in contradistinction to postconventional accounts of Kohlberg, which posit a perfect reversibility, which is, again, nothing but another idealisation. This is the ambiguity I spoke earlier that sharply contrasts with Habermas.

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Against all these, Benhabib wants a species of reciprocity, which is complementary, which requires that we must individuate others as well. This is what is called the otherness of others. Such an individuation is called alterity. It is not that we must put ourselves into the shoes of others, but we must see everything from the point of every body. This is what ensures a symmetry within the above. There are two criticisms about the conceptual flaws: one is that Benhabib's distinction between reciprocity and complementary reciprocity does not work as this is nothing more than a formal and informal equity. One does not explain the other and hence it is circular. Secondly, the otherness of others, based on the distinction between generalised others and concrete others does not go any more further than the gender specific trait, and hence this too does not work in any particularly interesting way, and un-Rortian. Since the whole project rests on this distinction, a distinction which is contradicted by saying that one reaches the generalised other via concrete others (If so, what is the antagonism she speaks of in the beginning.), it does not seem to get off the ground. Moreover, situating the self without language looks pernicious, as the very act of interaction requires language. Rorty recognises this in what is termed as the creative misuses of language while Benhabib does not.

As she argues, a correctly balanced account of reversibility requires a recognition of gender as a relational category, which is quite opposed to postmodernism (160-2; 197), along with an identity and autonomy of self. This is far-fetching and confused. Benhabib is, therefore, engaged in an immanent critique of both Kohleberg and Rawls, while accepting a Gilligan-Habermas framework for a moral epistemilogy, under the Rortian guise. This is a framework, which integrates ethics of justice with an ethics of care. This is exactly where the shoe pinches. If so, the question arises as to how Benhabib is going to reconcile her paradigm with that of the procedural model of social justice. Nevertheless, on closer examination, it is revealed that the reconciliation is not favoured, as this is not what is needed. What about a communicative ethics a la Habermas? On Benhabib's view, this is also ruled out as a postconventionl Sittlichkeit is not favoured by it. So her solution of interactive universalism is supposed to correct the defects of substitutional universalism of both of the above. Does she succeed in her endeavour, with her Rortian axe?

I want to argue that her project is flawed to the core, and hence the divergence between theory and practice become once more than apparent, in spite of the Herculean efforts to reconcile theory and practice by adopting a collapse of theory into practice. This is what is identified as the core axiom in her theory, which is bluntly asserted by holding that: practical rationality must also involve epistemic rationality as well (169). In fact, Benhabib makes an appeal to the widened base of this conflation without falling into any fallacy. She remarks that epistemic restrictions must be placed upon moral reasoning and moral disputation. It is exactly here that her theory overshoots the mark. For, it is not clear whether she argues for a primacy of theory over practice or else she wants to collapse one into another, theory into practice or vice versa, in accordance with the Rortian dictates.

What I want to argue here is that divergence is an additional one, that it is additional to the divergence caused by the dilemma that feminists face: that is, they cannot accommodate emancipation; if they ever do so, they are not alleys of postmodernists. Just as there is theory and practice within postmodernism, within feminism also, there is theory and practce. If coordination between them is to be sought anywhere, it is here that one must seek. Contrariwise, one may choose to argue that there is a certain discrepancy between theory and practice within feminism, just because there is a similar break between theory and practice within postmodernism. Thus, one can try to prove that the defect of one is traceable to the other. A critique of feminist theory unfolds as the critique of postmodernism proceeds or vice versa. This is resolved by adopting a Rortian imago within the project Benhabib has in mind as evidenced in the way she pleads for a certain co-ordination between theory and practice for feminists in her latest book. Quoting from various feminist theorists, she wants to argue that feminists need not give up the practice of emancipation of woman just because they have lost their gender identity, consequent upon the postmodernists' declaration of the 'death of man'. They can do this only if they are ready to abandon the stronger version of postmodernism (literal death of man and woman) and ready to follow a weaker version, which entails that self of woman has a certain autonomy. That is what that can ensure what she calls feminism as situational criticism in which a woman situates her self in the practice Book

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Book Review -IV

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The Gender Trouble:

A completion of the above reflection requires Benhabib to unsuccessfully address herself to the question about gender-oriented moral epistemology. Can we develop such a theory, and if so, what would be the contour of such a theory? It is in this connection, Benhabib engages in a critique of the view, which has its focus on what it calls gender trouble. According to this, gender is different from sex because it is culturally acquired, and hence it should be located within the narrative code of signification. Thus, the problem of individual consciousness is transformed into one about language (second order discourse). Benhabib's strategy of expressing a strong disagreement against such a dualism is essentially Rortian in its appeal in that it is against changing one metanarrative into another. Obviously, it inherits all the flaws of the Rortian model, including the aufgehobon motif, which is characteristically, American (Richard Bernstein has finally dropped this, if my understanding is correct; see Kanthamani, 1997). This is actually the point against Habermas as well since language sustains his paradigm too. The argument against Lyotard's agonal motif also shares a similar feature and this, together with the removal of general criticism against philosophy, her claim about social criticism with philosophy (theory) becomes the first casualty. This is what is seen in the following comments.

But Benhabib says more: she brings to the fore an important fissure between feminism and postmodernism. For Benhabib, therefore, neither the role of gender nor the role of sex is lost. Reacting against such a dualism, she says that in fact one cannot put them in different categories. She cannot agree that gender identity is performative in the sense that it should only be located in the vortices of discourses. Consequently, one must reject any thinking, which dichotomises between sexual identity and gender identity. Cutting across the boundaries, as she argues, one should go beyond this to a level of sublimation. Self is not to be conceived as a masquerading performer (215). What the above argument in effect does is that it takes the sexed body as a metanarrative to be thrown away. Benhabib opines that it is not an *episteme* that has to be rejected

in favour of gender, which is a cultural category. Dualism enjoins that gendered identity is a cultural category whereas sexual identity is a natural category. Such a dichotomous reasoning does not find favour with Benhabib. She intends to attack the consequent fallout by saying that it undermines the normative vision of feminist politics and theory.

The point of convergence is not to be traced by calling attention to what is called the gender trouble by Judith Butler (1990). Butler's point is that gender trouble is a trouble because it is localisable at the system of signification. At that level of second order discourse, philosophy of language mobilises this authorial position, and hence a Rortian counter to this form of the theory should reject this according to Benhabib. That is, it is countered by holding that, or rather one should take seriously that for a woman, I is therefore not merely a narrative code sanctioned by culture, but it has a normative content which defines selfhood. The question is, therefore, how to recover it, and its autonomy.

The issue between Butler and Benhabib boils down to this: whereas Butler argues against holding that one should have recourse to the I which is conceived to be pre-existing but it should be culturally constructed. Even if it is granted, it is so constructed, still one cannot guarantee that it remains intact. So culture cannot fully constitute the subject but to argue in this way rests on two false premises; that is, agency can be established only through the pre-existing I; and second, constituting it but not determined by it, since it forecloses the possibility of agency. For Butler, it is, therefore, not determined by it. Benhabib holds that what is not determined by discourse can very well be determined by the social dynamics, that is, the way individual self becomes a socialised self. Against the first premise, it can be argued that agency need not be established in the above way. No recourse, therefore, to the pre-existing I. Because it cannot be so determined. Against the second premise, it is argued that, there is no need to sacrifice the autonomy of the self. Its dynamism is taken care of the way in which philosophy interacts with other disciplines, causing new integration of other disciplines. Philosophy as such is the defaulter. Does it mean that philosophy should lose its autonomy for capturing the autonomy of the self. This looks counterintuitive. One may criticise this by saying that the sense of philosophy is not yet made clear except in the Rortian way. One way of clearing Book

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it is by grafting it on the kind of discourse ethics that Habermas advances. Her criticism notwithstanding, it is not clear why this cannot be preferred over that of Rawls's, which is, according to her, defective. The advantages are obvious; it has no Hegelian metaphysical trappings (postmetaphysical); secondly, the relation between theory and practice is resolved in favour of the primacy of practice; and finally, the dialectic of modernism and postmodernism has a more sanguine appearance. All these features do not augur for a Rortian ideal, which is the only she favours. To what extent this specific Rortian account of solidarity would serve as a theoretical base for feminist practice any more than this remains, therefore, an open question.

A. KANTHMANI

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IMPORTANT NOTICE

Subscribers will please note that the January-2000 (Vol. XXVII, no.1) and the April-2000 (Vol. XXVII no.2) issues of *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, will be published as Joint issue. We wish all our Readers a very happy and academically resourceful new year which opens up the new Century and the new Millennium.

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Indian Philosophical Quarterly VOL. XXVI

NUMBER 1 : JANUARY 19	999	Saward Medica	
Lachman M. Khubchandani		Speech as an Ongoing Activity: [Comparing Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein]	1
S. Panneerselvam	:	Myths as Discourse in The Structural Hermeneutics of Levi-Strauss	19
Prabhu Narayan Mandal	:	Logical Equivalence, Mutual Entailemnt and Phenomenalism	29
Buan Biswas	:	Pratyakş a and its Two Dimensions: Advaita Vedā nta Perspective	37
Kolawole A. Owolabi		Orientations in African Philosophy: A Critical Survey	59
MEENA A. KELKAR	:	Man- Woman Relationship in Indian Philosophy	71
Авеч Козну	:	The Feminine and The Question of Truth in Nietzsche's Philosophy	89
GEETA RAMANA	:	A Coginitive Journey Towards Truth	109
AMITABH DASGUPTA		Descartes and Chomsky: An Interface Between Language and Mind	125
BOOK REVIEWS			
S. V.Bokil		A Modern Introduction to Indian Ethics	149
A. Kanthmani		Naturalising The Mind	160
NUMBER 2 : APRIL 1999		dus, desput (SALE)	
Archana Barua	:	Some Aspects of Professional Ethics	171

BEN

P.K

MAI

RAJ

BOO V.K S.V

NU!

Ash Mai

P. S

BENULAL DHAR		The Phenomenology Of Value - Experience: Some Reflections on Scheler and Hartmann	183
P.K.Sasidharan	:	Derridean Overtures Of Wittgenstein Critique	199
Manjulika Ghosh	:	Performatives and Truth	207
Ramakrishna Puligandla	:	The Message of The Mandukya Upanisad: A Phenomenological Analysis of Mind and Consciousness	221
Rajendra Prasad	:	Man's Timeless Dialogue with His God: Another Recording	233
BOOK REVIEWS			
V.K.Bharadwaja	:	Aparigraha	277
S.V.Bokil	:	Idealism and Rights	279
NUMBER 3: JULY 199	99		
Amitabh Dasgupta	•	Language And The Metaphysics of Interpretation: A Critical Note On Davidson's Agenda on Realism	299
ASHOK VOHRA		Philosophy - Theory or Therapy ?	325
MARK R. WHEELER	:	In Defense of A Derivation of 'Ought' From 'Is'	344
P. Sudarsan		The Logistics of Argumentation: Habermas And Nyāya (A Comparison)	355
Ananda Pramanik	:	The Failure in The Pursuit of Foundational Justification: An Alternative Response	369
R. P. SINGH		Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas: A Critique of Enlightenment Rationality	381
KUMAR MITRA		How Much Deep Are The 'Deep Structures' From The Chomskyan Perspective?	395

TARITMOY GHOSH	: Is Observation Theory - Loaded ?	405	
DISCUSSIONS	HOLE STREET, ALL STREET, STREE	ALD THE	
A. KANTHMANI	: Are Mahāvākyas Identity Väkyas?	415	
S. V. Bokii.	: A Note On 'Tattvamasi'	425	
BOOK REVIEWS			ı.
ANANTANAND RAMBACHA	N : Understanding Religious Phenomenon	435	
S. V. BOKIL	: Realistic Rationalism	437	2.
boo all mov			
NUMBER 4 : OCTOBE	CR 1999		
R.C. Pradhan	: What is it to be a Human Soul?	457	3.
Md. Abdur Razzaque	: William James' Theory of Truth And its Later Development	475	100
JAGAT PAL	: D. Lewis on Causation	495	4.
SYED ABDUL SAYEED	: A Perspective on The Analysis of Knowledge	e 503	,381
Murzban Jal	: Karl Marx's Theses on Feuerbach': Towards an anti - Hermeneutic study	515	5.
S. M. BHAVE.	: Descartes : Epitome of Scientific Revolution	529	6.
R. S. KAUSHAL	: The Role of Structural Analogy In Physical Sciences : A Philosophical Perspective	543	7.
SANJAY KUMAR SHUKLA	: Sākṣī It's Nature, Role & Status in Advaitic Tradition	575	.8.
BOOK REVIEWS	the Please on The Parker in The Pur		
V. K. Bharadwaja	: Hetu-bindu of Dharmakīrti	589	9.
P. P. GOKHALE	: A Clarification on Hetu-bindu	595	
M.SATISH KUMAR	: Modernity, Morality and the Mahatma	599	10.
A. KANTHMANI	: Situating the Self & Post-Modernism	605	

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